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Preface
There is no shortage of epistemologies and ontologies (e.g., feminist,
indigenous, African, anticolonial, etc.) which have called attention to and
critiqued Western humanism and nature-culture binary thinking; nonethe-
less, there is a shortage of collective organizing, reconfiguring, and reimag-
ining of science curriculum in light of these calls. (Kayumova, McGuire, &
Cardello, 2019, p. 212, emphasis in original)
Science education is increasingly being heralded as remedy to a multi-
plicity of contemporary issues (e.g., scientific literacy) and is actively
worked upon in order to be more accessible, inclusive, and empowering.
However, the ways in which science education takes up its responsi-
bility in making itself accessible to all learner does not always come to
value the ways-of-knowing and -being that diverge from the standard
account of Western humanist thought (e.g., nature/culture as binary):
be it feminist, Indigenous, postcolonial, queer, or other. As a result, in
our contemporary moment in science education, the concepts of justice,
equity, and ethics are simultaneously ubiquitous, necessary, yet un- or
under-theorized: science education is a pharmakon (Derrida, 1976). This
is to say, science education is a panacea that cannot account for or be
accountable to the ways in which it is always already a poison, despite there
being no shortage of productive critiques. In turn, the oft depoliticized
and atheoretical work of inclusion and empowerment continues to house
the potential for reproducing and reifying systems of power: be it at the
level of policy, curriculum and pedagogy, or research practice.
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In response, there is a recent but growing movement within science
education that follows the call by Kayumova and colleagues (2019)
to move “from empowerment to response-ability”. Echoing Elizabeth
Ellsworth’s (1989) seminal piece and poignant question, why doesn’t this
feel empowering?, Kayumova and colleagues (2019) invite us to attend
to the ways in which disempowering logics and practices linger and lurk,
even when the intentions are otherwise (e.g., taking up one’s responsi-
bility): “‘empowerment’ discourses are reminiscent of a colonizer narra-
tive that assumes for a dominant to be in a position to ‘give’ and bestow
the ‘power’ to those who they have subjugated in the first place” (p. 224).
However, we are not off the hook for empowerment: response-ability
is about (re)opening the norms of responsiveness through which the
attempt is made.
The shift from empowerment to response-ability is particularly signifi-
cant for two reasons:
Children and communities living under socio-spatial and environmental
challenges are powerful individuals and collectives, they do not “need” to
be, per se, “empowered” into dominant thinking or practices, but what
we might need powerful frameworks, which take into consideration and
legitimizes the diverse ways-of-knowing, -being, describing the naturalcu-
lutral world among diverse socio-cultural groups that are different from the
dominant ways in which conventional science education understands and
explains it. (Kayumova et al., 2019, p. 225)
The first is, as Kayumova and colleagues explain, is that notions of
“empowerment” are more often than not about including marginal-
ized peoples within the practices and processes of dominance without
disrupting or displacing these very systems that placed them at the
margins in the first place (and, thus, naturalizing and normalizing such
frames). Not only does inclusion becomes but a differing and deferred
articulation of the problematic norms, practices, and structures through
which exclusion previously occurred: the implicit message is that other(ed)
ways-of-knowing and -being are not welcome and that assimilation is
the desired outcome. The second reason is that differentially situated
peoples not already within dominant discourses have always already had
rich practices of knowing nature as well as their own priorities, both
of which might not align with those of science education: “empow-
erment” often comes at the expense of further delegitimizing peoples,
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places, practices, and priorities. In turn, the question is not one of “giving
voice” or “power” to those who are marginalized by systems of domi-
nance, but rather work with that which diverse communities of knowers
bring to the table to collectively organize otherwise. As Kayumova and
colleagues (2019) state, there is no shortage of ways-of-knowing and -
being which might provide rich orientations towards differentially concep-
tualizing and enacting science education should we take them seriously:
epistemic plurality as gift rather than a lack that requires repair.
However, the challenge that this presents, and it is one that is pressing
and persistent, is the following: if science education has a responsibility,
is it able to respond? As both science, and in turn science education,
are premised upon the Othering of Nature and those “closer to nature”
via nature-culture binary thinking as a means of (re)constituting itself as
science, this is not a simple question. These binary logics shape not only
the ways in which we are always already in co-constitutive relation but also
the ability or inability to respond. Accordingly, and more importantly, the
question we should be asking is: how might we go about (re)opening the
space of responsiveness?
Recognizing that every act of (re)opening the space of responsiveness
is partial, situated, and contingent, the work within this book is not a
reply to approaches “reminiscent of a colonizer narrative” (Kayumova
et al., 2019, p. 224, emphasis mine), but rather the ways in which colo-
nial and neo-colonial practices literally continue to linger and lurk within
science education. Thus, I turn to, and think with,1 Sami scholar Rauna
Kuokkanen (2007) to frame response-ability: “an ability to respond, to
respond to the world beyond oneself, as well as a willingness to recog-
nize its existence” (p. 39).2 Within this book, the question of response-
ability is taken up as central, particularly articulating it towards the rela-
tion between Western modern science and Indigenous3 ways-of-living-
with-Nature: Is science education able to recognize the gift (and the logic of
the gift) that Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being offer? If so, can science
education responsibly receive it? Can science education learn (and learn
to learn) from Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being in order to hospitably
receive this gift?
Responding to the above questions, like all questions of decolonizing
education, are journeys rather than destinations. In prefacing the journey
presented within this book, I provide a map of the networks of paths
constituting this book so that the pathways of science education might
be wandered anew. In particular, I speak to the general structure of each
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chapter, as well as the methodological moves I make therein (e.g., posi-
tional vignettes, differential articulation of deconstruction). Following
this, I outline the overall arrangement of the book as a whole, as well
as some recommended strategies for reading. This is supplemented by a
short outline of upcoming chapters.
Structure of the Paths: Moving
with Theory-Practice-Ethics
through the Chapters
Within a larger network of paths, each chapter represents a differen-
tial4 hike, journey, or outing through a path of science education. Each
journey is iterative, travelling through, against, and/or beyond a partic-
ular path, wherein the learning is enfolded and carried forward into the
next trip. Representationally, this requires that each chapter as journey is
presented as self-contained, yet interconnected. I regularly speak to the
path being journeyed upon, as well as the ways in which I attempt (and
encourage the reader) to “get lost” within said path to find a way back
anew (see Cajete, 1994). Accordingly, each chapter generally includes its
own positional piece, literature review, theoretical framework, method-
ology, analysis, and relational findings in a variety of forms such as open-
ended questions, future orientations, and/or considerations and applica-
tions for situated practices—all of which come together giving the larger
project of this book shape as a network of paths towards (re)opening the
space of responsiveness towards Indigenous science (to-come) in science
education. As the network of paths come to cover a plurality of locations,
this differential approach is in line with aforementioned postcolonial and
decolonizing approaches to education and educational research that call
for attentiveness and responsiveness to the relations that come to consti-
tute these theoretical, methodological, and substantive sites (e.g., Battiste,
2013a, 2013b; Carter, 2010; Smith, 1999/2012; Smith, Maxwell, Puke,
& Temara, 2016). As this significantly inflects conventional book norms
(e.g., theory and methodology in separate chapters), I quickly speak to
what this means for theory, methodology, and positionality.
With regard to theory, I align myself with scholars such as Fikile
Nxumalo (e.g., 2016, Nxumalo & Cedillo, 2018), Julie Kaomea (e.g.,
2001, 2016), and Rauna Kuokkanen (e.g., 2007, 2010) who simultane-
ously resist and refuse the (neo-)colonial5 desire for theoretical purity and
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transcendentalism—no singular theory could ever account for or be ethi-
cally accountable to the complex and contingent relations that are at play
in everyday placed encounters on stolen land. As Kaomea (2001) states,
engaging plurality is “consistent with the logic of post-colonialism and its
declining emphasis on grand theories and narratives, my hybrid method-
ology, and thus my story, is intentionally eclectic; mingling, combining,
and synthesizing theories and techniques from disparate disciplines and
paradigms” (2001, p. 68). Complicating and challenging the “rage for
unity” (Spivak, 1976, p. xvi) produced by the clôture (i.e., [en]closure)
of Western modern(ist) metaphysics “demand[s] such theoretical inno-
vation and flexibility” (Kaomea, 2001, p. 69). Further, As Kuokkanen
(2007) states, the working of plurality is also a working towards a re-
opening of responsiveness: such an approach brings “a confluence of
voices” which has “resulted in a practice of reading—or even misreading—
that has allowed me to be carried away by the ideas that various theories
and approaches represent instead of seeking orthodox interpretations of
them” (p. xx). Accordingly, I (give myself permission to) relationally draw
from a diverse and often commensurate range of scholars who support
the exploration of response-ability towards Indigenous science to-come.
This theoretical plurality is purposeful as “many of the arguments against
IK [Indigenous Knowledges] inclusion in the curriculum are more of a
philosophical nature” (McKinley, 2007, p. 210). Diverse approaches are
required to (re)open a seemingly ever-threatened and -shrinking land-
scape of plurality. I attempt to critically inhabit this process by engaging
theoretically with philosophies and arguments that do not typically hold
a central position within science education (e.g., postcolonialism, decol-
onizing, posthumanism).6 Importantly, this includes (and must include,
given the scope of the research) thinking with Indigenous scholarship:
I also contend that the significance of [I]ndigenous philosophies extends
beyond [I]ndigenous communities; these can be employed in various
non-[I]ndigenous contexts as well. Indeed, I believe that indigenous
philosophies offer a timely alternative paradigm for the entire world,
which is increasingly characterized by tremendous human suffering and
environmental destruction. (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 25)
As Kuokkanen (2007) states, Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being offer
alternative ways of addressing our very real and pressing contemporary
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problems; more so, to not think Indigenous scholarship is to (differ-
ently) engage in the longstanding and ongoing (fore)closure of Indige-
nous peoples, places, practices, and protocols that has historically shaped
Indigenous-settler relations in most institutional places of learning. Addi-
tionally, to take theoretical plurality seriously is to also recognize the ways
in which Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being extends beyond tradi-
tional (yet ongoing) knowledge-practices: it also comes to include “deep
knowledge of colonizers and the practices and effects of colonization”
(Smith et al., 2016, p. 136). Further, in working towards the possibility
of a response-able reading, I take seriously Kuokkanen’s (2007) call that
diverse perspectives might also come to include “the work of (relatively)
well known critics”:
Injecting the work of critics who are (relatively) well known – espe-
cially within dominant discourses and scholarly circles – into an inquiry
dealing with the gift of [I]ndigenous epistemes and the academic respon-
sibility of hospitality, is a way for me to bring closer the two sometimes
separate worlds of [I]ndigenous and non-[I]ndigenous scholarship… It is
also a strategy for summoning circles which might dismiss considerations
on [I]ndigenous issues as either irrelevant to their own fields or, worse,
unscholarly. (Kuokkanen, 2007, pp. xx–xxi)
Here, the inclusion of post-humanist theories is of particular significance
in this contemporary moment which is often referred to as the ontological
turn in education and educational research. In a nutshell, post-humanist
theories call for a double(d) decentering of both the human and Western
humanism. Post-humanisms call for a reconfiguration of priorities that
brings to the forefront questions regarding the nature of Nature (e.g.,
time, space, matter) which, importantly, is not an instead of culture,
but rather an after of previous educational turns (e.g., socio-cultural,
linguistic, ethical). In other words, the ontological turn is a moment in
which we are still called to continue responding to, and be answerable
to, education’s previous challenges and possibilities, but with ontology as
entry point. As Milne and Scantlebury (2019) suggest, this is of particular
significance within science education: “it is ironic that a field such as
science education has ignored (or has been silent) about the material
in learning science given science’s focus on understanding matter and
materiality” (p. 4). Science education’s late rejoinder to this conversation
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speaks to the ways that science education is a field that is at once politi-
cally and theoretically conservative (see Lemke, 2011), particularly when
many post-humanist theories are rooted in the materiality of science.7
Yet, there is nonetheless a growing body of work that is taking up the
posthuman question of how matter matters in science education, as well
as its epistemological, ontological, and ethical consequences (e.g., Bang
& Marin, 2015; Bazzul & Kayumova, 2016; Higgins, 2016; Kayumova,
McGuire, & Cardello, 2019; Milne & Scantlebury, 2019).
However, this taking seriously of the ontological turn is not without
its problems—problems which extend above and beyond challenging
claims of “newness” (i.e., who considered materiality first) despite it
being a recent “turn” in the academy. However, this positioning of
newness and focussing on other-than-humans, but not always other-
than-(Western-)humanism, risks subsuming or suturing over the ways
in which Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being have been thinking and
practicing co-constitutive relations to other-than- and more-than-human
worlds since time immemorial, and thus differentially (re)producing
(neo-)colonial relations (see Bang & Marin, 2015; Cole & O Riley,
2017; Jones & Hoskins, 2016; Patel, 2016; Todd, 2016; Tuck, 2010;
Watts, 2013). As decolonizing scholar Leigh Patel (2016) suggests, that
“understanding that knowledge is inseparable from materiality does not
necessarily move to a less colonial stance” (p. 56). It is perhaps for this
reason that Métis scholar Zoe Todd (2016) states explicitly, “ontology”
might come to be “just another word for colonialism” if these dynamics
go unmarked and unchallenged. Nonetheless, there is also a growing
body of scholarship that is engaging in the interface between Indigenous
and post-human theories and practices which recognizes and productively
labours these tensions (e.g., Kerr, 2019; Rosiek, Snyder, & Pratt, 2019;
Nxumalo & Cedillo, 2017; Zembylas, 2018).
On the subject of methodology (i.e., the interconnection of theory-
practice-ethics), most chapters use a deconstructive approach (see
Derrida, 1976).8 As deconstruction is always already in relation to the
context in which it is being applied, articulations and enactments of
deconstruction differ from chapter to chapter, often building upon one
another.9 In turn, it is more apt and useful to describe and situate these
concepts with/in the proximal relations by which they are co-constituted.
However, as a nod to Derridean approaches, (near-)homonyms are
frequently used throughout to productively defer and differ meaning-
making practices. For example, response-ability is a central deconstructive
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concept which retains the significance of and need for responsibility while
simultaneously working to trouble some of the received assumptions that
might be inherited (e.g., that responsibility is something that one takes
up, and that one is, in turn able to respond).
Further, taking seriously deconstructive writing practices, there are
multiple footnotes located throughout the text. These are, in a way, a form
of writing under erasure. To put something under erasure “is to write a
word, cross it out, and then print both word and deletion. (Since the word
is inaccurate, it is crossed out. Since it is necessary, it remains legible)”
(Spivak, 1976, p. xiv). Because textuality is always already complicitous to
its otherness,10 footnotes present themselves as traces of a main body that
either once was or could have been. They are the main body of the text,
at once useful and unnecessary, as well as multiplicitous in their form and
purpose (e.g., productive tangents, elaborations, definitions, stories).
Similarly, while it is commonplace and of importance to position
oneself within decolonizing work (e.g., through identity), Carter (2004)
offers that:
Postcolonialism’s ability to delve into these processes, and into the deeper
ravines of referents like modernity, identity, representation, and resistance
underpinning many theorizations of culture and difference including those
used, but underexplored, within science education, can open spaces to
generate different discussions about what science education is, and could
be. (p. 821)
I take up this invitation to consider the ways in which identity, repre-
sentation, modernity, and (neo-)colonization are inevitably intertwined
through differential articulations of metaphysics by using and troubling
“position” (see also Spivak, 1988; 1993/2009). Thus, rather than offer
a (i.e., singular) positional piece here in the introduction, you will find
small and partial positional vignettes at the beginning of each chapter.
This approach is by design and aligns with my understanding that posi-
tionality, too, is always already in relation (and is a differential articulation
of all my relations). Such positionality cannot be disclosed through the
self-sameness of identity, least not in the essentialized, stable, and singular
understanding of the term (i.e., position rather than positionality). Rather,
positionality is always contingent, partial, plural, and emerges in rela-
tion to the “scene of address” of the account that is being represented
(see Butler, 2005). Furthermore, drawing on the work of the late Vine
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Deloria, Wildcat (2005) reminds that the very concepts we hold are
exceeded by lived experience and shared experiences can become a site
of shared meanings across difference (see also Bohm, 1996). In turn, the
vignettes are also stories of why the very concepts under exploration are
always already deconstructing, require deconstructive engagement, and/or
are productive sites of relational reconstruction.
Navigating the Network of Paths:
Or, on How to Read this Book
The book invites a process of wandering the pathways of science educa-
tion, journeying the paths anew so that new pathways (e.g., Indigenous
science to-come) might come to constitute the network of paths (see also
Cajete, 1994; Kuokkanen, 2007). On pathways, Tewa science educator
Gregory Cajete (1994) states that,
In travelling a pathway, we make stops, encounter and overcome obstacles,
recognize and interpret signs, seek answers, and follow the track of those
entities that have something to teach us. We create ourselves anew. Path
denotes a structure; way implies a process. (p. 54, emphasis in original)
What might appear as a sedimented and stratified path is inseperable from
its enactment, its journeying, its way. Such is important in differentially
enacting the double(d) closure (i.e., enclosure [noun], enclosing [verb])
of modernity’s metaphysics that seek to make the ends (i.e., the path)
congruent with the means (i.e., the way). However, when the path is
revealed as but a path, a multiplicity of possibilities opens up.
As the human, other-than-human, and more-than-human worlds that
constitute a(ny) path “move in never ending cycles of creation and disso-
lution” (p. 43), it is necessary to engage in what Cajete (1994) refers to
as “creative acts of perception. A free play of thought and an opening of
the field”. (p. 19). This process requires realizing that there are tacit, ever
shifting infrastructures (i.e., like paths) that frame what is, is not, as well as
becoming possible within a field. Rather than engage in the destruction of
a path (if such were even a desirable possibility)11 or complicit journeying
on a path as is (upholding the status quo in which Indigenous science is
to-come), the task as one of coming-to-know the “nature” of many of the
paths that lay before me and others in science education, their possibilities
and problematics, and to look for different ways (and potentially (re)open
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new paths) to journey through this field. In other words, the goal is to
wander these pathways deconstructively, “turn[ing] the outside in and the
inside out” (Donald, 2012, p. 544, emphasis in original) while recog-
nizing that each pathway presents its own challenges and possibilities.
As the book is not knowledge made but knowledge in the making (see
Ellsworth, 2005), reading the book invites engaged, active, and relational
reading.
Wandering pathways anew can be described as a process of “getting
lost” within science education. Such strategic straying off the beaten
path or taking ‘the path’ in unintended ways is positioned “not as
‘losing one’s way’ but as losing the way—as losing any sense that just
one ‘way’ could ever be prefixed and privileged by the definite article”
(Gough, 2006, p. 640, emphasis in original; see also Lather, 2007; Patel,
2016). Furthermore, as Gough (2006) states on “getting lost” in science
education:
…to “wander” away from the semiotic spaces of science education text-
books and scientific media reports, and to experiment with making passages
to hitherto disconnected systems of signification, is neither “haphazard”
nor “careless” but a deliberate effort to unsettle boundary distinctions and
presuppositions. (p. 640)
In reading this book, I invite the reader to tactically wander within,
against, and beyond the sedimented spaces of knowing in/of science
education, because “Western science and science education also tend to
be written from a sedentary point of view” (Gough, 2006, p. 640).
Importantly, it is important to recognize that coming-to-know otherwise
in science education requires being vulnerable and attuned to what can
be known through the process of not knowing. In addition, this tactical
wandering, or science education as on-the-move (literally and towards
Indigenous science to-come), is not about wholly stepping away from
the pathways of science education, but rather about wandering them
anew. Importantly, such wandering is and must not be without aim:
“to liberate thinking about science education from the sedentary points
of view and judgmental positions that function as the nodal points of
Western academic science education discourse. What happens when we
encourage random, proliferating and decentred connections?” (Gough,
2006, p. 628, emphasis mind). Particularly, as a reader, you are encour-
aged to tactically wander within, against, and beyond the sedimented and
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stratified locations which continue to (re)centre the West as the standard
against which other ways-of-knowing-in-being are measured.12
Further, while not wanting to be (wholly) prescriptive about how the
book is to be read, one of the ways in which a tactical wandering might
be engaged with is through slow science (Stengers, 2018). As science
education is often caught up in efforts to rapidly increase pedagogical
and curricular effectiveness, the complex question of Indigenous science’s
place and how we might go about meaningfully incorporating it cannot
be and is not productively met with a certain degree of expediency. Ques-
tions of how the sciences interact with society are often perceived as non-
scientific and are rarely taken up in a “fast science”13 curriculum whose
image of creativity, as critical science studies scholar Isabelle Stengers
(2018) offers, is one of the sleepwalker:
The… current image of scientific creativity, that of the sleepwalker walking
on a narrow ridge without fear or vertigo because he is blind to the danger.
Asking creative scientists to be actively concerned about the consequences
of their work would the equivalent of waking the sleepwalkers, making
them aware that the world is a long way from obeying their categories.
Struck by doubt, they would fall from the ridge into the morass of turbid
opinions. They would, that is, be lost for science. (p. 114)
Stuck in a form of “fast science” whose “imperative not to slow down”
(Stengers, 2018, p. 115) dictates which pathways it travels upon, as well as
how, scientists and science educators are often channelling attention away
from the very landscape it traverses, only attending, albeit momentarily to
the obstacles that present themselves. In contrast,
Slow science is not about scientists taking full account of the messy compli-
cations of the world, it is about them facing up to the challenge of devel-
oping a collective awareness of the particularly selective character of their
own thought-style. (Stengers, 2018, p. 100)
In turn, the slow in slow science invites not only a different style of percep-
tion and awareness to that which we inherit and enact as science educators,
but also a different pace and temporality. As “colonial projects have shaped
technology, knowledge, and connection”, (Patel, 2016, p. 1) the act of
slowing down is one that is not inconsequential to the central exploration
in this book:
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Perhaps one of the most explicit decoloni[zing] moves we can make, at
this moment, is to sit long enough to see clearly what we need to reach
beyond. This stillness should not be confused with doing nothing. Without
pause, it’s difficult to ascertain what structures, what inequitable structures,
are enlivened by narratives, even and perhaps especially the progressive
narratives. Our pauses, actions, and revisiting should be answerable to a
constant desire for material transformation, repatriation, and rectification.
(Patel, 2016, p. 88)
Without slowing down or pausing, it might be impossible to slow down
or pause that which we are working against, or notice the ways in which
(neo-)colonial logics are always already at play when we, like the sleep-
walker, are continuing on our pathway dictated by the mandate of fast
science (see also Higgins, Wallace, & Bazzul, 2019).
Along these lines, it has been productively suggested by some readers
that this work is enjoyed most when read a chapter or two at a time. Like
when one approaches a network of pathways covering a large expanse
of territory, only the most experienced hikers should attempt a multi-
path hike. Furthermore, as each pathway (as process and product) builds
upon the previous one, it may even be worth revisiting a path a second
time before continuing on.14 To assist in this process, the remainder of
the book is divided into four two-chapter arcs (discussed below) that are
strongly connected to one another. Furthermore, because this book is
not meant to be read in a single sitting (and importantly not the only
text read on the subject), you will find “trail markings” throughout that
provide orientations through signalling preceding and forthcoming work.
These may serve as a welcome reminder of where one has journeyed and
where one is going.
The book is broken into four two-chapter arcs as a suggested reading
pace.15 The first section, Unsettling the Metaphysics of Responsibility,
introduces and troubles the relationship between Indigenous and Western
modern metaphysics and its consequences for science education, with
a focus on science education’s responsibility and (in)ability to respond
to Indigenous ways-of-living-with-Nature. The second section, Critical
Possibilities and Possible Critiques through Deconstructive Play in/of the
Multicultural Science Education Debate, works within and against the
tradition of WMS-based science education that (re)produces science
educator and science education as a field by critically inhabiting the multi-
cultural science education debate and critically questioning the potency
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of critique when enacted through the clôture of metaphysics. In the third
section Tinkering with Ontology with/in the Multicultural Science Educa-
tion Debate, the insight that ontology matters in the (re)construction of
norms and practices through which Indigenous science is yet-to-come is
pursued. The fourth and final section, Towards a Curriculum for Indige-
nous Science To-Come, uses insights from previous sections and works
imperfectly towards leveraging these differential (re)openings towards a
re(con)figuring of science education knowledge-practices.
A short synopsis of each chapter that appears in the remainder of the
book follows.
Overview of Arc 1: Unsettling the Metaphysics of Responsibility
Within Chapter 1, the simultaneously co-constitutive and othering
relation between Western modern science and Indigenous ways-of-
knowing-in-being is introduced, with specific attention the metaphysics
of this relationship as well as how it is taken up with science educa-
tion, both as curriculum and research. Unsettling science education
is presented as a double(d) approach to address the ways in which
settler colonial logics linger and lurk within sedimented and stratified
knowledge-practices (Bang & Marin, 2015; Bang, Warren, Roseberry, &
Medin, 2013). As a more nascent approach to the question of Indige-
nous science within science education, this is expanded upon by drawing
from decolonizing (e.g., Aikenhead & Elliot, 2010; Chinn, 2007), and
postcolonial (e.g., Carter, 2004; McKinley, 2007) approaches to science
education. Specifically, drawing across the two, deconstruction is high-
lighted as a (meta-)methodological approach that is employed across the
two approaches, to bear witness to the ways in which settler coloniality
often manifests as absent presence and to (re)open the space of response
within science education towards Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being.
Within Chapter 2, attention is brought to taken-for-granted notions
of responsibility as the ways in which science education’s responsibility
towards Indigenous ways-of-living-with-nature (IWLN) and traditional
ecological knowledge (TEK) is often and inadvertently over-coded by the
(neo-)colonial logics that it sets out to refuse and resist. To animate this,
I revisit a significant personal pedagogical encounter in which this distinc-
tion between responsibility and the ability to respond made itself felt
and known. Thinking with the work of Sami scholar Rauna Kuokkanen
(2007, 2008, 2010), this narrative provides a platform to explore and
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deconstruct practices of epistemic ignoranceignorance its (co-)constitutive
relation to knowledge, as well as “the homework of response-ability”
required to (re)open the norms of responsiveness towards the possibility
of heeding the call of Indigenous science from within the structure of
science education.
Overview of Arc 2: Critical Possibilities and Possible Critiques through
Deconstructive play in/of the Multicultural Science Education Debate
Within Chapter 3, the multicultural science education debate around
how, when, and if TEK and IWLN are included within science education
(re)presented as (a) play. However, as the debate comes to be shaped by
what Moulton (1983) refers to as the “adversary method”, an invitation
to (mis)read the dialectic negationnegation of conversation as dialogue is
posited in an attempt to open a different space in which cross-culturalists
and universalists might come to shared meanings. A significant ques-
tion emerging from shared meanings within this chapter, and revisited
in the chapters following, is How might considering scientific knowledge as
knowledge-practice assist us in collectively working towards the shared goal
of working against scientism in science education? This is significant to
the overall scope of this book as scientism often comes to be a central
mechanism (alongside exclusivity and Eurocentrism; see McKinley &
Stewart, 2012) through which Indigenous science is excluded, differing,
and deferred.
Within Chapter 4, the taken-for-grantedness, yet centrality, of
metaphoric visuality in science is utilized as an opening to re(con)figure
critique in science education. Specifically, three different optical
metaphors are offered to inform gazing critically otherwise within science
education: the mirror, the prism, and the diffraction grating. Drawing
from the work of Latour (a critique of the mirror; 1993, 2004), Foucault
(the prism; 1977, 1979, 1997), and Barad (the diffraction grating; 2000,
2007, 2010) each metaphoric visual technology and their relation to
critique are respectively explored to inform new lines of critical ques-
tioning. Particularly, these critical metaphors are employed to ask theoret-
ical, methodological, practical, and ethical questions of the multicultural
science education debate presented within the previous chapter.
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Overview of Arc 3: Tinkering with Ontology with/in the Multicultural
Science Education Debate
Within Chapter 5, Cobern and Loving’s (2008) call to consider scientific
knowledge-practice as ontologically situated (articulated in Chapter 3) is
used and troubled. As they refer to this consideration as uncommon, I
explore the ways in which ontology is utilized to make common a science
education status quo. In turn, I tinker with/in the common/uncommon
dichotomy to work within and against this problematic, yet productive,
statement. Particularly, I draw from “uncommon” (to science education)
work at the ontological turn to explore how “ontological alignment”
might be re(con)figured when ontology is no longer a singular affair that
pre-exists scientific meaning-making.
Chapter 6 extends the work of Chapter 5 by positing Cartesianism as
an ontology, as well as what it might mean to account for and be account-
able to the ways in which this classical Western metaphysics comes to
(co-)constitute knowledge-practices of WMS and science education. An
interview with Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin grounds this exploration
(see also Apffel-Marglin, 2011). It is put into conversation with Cobern
and Loving’s (2008) statement that cites “common sense” in the asser-
tion that WMS offers an epistemologically privileged position from which
to know Nature as it best aligns with ontology. Apffel-Marglin’s inter-
view gives what she refers to as a “thumbnail account” of the birth of
modernity (as an entanglement of economic, political, social, and reli-
gious forces and flows). This account elucidates how “common sense” has
become common. Within the interview, she unpacks some of the taken-
for-granted notions that are naturalized in making such a statement (e.g.,
values entangled with/in statements that are further entangled within a
Cartesian ontology). These insights are then diffractively read through the
practices of the multicultural science education debate to produce new
insights, differently.
Overview of Arc 4: Towards a Curriculum for Indigenous Science
To-Come
In Chapter 7, I draw insights from the previous chapters to work
towards responding to Indigenous science to-come, with attention to the
dynamics of the cultural interface (Nakata, 2007a, 2007b). Extending the
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concept of response-ability, I (imperfectly) re(con)figure science educa-
tion curriculum and pedagogy by opening it to its constitutive otherness.
Arguing that scientific literacy presents itself as a rife location to promote
response-ability towards Indigenous science to-come, I engage in decon-
structive (mis)readings to posit an(other) ontology. Notably, I think
with and consider points of convergence and divergence between Karen
Barad’s (2000, 2007, 2010) quantum philosophy-physics and Gregory
Cajete’s (1994, 1999, 2000) Indigenous science in order to re(con)figure
scientific literacy as ecologies of relationships and agential literacy. Lastly,
the consequences of teaching and learning with and across these forms
of literacies are explored: troubling how Cartesian modes shape how we
know Nature (i.e., space, time, matter)(e.g., other-than-human agency,
non-linear space-time).
In Chapter 8, I conclude with a summary and synthesis of the book to
highlight the ways in which Indigenous science is (yet-)to-come. Notably,
each chapter is revisited to (re)articulate the significance of their contribu-
tions with the triple(d) understanding of to-come explored within the book
in mind: (a) Indigenous science, in the context of science education, has
not yet (wholly) arrived; (b) where and how science education might be
(re)opened towards hospitably receiving Indigenous science; and (c) the
types of deconstructive practices that support this work. The chapter, and
in turn the book, ends with an affirmative message that the potentiality
of Indigenous ways-of-living-with-Nature in science education remains,
even if not fully actualized; thus, an invitation.
Towards Response-Ability in Science Education
When applied to notions of justice in education, response-ability invokes
the right to epistemological and ontological heterogeneities, all the
different ways by which we, communities of different ethnicities, languages,
and locations understand ourselves, our relations, and the world around us.
(Kayumova et al., 2019, p. 227)
Once again, returning to the initial statement within this preface, there
is no shortage of ways-of-knowing and -being which might provide rich
orientations towards differentially conceptualizing and enacting science
education should we take them seriously. However, in recognizing the
gift that is “epistemological and ontological heterogeneities” (Kayumova
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et al., 2019, p. 227) requires that we make the shift from (only) empower-
ment to response-ability.16 As Kayumova and colleagues (2019) remind,
the shift towards response-ability would, by necessity, address the systems
which render the ability respond lesser or null. In turn, (re)opening
the norm of responsiveness entails: refusing and resisting the systems of
dominance that have Othered human, other-than-human, and more-than-
human beings through the scientific construction of knowledge. Further,
it entails disrupting and displacing the logics which come to constitute it
(e.g., teleology of progress, binary logics). However, to shift to response-
ability is not a move away from empowerment, it is a differential recom-
mitment: it is to labour towards empowerment while (post-)critically
attends to our own complicities and the ways in which empowerment
is conceptualized and enacted always already becomes disempowering
to those it attempts the response (see Ellsworth, 1989). This is to say
that the shift towards response-ability requires of “collective organizing,
reconfiguring, and reimagining” (Kayumova et al., 2019, p. 212) that
begins from criticality accounting for and being accountable to science
education’s (co-constitutive) margins rather than an a ubiquitous yet
somehow depoliticized and under-theorized notion of empowerment that
is formulated within its centre.
In order to account for and be accountable to difference, figurations
of response-ability must (and will) always take shape differently as they
are always already in relation to the particular relations that co-constitute
them. This will require that the orientations, theories, practices, and ethics
with which we approach the problems and possibilities anew in critical
and creative ways: “to make science education more relevant, response-
able, and reflexive in its efforts to be equitable, inclusive, and robust
requires an integration of ‘new’ and alternative frameworks” (Kayumova
et al., 2019, p. 212). Herein, as the project is working towards recog-
nizing and hospitably receiving Indigenous science, and particularly the
ways in which it continues to be excluded as policy mandates its inclusion,
such a figuration of response-ability must be a double(d) movement that
ruptures (neo-)colonial systems and also leverages these openings towards
making space for honouring Indigenous peoples, places, practices, and
priorities. In turn, this messy work of creating alternative frameworks
for approaching old questions anew braids together Kuokkanen’s (2007)
conception of response-ability, as well as decolonizing, posthuman, and
postcolonialtheories to critically inhabit spaces of science education which
(fore)close the space of responsiveness. We must still attempt a response
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within this relation of responsibility, even if response-ability may never
be (fully) achieved. Working with purpose, but without guarantee, is par
for the course when it comes to such enactments of response-ability; yet,
there is (home)work to be done.
Edmonton, Canada Marc Higgins
Notes
1. The work herein is in part indebted to the work of Alecia Jackson and
Lisa Mazzei (2012, 2017) and the rich framework offered by thinking
with theory . This framework can be succinctly described as “reading-
the-data-while-thinking-the-theory” or “as a moment of plugging in, of
entering the assemblage, of making new connectives” (2012, p. 4). It
is a research stance that actively works against decontextualization of
knowledge-making by encouraging the explicit, transparent and inten-
tional engagement with the theories with which we think: a stance that
is deeply relevant given the ways in which the universalization of Western
modern science forecloses the ability to respond to Indigenous ways-of-
knowing-in-being (see Higgins & Kim, 2019). Significantly, rather than
engage in knowledge-practices that (re)produce what is already known
and knowable through the frameworks we already hold (which then hold
us), Jackson and Mazzei (2012, 2017) invite us to move beyond thinking
with scholars who reflect back to us what and how we already know.
Instead, they suggest turning to those who offer a “productive provo-
cation: theorists who open up thought rather than foreclose it” (2012,
p. 5).
2. Whereas response-ability is making an appearance most frequently in
educational research via the work of feminist technoscience scholars Karen
Barad (e.g., 2010) and Donna Haraway (e.g., 2016), I want to note
the significance of response-ability productively taking differing shapes
should we approach it via other theoretical approaches such as post-
colonialism (e.g., Spivak, 1994) or Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being
(e.g., Kuokkanen, 2007).
Further, there is a growing body of scholarship in science education
that is making the move from empowerment to response-ability (e.g., deFre-
itas, Lupinacci, & Pais, 2017; Higgins & Tolbert, 2018; Wallace, Higgins,
& Bazzul, 2018).
3. Importantly, Indigenous is capitalized throughout the book not only to
recognize the sovereignty of Indigenous nations or to signal the hard-
fought political designation (e.g., the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, but also to differentiate from and trouble
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the ways in which the lower-case indigenous gets leveraged as a move to
innocence, most often by settlers:
The concept of [I]ndigeneity (at least as it is used by [I]ndigenous
peoples themselves) is grounded in and inseparable from the legacy
and aftershocks of colonialism…. To claim, that – as is often done
– that “we are all indigenous” is either to be blind to this contem-
porary reality or to refuse to recognize the ways in which colonial
history continues to affect not only [I]ndigenous peoples but also
relations between states and [I]ndigenous peoples. The statement
“we are all indigenous” reflects a reluctance to take responsibility
or engage with those issues which, far from belonging to the past,
continue to keep [I]ndigenous peoples in a subordinate position
and to deny them rights that peoples who belong to nation-states
can and do take for granted. (Kuokkanen, 2007, pp. 10–11)
This is not to deny the veracity of the statement that we are all indigenous
(lower-case) to somewhere, but rather to call attention to what colonial
productions it makes possible. Particularly as it often works against a more
response-able science education towards Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-
being (as the statement is rarely accompanied with the caveats that would
still come to recognize the importance of Indigeneity): namely, as explored
in the first chapter, it becomes a way of “masking [colonial] power with
innocence” (McKinley, 2001; see also Tuck & Yang, 2012).
4. Differential here signals difference without a priori mutual exclusivity (i.e.,
A is not B). Rather, differential signals the ways in which difference is co-
constitutive: the part enfolds the whole and is articulated as degrees of
difference from with/in that whole (see Deleuze, 1994).
5. While coloniality and neo-coloniality are often framed as historically
distinct (i.e., past and present), these respective projects of territorial and
economic imperialism are bound by a relation of co-constitutive exclu-
sion (Spivak 1999). I signal this assumption through the use of the term
(neo-)colonial throughout.
6. Since, as Carter (2004) suggests, there is a “paucity of this type [(i.e.,
post-colonial and decolonizing)] of inquiry in science education” (p. 833),
many related concepts may be foreign to some science education readers.
Nevertheless, terms and concepts are defined as they appear within the
text, and the ways in which they are leveraged towards decolonizing goals.
7. For example, Darwinian evolutionary processes in Elizabeth Grosz’s
(2011) Becoming Undone; quantum mechanics in Barad’s (2007) Meeting
the Universe Halfway.
8. This bears significance as decolonizing and deconstruction share an
intimate and (co-)constitutive relationship (Battiste, 2013b): there is
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critically subtle work to engage in (re)opening taken-for-granted (i.e.,
settled) concepts which uphold settler- and/or neo-colonial logics (e.g.,
representation, see Kayumova, Zhang, & Scantlebury, 2018).
9. For example, in Chapters 5 and 6, the deconstructive metaphor is one
of tinkering as it entails misusing science’s tools, or using those foreign
to science education, to (re)open its structure (see Higgins, Wallace,
& Bazzul, 2018). This builds upon deconstruction as the possibility, as
well as intentional use, of substitution (or misreading) as deconstructive
methodology as used in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.
10. This is to say that for any and every instance of textuality, the word as
signifier has both an irreducible relation to that which is signified (if such
a signaling could ever be said to be stable), but also to that which is not
(be it oppositionally other(ed), or otherwise). Deconstruction, which is
always already happening, differs and defers the possibility of a meaning
(in the singular sense, but not the possibility of meaning).
11. Sami scholar Rauna Kuokkanen (2007) reminds of the tenuous path
of critically inhabiting spaces—that one must always be critical and
complicit—as to engage in destruction rather than deconstruction results
(re)produces similar results albeit differently. There requires, in her words,
a “subtlety and responsibility in the process of transforming the [insti-
tution of learning], … proceeding in any other way would eventu-
ally backfire and merely too tight[ly] reinforce existing structures and
discourse [through]… ‘irresponsibilizing destruction’” (p. xx; see also
Spivak, 1994).
12. Further, there is a certain degree of pedagogical side-stepping or “wander-
ing” of the pathways of science education required to respond (and to be
able to respond) to Indigenous science to-come. In part, this is because of
the ways in which WMS-based traditional “school science” frames Nature
a priori: by taking for granted that Nature is separate, separable, static,
and passive (i.e., Cartesianism), Indigenous ways-of-living-with-Nature are
presented as lesser means of reflecting that reality, by design. Wandering
offers a pedagogical form of “getting lost” works within/against many
of the nodes of science education, towards the possibility of other-than-
Cartesian ontologies: such furtive and deconstructive movements displace
and disrupt rather than destroy the structure of science education.
13. Stengers (2018) does not wholly dismiss fast science, but rather highlights
its limitations in terms of what it can and cannot engage with:
What characterizes fast science is not isolation, but rather working
in a very rarified environment, and environment divided into allies
who matter and those who, whatever their concerns and protests,
have to recognize that they are the ultimate recipients of [scientific
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creativity], and therefore should not disturb the progress of science.
(p. 116)
Which is to say that the ways in which it frames itself in binary terms
in relation to that which it deems unscientific makes it rather difficult to
engage with those very same things.
14. This advice may also be considered for individual sentences which utilize
the theory-practice of deconstruction to deploy ontological indetermi-
nacy in locations that are problematically singular(izing). Much more
than a stylistic choice, such deconstruction leverages open a singularizing
(neo-)colonial center, which itself is always on the move (see Spivak,
1993/2009, 1999). This means that there are often multiple ways to
wander the path that is a sentence and that it is productive to linger
and explore its possible possibilities.
15. Note that differing chapters might be of particular importance for diverse
audiences. For example: readers firmly familiar with the multicultural
science education debate and its largely adversarial workings may want
to forego Chapter 3; readers already familiar with the post-structural turn
and the ontological turn in educational research could potentially skip
Chapter 4; readers most interested in pedagogical design and delivery may
be most interested in Chapter 7. However, also note that each chapter
is more than its substantive content as it also presents and builds upon
methodology (i.e., theory-practice-ethics).
16. Furthermore, as Battiste (2013b) suggests, decolonizing education invites
the nurturance of a diversity of teaching and learning gifts: these are assets
to be celebrated and lifted rather than liabilities to be addressed through
a deficit lens.
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Unsettling theMetaphysics of Responsibility
CHAPTER 1
UnsettlingMetaphysics in Science Education
This ‘beginning,’ like all beginnings, is always already threaded through
with anticipation of where it is going but will never simply reach and of
a past that has yet to come. It is not merely that the future and the past
are not ‘there’ and never sit still, but that the present is not simply here-
now. Multiply heterogeneous iterations all: past, present, and future, not
in a relation of linear unfolding, but threaded through one another in
a nonlinear unfolding of spacetimemattering, a topology that defies any
suggestion of a smooth continuous manifold. (Barad, 2010, p. 244)
As critical science studies scholar Karen Barad (2010) reminds us, “the
present is not simply here-now” (p. 244, emphasis mine). Rather, it is
also a dis/continuous enfolding of heterogenous there-thens.1 This is
to say that the central process of this book—accounting for and being
accountable to the uneven and unequal relation between Indigenous
metaphysics and classical Western metaphysics by way of quantum meta-
physics, and the ethical, epistemological, and ontological implications for
science education—has and will have already begun elsewhere and elsewhen
(both past and futures to-come).
Such is significant in science education where often, or perhaps too
often, the work is framed in way that asks where do we begin to engage
the question of including Indigenous knowledges or perspectives in science
education? While there is usually an intent of being in relation in a good
way, the language and the practices they signal are fraught. There is
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often a forgetting (be it one that is individual or systemic) that science
education is always already in relation to Indigenous ways-of-knowing-
in-being.2 As Ngāti Kahungunu ki Wairarapa and Ngāi Tahu scholar and
science educator Liz McKinley (2001) states, this has much to do with
the ways in which dominance operates in science education: its response
to difference is often a form of “masking power with innocence” (see
also Kuokkanen, 2007). Primarily, McKinley (2001) suggests that a lack
of knowledge (or a positional stance of “not knowing”) often serves to
(re)produce the norms of power; in turn, “we need to challenge the
mask of innocence and ask ourselves how relations of domination and
subordination regulate encounters in classrooms” (p. 76). This is not
only significant because science education has a responsibility towards
Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being that goes beyond a responsibility
for the Other, but it is also a responsibility as well as an indebtedness
to the Other.3 If responsibility is an “an incarnate relation that precedes
the intentionality of consciousness” (Barad, 2010, p. 265) the question
is no longer whether or not we are responsible but rather if we are able
to respond. Importantly, “we no longer have any excuse, only alibis for
turning away from this responsibility” (Derrida, 1994/2006, p. 14).
Then again, the question of already having begun is substantially rele-
vant. Both quantum and Indigenous metaphysics “caus[e] trouble for
the very notion of ‘from the beginning’” (Barad, 2010, p. 245; see
also Cajete, 2000; Kawagley, 2006). They are un-settling. Nonetheless,
because the ability to respond is always situated, this inquiry must begin
some-where and some-time (as well as given over to someone; see Butler,
2005), even though these spacetime coordinates (what are conventionally
referred to as history and geography, as separate and separable; see Barad,
Barad 2010) cannot be torn asunder from their co-constitutive otherness
(see also Cajete, 2000; Kawagley, 2006; Kirby, 2011; Kuokkanen, 2007).
This book’s intended purpose is to take seriously this simultaneously
co-constitutive and othering relation between Western modern science
and Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being; dialogically engaging with
the field of science education4 to so that it might practice “an itera-
tive (re)opening up to, an enabling of responsiveness” (Barad, 2010,
p. 265) to the possibility of Indigenous metaphysics (to-come). Yet,
before “beginning” if one could make such a proposition, the purpose
of this introductory chapter is to put forward the relationships between
metaphysics, decolonizing, and post-colonial approaches to science educa-
tion, and deconstruction that are central to the work to-come within
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this book. The framing of these relationships is done by attending to the
double(d) meaning of unsettling science education in two parts to provide
orientations for the reading journey. The first provides an overview of
some of the pathways explored with/in decolonizing science education:
decolonizing and post-colonial science education in response to the meta-
physics of modernity. The second unpacks deconstruction in relationship
to decolonizing methodologies as well as decolonizing science educa-
tion as a (meta-)methodological approach to (re)open the metaphysics of
modernity. In this chapter, as in those that follow, I initiate the work with
a positional vignette that give glimpses of the curiosities and questions
that motivate and guide my explorations and give shape to the inquiries
to come.
My Relation to Indigenous
Metaphysics, the Metaphysics
of Modernity, and Science Education
Because we need to “begin” some-where and some-time, let’s “begin” in
Calgary, Alberta on 1 June 2016. Blackfoot Elder and scholar Leroy Little
Bear is giving a Big Thinking address at the annual Canadian Congress of
the Humanities and Social Sciences. The title of his talk: “Blackfoot Meta-
physics is Waiting in the Wings”. Playing off the title as he walks onto the
main stage, Little Bear jokes “[waiting in the wings] just like I was a few
minutes ago”. This calls to mind(-body-heart-spirit) the importance of
making connections through humour (see also Little Bear, 2000). Leroy
Little Bear invites those in the crowded auditorium to (re)consider what
Blackfoot and other differentially articulated Indigenous metaphysics (i.e.,
the co-constitutive space of axiology, epistemology, ontology, ethics, and
cosmology) continue to offer: ways-of-knowing-in-being premised on
ethics, relationality, process, flux, and renewal centering a sense of place.
Already, the talk is rife with significance: metaphysics is “classically” under-
stood as a philosophy of being or what is (i.e., ontology) or the nature
of Nature which comes to describe multiple concepts and enactments
such as space, time, matter, causality, agency, identity, among others.
Little Bear implicitly calls it out as but one metaphysics amidst many.
Furthermore, he articulates a need to consider Indigenous metaphysics
in response to the metaphysics that are already and often in operation
within educational spaces: “What are the metaphysics of our schools?
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Where are those metaphysics taking us?” Articulating a metaphysics of
modernity as taken-for-granted, unquestioned, and unstated, Little Bear
subtly shifts the statement that metaphysics is (i.e., singular and a priori)
to one wherein metaphysics are5 and are in relation (i.e., plural and
entangled in the world’s ongoing becoming). Furthermore, he motions
that the metaphysics of modernity continues to provide some comforts
(e.g., material goods), “but at what price? Is our metaphysics making us
better? Happier?” he asks. In referring to this metaphysics as ours, Little
Bear signals that metaphysics is not strictly a binary either/or affair, as in
Indigenous or Western. Rather, metaphysics is always both/and. In other
words, metaphysics are neither separate nor separable, but rather always
co-constituted and co-constitutive. In turn, responsibility for the meta-
physics of modernity is also shared, albeit, and importantly, not in the
same way. Making his concluding remarks, Little Bear suggested that it is
time to move Blackfoot and other Indigenous metaphysics from the wings
to the main stage where their contributions might significantly come to
bear in generative ways.
During this address, Little Bear only hinted at the ways in which the
knowledge-practices of Indigenous metaphysics come to be positioned in
the wings where they have been waiting for a long time. He signalled
dialogues that began over 20 years ago6 between Indigenous Elders
and scholars (e.g., Leroy Little Bear, Chickasaw and Cheyenne scholar
Sakej Youngblood Henderson) and Western scientists and linguists (e.g.,
quantum physicists David Peat and David Bohm). During these dialogues,
they met “to discuss the underlying principles of the cosmos, not from an
adversarial point of view, but from one of mutual respect and deep listen-
ing” (Parry, 2008, p. 37). The purpose of the Science Dialogues was not
to work towards knowledge, but rather understanding (see Little Bear,
1994; Parry, 2008; Peat, 2002, 2007). This certainly was not the first
time, nor would it be the last that such an initiative towards cross-cultural
understanding would take place. Yet, despite such efforts, Indigenous
metaphysics still waits in the wings of science education.
When I began graduate studies in decolonizing science education in
2008, the very first book I read was Peat’s (2002) Blackfoot Physics.7
While I was on the lookout for Indigenous science,8 David Peat (2002)
reminds that Indigenous metaphysics and Indigenous science are differen-
tial articulations of one another that cannot be separated (see also Cajete,
1994, 2000; Kawagley, 2006):
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As a science, [Indigenous science] is a disciplined approach to under-
standing and knowing, or rather, to the processes of coming to under-
standing and knowing. It has supporting metaphysics about the nature of
reality, deals in systems of relationship, is concerned with the energies and
processes of the universe, and provides a coherent scheme and basis for
action. On the other hand, it is not possible to separate Indigenous science
from other areas of life such as ethics, spirituality, metaphysics, social order,
ceremony, and a variety of other aspects of daily existence. This it can never
be a “branch” or a “department” of knowledge, but rather remains insepa-
rable from the cohesive whole, from a way of being and of coming-to-know.
(p. 241, emphasis mine)
Blackfoot Physics was a powerful early read for me as it discusses the
“points of resonance” between Indigenous metaphysics and quantum
physics that emerged from the Science Dialogues . Holding the complexity
of difference without subsuming it into sameness, Blackfoot Physics
explored these two systems that diversely articulate flux and relationality
concurrently, providing me with a hopeful potentiality for science educa-
tion to be constituted and enacted otherwise. It could be stated that this
was an example of what Yupik science education scholar Oscar Kawagley
and his settler ally Ray Barnhardt (2005) meant when they suggested
that “there is a growing appreciation of the complementarity that exists
between what were previously considered two disparate and irrecon-
cilable systems of thought” (p. 12).9 Notably, from this exploration
of putting Indigenous and Western science into proximal relation and
productively their similar differences and differing similarities (see Bohm,
1994), there was and continues to be rich potentiality. Notably, the possi-
bility for respectful, relevant, and responsive science education whose
pedagogical potency is enriched from cross-cultural diversity resonated
with my own professional experiences of working as a fourth genera-
tion white Euro-settler of Irish ancestry working as an informal science
educator in First Nations, Métis, and Inuit communities across Canada.
I had witnessed and worked towards contributing to science education
as plurality; science education shaped by cross-cultural understandings
through similar, yet different, practices; and science education that draws
strength from cultural and placed locations, instead of treating difference
as an individual problem located with the one who diverges from the
norm (e.g., Higgins, 2014; see Chapter 2). In my experience, and at the
time, there was no lack of respectful, reciprocal, and relational models
for cross-cultural science education drawing from Indigenous traditions
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(e.g., Aikenhead, 1997, 2006b; Cajete, 1999; Barnhardt & Kawagley,
2005, 2008). Yet, despite science being a fruitful location for cross-
cultural “points of resonance” (Peat, 2002), to my surprise Indigenous
metaphysics was still waiting in the wings when it came to most science
education spaces. Blackfoot Physics illuminated the ways in which Indige-
nous science was yet-to-come and productive locations to bring about
that potentiality.
Now, over ten years later, at the time of writing this book, Indigenous
metaphysics’ status can still be referred to as “waiting in the wings”, of
not yet having (fully) arrived, in relation to school science. This, in part,
has a great deal to with the ways in which Indigenous knowledges are
generally approached from within spaces of science education. Above and
beyond the aforementioned treating of Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-
being as if it were a new relation rather than approaching the relation
anew, there is often an attempt to come-to-know the defining character-
istics of Indigenous metaphysics (i.e., knowing about) without accounting
for (or being accountable to) the ways in which Western modern meta-
physics has always and continues to dialectically subsumes, sublates, or
sutures over Indigenous metaphysics. This becomes problematic when
there a positional stance of “not knowing” that operates in tandem (see
McKinley, 2001).
To dig deeper into the various ways in which science education is
seemingly unable to know Indigenous science, I turn to Sami scholar
Rauna Kuokkanen (2007), whose scholarship centres Western modern
educational and institutional responsibility towards Indigenous ways-of-
knowing-in-being. Specifically, with respect to the question of knowledge
and learning, Kuokkanen (2007) asks us,
Why is the academy, the supposed generator of knowledge, so disinclined
to engage with [I]ndigenous ontologies and philosophies? Considering
the endless number of studies on, and the voluminous information
about, practically every imaginable topic dealing with the world’s various
[I]ndigenous peoples, how can this general ignorance of [I]ndigenous
epistemes continue to be so pervasive? (p. 56)
How is it that science education continues to engage from a place
of “know-nothing-ism” (Kuokkanen, 2007) or “sanctioned ignorance”
(Spivak, 1999)10 despite there already beings so many, and an ever-
growing quantity of, resources describing, defining, and documenting
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Indigenous metaphysics? Is this more than simply being “commonplace
‘moves of innocence’” through which educators “claim the right to not
know” (Kuokkanen, 2010, p. 65)? While these are questions that are
approached from multiple angles over the course of this book, it is impor-
tant to immediately dispel the easy, yet problematic answer: “the problem
is not that that there are no [or not enough] books on Indigenous peoples
by Indigenous peoples” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 102), even on the topic of
Indigenous science.
As a white settler scholar, I see it as both my role and responsibility to
take up the task of accounting for and being accountable to the ongoing
dialectic negation of Indigenous metaphysics, and the ways in which this
process of negation cannot be separated from colonial referents which
linger and lurk in science education. Simultaneously, I recognize that
an a-political documenting of Indigenous metaphysics cannot be disas-
sociated from forms of differentially (re)producing contemporary and
historically ongoing colonial relations: here, shoring up my privilege as a
settler academic through describing and defining Indigenous Others in a
contemporary moment in which the will-to-know is driving a great deal of
educational change. However, the work of addressing the ways in which
science education is produced by and reproducing colonial logics is not
a straightforward or simple task. As Mik’maq educational scholar Marie
Battiste (2008) states, “what is becoming clear to educators is that any
attempt to decolonize education and actively resist colonial paradigms is
a complex and daunting task” (p. 508): not only because they are strictly
complicated tasks, but also because colonial structures and systems also
come to shape our ability to respond to them and even imagine something
beyond them (see also Ahenakew, 2017; Battiste, 2005). For example,
even within Peat’s (2002) articulation of the rich potentiality of points of
resonance, there are subtle and not-so-subtle traces of the ways in which
the relationship Indigenous and Western science is always already one
that cannot not be colonizing (even when working towards something
else)11:
It is at this point that a tantalizing paradox presents itself. On one
hand it seems that the very activity and busy-ness of our analytic, linear
Western minds would obstruct us from entering into Indigenous coming-
to-knowing, yet, on the other, scientists who have been struggling at the
cutting edges of their fields have come up with concepts that resonate with
those of Indigenous science. (p. 6)
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While, as Peat (2002) suggests there are rich points of resonance between
the Indigenous and Western metaphysics (e.g., around questions of
quantum physics), there are still patterns of difference that matter. To
uniquely focus on commensurability here becomes an act of mirroring
sameness elsewhere, dialectically subsuming into or sublating through
sameness patterns of difference, as well as making it difficult to account
for and be accountable to the enactment of difference. Relationships of
commensurability become all the more complicated between Indigenous
and Western metaphysics as equivocation often becomes a move to mask
colonial relations of power between the two (Carter, 2004; McKinley,
2001; Tuck & Yang, 2012). Further, as Kuokkanen (2007) states, “the
demand and desire that [I]ndigenous cultures and epistemes be translated
into forms recognizable by the dominant colonial society is at least as old
as colonialism itself” (p. 75). Colonial logics always come to differ and
defer what can be said, to whom, and for what purposes. Here, the move
the make space for Indigenous metaphysics simultaneously (re)centres
scientist as subject as a form of listening-as-imperial-benevolence in which
the Indigenous other can only be heard in the spaces in which it relates to
and potentially benefits the Western scientist (Kuokkanen, 2007). It is for
this reason that Ngāti Kahungunu ki Wairarapa and Ngāi Tahu scholar Liz
McKinley and Maori scholar Georgina Stewart (2012) state, “the aspira-
tion of defining and understanding IK [Indigenous knowledges] (in order
to place it in the science curriculum) can be likened to chasing the pot of
gold at the end of the rainbow, which remains permanently out of reach”
(p. 551).
However, rather than reverse the logics and wholly adopt a position
of incommensurability when considering the space between Indigenous
and Western metaphysics, Tewa scholar Gregory Cajete (2000) suggests
that we account for and are accountable to the diverse ways in which they
come to be constituted and enacted:
Native science is a product of a different creative journey and a different
history than that of Western science. Native science is not quantum physics
or environmental science, but it has come to similar understandings about
the workings of the natural laws through experimentation and participa-
tion with the natural world. The groundwork for a fruitful dialogue and
exchange of knowledge is being created. (p. 14)
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While both may have reached similar destinations when it comes to
notions of flux, uncertainty, and co-constitutiveness, Cajete (2000)
reminds us that this destination is shaped by “different creative
journey[s]” (p. 14) both in terms of where they have come from as
well as where they are going. These currently intersecting pathways are
differentially produced, and produce ways-of-knowing-in-being differ-
ently. Furthermore, such patterns can become rich locations for dialogue:
points of resonance become an entry point towards what one can learn
from the others’ points of divergence. Thus, rather than sameness and
its constitutive other of difference as oppositional negation, we can
consider the ways in which Indigenous and Western metaphysics are in
ever-shifting, situated, and differential relations.
Despite its “to-come” status, the potential of Indigenous metaphysics
(and its differential articulation as Indigenous science) within and beyond
cross-cultural science remains a central motivation that continues to drive
the inquiry herein that is grounded in an ethical commitment towards a
future12 in which Indigenous metaphysics is no longer “waiting in the
wings”.
Barad (2010) suggests, “we inherit the future, not just the past”
(p. 257). In considering the future, we not only inherit the future (avenir)
that is the most possible possibility; one that prolongs and replicates the
present condition, albeit differently, by restituting a foreclosed past that
has yet to happen (again). We also inherit futures that are yet-to-come
(à-venir); those unexpected arrivals that produce a (re)opening of differ-
ence whereby possibilities and consequences are not (fully) knowable (see
also Smith, 2005). However, “there is no inheritance without a call to
responsibility” (Derrida, 1994/2006, p. 114); a responsibility that is not
only an epistemological and ontological accounting for but also an ethical
accountability towards that which is yet-to-come (see also Kuokkannen,
2007; Spivak, 1994). The Otherness that has yet-to-arrive (e.g., a future
to-come where Indigenous metaphysics is no longer “waiting in the
wings” of science education),13 whose arrival cannot be anticipated, is
entangled in what Barad (2010) refers to as co-constitutive “relations of
obligation”:
Othering, the constitution of an ‘Other,’ entails an indebtedness to the
‘Other,’ who is irreducibly and materially bound to, threaded through,
the ‘self’—a diffraction/dispersion of identity. ‘Otherness’ is an entangled
relation of difference (différance). Ethicality entails noncoincidence with
oneself. (p. 265)
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As the future (avenir) and the to-come (à-venir) are not one and the
same (without being mutually exclusive),14 the present of science educa-
tion is irreducibly bound to and ethically indebted to Indigenous science
to-come. Articulated otherwise, it is a responsibility that is not for the
other but to the Other whose labelling as “non-scientific” allows that
which is “scientific” to persist and thrive (see Wallace, 2018). Indigenous
metaphysics is already entangled within the production of science educa-
tion. Rather, science educators are tasked with (re)opening the ability to
respond to towards Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being. This poten-
tiality that has yet-to-(fully-)come, whose arrival is unforeseeable, invites
“the continual reopening and unsettling of what might yet be, of what was,
and what comes to be” (Barad, 2010, p. 264, emphasis in original).
In order to engage in the work of un-settling (i.e., what I have come
to understand and will present as deconstructing and decolonizing) what
might yet be, what was, and what will come to be science education, the
central question that guides the inquiry presented within this book is:
How is Indigenous science to-come with/in the context of science education?
The central question is understood and explored in this book through
three guiding inflections that are inseparably entangled. First, to-come
signals that Indigenous metaphysics, in the context of science education,
has not yet (wholly) arrived. This precipitates the questions: How is it that
Indigenous science is still to-come? How do the structures of science educa-
tion—the assumptions, terms, categories, practices, and beliefs—contribute
to exclusion of Indigenous science, as well as inclusion that disciplines, differs
from, and defers Indigenous science to-come? Secondly, to-come signals
ethical indebtedness; this invites the question How might the structure,
culture, and discipline of science education be (re)opened and re(con)figured
to receive Indigenous science to-come, on its own terms, and in ethical
relation? Thirdly, to-come entails a responsibility for and towards that
which is to-come. Yet, modes, practices, and enactments of responsibility
cannot be prescribed when that which is to-come is never (fully) know-
able and distorted by the current frames of science education. Stated
otherwise, responsibility requires the occasion and ability to respond.
Accordingly, I wonder: What types of practices15 might allow for and
nurture the possibility of Indigenous science to-come? This final query recog-
nizes that potentiality need not require actualization for it to be worthy
of consideration.
To situate the engagement with the central questions and its different
inflections, the remainder of this introductory chapter provides a
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double(d) orientation to guide the reader through the book: unsettling
science education. To animate the two ways in which unsettling can be
read, first, decolonizing and post-colonial approaches to science educa-
tion will be introduced as these are the disciplinary spaces within which
I situate this work. Secondly, in addressing the ways in which meaning
and matter become stratified or sedimented in science education, decon-
struction as a (meta-)methodology will be explored. However, as the
metaphysics of modernity is often entangled with/in enactments of WMS
and science education, (re)producing Indigenous science as to-come, this
relation is also explored as (co-constitutive) site to unsettle.
On Unsettling Science Education:
Decolonizing and Deconstructing
In our view science education is a key site in which nature–culture relations
are defined, enacted, brought-to-life, expanded, narrowed and legislated.
The manifestations of nature-culture relations, from the very construc-
tions of subject matter, to focal content, to the configurations of practice,
engaged in science learning environments are often deeply unreflective
of the most pressing scientific questions—rather they focus on ‘‘settled’’
phenomena as well as ‘‘settled’’ perspectives and relations to phenomena.
(Bang & Marin, 2015, p. 531, emphasis in original)
As Ojibwe scholar Megan Bang and Choctaw scholar Ananda Marin’s
state in their seminal 2015 piece on unsettling science education (see also
Bang, Warren, Rosebery, & Medin, 2012), they state that the science
education is a key site for addressing and the ways in which relations
between Nature and Culture are produced through a double(d) settling.
Accordingly, unsettling science education is a practice that is first about
addressing the ways in which settler colonialism (i.e., the structure rather
than event through which settlers continue a project of Indigenous
erasure; see Tuck & Yang, 2012) manifests within science education by
refusing and resisting the logics and structures through which the colonial
project remains ongoing. As Bang and Marin define, “the fundamental
tenant of settler-colonial societies is the acquisition of land as prop-
erty, followed by the establishment of settler lifeways as the normative
benchmark from which to measure development” (p. 532). In addition,
unsettling also has a second, subtler, but no less significant meaning:
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attending to the ways in which science education draws from stratified
and sedimented knowledges, phenomena, histories, pedagogies, and other
practices which complicate questions of making space for and responding
to Indigenous ways-of-living-with-Nature.
Yet, working towards unsettling science education is a task that is
already trouble(d) from its very beginning (see Higgins, 2014; McKinley
& Stewart, 2012; Sammel, 2009).16 Notions and enactments of decol-
onizing are often already overcoded by the colonial logics that we
attempt to work within, against, and beyond. Working towards a science
education that is able to respond to Indigenous ways of Indigenous ways-
of-knowing-in-being is often marked by a de/colonizing relation. Like
Subreenduth (2006),
I use the slash (/) in ‘decolonizing’ as visual demonstration of the incom-
pleteness of the process of de/colonizing. What I suggest in this use is
the impossibility (at least at this historical juncture) to speak of a totalizing
decolonizing discourse or imagination. (p. 618)
As with others (e.g., Madden & McGregor, 2013; Rhee & Subreenduth,
2006), I employ the term de/colonizing as a post-colonial inflection to
decolonizing theories and practices to consider the ways in which decolo-
nizing and colonizing discourses cannot be wholly framed in opposition,
particularly within spaces like educational institutions (see Higgins &
Madden, 2017, 2019) or in fields such as science education (see Higgins
& Kim, 2019; Higgins, Mahy, Agasaleh, & Enderle, 2019; Higgins &
Tolbert, 2018). As a result, “the process and acts of de/colonizing
are not only always an antithesis of colonialism … but rather a convo-
luted, complex and paradoxical one” (Subreenduth, 2006, p. 619).
De/colonizing invites an ongoing and hyper-vigilant examination of the
ways in which (neo-)colonial logics seep (even) into decolonizing efforts,
through engaging with the following questions:
How should we rethink and rearticulate the conceptualization and prac-
tice of education and research when we situate them within contemporary
imperialism and the history of pervasive colonialism? What theoretical
and practical possibilities can be retrieved by analyzing de/colonizing
educational practices through the history of imperialism? What alterna-
tive ideas of educational theorizing can be articulated in relation to
local/global responsibility, equality and justice? How does local/global
mobility and changing demographics impact on such knowledge produc-
tion and consumption? (Rhee & Subreenduth, 2006, p. 546)
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For example, and importantly (particularly as it is the primary form of
response), if after Barad (2007), “responsibility must be thought of in
terms of what matters and what is excluded from mattering” (p. 220),
there is a need to attend to the ways in which the logics of exclusion
continue to operate through the ways in which Indigenous ways-of-
knowing-in-being are included. As Bang and Marin (2015) remind, the
curricular inclusion of Indigenous perspectives is differentially problem-
atic if we cannot also attend to the taken-for-granted and naturalized epis-
temological, ontological, and axiological commitments and enactments of
what we are including perspectives into. As Bang and Marin (2015) state,
if science education continues to “focus on ‘settled’ phenomena as well
as ‘settled’ perspectives and relations to phenomena” (p. 531), which rely
on and reinforce settler privilege while simultaneously dismissing, dimin-
ishing, and denying Indigenous ways-of-living-with-nature, presence, and
futurities, it will remain but a tokenistic inclusion which serves to distract
from the more unsettling demands of this work (namely, Land) and is
often primarily an effort to reconceptualize and recenter the subject of
dominance (see also Ahenakew, 2017).
Importantly, science education centring of “settled” phenomena
through “settled” perspectives matter and materialize beyond the class-
room as well (see also Kayumova, McGuire, & Cardello, 2019). Science
education’s (pre)dominant conceptualization of Nature(-Culture) makes
palatable and possible the ongoing dispossession and devastation of
Indigenous Land:
The maintenance of settler normativity requires the structuration of time-
space relations in ways that make the inseparable dynamics of acquisition
of land, [I]ndigenous erasure, and the domination of black people appear
as an inevitable, unconnected, and natural course of development rather
than socio-politically engineered to support and foster white entitlement
and privilege. (Bang & Marin, 2015, p. 532)
Also, through this double(d) settling, Indigenous peoples have been and
continue to be the objects of science rather than its subjects (see also
TallBear, 2013). In turn, echoing Bang and Marin, I argue that science
education is a “key site” to unsettle the relationship between Nature and
Culture.
As unsettling’s double(d) meaning and practice is underexplored in
science education, it will be framed through an exploration of ways in
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which (neo-)colonial logics are responded to in science education (i.e.,
decolonizing and post-colonial approaches) as well as the ways in which
meanings and practices are productively destabilized and decentered (i.e.,
deconstruction).
First Orientation: An Introduction to Decolonizing and Postcolonial
Science Education and Their Relationships to Metaphysics
As [Derrida] develops the notion of the joyful [i.e., play-full] yet laborious
strategy of rewriting the old language—a language, incidentally, we must
know well—Derrida mentions the “cloture” of metaphysics. We must know
that we are within the “cloture” of metaphysics, even as we attempt to
undo it. It would be an historicist mistake to represent this “closure” of
metaphysics as simply the temporal finishing-point of metaphysics. It is also
the metaphysical desire to make the end coincide with the means, create
an enclosure, make the definition coincide with the defined, the “father”
with the “son”; within the logic of identity to balance the equation, close
the circle. Our language reflects this desire. And so it is from within this
language that we must attempt an “opening.” (Spivak, 1976, p. xx)
I begin this section by asking: what does metaphysics (i.e., the co-
constitutive space of epistemology, ontology, ethics, among others) have
to do with science education and Indigenous science to-come? Recall that
Indigenous science is always already an articulation of Indigenous meta-
physics and an inseparable part of the whole (see Cajete, 1994, 2000;
Little Bear, 2016; Peat, 2002). However, what of Indigenous metaphysics
within the Western modern science (WMS) which largely comes to inform
most of science education’s school-based curricula? As Derrida (1976)
offers, we are always already within the clôture (i.e., enclosure) of meta-
physics: there is no outside of metaphysics (see also Spivak, 1976). Also,
as stated earlier, there is no outside of the metaphysics of modernity (see
also Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Carter, 2010; Kuokkanen, 2007; Little Bear,
Bear 2016; Spivak, 1976, 1993/2009, 1994, 1999).
WMS and science education too must also be within, and have, a meta-
physics. Sciences, in all shapes and forms, are premised upon the ways
in which Nature’s enactments (i.e., ontology) are understood through
and in relation to Culture (i.e., epistemology) (see Barad, 2000; Cajete,
2000; Kirby, 2011; Latour, 1993). However, as Little Bear (2016) enun-
ciated in his keynote address, the metaphysical relation between Nature
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and Culture enacted by Western modernity that informs and produces
WMS is often one that assumed, presumed, and/or taken-for-granted.
Thus, adding to Little Bear’s questions, “What are the metaphysics of
our schools? Where are those metaphysics taking us?,” I ask: What are the
metaphysics of science education? In response, I offer that WMS and by
extension science education are (mis-)articulated as transcending meta-
physics (Barad, 2000, 2007; Cajete, 1994, 2000). This (self-)perceived
metaphysical exclusion becomes a criticism that is levied against other
ways-of-knowing-Nature (e.g., Cobern & Loving, 2001), becoming one
of the ways in which Indigenous science is (yet-)to-come (McKinley,
2007). Answering (and being answerable as form of responsibility; see
Patel, 2016; Spivak, 1994) to the metaphysics of science education then
becomes a question of (mis)reading science education for its subtle
and lingering colonial referents and enactments (Carter, 2004, 2005;
McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005): the process of “joyful [i.e., play-full]
yet laborious strategy of rewriting the old language” (Spivak, 1976, p.
xx) that is deconstruction. (Re)opening science education to Indigenous
science-to-come labours the structure of education between what it is,
is not, and could be(come), particularly in instances when meanings (and
matter) are sedimented and stratified (e.g., through knowledge-practices
such as science as metaphysically transcendent).
Regarding metaphysics as they relate to science education, Derrida
(1976) offers that the metaphysics of Western modernity are both the
process and product of clôture: at once being an enclosure and a closing.
This double(d) normative process can never be wholly separated from
“the metaphysical desire to make the end coincide with the means”
(Spivak, 1976, p. xx). In other words, the closing is naturalized, rendering
the process an absent presence whose partial erasure (but irreducible pres-
ence) gives the appearance of stable, unitary, separate, and seperable
epistemological and ontological units (see also Apffel-Marglin, 2011;
Bang et al., 2012; Bang & Marin, 2015; Barad, 2007; Cajete, 1994,
2000; Latour, 1993). However, how the metaphysics of modernity are
always already entangled within science education, how this entanglement
is produced, as well as what it produces, and what is producible with/in
are undertakings engaged within this book. If we are to (re)open science
education to Indigenous science to-come, “it is from within this language
that we must attempt an ‘opening’” (Spivak, 1976, p. xx), we must do so
with/in science education, “a language, incidentally, we must know well”
18 M. HIGGINS
(p. xx). Thus, in the next section of this introduction onto science educa-
tion, Indigenous science to-come, and metaphysics, I outline a few more
of the features of science education and its relationship to Indigenous
science.
Understanding School Science and its Relation to Indigenous
Science To-Come. Generally speaking, within science education, “the
conventional goal” is one “of thinking, behaving, and believing like a
scientist” (Aikenhead & Elliot, 2010, p. 324). Currently, through the
two predominant methods of teaching and learning science, this entails:
coming to know what scientists know (i.e., cognitivism, intra-personal
learning, scientific knowledge as representation of nature) and/or encul-
turation into how scientists come-to-know (i.e., socio-constructivism,
inter-personal learning, scientific knowledge as representation of culture)
(Aikenhead, 2006a; Erickson, 2000). Untroubled, both approaches
collude and coalesce around the construction and reification of the subject
position of “Scientist”. It has been argued that this subject position is
emblematic of the masculine, Eurocentric, and anthropocentric subject
of Western modernity through modes that enact and uphold its meta-
physics (e.g., representationalism, universalism, nature/culture divide)
(see Barad, 2000, 2007). This (re)produces science as a modern(ist)
practice through which nature is knowable and representable (i.e., quan-
tifiable, generalizable, and predictable; see Aikenhead & Michell, 2011;
Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007), and in which neither the culture of science
nor the agency of nature can be (wholly) accounted for or be held
accountable. Furthermore, this type of scientific literacy and its entangled
culture of “school science” potentially produce experiences of cultural
assimilation and acculturation rather than enculturation for the vast
majority of students.17
In other words, rather than a harmonious interfacing of cultures
(i.e., enculturation), encounters of school science are more likely to
house potential for dialectical negation that is either actualized (i.e.,
assimilation) or remains un-actualized through students’ complex and
complicated curricular navigation (i.e., acculturation). Such dialectic
negation occurs at the level of the individual, as well as the system.
In reviewing literature on science education in diverse school settings,
Aikenhead and Elliot (2010) state that “most students (about 90%) tend
to experience school science (Grades 6–12) as a foreign culture to varying
degrees, but their teachers do not treat it that way” (p. 323; see also
Bang et al., 2012; McKinley, 2001, 2007; McKinley & Stewart, 2012).18
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For students whose daily lived experiences continue to be negatively
impacted by Eurocentrism19 (re)produced with/in (and beyond) science
education, learning with/in the cultural practice of “school science”
largely continues to be a form of epistemic violence. As such, assimilation
is overwhelmingly identified as a common barrier to engagement (Aiken-
head, 2006b; Bang et al., 2012; Barnhardt & Kawagley, 2005; Canadian
Council on Learning, 2007; McKinley, 2001, 2007).
There are various ways in which this systemic problematic manifests at
the level of individual students and groups. For Indigenous, diasporic,
and other post-colonial students20 these include, but are not limited
to: (a) under-representation within science and technology occupations,
(b) under-representation within formal education and training that paves
pathways to such occupations, (c) gaps in achievement on standard-
ized international assessment such as the Programme for International
Student Assessment, and (d) lower rates of graduation (Barnhardt &
Kawagley, 2005; Canadian Council on Learning, 2007; MacIvor, 1995;
McKinley, 2007). For Indigenous, diasporic, and post-colonial students
who succeed in spaces of WMS despite the odds that are stacked against
them, it is often at a cost: learning science is often at the expense of
one’s cultural being and belonging, becoming otherwise in the process
(see Bang et al., 2012; Cajete, 2000; Marker, 2019; McKinley, 2005,
2007). Furthermore, as local Indigenous ways of coming-to-knowing
the natural world continue to be underrepresented, misrepresented,
misunderstood, and undervalued, WMS tends to be overrepresented and
misrepresented (Aikenhead, 1997, 2006b; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011;
Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007). As a result, many students come away from
science education with an understanding of WMS that is shaped by myth
(e.g., science as culturally neutral, unbiased, and thus ethical), alongside
under-appreciation of what other ways-of-knowing-nature might have to
offer.
This not only has an impact upon students, but also their teachers:
“stereotypical views of [I]ndigenous students [and their knowledge-
practices] have led to assumptions of teaching and learning for them”
(p. 214, emphasis mine). In a study with science teachers of Indige-
nous students, Aikenhead and Huntley (1999) documented four ways
that deficit thinking manifests:
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1. Teachers generally viewed Western science as course content or as a way
of exploring nature, not as a foreign culture as experienced by many of
their students; 2. Aboriginal knowledge was respected by science teachers,
but only a token amount was added onto, but not integrated with, school
science; 3. Teachers thought that the act of learning science was unre-
lated to their students’ [Indigenous] worldviews; 4. Students’ disinterest
in pursuing science careers was either unexplainable by the interviewees or
was blamed on student deficits. Few teachers blamed their curriculum and
teaching. (pp. 162, 164)
If science education is to be (re)opened to Indigenous science to-come, it
is important to recall that the ethical imperative of education is “a respon-
sibility to the Other (as answerability or accountability) and not for the
Other (as the burden of the fittest)” (Andreotti, 2007, p. 74, emphasis
mine), as well as recognition of the ongoing (re)construction, enactment,
and productions that result from such positioning (see also Andreotti,
2011; Kuokanen, 2007, 2010; Patel, 2016; Spivak, 1994).
The ways in which Indigenous ways-of-living-with-nature (IWLN)
come to be under- and misrepresented signals how dialectic negation
plays out at systemic, cultural, and discursive levels.21 The very topic of
IWLN in science education is itself subsumed within wider concepts such
as multiculturalism and equity that fail to wholly account for the complex-
ities of Indigenous-Western relationships (Carter, 2004, 2010; McKinley
& Stewart, 2012). Furthermore, the term traditional ecological knowl-
edge (TEK) that is regularly employed potentially (re)centres a Western
modern(ist) notion of knowledge as a discrete unit that exists outside
of and beyond the knower and its ecology of relationships (Aikenhead
& Ogawa, 2007; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011; Kim, Ashgar, & Jordan,
2017; McKinley, 2007). However, McKinley and Aikenhead (2005) state
that while these concepts and conceptual locations have been problem-
atic, they nonetheless provide productive locations to critically inhabit
science education and gain leverage (see also McKinley & Stewart, 2012).
Whether Indigenous science should be included or not within science
education, as well as how, where, and when, has become:
…one of the largest (in terms of literature) debates in the field of
culture and science education… [which has centered around] the nature
of knowledge…. The relevance of this literature to schools is that a univer-
salist understanding of science informs the assumptions implicit in school
curricula about the nature of science and how science should be taught.
(McKinley, 2007, p. 206)
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Here, what is called the multicultural science education debate is of central
relevance to the ways in which Indigenous science is to-come; it is not
only part of our collective inheritance as science educators but rather part
a pivotal one, shaping how and who we can be(come).22 As such, it is a
central node that is explored within this book. Following its more fulsome
introduction in Chapter 3, it is differentially revisited and explored in
further depth in the chapters following (i.e., 4–6).
“Universality” (i.e., transcendental knowledge) is “achieved” when
metaphysics of modernity come to mark IWLN, TEK, and WMS through
systems of clôture (e.g., as either strictly similar or different ), as well as
when WMS reasserts itself as the (“neutral”) norm and standard against
which other knowledge systems are to be judged through Eurocentrism
(see Carter, 2004; Lewis & Aikenhead, 2001). Significantly, this does not
strictly mean that Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being are compared to
Western modern practices, but also through Eurocentric concepts and
practices. As Kuokkanen (2007) explains, this includes:
Eurocentric arrogance of conscience… the simplistic assumption that as
long as one has sufficient information, one can understand the “other”….
By assuming that epistemologies are universal and that any episteme or
system of knowledge can be accessed, this view reflects the Eurocentric
claim that Western or modern intellectual traditions are more sophisticated
than are other kinds (assuming that the latter even exists). (p. 99)
The result of such “universalism,” at both the level of knowledge and
knowledge-making practices, are forms of sameness and difference that are
irreducibly bound to the ways in which (neo-)colonial power dynamics
manifest in knowledge production (see also Andreotti, 2007, 2011).
Within science education, McKinley (2007) states that the relationship
between IWLN and WMS can be generalized into four categories: (a)
where Indigenous science can be explained within WMS; (b) where
Indigenous science could be explained through WMS, but the explanation
has yet to be developed; (c) where there is a link between Indigenous
science and WMS’s knowledge claims, albeit through different knowl-
edge principles and practices; (d) where WMS cannot accept aspects
of Indigenous science (e.g., spirituality, animism). The extent to which
if and how Indigenous science is to be included within school science
curriculum depends highly upon the type of Indigenous knowledge (IK)
being brought in, as well as science education’s ability to ethically respond
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to difference (see also Kuokkanen, 2007; Marker, 2006); some forms of
Indigenous science are more to-come than others. As the relations of
power between IWLN, TEK, and WMS are uneven and unequal, it is
often the case that “those opposing the inclusion [of IK] argue that there
is no place for IK unless it has been subsumed into the body of knowl-
edge referred to as WMS, that is, unless it is made the same as WMS, in
which the status quo continues” (McKinley, 2007, p. 208). Alternately,
some who uphold the universality of WMS (e.g., Cobern & Loving,
2001; El-Hani & de Ferreira Bandeira, 2008) argue that the inclusion of
Indigenous science is a non-issue so long as it is neither called science nor
included within the science classroom (but rather as a separate subject, like
art, literature, or history). However, such “inclusion” fails to redress the
dialectic negation of Indigenous science marked by sublation, subsum-
tion, or suturing over; further, it masks the colonial relations of power that
produce these moves (see McKinley, 2001, 2007). Further, as Kuokkanen
(2007) explains, “inclusion” is not a move marked by innocence, removed
from dynamics of power, nor one that is new:
The demand and desire that [I]ndigenous cultures and epistemes be trans-
lated into forms recognizable by the dominant colonial society is at least
as old as colonialism itself. Colonizers have always used translation against
indigenous peoples in an attempt to manipulate and displace them and
thereby dispossess them of their land. (p. 75)
Inclusion is not the remedy to exclusion when the structures into which
inclusion happen continue to (re)produce and uphold settler-colonial
ways-of-knowing-in-being: be it complicity in the devaluation and erasure
of Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being or participating in interrelated
delegitimizing claims to Land in the larger project of dispossession (see
also Bang & Marin, 2015). As mentioned early within this chapter, mean-
ingful and respectful dialogue between Indigenous science and WMS is in
a perpetual state of im/possibility as they are not and never will be (fully)
commensurate; Indigenous science will always be to-come but the ethical
responsibility is ever-present and irreducible.
Decolonizing and Post-Colonial Responses in Science Education.
There are growing bodies of work within science education that address
Western modernity’s Eurocentric legacies that are often referred to as:
decolonizing science education (e.g., Aikenhead, 2006c; Aikenhead &
Elliot, 2010; Belczewski, 2009; Chinn, 2007; Higgins, 2014) and post-
colonial23 science education (e.g., Carter, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2010;
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McKinley, 2001, 2007; McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005; McKinley &
Stewart, 2012). Battiste (2013a) describes decolonizing education as
is a “two-prong process”. It entails deconstruction of (neo-)colonial24
structures and strategies, and reconstruction that centres and takes seri-
ously Indigenous, diasporic, and other post-colonial ways-of-knowing and
ways-of-being towards reshaping the place-based processes and priorities
of education and educational research (see also Donald, 2012).25 Simi-
larly, post-colonial approaches to science education26 seek to (re)open
(neo-)colonial structures strategies in order to ethically respond to the
Otherness of Indigeneity.27 As both draw from diverging theoretical
lineages and enactments of educational practice (e.g., critical peda-
gogy and post-structuralism respectively), there are productive points of
resonance and tension between the two. Of the latter, and of partic-
ular relevance to this book, are: (a) the centrality of land as beyond
human cultural understandings of it, and (b) whether ethics is a possible
possibility or not. Herein, regarding the first statement, I align with decol-
onizing theories who suggest that post-colonial theories’ focus on cultural
hybridity, flow, and porousity do not strongly enough consider the ways
in which coloniality operates and circulates beyond an anthropocentric
(inter-)textuality. The critique is levied to bring attention to the ways in
which (neo-)coloniality comes to problematically shape not only human
cultural relations, but also those of other-than-humans, and more-than-
humans who, together, come to collectively constitute the ecology of
relationships that is signified by an Indigenous concept of place (Donald,
2012; Grande, 2004, 2008; Marker, 2006; Smith, 1999/2012). With
respect to the latter statement, I align herein with post-colonial notions
of ethics as im/possibility to push forth my own decolonizing scholar-
ship; the discursive practices of decolonizing approaches can (but do not
always) come to mask colonizing tendencies (see Carter, 2004, 2010;
Subreenduth, 2006; Rhee & Subreenduth, 2006; Smith, 2005; Smith,
Maxwell, Puke, & Temara, 2016; Spivak, 1993/2009). Nonetheless,
ethical im/possibility need not be paralyzing; Spivak (1988a, 1993/2009,
1994) reminds of the importance of persistent critical and complicit
enactments that work towards “transforming the conditions of impos-
sibility into possibility” (Spivak, 1988b, p. 201), even if/as they are never
achieved.
Within science education, this call has been primarily taken up
by extending the openings produced through treating both science
(e.g., Haraway, 1989; Latour, 1993; Traweek, 1992; see also Shapin
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& Schaffer, 1985) and science education (e.g., Nadeau & Désautels,
1984; O’Loughlin, 1992; Pomeroy, 1994)28 as problematic cultural
spaces to be examined through sociological, anthropological, and cultural
studies approaches. In particular, a two-pronged approach to decolo-
nizing science education29 focuses primarily on addressing the ways in
which Eurocentrism (re)produces science education as a space of cogni-
tive and cultural imperialism (Aikenhead, 2001, 2006c; McKinley, 2001,
2007; Sammel, 2009) in order to make space for learning that is episte-
mologically diverse and pedagogically pluralistic (i.e., which recognizes
that there are diverse pathways to learning about and with Nature;
Aikenhead, 2006a, Barnhardt & Kawagley, 2005, 2008; McKinley, 2007;
Sammel, 2009). In Canada, there have been some successes in this area.
For example, there are increasingly more policy-mandated curriculums
that include Indigenous perspectives on science (e.g., British Columbia
Ministry of Education’s 2005 Science K to 7 and 2008 Science and Tech-
nology 11),30 general frameworks for school-based integration in place
(e.g., Manitoba Education and Youth’s 2003 Integrating Aboriginal
Perspectives into Curricula), as well an overall commitment from Deans
of Faculties of Education to prepare teachers accordingly (Association of
Canadian Deans of Canada, 2010).
However, given the capillary pervasiveness of Eurocentrism and its co-
constitutive mechanisms (e.g., (neo-)colonialism), decolonizing science
education is not simply a process of desiring it to be decolonized. Rather,
it is (over-)written in a contradictory, conflicted, and contingent space in
which the very processes and practices that explicitly seek to dismantle
colonial logics often implicitly uphold and reinforce that which they seek
to challenge (Carter, 2004, 2005, 2010; Higgins, 2014; McKinley, 2001;
McKinley & Stewart, 2012; Sammel, 2009). On this, Carter (2004)
states:
The inclusion of Other’s science has the potential to trouble the cate-
gories of Western science, but the processes of cultural representation
and translation [i.e., differing and deferring Indigenous science] ensure
Western science remains authoritative in most settings. These processes
simultaneously work to separate, domesticate, and subsume, regulating the
boundaries and preserving the integrity of Western science and science
education. Hence, the inclusion of the Other’s science in school curricula
risks an empty form of pluralism implicated… in restorationist agendas to
reassert Western cultural control. (p. 832)
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In other words, there needs to be a constant vigilance and (re)evaluation
of decolonizing goals and processes, as they are always in co-constitutive
relation with (neo-)coloniality. As these discussions have primarily and
almost exclusively focused on (a particular) epistemological grounds or
locations (see Cobern & Loving, 2008; van Eijck & Roth, 2007), one
problematic production is the lack of attention to ontology in science
education.
On the topic of considering ontology within science education,
Sammel (2009) states that “given the pervasiveness of assimilationism
in Western science education” (p. 653), to only address the colonial
episteme leaves the systemic strategies and structures that “push for assim-
ilation of students into Western science ontology” (p. 653) to continue
functioning implicitly (see also Carter, 2004, 2005). This is to say that
to treat science education uniquely as a culture potentially masks the
ways in which Culture’s Other (i.e., Nature) is implicated with/in these
processes (see Barad, 2000, 2007; Latour, 1993). Again, this begets
the question, What are the ways in which the absent presence of the
metaphysics of modernity operate in science education? (e.g., represen-
tationalism, Nature/Culture binary; see Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Carter,
2004). While there is space for diverse ways-of-knowing through cultural
critique, Sammel (2009) invites us to consider how science pedagogies
and curriculums often work to make science accessible and responsive
to all learners, but then differ and defer these goals by falling back on
concepts-as-usual (e.g., scientific literacy) to achieve these goals: smug-
gling back in (neo-)colonial ways-of-knowing-in-being. Such a practice of
deferred and differing science-education-as-usual positions diverse ways-
of-knowing-nature that are not WMS as but different, and often lesser,
ways to attain the same goal of knowing nature with/in the ontology of
Western modernity (Carter, 2004, 2005; see also Latour, 1993).31 The
underlying and problematic message is that ontology is a singular affair
(Barad, 2007).32
Cartesianism, the classical Western ontological process through which
meaning and matter are individuated through separation from that which
co-constitutes them (e.g., mind/body, nature/culture; Apffel-Marglin,
2011; Barad, 2007; Cajete, 2006), often becomes the (only) ontology
onto which diverse ways-of-knowing differentially map. This tends to
differentially re-centre WMS as the metre stick against which all ways-
of-knowing and ways-of-being are measured. When Cartesianism is the
(only) ontology, it only makes sense that the epistemology of WMS that
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co-constitutes Cartesianism is best suited to work with/in this ontological
configuration (see Cobern & Loving, 2008). However, to forget that it
is an ontology rather than “ontology” (read: singular) when doing cross-
cultural and comparative work is to position other-than-Western-modern
ways-of-knowing at a taken-for-granted disadvantage, even when the
intent is to make space for both positions that extends beyond inclusion
and tolerance towards dialogue and collaboration. Accordingly, this also
complicates the entangled relationships held with/in school science for
those enacting other-than-Cartesian ways-of-being, such as Indigenous
ways-of-knowing-in-being, as they continue to be perceived as alterna-
tive but lesser ways of “reflecting” Nature as it is understood and enacted
through (the singularity of) Cartesianism (see Chapters 4–6).
When reaching and reading singularity, particularly singularities (e.g.,
Cartesianism) that impede the possibility of Indigenous science to-come,
it is productive to consider Cajete’s (1994) deconstructive invitation:
“Indigenous thinking honors the reality that there are always two sides
to the two sides. There are realities and realities. Learning how they
interact is real understanding” (p. 31). (Re)opening and re(con)figuring
science education to be able to respond to and receive Indige-
nous science to-come might entail considering co-constitutive relations
between what seems separate and separable quantities marked (wholly)
by relations of difference (e.g., Nature/Culture as nature-culture,
decolonizing/colonizing as de/colonizing, possibility/impossibility as
im/possibility).
In the next section, I detail the methodological approach to decolo-
nizing science education and research that guides process of reopening
the ability to respond in science education: deconstruction.
Second Orientation: (Re)Opening Science Education to Indigenous
Science to-Come Through Deconstruction and Reconstruction
Deconstruction has been developed by the French philosopher Jacques
Derrida and, very broadly, involves a critique of Western knowledge or
thought. Derrida … showed how anthropological knowledge is governed
by a philosophical category of the center (named Eurocentrism). The argu-
ment contends that in the last few hundred years Europe has constituted
and consolidated itself as sovereign and subject by constructing the colo-
nized according to the terms of the colonizer’s self-image. Deconstruction
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is the decentralization and decolonization of European thought… Hence,
deconstruction is a deconstruction of the concept, the authority, and the
assumed primacy of the category of “the West.” (McKinley & Aikenhead,
2005, p. 902)
Methodologically, this book works towards the “the decentralization
and decolonization of European thought” (McKinley & Aikenhead,
2005, p. 902) through deconstruction as an over-arching meta-approach
to work towards Indigenous science to-come. This is in line with
Battiste’s (2013a, b)33 and Donald’s (2012)34 conception of decolo-
nizing education as a “recursive process of deconstructing and then
reconstructing” (Donald, 2012, p. 547). Simultaneously, I heed the
warnings of post-colonial theorists and theory that the potentiality of
deconstruction and reconstruction lay in recognizing them as more-than
deconstruction and reconstruction as forms of taking apart and putting
together (see Derrida, 1976; Jackson & Mazzei, 2012; McKinley &
Aikenhead, 2005). Taking apart (i.e., destruction) through criticism,
as McKinley and Stewart (2012) suggest, is a “seemingly potent but
ultimately counter-productive strategy” (p. 545) in science education.
Rather, Battiste (2013b) argues that approaches to decolonizing educa-
tion “first and foremost must be framed within concepts of dialogue,
respect for educational pluralities, multiplicities, and diversities” (p. 107).
However, when criticism is perceived and enacted as taking apart, colo-
nial logics are replaced in but one sense of the word: displaced but
not always disrupted (see Kuokkanen, 2007; Spivak, 1994; see Chap-
ters 2 and 3). Deconstruction works against not only the Euro-centred
through Eurocentrism, but also the centering properties of Eurocentrism
through endeavouring to dismantle its logics of either/or. In turn, as
post-colonial theory presents Indigenous science to-come as a persistent
ethical im/possibility, this book tilts more heavily on the deconstructive
side, (re)considering reconstruction as inseparable from deconstruction
and as a form re( con)figuring (see Carter, 2005). As structure in science
education is not (fully) reached and, simultaneously, will never achieve
a state of being “deconstructed”, re(con)figuring is a continued decon-
struction, labouring between what a structure is, is not, and could be(come)
in response to an otherness who is yet-to-come (e.g., Indigenous science
to-come).
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Common Approaches to Cross-Cultural Methodologies in Science
Education. Prior to tracing how deconstruction as methodological
approach creates space for and supports wandering the pathways of
science education anew, it is important to touch on the ways in which
these problematic paths are usually journeyed upon. Just as teaching
and learning in science education are increasingly considered through
(socio-)cultural approaches (see Aikenhead, 2006a; Erickson, 2000),
so too are its cross-cultural methodologies. As McKinley (2007) states
regarding approaches to cross-cultural science education,
Dominating the field are approaches derived from anthropology, such as
worldviews, collateral learning, and border crossing. The anthropological
approach is a seductive one because it focuses on the culture and cultural
practices of different groups and treats science as a cultural activity. (p. 220)
However, at the same time, “science educators are seldom also trained
in associated disciplines, such as cultural studies” (McKinley & Stewart,
2012, p. 545). In turn, as McKinley (2001, 2007) and Carter (2004,
2005, 2010) state, culture comes to be perceived and enacted in ways
that often come to reify colonial constructs that they are working against,
albeit differently. For example, considering school science as having a
culture does not necessarily “critique the Eurocentrism inherent in stable
and unitary ideas of culture, identity, and context still to be found in some
of science education’s more traditional comparative and cross-cultural
studies” (Carter, 2004, p. 824). Modes such as worldview theory and
border crossing might be apt for considering the experience of a student
navigating between cultural spaces, but might not account for the power
relations in place between these knowledge systems which occurs beyond
the individual learner which produce the very borders they must cross
(Carter, 2004; McKinley, 2007). However, this is not to state that culture
should be jettisoned (thus reinforcing a status quo of science as acultural;
see Kirby, 2011). Rather, as culture offers both methodological possibility
and problematic (see Carter, 2010), it is important to use and trouble
this central referent to cross-cultural and multicultural science educa-
tion. Deconstruction, states McKinley and Aikenhead (2005), provides
such means to use and trouble culture within decolonizing and post-
colonial science education methodologies as it accounts for both process
and product of Eurocentrism and Cartesianism.35
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Deconstruction of/in Cross-cultural Science Education. Within
this book, I take a deconstructive stance that might best be described
as an “impossible ‘no’ to a structure which one critiques, yet inhabits
intimately” (Spivak, 1993/2009, p. 316). Critically inhabiting science
education entails refusing to inhabit it like that without refusing to
inhabit it altogether: deconstruction is at once critical and complicit (see
Chapter 3). In offering a succinct “how-to” for deconstruction,36 Spivak
(1976) suggests:
Deconstruction in a nutshell…[is] to locate the promising marginal text,
to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever
of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to
dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. (Spivak,
1976, p. lxxvii)
Spivak (1976) describes the process of bearing witness to undecidability
as being on the lookout for snags in meaning when it stops working
as intended, in which the absence of unified meaning might come to
threaten the very structure which it occupies. In short, this entails paying
attention to, and making use of, concepts and categories whose meanings
vacillate between a meaning and a constitutive otherness; intentionally
(mis)reading them by tinkering with meanings otherwise unintended but
potentially signalled by that which is there (see Biesta, 2009; Derrida,
1976; Spivak, 1976; St. Pierre, 2011). Echoing Spivak (1976), McKinley
and Aikenhead (2005) state of deconstruction in decolonizing science
education that:
…the key to deconstruction is not the identification of the dichotomy and
the inversion, (although that work is necessary and we do not wish to
underestimate it), but the displacement of such thinking. In other words,
how does one re-think these fundamental ideas? How does one displace
those assumptions that make “natural” meaning possible? Furthermore,
can deconstruction as a critique lift itself off the page to have any practical
application? (p. 903, emphasis in original)
Importantly, McKinley and Aikenhead (2005) remind that deconstruc-
tion should not strictly be theory for theory’s sake. Rather, as Lather
(2007) states, it is important to “[put] theory to work” by using theory
(e.g., deconstruction) towards and without losing sight of the critical
goals that one sets out to achieve (e.g., decolonizing).37 Deconstruction
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must be always already be deconstructing the theory/practice that keep
the two separate and separable (e.g., producing practice as “atheoreti-
cal”, and theory as a practice of “armchair philosophy”): “the production
of theory is also a practice; the opposition between ‘pure’ theory and
concrete ‘applied’ practice is too quick and easy” (Spivak, 1988a, p. 275).
There are three inseparable binary relations that feature strongly
within this book: Self/Other, Nature/Culture, and ethical possi-
bility/impossibility.
Deconstructing Self/Other. Given that cultural (re)constructions of
Otherness continue to be problematic within science education such that
they (re)centre colonial logics and subjects, a prevalent (but not unprob-
lematic) solution is often to reverse the gaze onto the Self (i.e., the
(neo-)colonial subject) of colonizing relationships (see Pillow, 2003). As
Tuck (2009) articulates, researchers do not need, nor should they use
the suffering of Indigenous, diasporic, and other post-colonial students
as evidence of colonial violence and as ethical motivation for research.
Above and beyond providing positive representations of these students,
there is always the possibility to look back at the culture of power that
produces this violence. However, to (too simply) displace the gaze by
reversing the hierarchy does not always disrupt it (particularly if the gaze
continues to operate similarly, albeit with a different target). Here, Lather
(2007) suggests a double(d) reversal of the ethnographic gaze. Such a
double(d) reversal entails both the literal reversal of studying those who
do the studying (i.e., in order to reverse the direction of the ethnographic
gaze), as well as the study of the ways in which those who do the studying
study (i.e., in order to reverse the way in which the ethnographic gaze is
produced). Such deconstructive Self-reflexivity might allow for the possi-
bility of thinking without the thing with which you think (when the thing
with which you think is part of the problem), producing the possibility
for alternate ways of being and becoming science educator and researcher.
For example, inverting the production of the gaze also entails resisting
a simple displacement of colonial violence and, further, houses the poten-
tial to disrupt it. I recognize there is something important in extending
a genuine invitation a relationship-to-come, even if its potentiality is not
enacted (see also Kuokkanen, 2007). Herein, I work to not negate the
work science educators who might disagree with the very premise of this
book. Rather, I extend an invitation to dialogue across difference towards
them.
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Further, in considering the Self/Other binary, I recognize that it is
important to move “the postcolonial critique of Eurocentrism beyond
identity politics, to the level of an epistemic challenge to science”
(McKinley & Stewart, 2012, p. 551). Spivak (1993/2009) states that
to reduce scholarship to identity politics can be a way which the workings
of power are (re)produced:
I have long held that in the arena of decolonization proper, the call to a
complete boycott of so-called Western male theories is class-interested and
dangerous. For me, the agenda has been to stake out the theories’ limits,
constructively to use them. (p. x)
In other words, deconstructing the colonial Self/Other binary does not
preclude any one identity from participating in the workings of power,
even if the circulation of power is uneven and unequal across different
identity positions (see also Spivak, 1988a). Furthermore, as Spivak (1994)
states,
It seems more responsible that, instead of falling back on the deceptive
simplicity of a proposition [(e.g., “a complete boycott of Western male
theories”)] and taking that as sufficient fulfillment of … philosophical
responsibility, … [we could] philosophize with all stops pulled out, without
denegating [our] complicity, to present [such proposition] as pharmakon,
what could have been medicine turned into poison. (Spivak, 1994, p. 34)
To strictly operate from an identity politics position in which “Western
male theorists” (such as myself) are excluded runs the risk of stating
that those excluded are “inherently” Eurocentric (i.e., being) rather than
shaped with/in Eurocentrism (i.e., becoming). This risks foreclosing the
space of possibility to not be Eurocentric like that (and invariably, leaving
particular individuals “off the hook”; see Kuokkanen, 2007).
In turn, the theory-practices that I employ throughout this book
are selected (but not “validated” as non-Eurocentric or unproblematic)
for their ability to displace and disrupt the metaphysics of modernity
and (re)open science education towards disrupting and displacing the
Self/Other binary as it prevents Indigenous science to-come (e.g., Carter,
2004; McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005). Significantly, science’s and science
education’s Self constructs Nature as it’s Other as well.
Deconstructing Nature/Culture. As Spivak (1993/2009) states, “if
the lines of making sense of something are laid down in a certain way,
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then you are able to only do things with that something which are
possible within and by the arrangement of those lines” (p. 34). Science
education often dialectically subsumes, sublates, and sutures over many
of the pluralities, multiplicities, and diversities called for in decolonizing
and post-colonial science education. As detailed in previous (sub)sections,
these enactments are achieved through an implicit and often taken-for-
granted centering of Cartesianism,38 while simultaneously working to
erase other ontologies and Cartesianism’s own workings by presenting
itself as the (only) ontology. Recall that Cartesianism is an ontological
enactment through which the Nature/Culture binary is (re)produced and
producible.
I endeavour to work within and against this problematic structure
that (re)constitutes science education; labouring within and against the
clôture of metaphysics that is (and is always becoming) singular, stable,
and subsuming (see Chapter 5 for a fulsome exploration of this).
Deconstructing possibility/impossibility. To reiterate, deconstruction
and reconstruction are not deconstruction and reconstruction (see
Jackson & Mazzei, 2012); this process is not destroying and then
rebuilding. Deconstruction and reconstruction invariably share a rela-
tion of co-constitution (see Chapter 7). As Spivak (1994) outlines, the
very possibility of reconstruction as ethical response to a call of otherness
such as Indigenous science to come is premised on responsibility. In turn,
ethical responsibility is inevitably premised upon the ability to respond:
It is that all action is undertaken in response to a call (or something that
seems to us to resemble a call) that cannot be grasped as such. Response
here involves not only “respond to,” as in “give an answer to,” but also
the related situations of “answering to,” as in being responsible for a name
(this brings up the question of the relationship between being responsible
for/to ourselves and for/to others); of being answerable for … It is also,
when it is possible for the other to be face-to-face, the task and lesson of
attending to her response so that it can draw forth one’s own. (Spivak,
1994, p. 22)
In its multiplicity, responsibility for Spivak calls upon the ability to
respond in the moment, to take responsibility for the (inevitable)
inability to respond, and to continuously be responsible towards the very
(im)possibility of responding to the other whose experiences, ways-of-
knowing, and ways-of-being sit outside of the register of what we can
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know. The ability to respond is always, at best, partial as the Other to
whom response is granted is, as Spivak (1988a) reminds, “irretrievably
heterogeneous” (p. 284) and hence “non-narrativisable” (p. 284): that
which is to-come can never (fully) be known as it is always already within
the co-constitutive exteriority of that which can be known and responded
to.
However, working with purpose but without guarantee is par for the
course when it comes to deconstruction: “the philosophy of [decon-
struction] cannot be used to ward off accountability, answerability,
responsibility … It can only ever be a reminder of its open-ended and irre-
ducible risk” (Spivak, 1994, p. 27). While working towards reconstructing
science education with Indigenous peoples, places, and protocols in mind,
I remain hyper-vigilant: the very frames through which recognition of
Indigenous science to-come occurs are differential articulations of that
which makes it such that this call “cannot be grasped as such” (Spivak,
1994, p. 22). It follows that the reconstruction herein focuses largely on
the ability to respond on a continued deconstruction and (re)opening
of the space of response within science education towards Indigenous
ways-of-knowing-in-being.
Conclusion: Towards a Metaphysics
of Response-Ability in Science Education
Responsibility implies response-ability, but responsibility of [science educa-
tion] must also go beyond innocence. … innocence takes a special form of
choosing not to know in order to exercise patterns of systemic privilege.
(Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 154)
Returning to the question of where do we begin?, it is important to
take head of the ways in which Leroy Little Bear (2016) signalled in
his talk, Blackfoot Metaphysics is Waiting in the Wings, that there is no
metaphysics that exists outside of its relationship to others. This is to
repeat and reiterate that Western modern science and Indigenous ways-
of-knowing-in-being are always already in relation. The task at hand is
not to begin a new relation but rather to engage the relation anew.
Specifically, it is significant to not only attend to but also be answer-
able to the the troubled and troubling relationship between Indigenous
and Western ways-of-knowing-in-being which contribute to the ways in
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which Indigenous peoples, practices are rendered absent presences within
science education, or how Indigenous metaphysics continues to “wait in
the wings”. Importantly, this work includes accounting for and being
accountable to the ways in which science education has been masking
power with innocence, such as decontextualized (e.g., ahistorical, acul-
tural) accounts of difference that make it such that Indigeneity comes to
be presented as a dichotomously deficient otherness.
While the question is no longer, if it ever was, whether or not science
education has a responsibility, the question of (how) is science education
is able to respond? lingers and persists. Science education has made great
strides in the past few decades in treating science and science education,
respectively, as cultural practices which could ethnographically be inves-
tigated: revealing the ways in which these spaces continue to (re)centre
Western ways-of-knowing and erasing others in the process. However,
if we take seriously the double(d) task of unsettling science education
as the simultaneous processes of decolonizing and deconstructing, it
becomes important to recognize the sedimented notions which uphold
settler-colonial logics and structures, even when these “settled” beliefs
are leveraged towards critical aims as they shape both ability and inability
to respond to Indigenous science to-come. For example, the Carte-
sian belief, and colonial import, that Culture as dichotomously opposed
to Nature comes to partially reproduce the colonial structures worked
against. It is for this reason that I have stated elsewhere that, within
spaces of science education, “it might be time to begin thinking of decol-
onization as de/colonization” (Higgins, 2014, p. 265) by taking seriously
the ways in which (neo-)colonial logics unavoidably come to shape even
the ways in which they are responded within our theories, concepts, and
practices.
It is not enough to take responsibility for the ways in which
science education dialectically negates Indigenous science to-come unless
such action engages with the “difficult and contradictory nature of
de/colonization” (Subreenduth, 2006, p. 628). Moving towards a more
responsible science education also engages in “an iterative (re)opening
up to, an enabling of responsiveness” (Barad, 2010, p. 265) by attending
to the ways in which the ability to respond is always already shaped by
(neo-)colonial logics. Recognizing that some nodes are more pressing
and productive than others, this work of response-ability (see Chapter 2)
entails attending to the absent presences of science education which
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complicate and complexify the ability to respond: What cultural prac-
tices are masked when science is presented as or functions as acultural
(see Chapter 3)? What theories inhabit scientific practice when they
are treated as atheoretical (see Chapter 4)? What metaphysical commit-
ments are rendered invisible when science is defined in opposition to the
metaphysical (see Chapter 5)? What shared histories (and futures yet-to-
come) haunt science education when the relation between Indigenous
and Western ways-of-knowing-in-being are presented as but a new one
(see Chapter 6)?
Notes
1. Within this chapter, such there-thens entangled with the here-now might
notably include the following SpaceTime coordinates: Calgary, Canada
2016 [Leroy Little Bear’s Big Thinking Address at the Canadian Congress
of the Social Sciences and Humanities]; Kalamazoo, US 1992 [first
“Science Dialogues”]; diffracted through Stony Nakoda Nation (west of
Calgary), Canada 1989 [Native science conference, Little Bear meets Peat
and makes arrangements to meet David Bohm]; Albuquerque, US 1999
[Science dialogues continue where original funds from Fetzer institute
ran out]; Ottawa, Canada 1994 [David Peat writes the introduction to
the first edition of Blackfoot Physics]; Thunder Bay, Canada 2008 [I read
Blackfoot Physics for the first time]; Iqaluit, Canada 2009 [I am delivering
my first cross-cultural science education research project]; Edmonton,
Canada, 2019 [where/when I am (re)writing this introduction].
2. I use the expression ways-of-knowing-in-being throughout this book
for three reasons. First, it is a nod to the notion that knowing and
learning are always already processes. As Aikenhead and Elliot (2010)
suggest, “the expression Indigenous knowledge is problematic because the
word knowledge is embedded in a Eurocentric epistemology” (p. 322,
emphasis in original; see also Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007). Rather, within
many Indigenous languages, knowing and learning are not expressed as a
product (i.e., knowledge, a noun) but rather as a process (i.e., coming-
to-knowing, a verb): as Peat (2002) states, “coming-to-knowing means
entering into relationship with the spirit of knowledge, with plants and
animals, with beings that animate dreams and visions, and with the spirit
of the people” (p. 65). Second, coming-to-know is inseparable from
coming-to-being. They are ongoing and interconnected epistemological
and ontological processes that are deeply relational and holistically inter-
woven into the fabric of everyday life (Aikenhead & Michell, 2011;
Bang & Marin, 2015; Cajete, 1994, 2000, 2015). Lastly, it is to signal
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plurality with a reminder that plurality does not entail a form of relativism
(McKinley, 2007).
Furthermore, as Aikenhead and Michell (2011) state, “reading a book
is not adequate for understanding specific Indigenous practices (e.g., berry
picking or fishing), which invariably require experiential learning” (p. xii).
Rather than seeking to reach the problematic closure and containment
of knowledge, they propose that appreciating might be a more apt way
of approaching Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being (while not in itself
unproblematic, even if strategic; see Kuokkanen, 2007). Not only this, as
Cajete (1994) suggests of the textuality of his own work on Indigenous
ways-of-knowing-in-being, that writing for an academic audience shapes
what can be said, what cannot, as well as how. In other words, translation
with/in, as well as for, academic traditions differentially produces how
Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being are (re)presented. This differential
ecology of relations (partially shaped by the vales of the academy) matters.
3. Importantly, Other is used throughout the book not as a statement of
being (e.g., identity), but as a process of othering which says more about
the colonial Self from which this representation is projected: “the process
of containing the ‘other’ for colonial, imperial purposes…; it involves
domesticating an incommensurable and discontinuous ‘other’ in order to
consolidate the imperialist self” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 101).
4. The addressee to whom the account of this work is given to is of no small
significance, both in terms of what can and cannot be enunciated, as well
as its possible possibilities and problematics. As Butler (2005) states,
There can be no account of myself that does not, to some extent
conform to the norms that govern the humanly recognizable, or
that negotiate these terms in some ways, with various risks following
from that negotiation. … No account takes place outside the struc-
ture of address, even if the addressee remains implicit and unnamed,
anonymous and unspecified. The address establishes the account as
an account. (p. 36)
Whereas I generally address my work to others already and actively
engaged in processes of decolonizing education, the intended addressee
in this work is, more generally, those situated in the field of science
education whose consideration of decolonization and/or post-coloniality
is to-come (as an unactualized potentiality and a tout-autre [wholly other]
whose voice has gone unheard because it cannot yet be heard; see Spivak,
1993/2009). This entails that, as a means of (ethically) accounting for
and being accountable to this implicit addressee, I often draw from epis-
temic resources that may be intelligible as such (e.g., canonical science
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education literature and well-recognizable scholars) in my efforts to work
at the limits of intelligibility (i.e., to (re)open science education to the
possibility of Indigenous science to-come).
However, as Butler (2005) states, the productive necessity of giving an
account over to an addressee is not without risk. Here, the most significant
risks posed by this are that, first, there risks a too-easy and representa-
tional (ist) reading which produces a perception that Indigenous science
wholly yet-to-come (see next footnote) or that this is a space that has
not been and continues to be laboured by Indigenous and ally scholars.
Secondly, working within this space of un/intelligibility nonetheless defers
and differs intended meanings of Indigenous science; but how does one
articulate the unarticulable within the frames that render them such (see
Ahenakew, 2016; Higgins & Kim, 2019; McKinley & Stewart, 2012)? For
example, an Indigenous “sense of place” (Cajete, 1994) and other lived
concepts are differentially articulable and intelligible when accounting for
and being accountable to this double(d) relation to science education and
Indigenous science.
5. Interestingly, the common sense and taken-for-granted assumption that
metaphysics is in a singular sense is so prevalent that even auto-correct
suggests that metaphysics as plural is a grammatical error (see Chapter 5).
6. These dialogues began in 1992 (see Little Bear, 1994; Parry, 2008; Peat,
2002, 2007) but have seemingly ceased in the last few years.
7. The first edition, entitled Lighting the Seventh Fire, drew from and was
released two years following the 1992 Science Dialogues .
8. Importantly, throughout the book I use the Indigenous science to not
only signal the ways in which Indigenous peoples have practiced ways-
of-living-with-Nature since time immemorial, but also the ways in which
Indigenous peoples critically and creatively engage with science, such as
the emergent field of Indigenous Science, Technology, and Society studies
(STS)(e.g., TallBear, 2013). This is significant as:
Indigenous knowledge includes knowledge of imperialism from the
West, the East or even from the neighbours, deep knowledge of
colonizers and the practices and effects of colonization, of different
religions that were imposed, of nation states formed by different
conceptions of a state, western democratic, socialist or communist,
and of the institutions of the state. (Smith et al. 2016, p. 136)
Where colonial logics attempt to perpetually relegate Indigeneity and what
it has to offer as fixed, particular, and a “tradition”: it is important to
attend to the ways in which Indigenous peoples continue to engage with
the natural world as well as with science as conventionally defined.
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9. There are also many already present spaces that have been masked through
their dialectic negation. Here are but three examples that I am familiar
with. First, a more situated naming of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs might
be Maslow’s (mis)interpretation of a hierarchy of Blackfoot needs from his
time spent with the Blackfoot when he was “stuck” on his working devel-
opmental theory (Blackstock, 2011). Secondly, aspirin is the synthetic
simile of a willow-bark-based traditional medicine that was “discovered”
by the Bayer pharmaceutical company (Snively & Corsiglia, 2001). Third,
as Cajete (2000) states, Native Americans had a central role in “estab-
lishing uses for asphalt and other petroleum products” (p. 190) such as
petroleum jelly as a salve for treating burns and open wounds and asphalt
as a waterproofing material.
10. Spivak (1999) suggests that sanctioned ignorance is not only a practice
of strategically not knowing other(ed) ways-of-knowing and -being, but
also a collective forgetting of oppressive structures and practices that are
(re)produced by dominant groups: “the mainstream has never run clean…
part of mainstream education involves learning to ignore this absolutely,
with a sanctioned ignorance” (p. 2).
Importantly, such as stance is well documented in spaces of Indige-
nous education. Notably, Potawatomi-Lenapé scholar Susan Dion (2007)
refers to it as the “perfect stranger,” a stance simultaneously marked by an
avoidance of taking up colonial complicities and claiming to know little to
nothing about Indigenous peoples, places, and practices (see also Higgins,
Madden, & Korteweg, 2015).
11. This can be stated not only for the substantive content, but also in rela-
tion to the ways in which the medium is the message (see Cajete, 2015;
Higgins & Madden, 2018): specifically, Peat’s (2002) book is an early
text written for an audience that might not even consider the existence of
Indigenous ways-of-living-with-Nature. However, as Kuokkanen (2007)
states, inviting an audience towards an appreciative stance is not without
consequence:
Developping an understanding and appreciation for the “other” is
not only an inadequate response, but also an irresponsible one.
It reflects a specific type of racism that enables the dominant to
occupy the position of universality while consigning the “other”
to a partial and particular one. Through distancing, the dominant
takes the position of privilege and is able to disassociate itself from
any active commitment to a relationship, to reciprocation. (p. 109)
Importantly, the distancing produced through such a stance removes
readers in positions of power from being implicated: presenting them with
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only the lovely knowledge of such an inquiry and sparing them from the
difficult knowledge (e.g., inheriting colonial legacies).
12. Directly related to the notion of making a different future occur in the
context of colonial institutions is the concept of futurity. As Patel (2016)
describes it,
Futurity is the imprint, the scent, the murmur of what is in the
future. In that sense, it is actually unknowable in the immediate,
as its discrete details are not available through current lenses. You
can’t map futurity; you can only map possible futurities. Learning,
similarly, is an act of letting go of what one knows for what one
does not yet know…. As long as coloniality has been in existence,
so has learning, and it’s important to remember that not only has
learning predated and will survive coloniality, but that it has existed
despite, because of, and in defiance of coloniality. (p. 95)
13. This is not to state that Indigenous science is flatly yet-to-come as it is a
practice of living with Nature that Indigenous peoples have been enacting
with/in place since time immemorial (see Cajete, 1994, 2000; Kawagley,
2006). Rather, it is to state that it is still (partially) “waiting in the wings”
of science education (see McKinley, 2007; McKinley & Stewart, 2012).
14. This distinction bears significance both to the ways in which Indigenous
science is othered within science education, but also the role of meta-
physics. Analogously to science education, which simultaneously strives
to be for all students but always already fails in the effort, Derrida
(1994/2006) suggests that democracies are (by definition) shaped by
“the gap between fact and ideal” (p. 80) which is marked by “failure,
inadequation, disjunction, disadjustment, being ‘out of joint’”) (p. 81).
Stating that this is not only the case for older forms of government, but
also contemporary ones, Derrida (1994/2006) offers that the promise of
democracy is always deferred and differing from what can be done and
even imagined in the present:
… we always propose to speak of a democracy to come, not of a
future democracy in the future present, not even of a regulating
idea… – at least to the extent that their inaccessibility would still
retain the temporal form of a future present, of a future modality of
the living present. (p. 81, emphasis in original)
This is to state that, for Derrida, the call to democracy cannot be fully
heeded within a present moment, or even a future present which prob-
lematically displaces a current imaginary elsewhen. To-come signals a not
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yet which must be worked towards, which must be received hospitably,
but whose arrival cannot be anticipated. This is perhaps even more so the
case in science education where the very process of becoming scientific
is framed in opposition to Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being, rather
than strictly a failure to achieve an ideal (e.g., science education for all). It
is perhaps for this reason that Plains Cree scholar Cash Ahenakew (2017)
states, “the work of decolonization is not about what we do not imagine,
but what we cannot imagine from our Western ways of knowing” (p. 88):
Indigenous science is to-come within the context of science education.
15. Practice, as enacted and discussed herein, is not strictly understood in
the conventional sense (e.g., institutional teaching and learning). Rather,
the practice prominently articulated and employed herein is that of decol-
onizing and post-colonial science education scholarship-as-practice. This
is in line with decolonizing and post-colonial science education scholars
who articulate that theory too is a practice (Carter, 2005; McKinley &
Aikenhead, 2005), as well as recent calls in science education there is too
much focus on empiricism (and in turn too much data) and not enough
scholarship-as-practice (see Carter, 2010). Furthermore, it is also in line
with conceptions of decolonizing and educational research which advo-
cate for attentiveness to the practices one is already engaged in, as well
as the norms through which attention is deferred elsewhere and differed:
paying attention to the process without relegating its justification to the
product (see Higgins & Kim, 2019; Smith et al., 2016).
16. One of the reasons for this, as Tuck and Yang (2012) offer, is that “decol-
onization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and
internal colony have no spatial separation” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 7);
coloniality is always a proximal relation in settler contexts.
17. Potential is significant to highlight here. As Aikenhead (2006a) points
out, “students and many teachers react to being placed in the political
position of having to play school games” (p. 28). In turn, they often
creatively subvert this positioning by playing what is called “Fatima’s
game” in science education “to make it appear as if significant science
learning has occurred even though it has not” (p. 28).
Importantly, it is worth noting the larger, beyond-school context in
which these logics plays out. Notably as there are, most significantly,
ongoing practices in which Indigenous peoples continue to be the object
of science (see TallBear, 2013).
18. See Aikenhead and Elliot (2010) for the various qualitative and quantita-
tive science education studies that come to inform this figure.
19. In short, Eurocentrism is a discursive force which (re)centres Western
modern(ist) culture, people, places, and histories as the normative stan-
dard against which other ways-of-knowing are judged, usually as lesser
and deficient (see Battiste, 2005, 2013b). It is not only the “colonizer’s
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model of the world” (Blaut, 1993, p. 10), but also a colonizing model of
the world. Operating through diffusionism, a forced spread of culture, it
erases or assimilates non-Eurocentric knowledge systems establishing “the
dominant group’s knowledge, experience, culture and knowledge as the
universal norm” (Battiste, 2005, p. 124).
20. I use “post-colonial student” here as a general category and concept
to include other-than-Indigenous and other-than-diasporic students who
might also might be negatively impacted by ongoing (neo-)colonialism
and/or who are implicated and involved in the productive friction
signalled by the “post” (i.e., an ever partial but nonetheless productive
attempt to move beyond (neo-)coloniality).
21. For example, as Arapaho scholar Michael Marker (2019) signals, without
wanting to diminish the efforts of individual Indigenous students, the
desire to tell stories of Indigenous successes of participating within science
can also mask not only the stories of those who have not successfully
negotiated and navigated the space, but also can take attention away from
the systems and structures which make such a journey a difficult one to
begin with. As Ahenakew (2017) states, this can often be read as “a move
to distract from more unsettling Indigenous demands for decolonization”
(p. 85).
22. Here, inheritance comes to bear in a meaningful way: if we take Indige-
nous (e.g., Cajete, 1994) and quantum (e.g., Barad, 2007) metaphysics
seriously, our pasts continue to present themselves even if they are but
absent presences (see also Derrida, 1994/2006). This bears relevance as
the debate is left unresolved (despite the occasional claim of resolution);
it continues to haunt what science education is and can be in the present
and into the future.
23. Decolonizing, Indigenous, and post-colonial scholarship share many
similar facets. However, as McKinley (2007) states,
Postcolonialism is controversial among many groups… For many
[I]ndigenous researchers [and allies] the term signals that the Euro-
pean imperial project, and the appropriation of the ‘Other’ as a
form of knowledge, has been assigned to an historical past… This
understanding is always present in postcolonialism… [However,]
postcolonialism can be used to mean “beyond;” instead of arguing
lineal progression of before and after a point in history, another
dimension is added with this alternative meaning… “beyond”
suggests that boundaries or borders have become blurred. (p. 201,
emphasis in original)
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Most famously, Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s (1999/2012) rejection of post-
colonialism (as and through its first meaning of “after” colonization) is
most cited today, even if she has since revisited and revised her earlier
statement to consider the second interpretation to be deeply productive
in practice:
the idea that postcolonialism is more than what I have previously
viewed with scepticism as a not very good historical moment because
it does not really exist, there is no post to colonialism; more than a
methodology one can deploy to study difference, it is, rather, an
emergent, growing body of knowledge; there is a knowingness that
a postcolonial research disposition can reach, can see, can seek, can
come to know. (Smith, 2005, p. 552)
24. With respect to coloniality, neo-coloniality, and their relationship, Spivak
(1999) states the following:
Let us learn to discriminate the terms colonialism – in the European
formation stretching from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth
centuries – neocolonialism – dominant economic, political, and
culturalist maneuvers emerging in our century after the uneven
dissolution of the territorial empires – and postcolonialism – the
contemporary global condition, since the first term is supposed to
have passed or be passing into the second. (p. 172, emphasis in
original)
By highlighting that the contemporary global post-colonial condition
is supposed to have passed from colonialism to neo-colonialism, Spivak
brings attention to the ways in which coloniality and neo-coloniality
are bound by a relationship of constitutive exclusion. In other words,
even though they are often framed as historically distinct (i.e., past and
present), the ongoing project of territorial imperialism (colonialism) is
never absent but always already present, even if it is increasingly tied
to a project of economic imperialism (neo-colonialism). I signal this
assumption through the use of the term (neo-)colonial throughout the
book.
25. Battiste’s (2013a, b) framework is overarching. An implicit message
throughout her scholarship is that the work of decolonizing education
is multi-faceted, multi-sited, divergent, and pluralistic in nature. In turn,
decolonizing education resists the notion that there is a way of doing
it – that difference and diversity in positionalities, contexts, approaches,
and inclinations are strengths rather than weaknesses. This is particularly
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significant (in general and within this book) as the metaphysics of moder-
nity, as well as its Eurocentric and Cartesian modes are not uniform, but
rather are differentially articulated across diverse locations.
26. For Spivak, education is a post-colonial site that discursively produces the
very conditions of ethical im/possibility: education places teachers with
(unlike) others while institutionally framing learning as knowing what is
best for the other (see Andreotti, 2007, 2011; Spivak, 1993/2009).
27. Importantly, the post-colonial inflection on decolonizing that is
de/colonizing similarly employs a two-prong process. As Rhee and
Subreenduth (2006) unpack, de/colonizing approaches employ “two
interrelated moves” (p. 547):
First, projects of de/colonization need to reveal and disrupt the
ways in which imperialism constructs the inferior Others within
and beyond the West through complex apparatuses of oppres-
sion…. Second, [they] examine the process[es] by which societies
and individuals interpret, negotiate, subvert and re-construct such
knowledge/power to create performative possibilities for them-
selves. (p. 547)
28. In her ethnography of school-based science education, Deborah Pomeroy
(1994) came to refer to the “standard account” curriculum of WMS as
one of White Male Science.
29. Of course, “decolonizing school science begins at the stage of ‘accep-
tance’” (Aikenhead, 2006c, p. 393, emphasis in original): an acceptance
of IWLN and that decolonizing school science is a goal that is worthwhile
and important (see also Kuokkanen, 2007).
30. However, integration of Indigenous perspectives does not always entail
or require “acceptance” (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, even an intent to
accept Indigenous science is not necessarily unproblematic.
31. Latour (1993) refers to this as “particular universalism”: a framework in
which Nature is stable and outside of Culture in which diverse cultural
positionings mediate access to knowledge about Nature, but in which
“one society - and it is always the Western one - defines the general frame-
work of Nature with respect to which the others are situated” (p. 105).
In other words, it is a conceived of and enacted as an epistemic privilege.
32. This is a significant location to labour as some scholars, such as Cobern
and Loving (2008), problematically articulate the corollary argument that
the epistemology of WMS (i.e., epistemic realism) should be considered
the best way of knowing Nature of its high level of alignment with a
Cartesian ontology (see Chapter 5).
33. While Battiste (2013a, b) does not come to state explicitly how she
understands deconstruction or whom she draws upon, a persistent theme
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throughout this book is generous and generative (mis)readings. Rather
than criticize what some might perceive as a lack (as negation forecloses
possibility), such indeterminacy can be read as a gift of potentiality and of
meaning that is productively on the move that might come to respond to
diverse contexts (see Kuokkanen, 2007).
34. Donald’s (2012) use of deconstruction/reconstruction primarily hinges
upon Indigenous-non-Indigenous relationships that are already being
enacted. Here, deconstruction does not entail a destruction of the hybrid,
complex, and contradictory space interfacing Indigenous and Western
thought and being. Rather, it entails keeping an eye out for porous loca-
tions in order to reconfigure, rethink, and differently enact the relations
that are there to create new and renewed possibilities for ethical relation-
ality (see also Nakata, 2007a, 2007b). This metaphor is productive in
differentially coming-to-understand the ways in which the post-colonial
concept of de/colonizing is enacted throughout this book.
35. While still under-employed and -explored in science education, decon-
struction provides the possibility of (re)openings in a multiplicity of
seemingly stuck and sedimented locations by deferring and differing
concepts which problematically present themselves as stable such as repre-
sentation and self-identity (e.g., Gilbert, 2001; Gough & Price, 2009;
Sammel, 2010).
36. However, the question What is deconstruction? is always fraught; it is an
approach that works against the metaphysical stasis that comes with the
word “is” (see Derrida, 1976). So much so, that Derrida (1976) takes
up the complicity between is and and seriously: “in French, ‘is’ (est ) and
‘and’ (et ) ‘sound the same’” (Spivak, in Derrida, 1976, p. 30) but share
a much more complex relationship of signification. Because the statement
of this is that is never fully achieved or achievable due to that always
already being an unfaithful reproduction of this, an is statement is always
to a certain degree an and statement. This is to say that, for Derrida,
Being (i.e., to be) or presence is always deferred.
More importantly, as Spivak (1993/2009) suggests, Derrida “does not
develop a systematic description of this mode of operation. (There is, after
all, no useful definition of deconstruction anywhere in Derrida’s work)”
(p. 31). Thus, any account of deconstruction must always be partial as
deconstruction is always already on the move; the discontinuity that is
deconstruction is in itself dis/continuous such that Derrida does not have
the final word on deconstruction (see Barad, 2010; Kirby, 2011).
37. Importantly, deconstruction simultaneously is not, and should not
become, theory for the sake of theory. As Derrida (1994/2006) offers
about deconstruction, “what remains irreducible to any deconstruction,
what remains as undeconstructible as the possibility itself of decon-
struction is, perhaps, a certain experience of the emancipatory promise”
(p. 74).
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38. For example, at the time of writing, even auto-correct suggests that
ontology is a singular affair (via grammatical suggestions; i.e., ontology
rather than an ontology).
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CHAPTER 2
TheHomework of Response-Ability in Science
Education
The purpose of this chapter1 is to introduce response-ability as a concept
and practice to (re)open science education’s understanding and enact-
ments of responsibility towards Indigenous ways-of-living-with-nature
(IWLN) and traditional ecological knowledge (TEK). This is significant
as even well-intentioned forms of responsibility are often and inadver-
tently overcoded by the (neo-)colonial logics that it sets out to refuse
and resist: responsibility and the ability to respond are often not one
and the same. Within this chapter, I revisit a significant personal peda-
gogical encounter in which this distinction made itself felt and known.
Thinking with the work of Sami scholar Rauna Kuokkanen, this narrative
provides a platform to explore practices of epistemic ignorance and its (co-
)constitutive relation to knowledge, as well as what she refers to as “the
homework of response-ability” required to (re)open the norms of respon-
siveness towards the possibility of heeding the call of Indigenous science
from within the structure of science education. Concluding thoughts
underscore the promise of deconstruction (rather than destruction)2 as
a theoretical, methodological, and ethical tool to resist the (fore)closure
of responsibility towards hospitably receiving Indigenous science on its
own terms.
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and De/Colonizing Science Education
There is no single, simple, exhaustive answer to the complex question of
how we can know the “other” …. We must redefine the problem not
in terms of knowing the “other” but in terms of learning to “see” the
existence of epistemes [ways-of-knowing] that have long been rendered
invisible. We need to redefine the question in terms of a convergence of
epistemes. (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 120)
As explored in the previous chapter, “there is no single, simple, exhaus-
tive answer to the complex question of how we can know the ‘other’”
(Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 120) in (and importantly of ) science education.
This is in part because even when Indigenous science (see Cajete, 2000) is
included within school science, rather than excluded, it is often ways that
differ from or defer its intended meanings. Differentially, each exclusion
or problematic inclusion enacts (partial) dialectic negations of Indigenous
science by sublating, subsuming, or suturing over it. “We must redefine
the problem not in terms of knowing the ‘other’ but in terms of learning
to ‘see’ the existence of epistemes [ways-of-knowing] that have long
been rendered invisible” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 120) as the very framing
of the problem is not without consequence. For Indigenous, diasporic,
and other post-colonial students, such school science regularly produces
experiences of cultural assimilation and acculturation rather than encul-
turation. In other words, rather than a harmonious interfacing of cultures
(i.e., enculturation), encounters of school science are more likely to house
potential for dialectical negation that is either actualized (i.e., assimilation)
or remains un-actualized through students’ complex and complicated
curricular navigation (i.e., acculturation). For these students whose daily
lived experiences continue to be negatively impacted by colonial logics
(e.g., Eurocentrism), this manifests as a form of epistemic violence. Here,
as mentioned within the previous chapter, science education and educa-
tors have a responsibility for which there are but only alibis for turning
away.
However, in thinking with Sami scholar Rauna Kuokkanen (2007),
whose scholarship centres Western modern educational and institutional
responsibility towards Indigenous ways-of-knowing and ways-of-being, it
is not sufficient to take up this responsibility: “We need to redefine the
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question” (p. 120) of responsibility itself. As stated above, and simply
put, we need responsible ways to be responsible: science education cannot
be responsible towards Indigenous science if it cannot perceive it and
be responsible for the ways in which it has and continues to render
it invisible. For there to be responsibility, there must be an ability to
respond: how we (re)define and approach the question of IWLN in
science education matters, in both senses of the word (i.e., matters and
materializes).
As an emergent scholar pursuing unsettling science education and
aspiring ally, the primary orientation that guides my efforts is ethi-
cally heeding the call of Indigenous science (e.g., traditional ecological
knowledge [TEK], Indigenous ways-of-living-with-Nature [IWLN]). I
continue to wrestle with the question: How is Indigenous science to-come
with/in the context of science education? As Tewa scholar Gregory Cajete
(2000) explains, Indigenous science displays and has, since time immemo-
rial, always deployed “ingenuity, creativity, resourcefulness, and ability of
people to learn and to teach a harmonious way of existence with Nature”
(p. 78). Accordingly, the guiding question I pose is not intended to signal
a science yet-to-exist. Rather, to-come calls on both the ways in which
Indigenous science has not yet (wholly) arrived within the context of
science education, as well as a responsibility of hospitality towards that
which is to-come. If science education is to hospitably receive Indigenous
science, it must address the ways in which its structures—the assump-
tions, terms, modes of organization, practices, and beliefs—contribute
to exclusion of Indigenous science, as well as inclusion that disciplines,
differs from, and defers Indigenous science (to-come). Equally significant
is the exploration of the following: how can the culture of the discipline
of science education be (re)opened and re(con)figured to receive Indigenous
science to-come, on its own terms, and in ethical relation? Importantly, when
that which is to-come (here, Indigenous science) is never (fully) knowable
within and distorted by the current frames of science education, what modes,
practices, and enactments of responsibility are available? Lastly, how must
responsibility be unsettled (i.e., decolonized and deconstructed) in order to
(re)open the space of responsiveness?
Significantly, in unsettling responsibility, it is important to understand
the ways in which responsibility can be at once taken-for-granted (i.e.,
settled) and (re)produced through (neo-)colonial logics (i.e., settling).
With such a double(d) understanding in mind, Kuokkanen (2007) quickly
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describes the conventional and (neo-)colonial concept of responsibility as
such:
Western liberal notions of responsibility are often constructed as a social
Darwinist “burden of the fittest,” with the benevolent imperialist self-cast
as “helping” those less fortunate (read “privileged”). In this discourse,
responsibility becomes nothing more than a duty… [producing] a hier-
archy in which the “helper” enjoys moral superiority, which often manifests
itself as a patronizing attitudes and practices. (p. 41)
Responsibility, at least as such, cannot and does not account for the
ways in which the subject of responsibility might always already be in
Indigenous-Western relations and the ways in which Western subjects
already have responsibility in the juridical sense.3 Further, it doubly indi-
vidualizes responsibility, making responsibility an individual affair and
rendering the individual the adjudicator of responsible action (e.g., “if
an individual [educator] consciously believes that she or he is not racist,
that is the end of the issue for that person and the end of her or his
responsibility” [Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 63]).
Elsewhere (Higgins, 2014), I have begun asking similar questions
of the relationship between responsibility and the (in)ability to respond
within educational research: asking questions of response-ability (see also
Higgins, 2017). This earlier exploration began exposing and troubling
the ways in which I attempted4 to account for and be accountable
to Indigeneity (e.g., IWLN) from within (naturalized and normalized)
(neo-)colonial discourses (e.g., Eurocentrism, whiteness), even though
I was actively working against this power differential (see also Higgins,
Madden, & Korteweg, 2015). Stated otherwise, as the result of a
(neo-)colonial curriculum that is hidden in plain sight (see Battiste, Bell,
Findlay, Findlay, & Henderson, 2005), efforts to work against and beyond
(neo-)colonial categories, concepts, and structures often come to reify
that which is laboured against; decolonizing approaches may come to be
de/colonizing. In a nutshell,
De/colonizing underscores the complexity of the material-discursive struc-
tures, commitments, and practices of educational institutions and the
Indigenizing initiatives they pursue. It suggests that decolonization need
not be (and conceivably cannot be) constructed in neat opposition to
colonization, and calls for consistent examination of colonial logics and
productions that seep into hybrid colonizing and decolonizing contexts.
(Higgins & Madden, 2017, p. 35)
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To take seriously de/colonizing is to be hyper-vigilant of the ways in
which colonial logics and productions seep (even) into decolonizing
efforts (see also Madden & McGregor, 2013). This, as Lyn Carter (2004,
2010) and Ali Sammel (2009) point out, is much needed in spaces of
science education.
Within this chapter, I “begin” this exploration herein with a focus
on the relationship between response-ability and my own practice as
de/colonizing science educator through a narrative of a significant
personal pedagogical encounter in which the distinction between respon-
sibility and the ability to respond made itself felt and known.
Encountering the Subtle Yet Important Difference
Between Response-Ability and Responsibility in My
De/Colonizing Science Education Practice
Because we need to “begin” some-where and some-time, let’s “begin”
in Iqaluit, Nunavut in July of 2009.5 At the time of authoring this
book, the narrative I am about to tell is one that dates about ten
years. However, it is one that I continue to heed as it continues to
bear relevance on how I understand myself in relation to responsi-
bility and the in/ability to respond. During the summer of 2009, I
was delivering curriculum that I developed that engaged Indigenous
(here, Inuit) and non-Indigenous youth in exploring, constructing, and
documenting differential cultural constructions of science (i.e., ways-of-
knowing-Nature) through participant-driven videography in their home
community of Iqualuit, Nunavut. As my first major research project
towards decolonizing science education (see Higgins, 2014), I was poised
to learn a difficult lesson about the distinction between ability and willing-
ness that Kuokkanen (2007) presents in how she defines response-ability:
“an ability to respond, to respond to the world beyond oneself, as well as
a willingness to recognize its existence” (p. 39). But then again, “decolo-
nization … is not as straightforward a strategy as it first seems” (p. 144).
My willingness, intentionality, or desire to recognize the otherness that is
Indigenous science (in relation to science education) was not sufficient in
and of itself. But I am getting ahead of myself here.
Through this work, I took up the important call to decolonize science
education through what Mi’kmaq scholar Marie Battiste (2013) describes
as the “two-prong process” of decolonizing education. It simultane-
ously and iteratively entails deconstruction of (neo-)colonial structures and
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strategies, and reconstruction that centres and takes seriously Indigenous,
diasporic, and other post-colonial ways-of-knowing and ways-of-being
towards reshaping the place-based processes and priorities of education
and educational research. Both prongs are of significance given my posi-
tionality as a white, male, fourth-generation Euro-settler of Irish and
Scottish descent who is working to honour my ever-shifting relationships
as a science educator working with/in diverse First Nations, Métis, and
Inuit communities.
Responding to the first prong (i.e., deconstruction), I engaged in
examining and challenging the ways in which Eurocentrism—a perva-
sive discursive force that (re)centres Western modern(ist) culture, people,
places, and histories as the normative standard against which other ways-
of-knowing are judged, usually as lesser and deficient (Battiste, 2005)—
works to maintain the status quo. This was done through working to
disrupt the concepts and categories that tend to create, and are utilized to
uphold, inequality within science education, as well as the systems under
which these inequalities become possible (e.g., “what counts” as science
in science education and its entangled apparatus of norms; see Chap-
ters 3–6). This process largely involved engaging in critical self-reflexive
questioning, responding to queries such as:
How does my Western training in the world of science (i.e., in physics)
differentially produce my conceptions of the nature of science, what it
is, what it is perceived as, and what it can be? How do I work against
the problematic foreclosure of such knowledge in order to maintain
pedagogical flexibility? How do I work within and against the implicit
Eurocentric notions of validity, empirical worth, and instrumentality that I
have received in order to make space for Indigenous knowledges? (Higgins,
2014, p. 163)
In engaging in the second prong of decolonizing education (i.e., recon-
struction), students were collaboratively involved in creatively juxtaposing
Western modern science (WMS) and Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (i.e., Inuit
traditional knowledge) to reveal, (re)structure, and (re)direct the multiple
ways that the gaze of dominance is maintained. For example, this gave
youth an agentic role in resisting problematic constructions of Indigeneity
with respect to ways-of-knowing-Nature (e.g., science). This participant-
directed videography took various shapes, notably documentary-style
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interviews with diversely positioned community members (e.g., tradi-
tional knowledge holders, health practitioners, environmental scientists),
alongside their own short movies that were a form of digital storytelling.
Despite well-laid plans, in attempting to put to work a decolo-
nizing sensibility and taking up responsibility (both that of pedagogy
and educational research), there were nonetheless ways in which I was
not able to respond. This subtle but importance differentiation between
responsibility and response-ability manifested most noticeably though my
self-reflexive work around the youth’s engagement in digital storytelling
(see Higgins, 2014). While my research was originally planned around
youth engaging in documentary film, early on the youth made it clear
(through scrunched brows, an Inuit way of saying no) that they did not
wish to only make movies about their perception of science during what
was, for them, a STEM summer camp. Cognizant of the multiple gradi-
ents of power across which dissent was being articulated, as well as the
ongoing problematic research relationships between research institutions
and Indigenous communities (see Battiste, 2013), I knew I would have
to “let go” of the research project as designed.
While the youth agreed to participate in interviewing community
members around ways-of-knowing-Nature, we negotiated that the youth
would primarily engage in digital storytelling practices as their major
project to share with parents and community members by the end of
the programme. As an emerging decolonizing educator, I recognized the
importance of respecting learners’ choices. However, as a budding science
education researcher, it was difficult to shift away from a focus I had
been developing (i.e., exploring cross-cultural ways-of-knowing-Nature).
Because youth were spending less time accessing those who “know” about
and with Nature (e.g., traditional knowledge holders, health practitioners,
environmental scientists), I had trouble conceptualizing the youth’s story-
telling practices as enacting ways-of-knowing-Nature. This dissonance was
perhaps most heightened when some of the youth explored Oreo eating
Olympics as a central story topic! In this sense, I was not able to take up
responsibility much beyond the ways the ways in which I had conceived
of prior the research; there were ways in which I was not able to respond.
Significantly, plugging Indigenous metaphysics into an educational
framework organized by a Western modern metaphysics resulted in
excesses that were far too often sutured over, subsumed, and/or sublated
by an approach to knowing and being with nature that could not account
for Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being’s excesses.6 Specifically, I had
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come to the research with the settled, Western modern scientific assump-
tion that science is strictly a human, epistemological affair (see Barad,
2007; Cajete, 2000). Because of the ways this dialectic negation oper-
ates, as a result, I was blind(ed) to the ways in which some of the digital
storytelling practices that youth engaged in (e.g., (re)telling of tradi-
tional story of Muhaha, the aptly named traditional Inuit monster who
chases after children to tickle them to death with his long claws) were
not simply stories about place but were told with place (i.e., having and
being had by an Indigenous “sense of place”; see Cajete, 1994, 2000). In
the videos, place makes itself intelligible through the beings that come to
(co-)constitute the ecology of relationships that make the eastern arctic a
beautiful, yet dangerous place if not respected on its own terms. Their
stories “starred” an ecology of relationships with which Inuit peoples
have developed ways-of-knowing-in-being premised on Nature’s flux and
processes, deeply guided with and through relational ethics, as well as
practices of regeneration. The stories were never the students’ (and the
humans they worked with) alone (despite the frames brought to the
viewing); the natural world always makes itself intelligible and participates
in the construction of knowledge about itself, whether we acknowledge
it or not (see Cajete, 1994, 2000).
Elsewhere (Higgins, 2014), I stated that the decolonizing curriculum
(e.g., border crossing) and pedagogies (e.g., culture broker) available
to me worked both within and against a problematic centre. As such,
curriculum, pedagogy, and pedagogue were exceeded in pedagogical
practice by the very coloniality the approach worked against, thus
becoming de/colonizing: pedagogical slippage occurred. Here, thinking
with Kuokkanen (2007), coloniality overcoded the ability to respond,
making me unable to (fully) take up the responsibility of heeding the call
of Indigenous science. Specifically, I could not (wholly) respond to the
natural world and Indigenous-ways-of-living-with-Nature because I could
not recognize its existence (beyond that which made itself intelligible
within my frames). I could not responsibly heed the call of Indigenous
science because I could not hear the call as such. Again, a willingness
to recognize the otherness that is Indigenous science is not sufficient7;
it is specifically for this reason that Kuokkanen (2007) suggests that
response-ability entails addressing epistemic ignorance.
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Epistemic Ignorance and/in Science Education
Kuokkanen (2010) states, “if knowledge is a prerequisite for responsi-
bility, ignorance presents a serious threat to responsible, response-able
behaviour and thinking” (p. 64). Yet, as illuminated by my desire to
recognize the existence of Indigenous science from within a Western
modern(ist) episteme, working to know Indigenous-way-of-living-with-
Nature from such a perspective is also a project that is fraught. As
Kuokkanen (2008) suggests, the relation between knowledge and igno-
rance is not so linear or dichotomous; not knowing is not necessarily
an absence of knowledge, but can also be the result of knowledge.8
Kuokkanen (2008) refers to this knowledge-as-ignorance, as well as traces
the discursive forces and flows through which it emerges as epistemic
ignorance:
Epistemic ignorance refers to ways in which academic theories and practices
ignore, marginalize and exclude other than dominant Western European
epistemic and intellectual traditions. These ‘‘other’’ epistemic and intel-
lectual traditions are foreclosed in the process of producing, reproducing
and disseminating knowledge to an extent that generally there is very little
recognition and understanding of them. Epistemic ignorance is thus not
limited to merely not-knowing or lack of understanding. It also refers
to practices and discourses that actively foreclose other than dominant
epistemes and refuse to seriously contemplate their existence. Epistemic
ignorance is thereby a form of subtle violence. (p. 63)
As Michiel van Eijck and Wolff-Michael Roth (2007) underscore, this is
certainly the case in science education regarding the relationship between
WMS, TEK, and IWLN. Drawing on Michel Foucault, they explain that
the logics of science education can often be characterized as a “regime of
truth”. Regimes of truth are marked by circular relations: each “truth”
is but a differential articulation of the systems of power that produces
it, whose articulation in turn (re)produces the systems of power. Such a
circular relation can be read in two ways: first, as the capillary circulation
of power from one conceptual node to another; and second, signaling a
(quasi-)hermetic circle, a (fore)closure of knowledge.
Foreclosure, as post-colonial scholar Gayatri Spivak (1999) utilizes it,
signals instantiated pre-emergence of meaning. It indicates the ways in
which the language we possess also possesses us. It is when the knowledge
shapes how we intake experience, preventing experiences of otherness to
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be anything more than what can already be known within the already
existing, and rigidified, circular relations of closure. In other words, how
what we know acts as barrier to engaging with what we do not; a form
of closure that is a priori to meaning-making.
The foreclosure resulting from epistemic ignorance is of particular rele-
vance considering the ways in which IWLN and TEK are often only
considered science when they fit the criteria of “valid” science (which
often happens to be that of WMS). Or, as Kuokkanen (2008) summa-
rizes, the foreclosure resulting from epistemic ignorance makes it such
that “Indigenous people ‘cannot speak’; that is, when they speak from
the framework of their own epistemic conventions, they are not heard or
understood by the academy” (p. 60). As mentioned within the previous
chapter, after Ngāti Kahungunu ki Wairarapa and Ngāi Tahu scholar
and science educator Liz McKinley (2007), the ways in which Indige-
nous science can be articulated in relation to WMS maps onto four
general categories: (a) where Indigenous science can be explained within
WMS; (b) where Indigenous science could be explained through WMS,
but the explanation has yet to be developed; (c) where there is a link
between Indigenous science and WMS’s knowledge claims, albeit through
different knowledge principles and practices; (d) where WMS cannot
accept aspects of Indigenous science (e.g., spirituality, animism). This
cartography of relations comes to shape if, as well as when and how,
Indigenous science is to be included within school science curriculum.
Importantly, the degree to which “included” Indigenous science differs
from its intended purposes or is deferred through non-inclusion depends
highly upon the degree to which it is already articulable within the terms
of WMS, as well as science education’s ability to ethically respond to
difference (from itself). As a result, some forms of Indigenous science
“cannot speak” (Kuokkanen, 2008) and remain more “to-come” than
others.
It is for this reason that Kuokkanen (2010) states that “the respon-
sibility towards the other must not emerge from hierarchical relations”
(p. 69) as these often come to reproduce the very structures of said
hierarchy (e.g., here, the epistemic privileging of WMS over other
ways-of-knowing-Nature such as TEK and IWLN). Not only do these
hierarchal relations potentially produce foreclosure of (the possibility of)
knowing otherwise for those who would wish to uphold the hierarchy, but
possibly also for those who are critically within and against it (as illustrated
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by my story earlier). The reproduction of such hierarchies of relation-
ships (which also remain on-the-move) is not always a conscious choice;
even work founded in best intentions to challenge inequitable relations
may come to reify problematic structures. Integrating Indigenous science
into an educational programme that has not come to examine the ways in
which it (re)produces and is (re)produced by forms of epistemic ignorance
runs the risk of (re)producing similar problematics, albeit differently.
For example, this can result in enacting pedagogies or curriculum that
work towards “‘rescuing’ the ‘other’ or knowing what is best for the
‘other’” (Kuokkanen, 2010, p. 69). It can also corral Indigenous ways-
of-living-with-Nature into a (neo-)colonial space of intelligibility without
accounting for or be accountable to the ways in which it differs and
exceeds such framing. In turn, the work of responsibility towards the ways
in which Indigenous science comes to be othered, as well as to-come, in
science education requires more than a desire for the relationship to be
otherwise if and when the possibility of ethical relationality is (fore)closed
by epistemic ignorance.
There is work to be done: work that addresses not only what we do
not know, but also how what we know prevents us from knowing what we
do not. This is, following Kuokkanen (2007), the homework of response-
ability.
The Homework of Response-Ability (Towards
Indigenous Science) in Science Education
Doing homework is an ongoing practice that includes learning as much as
possible about the area where the academic takes risks. However, familiar-
izing oneself with areas one knows little about still amounts to hegemonic
practice if we do not engage in the “home” part of the homework….
Homework starts from where we are. (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 117)
As stated, earlier, responsibility is often premised upon the possibility
of knowing the other(ness) to which we are responding. But, as the
discursive formations of science education often come to foreclose the
very possibility of (wholly) heeding such a call (through varying degrees
of epistemic ignorance), attempting to know about Indigenous science
requires that we engage with, as Kuokkanen (2007) invites, the “‘home’
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part of the homework” (p. 117) for it to be more than a “hege-
monic practice” through which responsibility becomes response-inability
through its enactment (even when the individualistic desire is otherwise).9
The “home” part of homework can take many meanings: home as
cultural, disciplinary, geographical, historical, epistemological, ontolog-
ical, among others. However, homework is always risky as it threatens to
rupture who we (think we) are, what we (think we) know, and what we
(think we) do. Addressing the ways in which the multiplicity of “homes”
in homework are (fore)closed when responding to otherness to-come
such as Indigenous science is a project that can be unsettling. In part, this
is because it asks critical science educators to examine and sit with the ways
in which (their) science education practice continues to uphold problem-
atic practices of subsuming, sublating, and suturing over of Indigenous
science. Yet, it must bear risk if we are to (re)open responsiveness and the
ability to respond to the (constructed) otherness of Indigenous science
which is to-come: “responsibility with an inventive rupture implies, first
and foremost, the ability of interrupting the self, of moving beyond the
‘I’ as the ethical subject” (Kuokkanen, 2010, p. 65). Moving beyond the
“I” as the ethical subject means considering the ability to respond as being
more than individualistic (without excusing the “I” from responsibility):
responsibility must be more than a (double(d) practice of) self-accounting
for individually doing or having done the right thing. This is a key compo-
nent of homework. As Kuokkanen (2010) explains, addressing Western
modernity as the cultural “home” of science education entails addressing
its “worldview of individualism and the notion of the Cartesian subject,
[in which] dependency on others is considered a burden” (2010, p. 62),
as well as the ways in which this comes to shape responsibility.10
For science educators, moving beyond the “I” as the ethical subject
entails considering the self-in-relation as always already (co-)constituted
by vectors of power such as whiteness, Eurocentrism, (neo-)coloniality,
modernity, neoliberalism, amidst many others and their respective but
irreducibly linked historicities and futurities-to-come, even when working
against them. This is all the more important for those who, like me,
occupy markers of identity that are privileged by these systems. It is the
homework of attending to the ways in which the forces and flows of
dominance come to produce the (fore)closure of both self and other-
ness (making both invisible the normalization of normativity as well as
that which lay beyond). Considering the self-in-relation also entails the
unheroic work of not assuming that critical pedagogy will always be
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empowering (Ellsworth, 1989), but examining the ways in which this
approach may always already be disempowering and prevent participants
from responding (from “home”). It is an attempt at a double(d) reversal
of the gaze of dominance: a gaze that entails both the literal reversal of
studying those who do the studying (i.e., in order to reverse the direc-
tion of the gaze), as well as the study of the ways in which those who do
the studying study (i.e., in order to reverse the ways in which the gaze is
produced and producible).
Yet, while such a double(d) reversal is important, it does not reduce
accountability for and towards the other. As mentioned earlier, decolo-
nizing science education must be a movement that creates openings in
(neo-)colonial systems and also leverages openings towards making space
for honouring Indigenous peoples, places, practices, and priorities. We
must still attempt a response within this relation of responsibility, even
if response-ability may never be (fully) achieved. Battiste (2005) under-
scores this (im)possibility using the example of Eurocentrism: “Eurocen-
trism is not like a prejudice from which informed peoples can elevate
themselves” (p. 122). It is for this reason that there is need to recon-
figure the normative processes through which we respond and enact
responsibility (within the “home” that is science education):
What is more, ‘starting from here’ involves a subtle but radical shift from
‘knowing the other’ to learning, and more specifically, learning to receive.
Rather than assuming the possibility of knowing the other, we need to
learn to think in a fundamentally different way. Instead of thinking that ‘we
must know’ or even ‘we are entitled to know’—positions that, by retaining
the sense of ownership as well as distance, allow very little room for
hospitality…—we need to draw a difference, however provisional, between
knowing and learning. (Kuokkanen, 2010, p. 68)
In other words, moving beyond the “I” as the ethical subject entails
recognition of the ways in which the Other is always already an irreducible
and (co-)constitutive part of the self-in-relation of response-ability.11
Rather than the individualistic project of knowing the other (which, as
mentioned earlier, cannot be disassociated from forms of epistemic igno-
rance), we are called to learn from the other (something that requires,
by definition, relationality). As Kuokkanen (2010) states, not all learning
results in knowing the other: response-ability “requires not only patience
but acceptance that there will always be gaps, the ‘other’ can never be
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fully known” (p. 70). As we learn from the other (recognizing the impor-
tant, yet subtle distinction between learning about and from), we can
learn to learn. Stated otherwise, as we attempt to heed the call of Indige-
nous science (that is not wholly intelligible as such within the epistemes
of science education), we must not only listen, but also listen to how
we listen (for the ways in which listening prevents us from hearing).12
It is a subtle and attentive movement that necessarily vacillates between
knowing and not knowing in order to (re)open the norms of respon-
siveness in order to not only heed the call of Indigenous science but
also work towards hospitably receiving this plurality of diverse Indigenous
ways-of-living-with-Nature.
Conclusion: Response-Ability
as Moving Within, Against, and Beyond
the (Fore)Closure of Epistemic Ignorance
oR Deconstruction as Learning to Learn
Science education always already has a responsibility towards TEK and
IWLN; such responsibility precedes its being.13 However, it is not always
able to enact and uphold this task. As explored within the significant
encounter I opened with, the ways in which I became science educator
(fore)closed my ability to respond to Indigenous science because I could
not heed its call as such. For example, at the time, I could not respond to
the ways in which TEK and IWLN are always already more than strictly
a human practice that is enacted by the other-than-humans that come
to constitute place. My knowledge of what science is was knowledge
that acted as epistemic ignorance towards what science could be; specifi-
cally, what it always already is and continues to be since time immemorial
in the form of TEK and IWLN. There was and continues to unsettle
responsibility, in both senses of the word.
In turn, thinking with this experience generated the central question
explored throughout: How is the irreducible responsibility that science
education has towards Indigenous science to be enacted when Indigenous
ways-of-knowing-in-being are made unintelligible, undesirable, and/or
invisible through science educations’ very systems of thought? This
chapter coalesces around the (co-)constitutive relation between knowl-
edge and ignorance (e.g., knowledge-as-ignorance) through Kuokkanen’s
(2008) conceptualization of epistemic ignorance, such that the inability to
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respond can be framed as rendering unintelligible that which lay beyond
epistemic registers, and also inefficacy to account for or be accountable
to the ways in which engagement is fraught through the naturalization of
said frames. Accordingly, the homework of responsibility through which
we labour to transform response-inability into response-ability must entail
a (re)opening of the closure through which the other cannot be heard,
while simultaneously working to heed the call:
doing one’s homework implies unlearning one’s privilege and learning…
It requires the critical examination of one’s beliefs, biases, and assump-
tion as well as an understanding of how they have developed and become
naturalized in the first place. (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 115)
It is important to note that addressing the “home” of homework in
attempting to move beyond the (fore)closure of knowledge that is
epistemic ignorance is not only deeply productive, but also necessary.
Addressing the multiplicitous “home” in the homework of response-
ability must begin from the ways in which we are shaped by “home”
towards its (co-)constitutive exteriority. Kuokkanen (2007) states, as we
engage within the very structures that produce epistemic ignorance, this
work requires “subtlety and responsibility”. Homework that too quickly
attempts to evacuate the ways in which we carry “home” elsewhere runs
the risk of reproducing the same problems in a new context, albeit slightly
differently. Rather, it is important to continue labouring within and
against “home” as we attempt the move beyond; to move too quickly to
a theory-practice beyond without attending to the “home” of homework
runs the risk of as “proceeding in any other way would eventually back-
fire and merely too tight[ly] reinforce existing structures and discourse
[through]… ‘irresponsibilizing destruction’” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. xx).
In other words, Kuokkanen (2007) advocates for a deconstructive and
critical inhabitation of these structures rather than an attempt to move
beyond through their destruction: “the process of decolonization can
only emerge from within those structures of domination, from inside”
(p. 146).14
Deconstruction provides a way out of the (fore)closure of knowl-
edge by (re)opening the interiority to its co-constitutive exteriority, and
revealing the ways in which the “philosophical category of the centre
(named Eurocentrism)” (McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005, p. 902) oper-
ates. It is to attend to porosity between the two in order to displace,
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disrupt, and decentralize that which was placed with/in (and in turn
with/out). As McKinley and her ally Glen Aikenhead state: “deconstruc-
tion is the decentralization and decolonization of European thought…
Hence, deconstruction is a deconstruction of the concept, the authority,
and the assumed primacy of the category of ‘the West’” (2005, p. 902).
Deconstruction provides a means of engaging with the interplay of
knowing and not knowing that is inextricably linked to epistemic igno-
rance, as well as the possibility of placing self and other in relations that
(re)open the possibility of learning to learn (as opposed to “knowing the
other” within the structures afforded).15
Importantly, the possibility of hospitably receiving Indigenous science
is not only an ethical call. Working to heed the call is ontologically, epis-
temologically, ecologically, and politically generative: science education
stands to learn much from Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being and its
practices of relational balance, (re)generation, and renewal.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this chapter appears in Bazzul and Siry’s (2019) Crit-
ical Voices in Science Education Resesarch (pp. 223–233), and is reprinted
with permission.
2. As responsibility is at once necessary yet inadequate, “deconstruction may
offer a new way of challenging conventional understandings of responsi-
bility by seeking to move beyond traditional interpretations of politics and
ethics” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. xx).
3. If not in the individual sense, then responsibility is juridical at least in
the structural sense. See Chapter 6 for a lengthier discussion on the tie
between legal and scientific systems.
4. It is worth latching onto the word attempt, momentarily, as it is signifi-
cant. It marks an important disjuncture between taking up responsibility
and actualizing it that was the deconstructive snag that was used to begin
unsettling responsibility (e.g., here, intentionality is often a double(d)
settled meaning that is equated with responsible action).
5. As explored within the previous chapter, the question of where to “begin”
an inquiry is trouble(d) from its very articulation: with each and every
here-now there is a multiplicity of there-thens which are enfolded into its
being and becoming. This turn of phrase, to appear in every chapter,
serves first to remind the reader that to “begin” as if nothing had been
done, what Kuokkanen (2007) refers to as “know-nothing-ism,” is its
own form of irresponsibility as it has always already begun elsewhere and
elsewhen. Second, it is to suggest that because we are already within the
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inquiry, there are many productive junctures with/in which the inquiry
can delve into.
Significantly, linking this to problematizing position (rather than
positionality) statements, Kuokkanen (2007) offers:
The responsibility of academics [and educators] cannot be limited to
neutral descriptions of who we are, as has become common practice
at least. In the more self-reflective, critical academic circles; it must
also link itself to the concrete, physical locations of our enunciation.
(p. 117)
The last part is significant as, for many educators in settler-colonial states
(e.g., the US, Canada, Australia), physical location places one in a direct
and irreducible relation with Indigeneity (either as someone ancestrally
belonging to the place since time immemorial; or as a guest, whether
invited or not):
Considering how many universities are located on [I]ndigenous
peoples’ lands, [I]ndigenous epistemes have always existed in the
physical space of the university, however invisible or ignored.
Without waiting to be invited, [I]ndigenous epistemes are already
“in” the academy. The problem is not how to bring [I]ndigenous
knowledge to the university, since it is already there. The problem
is the epistemic ignorance that prevails because of the gift of
[I]ndigenous epistemes remains impossible within the academy.
(p. 108)
Again, this is to say that we are always already within the question of
Indigeneity within science education: the somewhere where we “begin,”
whether a university or other educational institution, is on Indigenous
Land and places us firmly in relation. Importantly, as we are already in
relation, part of the work is addressing science education’s epistemic igno-
rance which prevents us from recognizing it as such, and in ways that are
of consequence to our ways-of-knowing-in-being. “Beginning” somewhere
matters (in both senses of the word).
6. While not wanting to reduce this to language, it is important to recognize
that the language we possess also possesses us (see Spivak, 1976): language
matters in terms of the phenomena we can bear witness to. As David Peat
(2002) explains:
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Our [scientific] language disposes us to employ concepts that are
entirely inappropriate for the quantum world…. [David] Bohm
rejected the idea of a reality composed of objects in interaction
in favor of processes and activities in a continuous movement of
unfolding and enfolding. Moreover, this reality is not confined to
matter but extends to thoughts, feelings, and emotions unfolding
within the brain and body. To Bohm there was no dichotomy
between inner and outer, mental and physical, subjective and objec-
tive, for all are aspects of one underlying movement. The English
language [as intended], however, keeps bringing us back to a world
of objects. (p. 237)
David Bohm, in his search for a means of accounting for and being
accountable to the process, flux, and relationality of quantum phenomena,
recognized that these phenomena not only exceeded the enacted prac-
tice of science but also the language with which science thought about
these phenomena. Bohm’s (1980) frustrations with language centred
largely around the subject/object binary enacted through much of the
English language and its inability to account for contexts which exceed
this framing:
The subject-verb-object structure of language, along with its world
view, tends to impose itself very strongly in our speech, even in
those cases in which some attention would reveal its evident inap-
propriateness. For example, consider the sentence “It is raining.”
Where is the “It” that would, according to the sentence, be the
“rainer that is doing the raining?” Clearly, it is more accurate to say:
“Rain is going on.” Similarly, we customarily say, “One elementary
particle acts on another,” but… each particle is only an abstrac-
tion of a relatively invariant form of movement in the whole field
of the universe. So it would be more appropriate to say, “Elemen-
tary particles are on-going movements that are mutually dependent
because they merge and interpenetrate.” (p. 37)
For Bohm, language is more than a representational tool that mirrored
reality; it is also an enacted enfolding and an unfolding of our epis-
temologies and ontologies (see also Barad, 2007; Peat, 2002; Spivak,
1993/2009). Language would then come to shape what was and what
was not knowable and do-able, as well as if and how it could come to
be. Thus, in order to differently consider and respond to these excessive
quantum phenomena, Bohm laboured to envision a hypothetical language
that he called the “rheomode” (see Bohm, 1980).
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Stemming from the greek word rheo, meaning to flow, the language-
to-come that is the rheomode would have been a language that dealt
with processes and activity, transformation and change. This would not
only be of use for the quantum phenomena he observed, but also for
the interconnected work to which he brought these understandings of
process and flux to, such as dialogue and creativity (see Bohm, 1994,
1996). As Peat (2002) explains, the rheomode “is based primarily on
verbs and grammatical structures deriving from verbs. Such a language,
Bohm argued, is perfectly adapted to a reality of enfolding and unfolding”
(p. 238).
However, not unlike Barad (2007), Bohm (1980) states that while
the linguistic structures that serve us to quickly describe the macro-world
are potentially better served by subject/object language than quantum
phenomena, it too is exceeded:
The same sort of description holds on the larger-scale level. Thus,
instead of saying, “An observer looks at an object,” we can more
appropriately say, “Observation is going on, in an undivided move-
ment involving those abstractions customarily called ‘the human
being’ and ‘the object he is looking at.’” (p. 37)
In taking the double(d) meaning of unsettling seriously, one of most
frequent critiques of engaging with the differential configurations of the
English language that scholars such as Bohm (1980) and Barad (2007)
propose and enact that I continue to encounter is one of unintelligibility.
“Why do we need a new language that is so complicated?” some might
ask. There is importance in the un/intelligible to push us beyond what
we know, how we come to know, and in turn, what we can know. This is
not only to differentially become aware of the epistemological and onto-
logical configurations that are always already present within language, but
also to (re)open that space, to foster a space of response-ability, a space
which allows us to consider otherwise excluded otherness and act in turn.
However, in closing this story (and lengthy footnote), what Bohm had
conceived of as a hypothesis and a theoretical language already had lived
and long-lasting analogues in place. The similar yet different vocabulary
of the “new physics” that stretches the boundaries of Western science was
part of the everyday (but differently articulated) vocabulary of Indigenous
people:
A few months before his death, Bohm met with a number of
Algon[qu]ian speakers and was struck by the perfect bridge between
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their language and worldview and his own exploration of philos-
ophy. What to Bohm had been a more breakthrough in human
though – quantum theory, relativity, his implicate order and rheo-
mode – were part of the everyday life and speech of the Blackfoot,
[Mi’kmaq], Cree, and Ojibwa[y]. (Peat, 2002, p. 238)
It is potentially the case that Bohm did not know because he could not
know if the “lines of making sense” (Spivak, 1993/2009) were laid out
such that science, particularly at the time, perceived IWLN as wholly
other; but this marks the importance of unsettling settler structures in
order to (re)open the space of responsiveness.
7. For Kuokkanen (2007), response-ability requires an ability and willingness
to recognize a world beyond oneself. However, and relevant to this story,
she cautions that recognition itself must be both an ongoing practice and
one that is not isolated from complimentary practices. She states, “recog-
nition cannot be merely an item on a list that, once checked, requires no
further consideration” (p. 93), as we often see as the case in practices such
as Land acknowledgements at the beginning of events. In these instances,
Recognition can, therefore, also become a proxy for avoiding any
responsibility for doing the homework of finding out about things
that are unfamiliar – a way of closing the doors and windows rather
than granting an unconditional welcome. (p. 91)
Explicitly stated, recognition is always fraught. In taking deconstructive
complicity or co-constitution seriously, recognition and misrecognition
share an intimate relation:
To recognize someone is always to misrecognize others and render
them and their work invisible. Thus, recognizing someone’s work
… always involves conforming to certain predetermined norms,
that is, to a set of prevailing assumptions about what is worth
recognizing. (p. 91)
This is to say that good intentions alone are not sufficient in moves of
recognition (even if a willingness to recognize is necessary, an important
first step): if practices of recognition cannot be answerable to its own
practices (e.g., here, attempting to perceive Indigenous ways-of-knowing-
in-being through a Western modern scientific worldview), recognition can
remain little more than lip service.
8. Further, linking to the previous chapter’s discussion of forms of know-
nothing-ism, ignorance “is not merely an innocent lack of knowledge
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but an intentional not-knowing that serves the economic interests of
the status quo” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 68). This can be thought of
in numerous ways: a refusal (or, softer, a deferral) to learn (despite
numerous resources), not taking seriously that which is offered (as a form
of epistemic superiority and hubris), or other.
9. Taking seriously the “home” in the “homework of response-ability”
includes accounting for and being accountable to our participation in any
of the phenomena, scientific or otherwise, that we come to bear witness
to. For example, Kuokkanen (2007) invites us to differently consider
the problematic relation between Indigenous and Western knowledges
systems:
Cultural discontinuity is a consequence, not a cause. It is the
result of two things: the willful ignorance that is embedded in
the mainstream middle-class culture; and the logic of Eurocentric
rationalism, which denies the existence of intellectual conventions
and perceptions of the world other than those rooted in the
Enlightenment. (p. 54)
Here, there is a clear responsibility. However, there is homework to be
done to be able to: first, receive such knowledge; and, second, to respond
to and with it.
10. Butler (2005), along these lines rhetorically asks the following: “does
the postulation of a subject who is not self-grounding, that is, whose
conditions of emergence can never be fully account for, undermine the
possibility of responsibility and, in particular, of giving an account of
oneself?” (p. 19). Where it is the common assumption that one must
“know oneself” (as a stable, containable, and individualistic subject) in
order to be morally responsible, Butler (2005) suggests that ethics can
only emerge because the “I” of ethics only emerges with/in relation
and that a self-contained self becomes a source of “‘moral narcissism’
whose pleasure resides in its ability to transcend the concrete world that
conditions its actions and is affected by them” (p. 105). Relation begets
and precedes responsibility; knowledge of a partially knowable self is still,
nonetheless knowledge upon which one can act.
11. Along similar lines, Barad (2007) suggests,
There are no individual agents of change. Responsibility is not ours
alone. And yet our responsibility is greater than it would be if it
were ours alone. Responsibility entails an ongoing responsiveness
to the entanglement of self and other, here and there, now and
then. (2007, p. 394)
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Because of this entanglement, responsibility is not simply a moral imper-
ative but rather an ethico-onto-epistemological enactment that shapes
and is shaped by our relational “being-of-the-world.” Here, being-of-the-
world is a response to Heidegger’s being-in-the-world which necessitates
an ‘I’ which precedes the relationship with the world, inevitably masking
the conditions of emergence for the ‘I’ which notably only comes to be
because there is a world from which it was never separated or separable.
Thus, as Barad (2010) states, responsibility precedes us because it is
produced with/in the co-constitutive relationships through which the ‘I’
of responsibility becomes:
Entanglements are relations of obligation–being bound to the
other–enfolded traces of othering. Othering, the constitution of
an ‘Other’, entails an indebtedness to the ‘Other’, who is irre-
ducibly and materially bound to, threaded through, the ‘self’–a
diffraction/dispersion of identity. (Barad, 2010, p. 265)
The (Western modern) self does not come to be without an Other;
we are always indebted to the inheritance of the other to whom we are
with/in relation, regardless of whether this self can or does respond to
such responsibility (see Higgins & Tolbert, 2018).
12. This is to refuse and resist “listening-as-benevolent-imperialism” (Spivak
in Harasym, 1990, p. 59), or the ways in which the attempt to listen
through dominant frameworks does not always result in hearing. This
underscores, as brought up in the preface, the need for a slower cross-
cultural or decolonizing science education practice that is rife with
unsettling pauses.
13. See Chapter 6 for a lengthier exploration of the temporality put forth by
this statement.
14. It is not only productively multiplicitous but also, as Derrida (1976)
reminds, an inescapable and necessary condition:
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from
the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take
active aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them
in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the more
when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside,
borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion
from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say
without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the enter-
prise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own
work. (p. 24, emphasis mine)
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There is no outside of “where we are,” only the differential ability to
respond to the relationality and responsibility that precede and shape us
through critical inhabitation in a certain way: active engagement with the
norms that structurally and invariably shape our becoming “all the more
when one does not suspect it” (Derrida, 1976, p. 24; see also Spivak,
1976, 1993/2009).
Or as scientist Mazzocchi (2006) states on the question of (re)opening
possible possibilities within the context of cross-cultural scientific endeav-
ours:
We need to open ourselves to participating in the experience of
others, and yet we should also be aware that this opening can only
start from where we already are – from our point of view or the
tradition to which we belong. (p. 465)
15. In making the case that there are commensurabilities between Indigenous
and deconstructive thought, Kuokkanen (2007) speaks to the ways in
which deconstruction offers not only a way out of the (fore)closure of
epistemic ignorance, but also the closure marked by epistemology itself .
… both [I]ndigenous thought and deconstructive practice recog-
nize that human existence is embedded in intricate webs that can
never be fully grasped either fully or once all…. But perhaps it is
productive to recognize that deconstructive practices have some-
thing to offer [I]ndigenous scholarship, which sometimes tends
to ground itself in modernist views rooted in linear reality, and
in assumptions that easy access to a neutral truth or the human
consciousness is somehow possible. (p. 62)
Without wanting to romanticize deconstruction, as “many theorists
of deconstruction are heavily invested in the West’s ontological and
philosophical traditions” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 62), it is productive to
engage in with deconstruction in the double(d) movement of unsettling
science education (here, deconstructing epistemic ignorance towards its




Barad, K. (2007). Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the
entanglement of matter and meaning. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Barad, K. (2010). Quantum entanglements and hauntological relations of inher-
itance: Dis/continuities, spacetime enfoldings, and justice-to-come. Derrida
Today, 3(2), 240–268.
Battiste, M. (2005). You can’t be the global doctor if you’re the colonial disease.
In P. Tripp & L. J. Muzzin (Eds.), Teaching as activism (pp. 121–133).
Montreal, QC: Queen’s University Press.
Battiste, M. (2013). Decolonizing education: Nourishing the learning spirit.
Saskatoon, SK: Purich Publishing.
Battiste, M., Bell, L., Findlay, I., Findlay, L., & Henderson, J. (2005). Thinking
place: Animating the Indigenous humanities in education. The Australian
Journal of Indigenous Education, 34, 7–18.
Bohm, D. (1980). Wholeness and the implicate order. New York, NY: Routledge.
Bohm, D. (1994). On creativity. New York, NY: Routledge.
Bohm, D. (1996). On dialogue. New York, NY: Routledge.
Butler, J. (2005). On giving an account of oneself . New York, NY: Fordham
University Press.
Cajete, G. (1994). Look to the mountain: An ecology of indigenous education.
Durango, CO: Kivaki Press.
Cajete, G. (2000). Native science: Natural laws of interdependence. Santa Fe,
NM: Clear Light Books.
Carter, L. (2004). Thinking differently about cultural diversity: Using post-
colonial theory to (re)read science education. Science Education, 88(6),
819–836.
Carter, L. (2010). The armchair at the borders: The ‘messy’ ideas of borders,
border zones and epistemological diversity in multicultural science education.
Science Education, 94, 1–20.
Ellsworth, E. (1989). Why doesn’t this feel empowering? Working through the
repressive myths of critical pedagogy. Harvard Educational Review, 59(3),
297–325.
Harasym, S. (1990). The post-colonial critic: Interviews, strategies, dialogues. New
York, NY: Routledge.
Higgins, M. (2014). De/colonizing pedagogy and pedagogue: Science education
through participatory and reflexive videography. Canadian Journal of Science,
Mathematics and Technology Education, 14(2), 154–171.
Higgins, M. (2017). Post-qualitative mo(ve)ments: Concluding remarks on
methodological response-abilities and being wounded by thought. Reconcep-
tualizing Educational Research Methodology, 8(3), 89–101.
Higgins, M., & Madden, B. (2017). (Not so) monumental agents:
De/colonizing places of learning. Canadian Social Studies, 49(1), 34–38.
2 THE HOMEWORK OF RESPONSE-ABILITY … 77
Higgins, M., Madden, B., & Korteweg, L. (2015). Witnessing (the lack of)
deconstruction: White teachers’ ‘perfect stranger’ position in urban Indige-
nous education. Race Ethnicity and Education, 18(2), 251–276.
Higgins, M., & Tolbert, S. (2018). A syllabus for response-able inheritance in
science education. Parallax, 24(3), 273–294.
Kuokkanen, R. (2010). The responsibility of the academy: A call for doing
homework. Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 26(3), 61–74.
Kuokkanen, R. J. (2007). Reshaping the university: Responsibility, Indigenous
epistemes, and the logic of the gift. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.
Kuokkanen, R. J. (2008). What is hospitality in the academy? Epistemic igno-
rance and the (im)possible gift. Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural
Studies, 30(1), 60–82.
Madden, B., & McGregor, H. E. (2013). Ex(er)cising student voice in pedagogy
for decolonizing: Exploring complexities through duoethnography. Review of
Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 35(5), 371–391.
Mazzocchi, F. (2006). Western science and traditional knowledge. EMBO
Reports, 7 (5), 463–466.
McKinley, E. (2007). Postcolonialism, Indigenous students, and science educa-
tion. In S. K. Abell & N. G. Lederman (Eds.), Handbook of research on science
education (pp. 199–226). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
McKinley, E., & Aikenhead, G. (2005). Comments on “Thinking differ-
ently about cultural diversity: Using postcolonial theory to (re)read science
education”. Science Education, 89(6), 901–906.
Peat, D. (2002). Blackfoot physics: A new journey into the Native American
universe. Newbury Port, MA: Weiser Books.
Sammel, A. (2009). Turning the focus from ‘other’ to science education:
Exploring the invisibility of whiteness. Cultural Studies of Science Education,
4, 649–656.
Spivak, G. C. (1976). Translator’s preface. In J. Derrida, Of grammatology (G.
C. Spivak, Trans., pp. ix–lxxxvii). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Spivak, G. C. (1993/2009). Outside in the teaching machine. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Spivak, G. C. (1999). A critique of postcolonial reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
van Eijck, M., & Roth, W. M. (2007). Keeping the local local: Recalibrating the
status of science and traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) in education.
Science Education, 91(6), 926–947.
78 M. HIGGINS
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
ARC II
Critical Possibilities and Possible Critiques
ThroughDeconstructive Play
in/of theMulticultural Science Education
Debate
CHAPTER 3
Serious Play: Inflecting theMulticultural
Science Education Debate Through
and for (Socratic) Dialogue
The purpose of this chapter is to differentially revisit the multicultural
science education debate, which is a central curricular location in science
education that acts as both a potential entry point and problematic gate-
keeping device for Indigenous science to-come, by inflecting it with
a potentially less oppositional mode of meaning-making. In short, by
inspecting and inflecting the culture of this debate, this chapter engages
in the cultural homework of response-ability. Within this debate, it is
generally agreed upon by science educators that there is a clear moral
imperative to respect students from diverse cultural backgrounds within
the multicultural science education classroom.1 However, what consti-
tutes respect and how it is enacted continues to be hotly debated; in
turn, this presents itself as a rich location to unsettle science educa-
tion. A significant contributing factor is how conceptions of respect are
deeply intertwined with, including influenced and impacted by, consid-
erations of “what counts” as science. This has produced two largely
incommensurable positions around the inclusion of Indigenous ways-of-
living-with-Nature (e.g., ethnoscience, Indigenous knowledge systems,
Indigenous science): those who contest its status as scientific knowledge
and those who champion it. However, as the process of debate enacted
is commonly one of opposition, there is little room for meaning made
across positions. Above and beyond addressing the sources of knowledge
that continue to uphold this serious debate, this chapter plays with/in the
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debate processes as a means of opening these foreclosed spaces in science
education as both form and content lead to the excluding, differing, and
deferring of Indigenous science to-come.
As with most other chapters in this book, this one begins with a posi-
tional vignette meant to simultaneously introduce the topic, situate myself
within the inquiry, and provide furtive glances at the concepts, questions,
and curiosities to-come.
Prelude to (a) Serious Play
Because we need to “begin” some-where and some-time, let’s “begin” in
Thunder Bay, Ontario in February of 2009.2 During a graduate student
conference (and as a graduate student), I was asked to take down a
poster I was presenting minutes after I put it up. The campus-wide grad-
uate research poster session had barely begun, as many graduate students
hurried to hang their posters up. During this time, a member of the
university’s Faculty of Science took note of my poster as he was walking
through the exhibit, seemingly on route elsewhere. However, he stopped
upon seeing my poster, his face reddening as his pace accelerated. “I’m
going to request that you take this poster down”, he tersely demanded.
Unsure as to why the request was being made, and unable to make sense
of the physical cues he was exhibiting, I nervously asked, “Why?”. The
point of contention, he said, was the title of the poster, “Shared hori-
zons: A dialogue between Indigenous and Western science”, as well as its
content below. In short, the poster highlighted my own work in cross-
cultural science education in which I endeavoured to juxtapose and braid
Western modern science (WMS)3 and local enactments of traditional
ecological knowledge (TEK),4 namely Inuit (i.e., Indigenous) science
in the circumpolar region (see Higgins, 2011, 2014). Feeling my pulse
quicken, I asked him to elaborate with noticeable defensive and deliberate
emphasis: “What is your issue with this?” The short of his response was
that the friction was stemming from the cultural prepositions (i.e., Indige-
nous and Western) preceding the word science. In other words, as he told
me, “there’s no such thing as Indigenous science, or Western science for
that matter”. Agitatedly, he added, “There is only science”. Reading the
issue as one of not recognizing Indigenous knowledge systems as valid
and productive ways of knowing nature, I too was visibly frustrated. In
an attempt to recover ground, I situated the cross-cultural work within a
longstanding and ongoing conversation in science education. To this, he
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retorted that this type of engagement was not happening “in science”.
With the tension escalating, both of us growing increasingly irritable,
and neither hearing nor being heard, he repeated his demand to take
down the poster. I outright refused. Our exchange ended as the faculty
member went to seek out a member of the graduate student conference’s
organizing committee to enforce his request.
As a science educator who has worked over ten years in Indigenous
communities, making space for diverse ways-of-knowing-nature was and
continues to be a commitment that is both personal and political. I could
not simply take down my poster. While it cannot be stated with certainty,
it is likely that the science faculty member also had his own commitments
that beckoned him to firmly take the position expressed. Nonetheless,
there is a part of me that wishes that this exchange could have played
out differently. In hindsight, and giving the faculty member benefit of
the doubt, the poster could have acted as a productive conversational
pivot for both involved. What if I perceived his position of science as
singular and universal as something other than a potentially disrespectful
“the ends justify the means” approach to morality in teaching science?
What if he perceived my position of advocating for scientific pluralism
as something other than “anything goes” epistemic relativism? While I
would like to think that we shared a common desire for science and
science education that is rigorous and empirical engages nature yet not
indoctrinating through cultural imposition, it appeared as though we had
implicitly agreed to disagree before said conversation could begin. If the
demand for me to take down my poster had not shut down the possibility
of conversation, my reaction, rebuttal, and refusal certainly did. The act
of attempting conversation further entrenched our respective positions,
giving the impression that a combative and antagonistic relationship was
the only type we could inhabit.
While this is but one experience from my perspective, the character-
istics that mark it are not isolated. Michiel van Eijck and Wolff-Michael
Roth (2007) state, “one can be surprised about the fierce debate that
currently shakes the foundations of science education” (pp. 927–928)
and, I would add, the plurality of locations in which it is and continues
to be occurring (e.g., science teacher education). Often referred to as
the multicultural science education debate,5 it is not strictly isolated to
a singular place but extends to plural locations that are continuously
and differentially shaped by Western colonial relationships. These include
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locations: (a) where settlers remain and have become numerically domi-
nant (e.g., New Zealand, Australia, Canada, United States, Peru, Taiwan);
(b) where colonial settlers have never reached majority and/or that have
undergone formal decolonizing as defined by the United Nations (e.g.,
India and many African nations); and (c) in which displaced diasporic
communities live, whose forced migration from the lands in which their
cultural identity developed is the result of colonialism past and present
(e.g., descendants of chattel slaves in former British and French colonies,
Hmong immigrants [formerly from Thailand] in China and the US)
(Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; McKinley, 2007).
At stake are notions of “what counts” as science within the context
of the multicultural classroom,6 and how their entanglement, impact,
and influence constitute respect and how it is enacted towards culturally
diverse students. Seemingly most polarizing, and of central significance in
this inquiry, is the status of TEK as scientific knowledge (or equally valid
to scientific knowledge).
I would argue that the ongoing debate is not the result of poorly
formulated scholarly arguments. Rather, it is a symptom of the opposi-
tional and antagonistic modes through which the multicultural science
education debate operates (see McKinley & Stewart, 2012), such as was
the case in the exchange between myself and the Faculty of Science
member in the introductory vignette. For the multicultural science
education debate to move towards shared meanings and understand-
ings, it must become and remain an open process rather than a sedi-
mented product. Open channels of communication allow for productive
engagement across and between positions, rather than a protective and
prohibitive form of disengagement, such as that demonstrated within
the introductory vignette. As Elizabeth St. Pierre (1997) reminds us,
the goal of educational research should be to both “produce different
knowledge and knowledge differently” (p. 175). As such, this chapter
seriously engages both within and against the norms that shape the
culture of the multicultural science education debate itself by differen-
tially (re)presenting the multicultural science education debate literature.
However, the purpose here is not to produce new knowledge through the
advancement of either universalist or cross-culturalist positions as is tradi-
tionally the case. Instead, I undertake, and provide tools for readers to
engage the task of producing knowledge differently through a differential
critical engagement with the knowledge production process that occurs
within this debate in order to move towards the possibility of shared
meanings.7
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Programme for (a) “Serious Play” To-Come
Differential knowledge (re)production takes the form of (a) “serious play”
as means of possibly working within and between the often “scripted”
(i.e., well-established and entrenched) positions of universalist and cross-
culturalist in order to (re)open these foreclosed8 spaces of meaning-
making. In short, the “serious play” introduced here but expanded
upon later signals an entangled conceptual apparatus comprising Socratic
dialogue, Bohmian dialogue, and Derridean “play”. Together, these
inform the textual strategies used as well as the practices of reading advo-
cated for. There are sharp distinctions between Socratic dialogue (i.e.,
Platonic form of representation of live, face-to-face discussions between
two “scripted” positions), and Bohmian dialogue (i.e., the stream of
meaning through which something is made in common), as well as a
play (i.e., theatrical drama), and Derridean play (i.e., the always already
present possibility and process of (re)signification; see Derrida, 1976).
However, through (a) “serious play”, this very term takes a double(d)
meaning in that it is both a theatrical drama (i.e., a play) engaging with
serious topics as well as a serious commitment and engagement with the
(re)signification (i.e., Derridean play) of the concepts and terms within.
Similarly, while the format of Socratic dialogue traditionally represents
discussions between two parties, it also acts as an invitation to the reader
who is open to being in a Bohmian dialogue with the text to create
movement of meaning between the two positions (re)presented.
The goal of this chapter is to encourage and invite “serious play”,
which can be read in two distinct ways. On one hand, it can be under-
stood as a call for science educators to seriously (re)engage in the drama of
foreclosed conversations around notions such as “what counts” as science
and other hotly debated issues within multicultural science education. On
the other hand, it can be interpreted as an invitation for science educa-
tors to engage with the always already possible play of (re)signification
of these notions and the associated positions. Together, serious play calls
for the dialogical movement of meaning that occurs through and during
the possible play of (re)signification, be it between people, concepts, or
(scripted) positions, in order to produce a different set of possible possi-
bilities9 emerging from discussions such as the one at the beginning of
the paper as well as the one that is mimicked within the Socratic dialogue
to come.
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There are four “acts” to this serious play. The first act sets the stage
for the dialogue. I further expand upon the conceptually entangled
notion of “serious play” through suggesting Bohmian dialogue as a means
of working towards non-adversarialism, expanding upon the Derridean
“play” of (re)signification, and proposing Socratic dialogue as a means
of representing and producing this play. In the second “act,” reading
notes are provided. I describe the universalist and cross-culturalist posi-
tions participating within the Socratic dialogue and beyond, and also
make suggestions for readers looking to engage in the serious play of
Bohmian dialogue. In the third “act”, the Socratic dialogue on multi-
cultural science education is “played out”. Herein, both universalist and
cross-culturalist characters enunciate points of contention and agreement
within multicultural science education (e.g., “what counts” as science)
while providing a space for readers to potentially engage in differential
meaning-making around these issues. The fourth and final “act” that
follows the Socratic dialogue is an exploration of how knowledge is both
reproduced and potentially differentially produced within the multicul-
tural science education debate. This section also engages with recent
literature that endeavours to open up multicultural science education
through (re)signification of locations that threaten to foreclose the possi-
bility of further play (i.e., those which remain unresolved and unresolvable
within the debate).
Act 1: Setting the Stage for (a) “Serious Play”
From the Dialectic of Discussion to Bohmian Dialogue: An Ethic
for Seriously Playing Together
The positioning and approach enacted between the Faculty of Science
member and myself within the introductory vignette could be stated to
be what Janice Moulton (1983) calls the “adversary method”. She char-
acterizes it by its aim “to show that the other party is wrong, challenging
them on any possible point, regardless of where the other person agrees”
(p. 156). Similarly, David Bohm (1996) might qualify the above engage-
ment between the faculty member and myself as “discussion”. Discussion,
having the same suffix as percussion and concussion, evokes imagery of
verbal jousting in which speakers must beat, bang, and thump one anoth-
er’s arguments in order for one meaning to emerge victorious through
the dialectic negation of the other. In order to achieve this, the discussant
3 SERIOUS PLAY: INFLECTING THE MULTICULTURAL SCIENCE … 87
must make common their view by subsuming, sublating, or suturing over
those with whom they are discussing. This “making common” is often
aggressive and adversarial, the shared assumptions required to engage in
conversation on common ground are rarely reached. In turn, not only is
it “not a good way to convince someone who doesn’t agree with you”
(Moulton, 1983, p. 156) but it also breaks down the very possibility of
communication (see also Latour, 2004a; Kirby, 2011). As was the case
between the faculty of science member and myself, our respective refusal
to consider the other’s point of view (re)entrenched our respective posi-
tions. As Bohm (1996) asks, “how can you share if you are sure you
have the truth and the other…[similarly] has the truth, and the truthes
don’t agree?” (p. 43). However, this did not mean we needed to concede
our respective viewpoints. While there is always moments in which one
must inhabit imposed norms within communicative spaces as a necessity,
such inhabitation often requires the one conforming to allow parts of
themselves to be dialectically negated. This type of subsuming, sublating,
and suturing over often results in either a communication (i.e., a singular
imposed meaning) or a null communication (in which silences are rife
with meaning; see Mazzei, 2007) but not necessarily communication as
an open process of back-and-forth.
For these reasons, there is a call from scholars such as Bohm and
Moulton for dialogue rather than the dialectic of discussion, a call to
listen rather than strictly talk. While both dialectic and dialogue begin
from an encounter in which two differing views on a similar or same topic
encounter one another, their ethic of resolution differs. Dialogue’s Greek
roots entail through (dia, as opposed to di which would simply signal
two)10 the meaning of the word (logos). Rather than a dialectic contest
between dichotomized views, dialogue acts as a stream of meaning, a
process of communication in which those engaged are not concerned
with defeating propositions or in which meaning is to be made common
through imposition but rather a process through which meaning is being
made in common. Because it is a non-adversarial model, a process
through which shared meanings are made together, it does not require
that the meanings interfaced together to be negated for something new
to emerge. This creates space for the possibility for meaning-making
positions in-between that are often lost and foreclosed in dialectic and
discussion.11
In and through dialogue, Bohm (1996) calls for “suspended action”.
The suspension is a call to listen that is framed as both a listening to others
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and to oneself in that the act “listening” to how we listen to others can
tell us much about ourselves, including the values that frame what and
how we “hear”. Between the science faculty member and myself, there
were diverse epistemic as well as affective cues that we could have sensed
of ourselves and of the other (e.g., physical indicators of tension). They
may have signalled the ways that we were being played by our respective
personal assumptions. For example, if I could take my quickening pulse
as an indicator of meaning on the move to partially glimpse at my then
held assumption of epistemic universalism being diametrically opposed to
respectful multiculturalism, perhaps I could have differently participated
in the conversation. The purpose of “suspended action” is then to come
to awareness, albeit partial, of how values are inflected, deferred, and
deflected through our selves. It allows us to re-think the self-in-relation
to the norms that shape how, who, and what we can be (see also Butler,
2005; Foucault, 1997; Mazzei, 2007; Peat, 2007). The action following
a suspension period in which we consider gentle ways in which the situ-
ation can be re(con)figured, is a non-adversarial process through which
shared meanings can potentially be made together.
The Serious Play of (Re)Signification
Within the introductory vignette, one of the potential issues at hand
was that the very terms and conditions that shaped engagement, such
as “what counts as science”, were sedimented, stratified, and thus unable
to move towards the shared meanings called for in Bohmian dialogue.
In order for conversations around and about multicultural science educa-
tion to be modes of dialogue rather than discussions, it required that the
terms of engagement not be foreclosed before they are brought up. In
order words, there is a need for the possibility of play. While the play
that I am advocating for here is not the same as that of a child who
might re-imagine a branch as wand, it is a useful metaphor with which to
think as play is deeply tied to the act and possibility of (re)signification.
(Re)signification is a conceptual process of un-binding and interchange-
ability of what something “is not” (e.g., a wand) and “is” (e.g., a stick).
It is an interplay of absence and presence with respect to what is signi-
fied while retaining the signifier (Derrida, 1976).12 In turn, it allows for
movement within the stream of meaning-making through the disruption
and destabilization of stratified and sedimented meaning. Such decen-
tering creates a space of meaning-making that allows for the production
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of positions in-between “present” and “absent”. Play is not a complete
unravelling and an undoing, but rather a critical and complicit use of that
which is played with, so that new meanings can take hold (Lather, 2007;
Spivak, 1993/2009). Accordingly, when that which is played with is no
longer the material of children’s games, “play can be serious business”
(Mazzei, 2007, p. 22).
Socratic Dialogue as (a) Serious Play
For revitalizing critical conversations that mobilize meanings of what
quality multicultural science education “is” and “is not”, it is useful to
think through a medium that works within and against the adversarial and
scripted discussions operating within the field: Socratic dialogue. Plato’s
Socratic dialogues are often read as a representation of a live, face-to-face
discussion between two scripted positions. These positions are usually in
unresolved, and potentially unresolvable, opposition to one another in a
manner that is not so dissimilar from the introductory vignette. However,
as Richard Smith (2011) reminds us, while it could be said that Socratic
dialogues are but another form of representation, they are even more so
a textual invitation to think across and between the positions presented
within. As Socratic dialogue is never fully captured by one definition
or the other, holding these two differing readings of Socratic dialogue
in tension make it an effective choice for thinking about multicultural
science education. Given the ways in which the positions discussing multi-
cultural science education are scripted, Socratic dialogue offers itself as an
effective medium through which to represent a possible discussion, hence
allowing for working within the script (e.g., TEK’s status of “counting as
science” defended or denied). Furthermore, Socratic dialogue’s implicit
invitation to dialogue across differently positioned concepts and commit-
ments allows for working against the script (i.e., towards the possibility
of shared meanings).
In addition to this textual invitation, Socratic dialogue provides the
disruption and destabilizing through serious play required for the stream
of meaning associated with dialogue. As Smith (2011) elaborates: (a)
Socratic dialogues are strictly imitations, (b) imitations are always a form
of play, and, accordingly, (c) Socratic dialogues are never more than
(a) play. Mimesis or imitation creates “an opportunity to adopt ‘alter-
native persona’ as a mechanism for addressing difficulties” (Turnbull &
Mullins, 2007, p. 94) and playing with/in difficult positions.13 Although
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the universalist and cross-culturalist characters (re)presented within the
upcoming Socratic dialogue are but imitations, seriously and respectfully
engaging with them and their interplay means not turning them into
caricatures of their positions. While Socratic dialogue is long known to
engage in serious topics, it is a mode in which seriousness and playful-
ness are always in tension and inverting so that “they do not form a fixed
binary” (Smith, 2011, p. 230) as they are always already enacting the play
of (re)signification. In addition, as it is (a) play with serious topics, “most
attempts in the dialogues to reach a definition—of courage, friendship
and so on—fail resoundingly” (Smith, 2011, p. 223). This “failure” to
reach fixed and (fore)closed conclusions or outcomes has much to do with
play’s productive prevention of foreclosure through keeping meaning
on the move. Accordingly, this generates a space for meaning-making
that is never fully prescriptive (i.e., meaning is not already made for the
reader but rather always open to a certain degree of interpretation), and
always open to further play (i.e., meaning is open to the possibility of
(re)signification as the context under which it is signified differs). For this
reason, Socratic dialogue acts as an invitation to the reader to engage in
their own playfulness with the ideas found within, to play with serious
notions that desire to be (re)produced differently.
Act 2: The Programme for (a) “Serious
Play”: A Primer for Playing Along
Who Is Playing (or Played)?
The Socratic dialogue intentionally plays within the period when this
debate reached its peak. As such, this dialogue primarily focuses on and
draws from what van Eijck and Roth (2007) refer to as “one of the land-
marks” (p. 927) of multicultural science education (see also McKinley &
Stewart, 2012),14 as well as some of the pieces the symposium authors
were responding to. Accordingly, the “key players” and their respec-
tive scholarship primarily informing and inspiring the universalist account
are the work of William Cobern and Cathleen Loving (2001), Michael
Matthews (1994), Harvey Siegel (1997, 2001), and Sherry Southerland
(2000). Similarly, the cross-culturalist position which is “played out”
draws on the scholarship of Bradford Lewis and Glen Aikenhead (2001),
Gloria Snively and John Corsiglia (2001), as well as William Stanley and
Nancy Brickhouse (1994, 2001).
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Within the field of science education, universalists are those who
uphold the belief that WMS is the best, most valid, and/or powerful way
of knowing the natural world. Furthermore, universalists see WMS as a
knowledge-practice that is quasi-objective, quasi-neutral, and/or quasi-
transcendental vis-à-vis culture. On the subject, Matthews (1994) states
that universalists:
… regard science as an intellectual activity whose truth-finding goal is not,
in principle, affected by national, class, racial or other differences: science
transcends human differences… This universalist view recognizes that while
aspects of culture do influence science, nevertheless cultural considerations
do not determine the truth claims of science. (p. 182)
WMS’s epistemic superiority with regard to knowing nature is substanti-
ated by WMS’s ability to explain, predict, empiricize, and stabilize natural
phenomena, and apply this scientific knowledge to produce technolo-
gies that are unique (e.g., airplanes, modern medicine). Because WMS
can at once be framed as culturally specific and universal, universalists
within the multicultural science classroom continue to deliver science
education curriculum which is about enhancing students’ scientific literacy
by developing an appreciation, and understanding, and applications of
WMS in everyday life. However, recognizing that universalism and multi-
culturalism are not a mutually exclusive and dichotomous, universalists
endeavour to instructionally provide culturally diverse students whose
opportunities to learn WMS in ways that are respectful of that diversity.
Within this Socratic dialogue, the universalist character’s account and
engagement is primarily inspired and informed by the aforementioned
scholars who take this stance with respect to multicultural science educa-
tion. Also, in keeping with the goal of “serious play”, these accounts
are inflected by recent scholarship that revisits the multicultural science
education debate as a means of working towards shared meanings from a
universalist position (e.g., Cobern & Loving, 2008; El-Hani & de Ferreira
Bandeira, 2008; El-Hani & Mortimer, 2007; Zeyer, 2009).
Cross-culturalists are those who take up the pluralization and prolifera-
tion of scientific perspectives, and the localization of scientific knowledge
without characterizing knowledges as relativistic (see McKinley, 2007).
Cross-culturalists accept and promote the idea that TEK can and should
be considered “equal” to that of WMS. This does not entail treating them
equal (i.e., the same) but as equally valid. Cross-culturalists work from
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the assumption that because WMS stems from the dominant, hegemonic
culture, many students who are not of that culture will experience science
education as a form of dominance and hegemony. This experience is, in
part, rooted in the valuation of WMS through decentering and devaluing
of their own cultural knowledge. As a result, cross-culturalists uniquely
endeavour to reform curriculum in addition to modes of instruction.
With respect to science education curriculum, there is a commitment to
create space in which TEK is included and simultaneously decenters WMS
(see Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011; LeGrange
& Aikenhead, 2016). It is important to note that what is argued for
here is not a teaching of all non-Western-modern bodies of knowl-
edge, which could result in relativism, but rather an inclusion of diverse
and longstanding empirical ways-of-knowing the natural world. With
respect to instruction within the multicultural classroom, the focus shifts
from having students accept culturally diverse scientific notions towards
developing understanding and appreciation. This often entails that cross-
culturalist teachers assist their students in respectfully and meaningfully
navigating cultural spaces that are not their own without the require-
ment that students abandon whichever way-of-knowing-nature that they
are further developing.
In this Socratic dialogue, the cross-culturalist account and engage-
ment is primarily inspired and informed by the aforementioned scholars
who take this stance with respect to multicultural science education. To
engage in the play of (re)signification, the cross-culturalist account is also
inflected by revisitations of the multicultural science education debate that
works towards shared meanings from a cross-culturalist position (e.g.,
Alsop & Fawcett, 2010; McKinley & Stewart, 2012; van Eijck & Roth,
2007).
It is important to note that while there are often internal similarities
within both of these positions in terms of how they are both defined and
enacted, there is also diversity. While the characters within the dialogue
are a universalist and a cross-culturalist who are composite characters of
the scholars who inspired this dialogical inquiry, there is not a singular
way of being either a universalist or a cross-culturalist. While we should
perhaps change the terms of the conversation to account for universalisms
and cross-culturalisms, it is generally the case that both universalists and
cross-culturalists will internally agree on the notion that WMS is or is
not the most or only valid way of knowing the natural world respec-
tively. However, the strength of such a “what counts as science” claim
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and other interrelated claims varies greatly within both positions, as well
as the degree to which one embodies such beliefs within their research and
teaching practices. It could even be argued that one need not consciously
or explicitly hold the belief that WMS is or is not the most or only
valid approach to be a universalist or a cross-culturalist respectively but
rather that any and every science educator’s curriculum and pedagogy can
implicitly demonstrate and convey such commitments (see Carter, 2004;
McKinley, 2000; Sammel, 2009).
These normative and counter-normative values are always already
circulating and inflecting the signification of what it means to be science
educator. As such, it is worth highlighting here that the strict use of two
characters is not an attempt to present them as the universalist and the
cross-culturalist. Furthermore, even if that were the goal, the ongoing
play of (re)signification makes it such that the position, even if there is
an attempt to fully account for the range of diversity, is always exceeded,
ruptured, and overturned. In other words, even in a more comprehensive
and expansive definition of both universalist and cross-culturalist posi-
tions, there is always already someone who identifies as either but only
partially fits within. Rather than attempting to engage in the impossi-
bility of presenting an essence, this dualistic choice is made as a means of,
first, working within the constraints that are posited by Socratic dialogue
as a methodology. Secondly, it is an attempt to reproduce some of the
particularities that occur through the adversary method. In particular, the
assumption that:
the only, or at any rate, the best, way of evaluating work … is to subject
it to the strongest or most extreme opposition. And it is assumed that the
best way of presenting work … is to address it to an imagined opponent
and muster all the evidence one can to support it. (Moulton, 1983, p. 153,
emphasis in original)
This imagined opponent is often the most radical proponent of that which
is considered the adversary. While scholars often see their own encamp-
ment as rich and diverse, through the adversary method, the opposing
side often becomes a parody of itself. As a result, the imagined adversary
who is addressed is often positioned in a manner that few, if any, scholars
occupy. Universalists are not-so-gently cast as wholly privileging epistemic
claims (through the norms of Western modernity) over moral or ethical
ones, and vice versa for cross-culturalists. This creates perceived positions
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which are either strawmen or deeply untenable. If more modest positions
are not more frequently discussed it is because scholars “who cannot be
recast into an adversarial mold are likely to be ignored” (Moulton, 1983,
p. 155). In some ways, like Socratic dialogue, the multicultural science
education debate has become a scene where drama (i.e., the serious
matters of “what counts” as science) and comedy (i.e., the parody-like
positioning of adversaries) alternate and seep into one another.
Rules for (a) Serious Play
Serious play is not something that occurs on its own.15 Rather, the act
of “playing” (i.e., (re)signification) is a process that requires both players
(e.g., “readers”) and played (e.g., texts). Furthermore, “playing” occurs
through the movement in-between the two. Consequently, as a reader
you are encouraged to engage with the Socratic dialogue in a manner
that is dialogical (i.e., so that there is movement in-between your views
and the views presented within the text and something is made in common
through reading), rather than dialectic (i.e., so that either your views or
the views presented within the text are made common through reading).
Here, the practice of suspended action is significant as a lived practice of
dialogue and a (partial) coming-to-awareness of what we think, as well as
how what we think is produced and producible.16
Achieving dialogue through suspended action, be it between people,
texts, or ideas, is not such a simple task as we often hold, and are held by,
assumptions that make it difficult for us to know differently. On this,
Bohm (1996) states that the assumptions we always already hold are
entangled within the meaning-making process. They not only shape and
are shaped by what we know (as representations), but also how we come
to know (as the world presents itself to us):
… representation is not only present in thought or in imagination, but it
fuses with the actual perception or experience. In other words, the repre-
sentation fuses with the “presentation,” so that what is “presented” (as
perception) is already in large part a re-presentation. (p. 64, emphasis in
original)
In other words, as difference presents itself in the world, the assumptions
that frame our thought subsume what is perceived within a represen-
tation, hence producing sameness. If we seriously desire being open
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to difference, Bohm (1996) states that there is a need to “go into
all the pressures that are behind our assumptions… into the process of
thought behind the assumptions, not just the assumptions themselves”
(p. 9, emphasis in original). However, as Bohm (1996) states, “thought
is not proprioceptive” (p. 29). In other words, thought is incapable of
perceiving itself. It is impossible to simultaneously think about something
and think about how we are thinking about something. Furthermore, the
privileging of one is almost always at the expense of the other (see also
Barad, 2007; Lather, 2007). Despite the impossibility of fully thinking
about how we think, this does not mean that we are “off the hook”.
Because thought is incapable of perceiving itself, Bohm (1996) suggest
paying attention to the affective and embodied movements occurring
alongside thought. This, he suggests, might offer a means of differentially
thinking about how we think while working towards the suspension of
our assumptions. As Moulton states (1983), such “reasoning has largely
been ignored by [scholars] because it is different from the reasoning used
to address an adversary and it is too complex and interrelated to be evalu-
ated by counterexamples” (pp. 160–161). As such, considering that which
is usually excluded from consideration in meaning-making processes can
become a useful tool in producing knowledge differently.
These affective and embodied movements of thought are not only
much more (self-)perceptible than thought but also hold a direct connec-
tion to thought:
Movements are taking place inside you – physical feelings – the heart beat,
the blood pressure, the way you breathe, the way your body feels tense;
and also the kinds of thoughts that go along with these feelings. You can
observe these things, be aware of them, and their connection. (Bohm,
1996, p. 84)
While a consideration of sensorial or affective cues on their own might not
provide direct insight into our assumptions and could also be considered
an act of navel-gazing, Bohm (1996) states that they are nonetheless indi-
cators that the process of knowing is occurring. Furthermore, not only are
they connected to thought but also part of thought. For Bohm (1996),
thought is “part of a material process” which happens with/in “the brain,
the nervous system, [and] the whole body”, such that thought is not
and should not be considered as disembodied and separate from affect
as they are “all one system” (p. 94). Accordingly, sensorial or affective
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cues should be thought of as constitutive parts, and signals of the process
of thought. Whether this process is one of knowledge production (i.e.,
new meaning being made of experiences or perceptions) or reproduction
(i.e., new experiences or perceptions being fused over by previously held
meanings) of knowledge, emotional and embodied indicators provide a
rich entry point for attempting to think about how you think.
Therefore, as you read the Socratic below dialogue below, there is an
explicit invitation to attempt to suspend the moments in which you would
want to interject and pay attention to your feelings, both emotional (e.g.,
frustration) and physical (e.g., furrowing of the brow) as they become
productive sites of inquiry into how we think about how we think (e.g.,
the systems and norms through which thought are inflected). If we take
the idea that playing requires both players and that which is played, not
only does a text require a reader for (re)signification, but it may be
productive to think about these affective and sensorial movements as one
of the ways in which the text is playing the reader.
Act 3: “Two Science Educators Walk
into a Bar”: A Socratic Dialogue
on Multicultural Science Education
Persons of the Dialogue: UNIVERSALIST (U); CROSS-
CULTURALIST (CC).
Scene: Two multicultural science educators, one a universalist, the
other a cross-culturalist, meet to discuss teaching practices over a pint
of their favorite form of fermentation.
U : Hello [CC]. I know that in the past, we haven’t always seen eye-to-eye
on what multicultural science education might entail; I thought that
today we could attempt to begin our dialogue from a point on which
we both agree. I brought with me a definition of multicultural science
education upon which we should both be able to concur:
Multicultural science education is a construct, a process, and an
educational reform movement with the goal of providing equi-
table opportunities for culturally diverse student populations to
learn quality science in schools, colleges, and universities. (Atwater
& Riley, 1993, p. 664)
3 SERIOUS PLAY: INFLECTING THE MULTICULTURAL SCIENCE … 97
CC: Hello [U]. Great idea! This is certainly a view of multicultural science
education that I can get behind. I take it this is also the case for you,
having picked the definition.
U : You are correct.
CC: Although we may both agree on the definition, I fear that we may
read, and implement the same definition differently.
U : How so?
CC: I believe we differ in how we might interpret what is meant by
“quality science”.
U : In that, like Southerland (2000), I view “quality science” as “inquiry
characterized by reliability on evidence and reason with the goal of
understanding an objective, external, physical world” (p. 290)?
CC: Yes, and that I, like Masakata Ogawa (1995), characterize science as “a
rational perceiving of reality” (p. 588, emphasis in original).17 That is
not to say that our respective definitions are incommensurate. However,
partnering words such as reliability, evidence, and external with reason
gives me the impression that there is a particular form of reason that
you may be privileging through this process. Nonetheless, I am more
concerned with how your definition of science is enacted within and
through your teaching practices, particularly around “what counts” as
science. If I may inquire, which systems of knowledge describing the
physical world could be, should be, and are taught as “science” within
your science classroom?
U : For the most part, my science education practices revolve around
canonical understandings of science. In other words, WMS is primarily
what is taught in my classroom. While I do not shy away from, nor
am I opposed to, teaching other scientific viewpoints and meaning-
making structures for understanding the natural world, WMS is the
most effective and useful system for working towards knowing nature.
CC: Is it fair here to state that the way in which you address multicultur-
alism in your classroom is largely instructional rather than, or in addition
to being, curricular?
U : Yes, that would be a fair statement.
CC: Before we address instructional questions, I would like to ask you a
few curricular ones.
U : Go ahead.
CC: Within science education curricula, the belief of WMS holding a
position of scientific superiority is one that is often and simply taken-
for-granted. However, this is not an accusation I am making of you. I
assume that your centering of WMS is an informed choice. Could you
justify this claim you make for WMS?
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U : First, WMS demonstrates the properties that are at the heart of “quality
science”: scientific knowledge and theories that are genuinely testable,
predictive, and explanatory. Secondly, this is not to say that other ways
of knowing the natural world are ineffective or not of value but rather
that WMS best matches the criteria I have outlined previously.
CC: While I recognize the desire to make utilitarian curricular choices
within educational spaces, it is also important to think about what is
being maximized through these choices as well as how and why these
choices are being made. My primary concern here is that how you define
science and implement educationally might be at odds with “providing
equitable opportunities for culturally diverse students” (Atwater & Riley,
1993, p. 664). In other words, taking such a stance is potentially disre-
spectful to students whose culture might not align with that of WMS,18
be it in the context of science education or elsewhere.
U : I’m not sure I follow as to how my curricular conception and
instructional delivery of science education might be inequitable or disre-
spectful, but I am willing to hear you out. Go ahead. Make your
case.
CC: Since science is dependent upon an intersection of particular exper-
imental systems, communities of researchers, organizational modes, as
well as historical circumstances, all of which contextualize the genera-
tion of scientific knowledge, would you not agree with me that science
is a situated practice?
U : Yes, I would have to agree.
CC: Similarly, since education is linked with culture, gender, history, socio-
political and socio-economic context, amongst other factors, would you
agree that education is also a situated practice?
U : Yes, go on.
CC: Should it not be argued then that science education, like its two
constitutive parts, science and education, also be a situated practice?
U : Agreed.
CC: Then, should science education, as a situated practice, not also draw
upon and reflect the contexts within and through which it emerges? This
might entail many different things when considering a variety of contex-
tual elements such as the constitution of the student body. For the sake
of this conversation, I would like to clarify that I am referring specifi-
cally to the inclusion and reflection of TEK, be it called ethnoscience,
Indigenous science, Indigenous knowledge systems or something else
altogether, to enhance students’ learning within the science classroom.
U : I would cautiously agree with you that science education should draw
on and reflect the educational context. As I mentioned earlier, I am not
opposed to teaching bodies of cultural knowledge alongside scientific
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beliefs, because teaching TEK, IWLN, ethnoscience, and other forms
of culturally-specific scientific understandings can enhance students’
learning by illustrating what WMS can do that which other approaches
to the natural world cannot. In other words, including non-canonical
understandings of science can be a way of showing that not all thoughts
are equal in all contexts. The inclusion of ways of knowing nature
beyond WMS in the science classroom is not something that is agreed
upon by all universalists. However, I do not view the exclusion of TEK
or other approaches to knowing nature as an essential practice within
science education. As an aside, I would like to inquire into the criteria
you are utilizing for the systems of knowledge whose inclusion you are
arguing for.
CC: I can certainly elaborate upon this. As you will recall, we have
discussed and agreed upon earlier that science needs to be conceived
as socio-culturally situated. However, this is not to say that it is only
situated in this manner. As Karen Barad (2007) states, it is important
“to remember that there are cultural and natural causes for [scien-
tific] knowledge claims” (p. 40, emphasis in original). Accordingly,
the ways-of-knowing-nature that I am arguing for are not only cultur-
ally situated, but also rooted in natural empiricism. Not only is TEK
empirical in its engagement with one’s natural environment, but it is
also a longstanding, intergenerational human engagement whose knowl-
edge traditions often span thousands of years. As such, I am arguing
for a pluralism of ways-of-knowing the natural world in which both
culture and nature are significant and significantly engaged factors in
the development of the knowledge claims being made.
U : While I do not wish to make a “slippery slope” argument, would
Creationism fit here?
CC: It certainly is not my intent to exclude Western ways-of-knowing the
natural world that are not WMS as there are multiple forms of TEK
stemming from the West. However, as I understand it, Creationists’
knowledge claims about the natural world are primarily, and possibly
strictly, culturally-based (i.e., around biblical scripture). As it does not
meet the criteria of natural and cultural causes for knowledge claims,
Creationism would not, and should not, be included with the other
bodies of knowledge that “count as science”. The pluralism for which
I am arguing need not and should not be an “anything-goes” form of
relativism.
U : Thank you for the clarification.
CC: It is my pleasure. Furthermore, I think you would agree with me here
that the science classroom should not be a place of dogmatic education.
U : I do agree here.
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CC: Then, if you will allow, I would like to ask further questions around
your earlier statement around how, in your science education practices,
you might include other bodies of scientific knowledge and compare
them to WMS. In particular, I am curious as to how you might respond
to the oft-enunciated claim that a WMS-centered science curriculum
has been and continues to be indoctrinating when there are pluralistic
perspectives with the classroom.
U : Certainly, go ahead.
CC: Do you believe that it is possible both to respect youth whose culture
is reflected in TEK and represent that TEK in terms of contrast with,
indeed in terms of deficit to, WMS? Furthermore, if WMS is maintained
as the primary curricular content in light of plurality, how do you avoid
the pitfalls of this becoming a form of dogmatism?
U : If it is done with caution, sensitivity, and care, I believe that this
comparative process can be engaged in and taught respectfully. Also,
one can teach science without demanding that students change their
beliefs, or denying them altogether. I recognize that historically there
have been many cases in which interfacing WMS with other ways of
understanding the natural world have been problematic in that they
have forcefully produced totalizing discourses, cultural silencing, and
marginalization. As Cobern and Loving (2001) state,
The problem is not that science dominates at what it does best:
the production of highly efficacious naturalistic understanding of
natural phenomena. The problem is that too often science is used
to dominate the public square as if all other discourses were of
lesser value. (p. 62)
I am not advocating for education that is disrespectful or impositional.
The issue at hand is not the comparative work, nor the centering of
WMS, but rather the educational mode through which it was done.
One can engage in teaching WMS without it devolving into scientism
through its unquestioned and unquestionable privileging at the expense
of other forms of knowledge.
CC: Would you care to elaborate on this? I do not understand how you
can simultaneously respect an individual while not affording validity to
their culturally-based scientific knowledges.
U : While these comparisons may not hold certain cultural knowledges as
equivalent to WMS, this is not to deny them validity. Rather, it acts
as an explication of how these knowledges do not meet the scientific
standard. This also entails that there are situations and contexts in which
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WMS is not the most appropriate form of knowledge. Furthermore, and
accordingly, such comparisons do not discredit the individual learner.
CC: Therefore, as I understand it, the terms we are currently discussing are
not those of “what counts” as science, but rather those of what counts
best, as well as when, how, and where.
U : Most certainly.
CC: However, if WMS is the only way of understanding the natural world
that is recognized, perceived, or privileged as “quality science” or as best
meeting its criteria, would students of non-Western cultures be required
to learn WMS at the expense of their culture? Furthermore, if this is not
to discredit the individual learner, could this be considered a form of
epistemic violence?
U : As I said, this would have to be done with caution, sensitivity and
care; I am not advocating for a form of science education that is inher-
ently disrespectful. It seems that we may have diverging notions of what
respect may entail in the multicultural classroom. Let us take a step back
and discuss this term of engagement.
CC: Certainly.
U : Within a multicultural classroom, there is a clear and moral imperative
to treat members of all cultures justly and with respect, correct?
CC: Of course.
U : Therefore, it is imperative that all students, as well as their cultures and
cultural beliefs be treated with respect as well.
CC: I agree with you up to here. Go on.
U : However, it is important to note that respecting students, as well as
their cultures does not require treating their scientific beliefs as scientific
knowledge. There is nothing wrong with identifying a set of beliefs
as scientifically deficient, so long as it is done in a culturally sensitive
manner, of course. The goal of science education is to make students
scientifically literate, not indoctrinate them through scientism.
CC: You are correct in highlighting the importance of science education
not simply being about teaching and upholding any belief about the
natural world. As mentioned earlier, science education should certainly
not become an “anything goes” form of relativism. However, this is
not to say that all cultural knowledge about the natural world should
simply be treated as belief. Even if the criteria for “what counts”
as knowledge of the natural world is different across various cultural
knowledge systems, this does not mean that TEK needs to loses its
status as knowledge once it enters the science classroom. It is also worth
noting that while all culturally developed systems for understanding
nature are different, there are often similarities as well. For example,
Gregory Cajete (1999) makes such a comparison between Indigenous
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science and WMS in stating: “Indigenous science is a broad category
that includes everything from metaphysics to philosophy to various prac-
tical technologies practiced by Indigenous past and present” (p. 83).
Similarly to WMS, Indigenous science “has models which are highly
contextual to tribal experience, representational and focused on higher
order thinking and understanding” (p. 85).
U : Perhaps I should rephrase my earlier statement. I do not wish to deny
diverse culturally-specific knowledge about the natural world the status
of knowledge. Furthermore, the degrees of similarity are in fact worth
noting as many forms of ethnoscience have rich histories of empirical
naturalistic observation. However, is there not something lost in calling
TEK “science?”
CC: Not always, but it is certainly a possibility that is always present. When
placing multiple and diverse competing claims next to one another,
there always runs the risk that they become homogenous in a way that
erases their diversity and distinctiveness.
U : This is not only the case for TEK, but also WMS.
CC: I certainly agree.
U : If so, then why is calling TEK science or having it “count” as science
of such importance?
CC: So long as “science” continues to be used in some educational loca-
tions as a term that excludes rather than includes, there is a need to
continue working within that space even if it is complicated, complex,
and sometimes contradictory.
U : I agree with you here that there continues to be science educators who
deny the inclusion of any other way of knowing nature beyond WMS,
but that is not what I am advocating for here.
CC: There is, however, one complexity or complication that I would like to
further discuss with you when both TEK and WMS are included within
a curriculum. Here, we both agree that such juxtapositions potentially
affect both TEK and WMS. However, as I see it, these processes of
interaction are not always even and equal in what they produce.
U : How so?
CC: Without going into a longstanding history of uneven interactions
between TEK and WMS, it is nonetheless worth considering the posi-
tioning of both bodies of knowledge within the science classroom.
As you mentioned earlier, you believe that it is possible to treat
non-Western-modern ways of knowing nature with respect while simul-
taneously treating them as scientifically deficient in comparison to WMS.
To me, treating TEK as less valid than WMS sends a message that is not
so dissimilar from treating it as invalid. While “what counts as science”
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has changed to be more inclusive, this type of valuation seems to indi-
cate that the norms through which it comes to count remain similar,
if not the same. However, perhaps I do not understand your position
correctly. Would you care to elaborate upon how you come to validate
scientific knowledge within the science classroom?
U : Certainly. It is worth repeating here that I do not wish to deny TEK
the status of knowledge about the natural world. However, this does
not mean that it wholly stands up to WMS or the criteria of “quality
science”. If we return to our earlier and agreed upon definition of
science education as providing students opportunities to learn “quality
science”, I think it is worth noting that quality is not something that
varying or competing forms of knowing the natural world have or do
not, but rather that some approaches are better than others. As Siegel
(2001) asserts, “knowledge prized by WMS goes beyond the observa-
tional, in that it seeks … theories which are testable, and which predict
and explain naturalistic observations” (p. 809). These are not only
qualities attributed to the knowledge but also the knowledge building
process. WMS seeks “the discovery, articulation and, explanation of
regularities in nature in terms of laws which are invariably universal and
invariant across time and place. This is not an assumption of universal-
ists, but rather a methodological directive of WMS” (p. 805, emphasis
in original). Do note that I am not attributing perfection to WMS as
there are many contexts in which it is not the most appropriate form
of knowledge such as the arts and the social sciences. However, I can
confidently claim that culturally-specific understandings of nature such
as TEK, as Siegel (2001) states, are “less adequate as scientific under-
standings than those of WMS” (p. 809, emphasis in original). While
culturally-specific understandings of nature share naturalistic observa-
tion as a property with WMS, they do not achieve or produce the
same quality of explanatory, testable, and predictive theories around,
or towards further, observation. As such, I believe that it would be a
disservice to students to not teach them primarily about the system that
has reached the deepest understanding of the natural world, WMS.
CC: I agree with you that not teaching students WMS would be to do
them a disservice. If you will recall, I am not arguing for the exclu-
sion of WMS but rather for an inclusion of other ways of knowing
the natural world that also takes them seriously. While I cannot fault
your logic for the claim of scientific superiority that you are making
for WMS when testability, predictability, and explanatory potential are
the criteria, I do take issue with the criteria and how they are shaped.
However, we can always come back to this as I am further preoccupied
by the underlying message that you believe that such valuation can be
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done respectfully. Where I am unable to follow your argument is in
your statement that denying a student’s cultural knowledge the status
of scientific equivalency can be done without disrespecting the student:
morality and episteme go hand in hand.
U : While I agree with you that ethics and knowing go hand in hand,
I do not agree with the conclusion you reach through this associa-
tion. Rather, I would argue that not engaging in such comparative
work would be disrespectful to students. I am making this claim on
the basis that within the relationship between ethics and knowledge,
there is a moral imperative to treat learners as fully rational persons
or, at very least, in the process of becoming fully rational. Being fully
rational means being capable of distinguishing between justified beliefs
and beliefs that are either unjustified or less justifiable. Hence, providing
students opportunities to exercise such rationality is to respect their
capacity as learners.
CC: Granted, not treating students as capable of learning and providing
opportunities for rich learning is highly problematic and disrespectful.
However, being respectful of students and their ability to learn need not
be at the expense of their cultural knowledges.
U : I agree here. As I mentioned earlier, providing opportunities to exercise
reason need not be culturally insensitive, nor is this what I am arguing
for. To learn as to why certain accounts, such as WMS, are worthy of
belief is not the same as imposing knowledge or requiring the student
to renounce their cultural knowledge.
CC: While we agree on not dichotomizing this issue, I believe that perhaps
we are attributing different weights to the ethical valuation of respecting
a student’s capacity to learn and respecting the culturally-specific scien-
tific knowledge they bring with them into the classroom. I am not
certain to which extent changing the explicit instructional message
changes the implicit curricular one. As I do not see us moving forward
on this at this point in time, let us return to our earlier discussion
about science, education, and by extension, science education as situated
learning processes. If we consider science, and hence science education,
to be a situated practice, could we not include culture to the ways in
which WMS’ knowledge is constructed?
U : As I have stated earlier, I do not deny the situatedness of scien-
tific knowledge processes, nor do I deny that culture shapes scientific
knowledge. As Siegel (2001) states, there is often a misconception
that universalists are perceived as framing science as acultural and,
accordingly, deniers of social constructivism. Rather,
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universalists happily agree that scientific theories are human
constructions in the sense that they are conceived, formulated,
articulated, and revised by human scientists… [They] agree that
culture influences the truth claims – i.e., what is claimed at a time
by scientists to be true – of science. (p. 807)
CC: Then let us reframe an aspect of this conversation. I am going to ask
you to reconsider the status that WMS is granted above other ways of
knowing the natural world. If we consider this to be a cultural claim,
would you agree that the privileging of WMS would then be considered
culturally insensitive for those who do not belong to this culture?
U : If this were strictly a cultural claim, I would have to agree, but this
is certainly not the case. The privileging of WMS over other forms
of understanding the natural world is not rooted in cultural presump-
tions or values, but rather on the criteria of “quality science”: testable,
predictive, and explanatory scientific theories.
CC: Surely these criteria concerning what is considered “quality science”
must also have their own cultural origins as well, mustn’t they?
U : Yes, they would.19 However, the fact that an idea has particular cultural
origins need not mean that it is true or relevant only to or within that
culture.
CC: My concern here is that criteria for what counts as “quality science”
are the same as those that define WMS. Furthermore, they are defined
through the same set of cultural values. This circularity would lead
me to believe, with WMS as the meter stick, that no other science
could be considered “quality science” by virtue of it not being WMS.
Would these criteria then not be self-serving, and therefore culturally
presumptive as well as assimilationist when they become the basis for a
“respectful” multicultural science education?
U : … but the criteria for good science are “universal” in that they are
universally applicable. By this I do not mean that WMS transcends
culture. Rather, if we are to take an instrumentalist approach, it is
the most reliable, reproducible, and productive knowledge about the
natural world. As such, it is applicable above and beyond the cultural
circumstances in which it originated. For the sake of argument, even if
it wasn’t, teaching WMS need not be a form of cultural imperialism.
It can be taught in a manner that is culturally respectful and sensitive,
there can be science education without scientism.
CC: Both of these clauses are debatable. While I believe that I have already
addressed the first when I brought up the circularity of the argument, I
am more concerned with the second. It has been argued that regardless
of how culturally relevant, culturally responsive or culturally respectful
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science education is, if the end goal is to teach youth of WMS and bring
them into its culture, it continues to be an assimilationist, marginalizing
practice. Like Ali Sammel (2009),
I wonder if there is a science curricula that does not indoctrinate.,
… given the pervasiveness of assimilationism in Western science
education… The system is pushing for assimilation of students
into Western science ontology…. The structural inequities are
given little attention while the mantra of we all have a chance to
succeed in science reigns supreme. (p. 653, emphasis in original)
It may very well be that if, as science educators, we wish to reach
our earlier agreed upon goal of “providing equitable opportunities for
culturally diverse students”, we may need to do so partially at the
expense of what has traditionally and singularly been considered as
“quality science”.
U : On this, we will have to agree to disagree. Like Charbel Niño El-Hani
and Eduardo Fleury Mortimer (2007), I find myself asking:
How can we avoid demanding that our students change their
beliefs by learning science, and, yet, intend that they apply in their
lives what they learn in the science classroom? Surely, we could
give up the second intention. But then why should we bother
about teaching science at all? (p. 673)
If we need to take the “science” out of science education, then I will
have no part of it. I think we are done here for today.
Act 4: Playing Out
the (Re)Production of Knowledge
When (Re)Signifying Is Signifying Again Rather Than Anew
Like all Socratic dialogues, the above dialogue on multicultural science
education produces some shared understandings but fails to reach a
conclusion beyond an agreement to disagree. This disagreement is both
vis-à-vis “what counts as science” as well as how one might respect-
fully engage multicultural science education in terms of curriculum and
instruction. It could be said that this result is, in part, a function of the
medium through which a mimetic production of these debates within
the science education literature is filtered and inflected. Another factor is
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that the predominant message being presented by the literature is that
the debate was and continues to be left unresolved and unresolvable.20
However, regardless of whether it is or is not resolvable, the Socratic
dialogue implicitly acts as an invitation to engage and participate in the
always already occurring play of (re)signification.
Above and beyond the dialogue between universalist and cross-
culturalist characters that occurs within the play, there is also a dialogue
and/or a dialectic that occurs between the reader and the text. Should
you have made meaning in common (i.e., dialogically) rather than made
common (i.e., dialectically), you may have located creative junctures in-
between the two positions that rupture and open up both sedimented
scripts. However, if as a reader, you interpret the perspectives as irrec-
oncilable, this does not mean that you have not engaged in the play of
(re)signification. Rather, it may mean that the act of signification that you
engaged is one that (re)plays that which is already there. In other words,
through your engagement in the play of (re)signification, you have either
signified again rather than anew the meanings that were already there.
Recall that unmooring meaning is neither an easy nor individual affair;
the “you” who (re)signifies is not only you—the language we possess also
possesses us—we inherit and are haunted by longstanding and lingering
meanings within science education. The production of meaning is always
already produced between the text and yourself, and as such, both you
and the text are partially implicated in whether the meaning made was
complicit and/or critical as a function of the relational flow of meaning
(Derrida, 1976; Lather, 2007; Mazzei, 2007; Spivak, 1976).21
Should you find yourself in the former position (i.e., complicit) rather
than the latter (i.e., critical), it is worth considering a few key differ-
ences between the Adversary method and Socratic dialogue. While both
methods rely on refuting arguments by shaking up beliefs that are held,
the way they go about it and the purpose is different. Moulton (1983)
elaborates that whereas the purpose of the Adversary method is to achieve
epistemic victory, the goal of engagement in Socratic dialogue is to posi-
tion the other party such that “they can begin philosophical inquiries with
a more open mind” (p. 156). Furthermore, the success of the Socratic
method depends on persuading the other person whereas the success of
the Adversary method depends “on showing [the other person’s] views to
be wrong to others” (p. 156). Accordingly, while the Adversary method
might be an effective means of proving someone wrong, it certainly is not
an effective means of getting someone to agree with you.
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Bohm (1996) elaborates upon this by stating that such a mode of
address is a double(d) form of violence. First of all, this puts the recipient
on the defensive:
The opinions that we are defending … are not merely opinions, they are
not merely assumptions; they assumptions with which we are identified –
which we are therefore defending, because it is as if we defending ourselves.
(p. 39)
Secondly, this self-defense psychically prevents not only the reception
of that which is being levied against you but also productive dialogical
thought that would allow you to find common ground:
You cannot defend something without first thinking the defense. There are
those thoughts which might question the thing you want to defend, and
you’ve got to push them aside. That may readily involve self-deception
– you will simply push aside a lot of things you would rather not accept
by saying they are wrong, by distorting the issue, and so on. Thought
defends its base assumptions against evidence that they may be wrong.
(p. 12, emphasis in original)
Through this process, sensory, and affective indicators often precede reac-
tive thought in the form of anger, frustration, a gut feeling, a clenched
jaw, a change in heart rate, or other. However, as Bohm (1996) states, you
don’t always make the connection between your sensory-affective reac-
tion, what occurred, and what you are thinking—it is incredibly common
for those schooled with, in, or though Western modernity to fragment
the thought from the thinker (and the mind from the body with/in the
thinker) (see also Cajete, 1994, 2000). Accordingly, you use the feeling
or the sensation to justify the thought, or inability thereof. In short, the
Adversary method simply does not encourage others to consider that
which is causing this violence, but rather a (p)re-entrenchment, a posi-
tion from which defense might be possible. In turn, this makes for poor
scholarly engagement if engagement is defined as something more than
an individualistic endeavour.
Instead, Socratic dialogue “looks for premises that the other person
will accept and that will show that the original belief was false” (Moulton,
1983, p. 156). It is certainly worth noting here that what each and every
reader might need to be convinced will be different, as well as what
they might be convinced of. Similarly, but holding patterns of difference,
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Bohmian dialogue searches for shared meanings. This does so by asking
the question “is it absolutely necessary?” (Bohm, 1996, p. 26): is it abso-
lutely required that the other be wrong or that there be an absolute truth?
For Bohm (1996), “dialogue may not be concerned directly with the
truth—it may arrive at truth, but it is concerned with meaning” (p. 43,
emphasis in original).22 Such meaning is the type of shared meaning that
emerges when assumptions and opinions are collectively opened and the
play of (re)signification can occur without the need to negate previously
held beliefs. Within recent literature, there have been some scholars who
have been attempting to produce intermediary positions within the within
the multicultural science education debate that extend (potential) points
of agreement without negating firmly held claims. These dialogical possi-
bilities yield potential for Indigenous science to-come (and are pulled
through as productive insights for (re)opening the structures of science
education in upcoming chapters).
What Continues to (Not) Be at Play? Possibilities for Further Dialogue
Through the Play of (Re)Signification
As it stands, the debate continues within multicultural science educa-
tion literature largely around conflicting notions of “quality science” (i.e.,
“what counts as science”, how it is valued and evaluated) as well as
questions of “quality education” (i.e., what is learned, how it is learned,
questions of what constitutes respectful teaching and learning). However,
a shared commitment across positions to a notion of science education
that respects diverse knowers, as well as a commonly held view that it
can be productive to include TEK and other non-WMS knowledges in
the classroom exists, despite divergences on how these are conceptualized
and enacted.
One such location is the growing consensus that students “should
become scientifically literate, but not indoctrinated by scientism”
(Zeyer, 2009, p. 1100). In other words, what in the past was primarily
a cautionary note stemming from cross-culturalists (e.g., Lewis &
Aikenhead, 2001; Sammel, 2009; Snively & Corsiglia, 2001; Stanley
& Brickhouse, 2001) is now general recognition of the possibility
that science education can be and has been impositional in its nature.
However, while Southerland (2000) states that one should not conflate of
WMS’s claim to universalism with the impositional nature of scientism,23
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other universalists are increasingly taking the position that it is nonethe-
less a possibility, and one that all science educators (regardless of their
positioning within the multicultural science education debate) should be
actively working against (see also Cobern & Loving, 2001, 2008; El-Hani
& de Ferreira Bandeira, 2008; El-Hani & Mortimer, 2007; Zeyer, 2009).
Despite these gains for diversity and equity, there continues to be a
multiplicity of sedimented and stuck categories and concepts that repre-
sent a serious challenge to dialogical interfacing of cross-culturalist and
universalist positions. Accordingly, some science education scholars have
welcomed the always already extended yet implicit invitation to engage in
the play of (re)signification in order to labour these meaning-full disjunc-
tures. They have opportunistically used shared yet never fully converging
meanings (e.g., the goal of science =/= scientism) to labour that which
continues to (not) be at play (e.g., Cobern & Loving, 2008; van Eick &
Roth, 2007; El-Hani & Mortimer, 2007; McKinley & Stewart, 2012). In
other words, they look to that which is conceptually absent yet present
(e.g., taken-for-granted implicit and tacit meanings) as a point of differen-
tial entry instead of (or in addition to) engaging in the dialectic negation
of those with whom they would disagree. For example, and explored in
further depth in Chapter 5, Cobern and Loving (2008) illuminate the
absent presence of ontology within the multicultural science education
debate in order to justify and defend a universalist position (in turn,
denouncing cross-culturalism). With these absent presences, they inflect
already present terms to mean something anew and askew.
Of particular interest is van Eijck and Roth’s (2007) effort “to
contribute to overcoming the multiculturalism-universalism incompati-
bility in science education” (p. 927) through the deconstruction of the
theory/practice binary (i.e., theory as always already present within prac-
tice and vice versa). Specifically, they invite both universalists and cross-
culturalists to (mis)read knowledge as knowledge-practice. Drawing from
cultural-historical activity theory and Bruno Latour’s work of reading
Louis Pasteur’s discovery (of pasteurization) through Actor-Network
Theory (Latour 1988), van Eijck and Roth (2007) extend a framework
in which: (a) scientific knowledge derived through WMS is not only a
product but also a dynamic and heterogeneous process; (b) never inde-
pendent of human activity such that “there is no possibility for someone
to ‘have’ knowledge and simultaneously ‘fail to enact’ it” (van Eijck &
Roth, 2007, p. 934); and (c) scientific knowledge is always in context
such that it is both naturally and culturally situated (see also Alsop &
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Fawcett, 2010; Barad, 2000, 2007; van Eijck & Roth, 2009). They also
signal the processual nature of scientific knowledge and the ways in it
plays out in the production and application of the knowledge.
As presented in the play, both universalists and cross-culturalists agree
that constructing reliable knowledge about the natural world, whether it
be through WMS or TEK, is a process that is at once culturally mediated
and employs naturalistic empiricism (Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; Cobern
& Loving, 2001, 2008; Siegel, 1997, 2001; Snively & Corsiglia, 2001).
However, the processual quality of meaning-making with nature is often
an absent presence that upholds arguments but does not fully come to
bear on the culture of the multicultural science education debate. Impor-
tantly, (re)signifying knowledge as knowledge-practice does not require
either party to renounce their position; rather, it potentially opens up
fruitful locations for possible dialogue.
How might considering scientific knowledge as knowledge-practice
assist us in collectively working towards the shared goal of working
against scientism in science education? This is significant to the overall
scope of this book as scientism often comes-to-be a central mechanism
(alongside exclusivity and Eurocentrism; see McKinley & Stewart, 2012)
through which Indigenous science is excluded, differing, and deferred.
The following are three contingent insights for potentially (re)opening
the spaces of science education which will come to inform the work of
the chapters to come, notably that scientific knowledge-practices are: (a)
always situated (Chapter 4), (b) culturally hybrid (Chapter 7), and (c)
ontologically situated (Chapters 5 and 6).
Scientific Knowledge-Practices as Always Situated. First, as van
Eijck and Roth (2007) discuss, one salient example of such an opening
produced by considering scientific knowledge as knowledge-practices is
around the contested status of WMS as universal. Recall that for univer-
salists, the knowledge produced by WMS is true in all contexts, with
the cautionary note that it might not be the most appropriate form of
knowledge when addressing particular topics and milieus (e.g., arts, social
sciences, humanities, the super-natural; Cobern & Loving, 2001, 2008;
El-Hani & de Ferreira Bandeira, 2008; El-Hani & Mortimer, 2007;
Zeyer, 2009). For cross-culturalists, what is at stake are the ways in which
WMS is often granted epistemic privilege as a result of undiscerning trans-
lation into diverse contexts that supersedes longstanding, traditional, and
complex knowledge-practices that are shaped in relation with the contexts
in which they emerged (see Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; Aikenhead &
112 M. HIGGINS
Michell, 2011; Snively & Corsiglia, 2001; Stanley & Brickhouse, 2001).
Van Eijck and Roth (2007) diverge from these either/or positions by
focusing on the when and how of universal knowledge-practice, rather
than the is or is not of universal knowledge (see also Harding, 2008).
In short, they focus not only on the practice of developing knowledge
that can be applicable in all contexts but also what it means to apply this
knowledge in a wide range of contexts:
a twofold price must be paid for scientific knowledge to transcend local
contexts and to become apparently static, singular, and homogeneous.
First, for scientific knowledge to be produced and to be transcendent,
the local contexts to be investigated must be reduced to scientific praxis.
Second, for the scientific knowledge to be applied in another local context,
this target context must be transformed again to scientific praxis. (van Eijck
& Roth, 2007, p. 938, emphasis in original)
In other words, they differentially articulate the cross-cultural statement
that scientific knowledge-practices are decontextualized as well as the
universalist one that scientific knowledge transcends context by firmly
placing it within a knowledge-practice context. This context, whether real
or imagined, is the scientific laboratory:
the reduction of local contexts to scientific praxis is inherent to the static,
homogeneous, singular, and transcendent nature of scientific knowledge
and that transcendent scientific knowledge is useless unless local contexts
are changed to function like scientific laboratories. (van Eijck & Roth,
2007, p. 935)
While such conclusion may not necessarily be agreed upon by both sides
as truth, it is nonetheless posits the possibility of shared meanings. For
universalists, this does not require the abandonment of the notions that
WMS is universal (i.e., applicable across multiple contexts) or “the best at
what it does” (i.e., producing claims about nature). Treating the knowl-
edge produced from empirical observation and Western modern scientific
modes as if the context in which it was produced or applicable in were a
scientific laboratory does not deny it of reliability or repeatability. Instead,
it situates the conditions through which such a knowledge-practice is
produced and applicable as well as the “price to be paid” for it to be
so. For cross-culturalists, the situating of WMS as a knowledge-practice
3 SERIOUS PLAY: INFLECTING THE MULTICULTURAL SCIENCE … 113
whose real or imagined context of production and applicability is the labo-
ratory produces a space in which a localized TEK provides a welcome
supplement to WMS that is more than the sum of what WMS is not.
Because TEK is produced and producible through a knowledge tradition
that accounts for and is accountable to the ecological contexts in which
they are developed, TEK’s knowledge-practices around nature are differ-
entially produced with many of the exclusions that WMS must make to
treat a context as a laboratory in mind. The “price to be paid” here is
the difficulty in translating across diverse contexts. For the multicultural
debate in science education here, this potentially produces a position in
which the knowledge-practices of WMS and TEK might be able to share a
differential yet overlapping space in which one can complement the other
without the need to renounce one’s position through the situating of
one’s knowledge-practice.24 These shared meanings might become ripe
for a (re)opening of science education for Indigenous science to-come by
not requiring an oppositional mode through which one side must emerge
victorious.
Scientific Knowledge-Practices as Culturally Hybrid. The second
possibility of working towards shared meanings with/in the multicultural
science education by considering scientific knowledge as knowledge-
practices debate rests in culturally hybrid knowledge-practices. Van Eijck
and Roth (2009), continuing their earlier work, extend science’s internal
dynamism and heterogeneity outwards by considering the complex and
conflicting ways in which WMS and TEK interact and interface at the
level of the personal learner in pluralistic science education contexts. This
is significant as discussions within multicultural science education debate
are often framed by a Western/non-Western binary that disallows the play
of (re)signification between the two. It is worth attending in brief to
the primary problematics engendered by the production of a fallacious
Western/non-Western binary including the exclusion of conversations
around the hybridity of science and the complexities of these cultural
interfaces (see also Harding, 2008). First, the assumption that cultural
traits are either separate or that they can be separated that is produced
by such a binary renders invisible the many elements of WMS that stem
from non-Western cultural sciences and vice versa (e.g., the “father” of
modern geometrical optics was Ibn al-Haytham, a middle-eastern a man).
Secondly, as these contributions are not always recognized or brought up,
the historical complexities of scientific knowledge production that occur
at these cultural interfaces (e.g., appropriation, assimilation) are also,
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accordingly, left out (e.g., the Bayer pharmaceutical company’s “discov-
ery” and subsequent synthesis of traditional willow-bark-based medicine
used by Indigenous peoples that is now known as Aspirin; see Snively &
Corsiglia, 2001). Lastly, the Western/non-Western binary makes it diffi-
cult for science educators to account for the complexities that occur at
the currently lived and differently situated cultural interfaces that both
they and their students occupy (see Belczewski, 2009; van Eijck & Roth,
2009; Higgins, 2014). However, as this binary often operates within the
bounds of multicultural science education, the Socratic dialogue is written
in a way that reflects it.25 As Indigenous science’s perpetual status of yet-
to-come is invariably shaped by culturally hybrid relations in which WMS
and TEK are unevenly and unequally interfaced, considering this interface
as a knowledge-practice entails that it is not something that simply is but
rather something that is done. As a doing, this invites the possibility that it
might be done otherwise, (re)opening this oft foreclosed space of science
education towards the possibility of Indigenous science to-come.
Scientific Knowledge-Practices as Ontologically Situated. The third
possibility for collectively working against scientism through situating
scientific knowledge-practice lies in a consideration of ontology. Cobern
and Loving (2008), extending van Eijck and Roth’s (2007) notion that
knowledge-practice is always culturally situated, direct attention to the
ways in which epistemologies are always already ontologically situated.
This is significant as the nature/culture binary, deployed within the
context of the multicultural science education debate, disallows the play
of (re)signification between the two (i.e., culture -> nature-culture; see
also Barad, 2007; Latour, 1993). As Cobern and Loving (2008) suggest,
the primary and almost exclusive focus on epistemologies within the
debate has detracted from considerations of how epistemology aligns with
ontology.26 While they use this (re)signified natural-cultural interplay to
make a stronger case for universalism (e.g., “Epistemic Realism Really is
Common Sense” [p. 425]), there is nonetheless room for the possibility
of shared meanings. Taking seriously the notion that ontology is not a
singular affair (Barad, 2007), this can be achieved not by refuting their
claim but rather by situating it within a context: epistemic realism (i.e.,
the epistemology of WMS) really does align best with an ontology of
Cartesianism (i.e., the ontology of WMS). This creates a space in which
WMS achieves “distinction not privilege” (Cobern & Loving, 2008,
p. 444) all the while not requiring universalists’ claims of onto-epistemic
alignment to be refuted. This also produces complimentary space for
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differently positioned, yet also onto-epistemologically aligned, forms of
TEK (see Cajete, 1994, 1999, 2000).27 Such plurality without negation is
significant for Indigenous science to-come as the requirement for there to
be a truth (read: singular) often places TEK at odds with WMS: a losing
proposition when the norms of “what counts” as science best describes
WMS (as “what counts” is modelled after WMS; see van Eijck & Roth,
2007).
Epilogue to (a) “Serious Play”: A Call
for Further Serious Play Through Dialogue
The way in which the adversary method insidiously operates within the
field of multicultural science education continues to produce a space
which, by paying attention to extreme positions because they are extreme,
presents a distorted picture about what sorts of positions are worthy of
attention, giving undo attention and publicity to positions merely because
they are those of a hypothetical adversary’s and possibly ignoring positions
which make more valuable or interesting claims. (Moulton, 1983, p. 158)
The resulting entrenchment of positions leads to percussive and concus-
sive discussions that foreclose the possibility of dialoguing across differ-
ence as well as the production of positions and positional proposi-
tions in-between those presented. Or, in my case within the example
at the beginning of this text, the dramatic yet almost comedic
mutual (dis)engagement protected our respective terms of engagement,
prohibiting the possibility of productive conversation before it even
began. Such engagements often result in communication that is protective
and prohibitive rather than productive (Spivak, 1976).
While the Socratic dialogue within this chapter is meant to be but an
imitation of life or a form of mimesis, this mimicry of a discussion between
the educators holding universalist and cross-culturalist positions acts as
an invitation to the possible play of (re)signification in order to make
space for dialogue and the possibility of Indigenous science to-come.
In turn, questions of respect within the multicultural science education
classroom need to remain open to respond to the differentially entan-
gled values, cultures, and histories of not only students present within
the classroom, but also that of science, as well as peoples to whom a
curricular geo-political commitment to is made (i.e., learning about and
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through local Indigenous peoples’ ways-of-knowing-nature, regardless of
classroom composition). Similarly, in order to keep the possibility of
(re)signification of “what counts” as science open rather than foreclosed,
there needs to be serious play with the assumption that non-Western
bodies of scientific knowledge are not held as concurrent systems not
because of their value, but how they are valued. As dialogue is about
process and not product, “it’s not all that important whether you agree
or not… the point is that we would establish, on another level, a kind of
bond” (Bohm, 1996, p. 37). It is important to not foreclose the possi-
bility of shared meanings (rather than “universal” truths) that are made
together, and within science education, this making in common need not
necessarily exclude students, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous (see
van Eijck & Roth, 2009; Higgins, 2011). This is of utmost importance as
not reaching shared meanings within the multicultural science education
debate is of consequence for Indigenous science to-come as it upholds a
status quo which (re)produces WMS as “what counts” best as science.28
While the multicultural science education debate is characterized by an
agreement to disagree, this is not to say that the dialogical movement
of meaning has not occurred. At the very least, there is an invitation to
enact science education in a way that is less “caught in the competition
of whose sword is sharper” (Spivak, 1994, p. 35). On this, it is important
to recognize that the nature of the debate has changed by “accepting
that all systems of knowledge about nature are embedded in the context
of a cultural group; that all systems are, therefore culture-laden; and that
(Western) science is the system of knowledge about nature that is predom-
inant in Western culture” (Lewis & Aikenhead, 2001, p. 3) and that even
the strongest of universalists agree that multicultural science education
is the direction that we should be taking in order for all students to
benefit from science education. Furthermore, the three insights gener-
ated through (re)considering scientific knowledge as knowledge-practices
(i.e., as always situated, as culturally hybrid, and as ontologically situ-
ated) will come to inform the work in the upcoming chapters as means
of (re)opening science education towards Indigenous science to-come:
creating possible possibilities for unsettling science education. However,
there continues to be a need for the (re)opening of foreclosed meaning-
making spaces between and across scripted positions: what counts as
science within science education continues to be a necessary and signifi-
cant conceptual scene for dialogical engagement, as well as a productive
rather than prohibitive point of entry for (further) serious play.
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Notes
1. Respecting Indigenous, diasporic, and other post-colonial students within
the science education classroom is one of the key motivators within the
culture of the multicultural science education debate for the inclusion
of TEK. However, in classroom practices, the central focus is often on
achievement; more specifically an “achievement gap” (without coming to
understand the norms under which uneven scholastic achievement comes
to be produced and producible; see McKinley, 2007; McKinley & Stewart,
2012). However, as I have addressed elsewhere (Higgins, 2011, 2014),
the incorporation of TEK and IWLN within the science classroom is
beneficial for all students.
2. The now mantra of beginning some-where and some-time is not only a
troubling of the notion of “beginnings” in the question of Indigenous
science in science education, but also a reminder that because we are
always already within the question, we can begin in a multiplicity of spatial
and temporal locations.
This even includes chapters within the larger narrative of science educa-
tion that have been deemed closed, such as the multicultural science
education debate. The call of placing this moment in the past may well
be a move to render this debate one that is passed over (see Derrida,
1994/2006). Rather, because it has not yet, and perhaps never will be,
resolved, its logics continue to haunt the ways in which we, as science
educators, approach the question of Indigeneity within science education.
For example, and most significantly, I encounter many of the arguments
that are made within the literature in science teacher education courses
when engaging students with how we might respond to and meaningfully
include Indigenous science within school science practice. Unsettling , in
its double(d) meaning, requires that we attend to such sedimented and
stuck locations that continue to bear on the ways in which settler colonial
logics are perpetuated within science education.
Further and related, even if the temporality of this “beginning” is one
that (re)opens a past passed over, it also points towards an enfolded and
slow practice of serious listening in the here-now (to this lingering critique
of the past). For Kuokkanen (2007), “listening seriously means that the
listener is able to go beyond the sort of benevolent imperialism that makes
arrogant assumptions about the speaker and her background” (p. 82).
Listening too quickly, as unpacked in the previous chapter, can become a
form of “‘listening-as-benevolent-imperialism’— that is, listening through
the dominant discourses and epistemes and therefore not hearing what
is actually said” (p. 75); this has the unintended consequence of defer-
ring a problematic past and (re)producing it in the present. Rather, a slow
listening requires that the listener inhabits the lengthy duration of the
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critique. As Kuokkanen (2007) suggests, we must not move too quickly
towards resolution as this “can remove the hegemonic listener from the
present and in this way either remove that listener from the present
critique or place the hegemonic subject outside of that critique” (p. 142).
For example, the binary logics of Western modernity often equate inac-
tion and irresponsibility; blinding the porous slippage that occurs in the
ways action itself can (re)produce the very problem being responded to
in a de/colonizing moment and movement (see Higgins, 2014).
3. It is generally agreed upon by science educators that perceptions of
WMS are often partially (mis-)informed by particular stereotypical and
monolothic images of scientists, as well as the notion that there is a
way to do scientists think (e.g., the scientific method; see Aikenhead,
2006). Nonetheless, there are still often similarities enacted across Western
modern sciences with respect to beliefs about science held and enacted
by many (but likely not all) scientists (see Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007;
Aikenhead & Michell, 2011). These include, but are not limited to:
• Nature is governed by laws that are quantifiable, generalizable, and
predictable—hence—nature is knowable (or can and will be known
in instances in which knowledge technology does not allow for the
study of phenomena).
• Nature can be reproduced (for realists) or represented (for socio-
constructionists) through scientific knowledge;
• The production of scientific knowledge is embedded within social
contexts. However, “the rigour of [WMS] decreases subjectivity as
much as possible” (Aikenhead & Michell, 2011, p. 43, emphasis in
original) to make knowledge claims (quasi-)objective;
• Because scientific knowledge reproduces or represents nature (the
latter with as little social and subjective noise as possible), scientific
data speaks for itself;
• Constructing knowledge about the natural world (i.e., scientific
knowledge) is the purview of humans and is represented or repro-
duced upon a static and (recti-)linear space and time.
4. Traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) is a term used by biologists and
ecologists that became prevalent in the 1980s that usually signals “expe-
rience acquired over thousands of years of direct human contact with the
environment” (Snively & Corsiglia, 2001, p. 11). TEK is often synony-
mous with terms such as ethnoscience, Indigenous or Native science,
as well as Indigenous knowledge and Indigenous knowledge systems; of
which, it has become the most prevalent in usage (McKinley & Stewart,
2012). These other terms are often preferred because TEK, like WMS, is a
concept that is often (mis-)understood as a result of prevalent, pervasive,
and problematic understandings (see previous endnote). These include
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“tradition” being defined in opposition to civilization and contempo-
raneity, “ecological” being reducible to ecology as defined by modern
biology, and “knowledge” as discrete and separate not being an adequate
referent for the relational knowledge processes from which TEK stem (see
Kim, Ashgar, & Jordan, 2017). Such mis- and missed representations are
often complicated by under-representation (Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007;
Aikenhead & Michell, 2011; Snively & Corsglia, 2001).
Similarly to WMS, there are many forms of TEK that are as diverse as
the longstanding Indigenous peoples’ traditions from which these knowl-
edges stem. TEK is not the binary opposite of WMS, however this is not
to say that there are not significant differences between the two (Aiken-
head & Ogawa, 2007; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011). However, there are
often some beliefs about nature that are sometimes but not always shared:
• Reality is not dualistic (i.e., Cartesian) but rather monist. This entails
that nature is not separate from culture, and that the physical and
metaphysical are always already entangled. In turn, this entails that
parts of Nature (i.e., the frequent purview of science) only make
sense within and can never be separated from the whole of nature or
reality. This whole can be referred to as an ecology of relationships
or a “sense of place” (see Cajete, 1994, 2000).
• Knowledge of nature emerges through natural-cultural relationships
with knowledge keepers who are either human (e.g., Elders) or
other-than-human (e.g., plants).
• Relationships entail responsibility. Accordingly, since everything is
interrelated, the ecology of relationships is sustained by responsi-
bility.
• Nature, which includes space, time, and matter, is in constant flux
and in a state of indeterminacy, whose indeterminacy and flux is
dis/continuous (e.g., non-linear time). In turn, while nature is
empirically observable, it is never fully knowable; ways-of-knowing-
nature must remain open and dynamic to ongoing patterns of
difference.
• Models developed empirically across generations do not function
as representations of nature but rather as flexible and adaptive
pedagogical tools for coming-to-know nature and be relationally
accountable to one’s relationships.
5. McKinley and Stewart (2012) suggest that the topic of IWLN in school
science is one “that has, in the past, been subsumed under wider concepts,
such as multiculturalism, equity, and the like” (p. 541). However, as post-
colonial scholars of science education, they do not dismiss the locations
in which inclusion happens as solely problematic. Rather, they critically
inhabit these spaces as a site of both possibility and problematics through
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what could be read as taking a deconstructive stance. Taking a decon-
structive stance is to “persistently to critique a structure that one cannot
not (wish to) inhabit” (Spivak, 1993/2009, p. 284) by critically inhab-
iting the practices (linguistic or otherwise) at hand that shape us while at
once troubling them.
As Spivak (1976) suggests, the language we possess also possesses us;
thus, too simply moving beyond is “to run the risk of forgetting the
problem or believing it to be solved” (p. xv) by reproducing it elsewhere,
albeit differently. Thus, while recognizing the language of multicultur-
alism in science as a problematic entry point to consider the inclusion of
IWLN, it is nonetheless the predominant entry point into conversations
of, as well as gatekeeping device for, Indigenous knowledges in the science
classroom. In turn, I also use and trouble this language.
6. The occurrence and recognition of classrooms as multicultural is recent.
As McKinley and Stewart (2012) state:
Solid decades of economic growth, and increased sensitivity to
human rights, post-World War II, supported a steady improvement
in education outcomes for [I]ndigenous students. As globalisa-
tion proceeded, teachers in Western countries faced classrooms of
increasing cultural diversity, and anti-ethnocentrism was one aspect
of the response, with teachers challenged to overcome their own
deficit thinking. (p. 546)
7. This distinction is significant. For example, Cobern and Loving (2008)
engage a similar representational mode (i.e., a conversation) with the
explicit “intention… to present the critical arguments in common sense
terms” (p. 438) and the implicit one of demonstrating that the terms of
their opposition (e.g., cross-culturalism through relativism) are untenable.
However, this opposition is one that is largely imagined: cross-culturalists
often repeat that they are advocating for pluralism rather than rela-
tivism and that they too do not wish the latter (see McKinley, 2007;
McKinley & Stewart, 2012). Furthermore, as discussed further within
this chapter, discussions whose aim are to emerge victorious, rather than
to listen to one another, are pyrrhic indeed. These victories not only ring
hollow following the defeat of an imagined opponent, but such combat-
iveness does not generate new and shared meanings but works towards
making meaning common by suturing over other meanings. As such,
these engagements always already fail in their ability to produce common
grounds from which to address the complex questions of multicultural
science education: they (re)produce ideological divisions which take us
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away from the possibility of learning from one another and working
towards shared goals (see Bohm, 1996; Latour, 2004a, 2004b).
8. Reminder (from Chapter 2), I use of “foreclosure” to signal instantiated
pre-emergence of meaning. In other words, foreclosure signals the ways in
which the language we possess sometimes appears as already fully formed,
stable, and signifying an ontologically stable location; foreclosure as the
semiotic locations which resist (re)opening due to their naturalization as
closed before the fact (Spivak, 1999).
9. Possible possibilities is an expression used throughout the book meant to
signal that not all possibilities are possible, nor equally possible. However,
as possibility and impossibility forever vacillate, possible possibilities are
always on the move (Barad, 2007). However, and importantly, not all
possibilities are desired nor desirable.
10. While theories of dialogue as practice (e.g., Bohm, 1996) do not explic-
itly limit the number of participants involved within a dialogue to two,
it implicitly groups them in and treats them as reversible communica-
tive pairs (i.e., transmitter and receiver) in a manner similar to Socratic
dialogue.
Further, note that, as Spivak (1994) states: “dialogue is, in fact, the
accepted proper name of responsibility as exchange-of-responses, implic-
itly understood as the flow of propositions or constatations rather than
responses from both sides” (p. 45). Dialogue as responsibility presents
itself as a mode to be able to respond, or of response-ability, to Indigenous
science to-come (see Little Bear, 1994; Parrry, 2008).
11. Alternately, the process and product of dialectic and dialogue can be
unpacked as mathematical operators. Consider two competing premises,
positions, or postulates: A and B. When brought into proximal rela-
tion, the type of ethic of resolution (i.e., the operator x) shapes what
is produced (i.e., the resultant side of the mathematical equation).
Ideally, for dialectic, this interaction resembles such:
A × B = C
Here, C is a third position or statement that would be a “best of both
worlds” that is developed in an equitable mode of collaboration. However,
due to always uneven relations of power, this ideal is almost never achieved
or achievable. In instances in which the unevenness is more pronounced,
the dialectic often bears closer resemblance the following:
A × B = A
This is what is referred to as dialectic negation: the absorption and/or
annulment of the other term (here, B).
122 M. HIGGINS
Some respond to this by articulating an ethic of incommensurability in
which:
A × B = A + B
This entails that the two positions do not, cannot, and/or should not
enter a proximal relation of co-production.
Recognizing that relations of power are always already uneven and
unequal from the get go, dialogue strives to reach shared meanings
without requiring the annulment of either meanings:
A × B = A + AB + A
This entails that both propositions or positions (i.e., A and B) stand while
also producing a shared meaning as the multiplicative cross-product of the
two (AB).
12. As Spivak (1976) suggests, such deconstructive play might offer “a way
out of the closure of knowledge” (p. lxxvii). For further examples of
deconstructive play in science education, see Carter (2005) and McKinley
and Aikenhead (2005).
13. While I lean towards a cross-culturalist position, it is productive for me
to ‘occupy’ a position that leans towards universalism, even if it may be
difficult for me, in order to think in ways that are productive rather than
protective and prohibitive (see Spivak, 1976).
14. This landmark is, notably, a symposium in the journal Science Education
(volume 85, issue 1). Despite its age, it remains relevant and significant.
As McKinley and Stewart (2012) suggest, that since the publication of this
symposium, “we have not progressed far with our arguments” (p. 547).
15. As dialogical approaches are infrequent within science education, this
following section is intended to provide insights into how one might
engage in this process. Furthermore, as Bohm (1994) posits from his
work with artists, science has much to learn about questions of aesthetics,
affect, and emotion and their respective role in process of knowledge
production (and reproduction):
Long before the scientist is aware of the details of a new idea, he
[or she, or they] may ‘feel’ it stirring in him [or her] in ways that
are difficult or impossible to verbalize. These feelings are like very
deep and sensitive probes reaching into the unknown, while the
intellect ultimately makes possible a more detailed perception of
what these probes have come into contact with. Here, then, is a very
fundamental relationship between science and arts, the latter must
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evidently must work in a similar way, except that the whole process
culminates in a sensually perceptible work of art, rather than in an
abstract theoretical insight into nature’s structural process. (p. 46)
16. (Re)opening science educator as location is an important project in the
(re)opening of science education towards Indigenous science to-come.
This is because educators are important performative agents who do and
undo science education’s circulating constructs, categories, concepts (see
Higgins, 2014).
17. As Aikenhead and Ogawa (2007) elaborate and specify:
The word rational does not signify a universalist rationality, but a
rationality founded within the cultural context of use… Perceiving
means both the process of constructing what is perceived to be
reality through the participation of a group of people, and their
resultant mental constructions of reality. (pp. 543–544, emphasis in
original)
This is significant: there needs to be attention to the ways in which we
differ and defer attempts at making meaning across difference by slip-
ping back into conventional understandings of science education as we
bring related but not identical concepts into the picture (see Chapter 5;
McKinley, 2000; Sammel, 2009).
18. As Glen Aikenhead and Dean Elliot (2010) point out, the culture of
school science potentially produces experiences of assimilation or accul-
turation rather than enculturation for the vast majority of students (~90%;
see also McKinley, 2007). In other words, most students run the risk of
experiencing science education as a form of dialectic negation rather than
a dialogical encounter.
19. See Chapter 6 for more on the operationalization of the culture of
Western modern science.
20. While it is not wholly agreed upon that the debate is unresolvable (e.g.,
Hansson, 2018), unresolvability remains nonetheless a productive feature
of the multicultural science education debate: it always remains, to a
certain degree, open to being otherwise (e.g., open to Indigenous science
to-come). However, as knowledge is a performative enactment (e.g.,
Butler, 1993, 2005, 2010), this (albeit partial) openness is contingent
upon continued engagement.
For Hansson (2018), the argument is made that the debate could be
resolved if we could come to appreciate that “science builds on the age-old
traditions of joint fact-finding that we can find in these [other] cultures”
(p. 522). While not wholly in disagreement, I also understand this as
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coming-to-perceive a location in which the homework of response-ability
should be engaged in. As explored more fulsomely in the chapters to come
(Chapter 6 particularly), there is a nexus of reasons in which the disjunc-
ture between Western modern and traditional knowledges is sedimented
and stuck: there are multiple systems and structures in place which work
to operationalize this disjuncture in favour of the Western modern Self
at the expense of its (constructed) Other (e.g., a teleology of progress).
Without also addressing these systems and structures, there runs the risk
of this becoming a de/colonizing move: (re)producing a settled status
quo, albeit differently.
21. Meaning-making of, or rather with texts is always a relational affair. As
Spivak (1976) provocatively posits, this goes beyond deciphering the (i.e.,
singular) meaning intended by the author as it never was or will be
possible for a text (or for a reader or an author) to reach the status of
identity (i.e., self-sameness):
two readings of the “same” book show an identity that can only be
defined as a difference. The book is not repeatable in its “identity”:
each reading of the book produces a simulacrum of an “original”
that is itself the mark of the shifting and unstable subject…, using
and being used by a language that is also shifting and unstable. (p.
xii)
In other words, readings are always temporary, transient, and contin-
gent because there was never is a stable text to being with. Accordingly,
readings are never singular either but rather multiplicity. This multiplicity
emerges from the multiple relationships in flux that come to shape each
and every reading.
22. The means of knowledge production never come to fully coincide with
its ends. In other words, the pursuit of truth never (fully) produces
truth (Derrida, 1976). Nonetheless, while truth is always already decon-
structing, deconstruction “is not the exposure of an error, it is a vigilance
about the fact that we are always obliged to produce the truth” (Spivak
in Harasym, 1990, p. 46).
23. However, as later explored in Chapters 5 and 6, universalism and scientism
are not so easily disentangled. While the two should not be conflated as
they are not one and the same, logics of not-the-same come to mask
the workings of power without an exploration of the ways in which they
express themselves through co-constitutive difference.
24. The insight of scientific knowledge-practice as always already situated
will come to inform the work of the Chapter 4. As scientific knowl-
edge claims do not mirror reality but rather are prismatic inflections
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of knowledge through a real or imagined laboratory, the next chapter
(re)considers optical metaphors as a location for rethinking criticality in
science education.
25. Scientific knowledge-practice as always already being hybrid informs
Chapter 7. As the ways in which hybridity is always uneven and unequal
through a dialectic relationship in which Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-
being are dialectically subsumed, sublated, or sutured over, the work of
Chapter 7 considers the ways in which responsibility is also shaped within
this interface. In turn, this interface must be laboured as it shapes the
ability to respond (see Kuokkanen, 2007).
26. Note: Cobern and Loving’s (2008) criteria of aligning with ontology
problematically treats ontology as a singular affair.
27. The insight of scientific knowledge-practice as always already being
ontologically situated becomes a central notion in Chapter 5 (and
extended in Chapter 6), in which Cobern and Loving’s (2008) call
for ontological-epistemological alignment is both used and troubled to
consider Cartesianism as but one ontology among many.
28. The ways in which science, education, and science education have respec-
tively operated through forms of cognitive imperialism which have had,
and continue to have, real and often negative effects on Indigenous and
other non-Western peoples (McKinley, 2007).
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CHAPTER 4
Mirrors, Prisms, andDiffraction Gratings:
Placing the Optics of the Critical Gaze
in Science EducationUnder Erasure (After
the Critique of Critique)
There has been in the modern Western world (dating, more or less,
empirically from the 15th to the 16th centuries) a certain way of thinking,
speaking and acting, a certain relationship to what one knows, to what
one does, a relationship to society, to culture and also a relationship to
others that we could call, let’s say, the critical attitude. (Foucault, 1997,
p. 24, emphasis mine)
The purpose of this chapter1 is to explore what Foucault refers to as
“the” critical attitude and its relationship to science education. Exca-
vating the concepts that linger and lurk when critique is presented as
atheoretical in science education, the following chapter engages with
the theoretical homework of response-ability. Drawing from Foucault’s
(1997) insight that the critical attitude is but a critical attitude, I explore
possibilities for and of critique that stem from and respond to the crisis
and critique of critique (see Barad, 2012a; Kirby, 2011; Latour, 1993,
2004a). The possibility of critique as plural is significant as the mode
of critique within the multicultural science education debate from the
previous chapter (re)produce Indigenous science as yet-to-come. Specif-
ically, the adversary mode therein not only excludes, differs, and defers
Indigenous science to-come, but also upholds the metaphysics of moder-
nity through its enactment (via distance, dichotomy as mutual exclusivity;
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discussed within this chapter). In turn, I posit that (an) unsettling criti-
cality is not only one which critiques settler colonial logics and practices
but also the taken-for-granted ways-of-critiquing which can undergird
these very efforts.
Building on the insight that scientific knowledge-practice is always
already situated from the previous chapter (e.g., WMS’s knowledge as
contextualized within a real or imagined laboratory), I consider the ways
in which criticality in science education is always mediated by conceptual
apparatuses. In particular, I metaphorically employ three optical appa-
ratus—the mirror, the prism, and the diffraction grating2—to analyse
and inform how the critical gaze might be re(con)figured within science
education.
As critique is always in relation (Foucault, 1997), I begin by posi-
tioning my own critical relation in and to science education. Secondly, I
propose critical and complicit (mis)reading as the deconstructive method-
ological approach in the potentiality of (re)signifying science education
otherwise. Third, a thumbnail account3 of the crisis of the critical
stance (Latour, 1993) is presented with attention to mirror metaphor
it makes operational and the outcome for critical engagement within
science education. Fourth, I explore prismatic dispersal as a first optical
alternative (Butler, 2001; Deleuze, 1988; Foucault, 1997) as well as
the types of critiques that can made be with/in this optics. Lastly,
extending upon the prism, I investigate diffraction as metaphor that builds
upon prismatic dispersal (Barad, 2007, 2012a; see also Cajete, 1994,
2000; Latour, 1993). To animate this discussion, these conceptual and
metaphoric critical apparatuses are employed to ask questions anew about
the multicultural science education debate (from the previous chapter).
The Subject of Critique: My Relation
to Critique in/of Science Education
Because we need to “begin” some-where and some-time, let’s begin in St.
Catherine’s, Ontario in May of 2014.4 During the 42nd annual Cana-
dian Society for the Study of Education (CSSE) conference, I am giving
a talk titled Post-Cartesian possibilities for schools as places of learning:
Putting to work an intra-active pedagogy (see Higgins, 2016). During
this presentation, given on a curriculum studies panel, new possible possi-
bilities for critique and critical engagement began to bubble; not as the
result of my own work, but rather an insightful comment about the ways
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in which I was being critical. Significantly, I was being invited to consider
the ways in which “the” critical attitude is but a critical attitude.
In this presentation, I discussed the taken-for-grantedness and social
constructedness of conceptual norms of science education produced
with/in Eurocentrism through a focus on its entangled epistemologies
(e.g., epistemic realism) and ontologies (e.g., Cartesianism). This was
very much in line with the ways in which I was approaching criticality
at the time: as a formal and informal science educator for over 10 years
at the time, I had become (and continue to be) critical of many of the
ways-of-knowing as well as the ways-of-being that govern the practices
within diverse spaces of science education (e.g., Eurocentrism, white-
ness, masculinism). It would not be long before I familiarized myself
with the multicultural science education debate in which questions of
“what counts” as science are asked, by extension what counts as valid
course content within school-based science curriculum. Largely at stake
within this debate is the inclusion or exclusion of traditional ecological
knowledge (TEK) and Indigenous ways-of-living-with-nature (IWLN)
alongside Western modern science (WMS), as well as the norms through
which they are included, excluded, and juxtaposed. This debate is largely
between science educators who champion the inclusion of TEK and
IWLN as an equally valid ways of knowing nature (i.e., cross-culturalists;
e.g., Snively & Corsiglia, 2001) and those who do not consider these
placed-based ways-of-knowing-nature as equally valid to the “universal”
standard of WMS (i.e., universalists; for example, Cobern & Loving,
2001). Note that equally valid here does not signify that TEK and
IWLN achieve equivalence or sameness with WMS, but rather that they
offer something that is of similar importance (e.g., the former presents
frames for ethical and sustainable practices of living with nature while the
latter offers quantifiability, reproduceability, and predictability through
laboratory-based experimentation; see Aikenhead & Michell, 2011).
Guided by the questions: Who is included?, Who is excluded?, and
What norms shape how participation is and can be enacted?, I had begun
examining the central constructs that often determine “what counts” as
science within science classrooms, with a focus on Indigenous and non-
Indigenous youth’s relationship to “what counts” (see Higgins, 2011).
Entangled with/in this criteria for inclusion is the question of whose
knowledge counts as scientific knowledge, and under which conditions
it comes to be as such (Snively & Corsiglia, 2001; Stanley & Brickhouse,
1994, 2001). Digging deeper, I shifted the critical gaze to explore the
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ways in which Eurocentrism is entangled with/in the culture of “school
science” (Higgins, 2014; McKinley, 2001, 2007; Sammel, 2009).
While these critical explorations and enactments were deeply fruitful
for me in working towards decolonizing goals, they also revealed the
ways in which Eurocentrism circulates in capillary5 manners into both
decolonizing processes (e.g., border crossing as pedagogy; see Aikenhead,
1997, 2001, 2006a, 2006b) and decolonizing subjects (e.g., decolonizing
pedagogue; Belczewski, 2009; Higgins, 2014; see also McKinley, 2001;
Sammel, 2009).6 Alternately stated, despite the ways that available decol-
onizing curriculum and subject positions of teacher-as-researcher worked
within and against a problematic centre, they were exceeded in pedagog-
ical practice by the very (neo-)coloniality the approach challenged, thus
becoming de/colonizing (see also Carter, 2004, 2010; Sammel, 2009).
While there continues to be diverse, productive possible pedagogical
possibilities that stem from de/colonizing approaches, not all opportu-
nities are equally productive (see Spivak, 1988, 1999). Accordingly, like
Sammel (2009), I was beginning to “wonder if there is a science curricula
that does not indoctrinate, … if there is really an authentic ‘decolonizing
science practice’” (p. 653).7 However, critique, of that sort, could not and
would not account for the multiplicity of ways in which (neo-)coloniality
was always already on the move beyond and between the concepts and
categories laid out for it (Spivak, 1999): it would never fit the labels of is
and is not applied by critique-as-usual.
This was precisely the insight that was presented to me following the
presentation. During the question period, Dr. Kent den Heyer, a co-
panellist then and colleague now, suggested that it appeared as though the
ways in which I come-to-see and critique Eurocentrism was by treating it
as a metaphoric “waste basket,” and that accordingly, “Descartes would
be rolling in his grave” (K. den Heyer, personal communication, May,
2014). In other words, I was treating these constructs and systems
as “prematurely naturalized objectified facts” (Latour, 2004a, p. 227).
Rather than treating them in a manner that obscured their relationships
as or within a complex ecology, they were all-too-simple, one-size-fits-
all, pre-determined matters onto which I had passed negative judgement;
they were disposable and to be disposed of. This, in turn, might make
my argument easily disposable and to be disposed of: “While it may seem
easy to critique Eurocentric thinking and structures, how might one ‘dis-
place’ current thinking?” (McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005, p. 903). If this
was the practice of perception that I was employing, I began to wonder
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if there were other ways of deploying a critical gaze that might be more
productive.
The Optics of Critique: Why
the Optical Configurations We
(Metaphorically) Deploy Matter
The eyes have been used to signify a perverse capacity—honed to perfec-
tion in the history of science tied to militarism, capitalism, colonialism,
and male supremacy—to distance the knowing subject from everybody and
everything in the interests of unfettered power. (Haraway, 2001, p. 677)
Of vision, Haraway (2001) reminds us that despite the perception that we
live in an age in which the plurality of technologies of sight that enhance
our primate eyes are near limitless (e.g., satellite surveillance, magnetic
resonance imaging, closed-circuit television, spectrometers, x-ray, radio
telescopes), we never come to achieve:
a God’s eye view of the universe, the universal viewpoint, the escape from
perspective, with all the rights and privileges accorded therein. Vision that
goes right to the heart of the matter, unmediated sight, knowledge without
end, without responsibility. (Barad, 2007, p. 233)
The “god-trick” of “seeing everything from nowhere” (Haraway, 2001,
p. 678) is but an “impossible dream of plenitude” (Spivak, 1976, p.
xix), an end goal never reached or reachable by its means. As “direct,
devouring, generative, and unrestricted vision” (Haraway, 2001, p. 678)
is but an ideology never achieved in technological practice, vision is
not only always a situated and partial practice but one that must be
accountable to its situatedness and partiality.
As Haraway (2001) posits, this is significant as there is a persistent
metaphorical reliance on vision within critique (see also Barad, 2007;
Haraway, 1997; Kirby, 2011). Even when critique metaphorically deploys
vision (simply) as perspective, critique is always already a “politics of
positioning” (Haraway, 2001, p. 681) in which positionings are plural,
fragmented, unsteady, shifting, and on the move (Barad, 2012a; Butler,
2001; Foucault, 1997; Kirby, 2011; Latour, 1993, 2004a). However,
just as “vision requires instruments of vision” (Haraway, 2001, p. 681),
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critique requires instruments of critique. Even normative and taken-for-
granted conceptions of vision (e.g., perspective, sight) are situated and
partial (e.g., location, direction), as well as supported by instruments of
vision (e.g., biological technologies such as the particular eyes engaged
in sight, epistemic frameworks; see Butler, 2010). Similarly, even what
Foucault (1997) refers to as “the critical spirit” (emphasis mine) employs
particular instruments of critique. While critique and the optical configu-
rations that they metaphorically employ and deploy (whether implicitly8
or explicitly) never fully come to coincide, it is nonetheless important
and productive to consider how diverse optical configurations continue
to produce particular “politics of positioning” (Haraway, 2001, p. 681)
within critique. Thinking with and through optical configurations can be
a productive way of bringing attention to the ways in which these complex
and contradictory positionings are differentially produced, framed, and
(un)acknowledged. Furthermore, to think of them as configurations is
an important step in working towards what Barad (2007) refers to as
re(con)figuring s: the ongoing processes in which configurations are
dynamic, temporary, and always already being produced differentially and
anew within their current agential relations.
For example, in my own critical engagement above, it could be stated
that I employed an optical configuration in which “reflection [is] a perva-
sive trope for knowing” (Barad, 2007, p. 72).9 That is, I arranged
constructs (e.g., “what counts as science” as a quasi-neutral cultural
construct) to appear as but a false reflections of reality, while simultane-
ously presenting them as productions of reflections from other mirrored
surfaces that I held to be true (e.g., Eurocentrism). All the while, I
partially masked the mirroring process that I was engaging in, as well
as the ways in which I manoeuvered from one mirror to another. Accord-
ingly, I was metaphorically positioning and utilizing the optical apparatus
that shapes my critical “ways of seeing” (Haraway, 2001, p. 679, emphasis
in original) such that it cast my “bad” objects into darkness and, by
contrast, my “good” objects into light, making me blind to both, as well
as the process itself. Through producing particular points of vantage for
another reader, as well as myself, I used the “poor trick that allows critique
to go on” (Latour, 2004a, p. 241): mirrors upon mirrors (Barad, 2007,
2012a).
It is not that the constructs and systems I addressed were unproblem-
atic, or that my earlier arguments held no merit or validity. Rather, these
arguments could easily be (un)done through processes of critique very
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similar to the ones I employed. Through slight of hand, a crafty critic
could easily reconfigure the optical geometry of my argument. Obscure a
little here, illuminate a little there, and a convincing reversal that exposes
that which I shadowed, while shading that which I presented could
be produced. Such smoke and mirrors would not resist the dialectic
reversal of the very same move I was making,10 but my “prematurely
naturalized objectified facts” would also do little to sway or engage with
those whose matters of fact were oppositional to mine (see Bohm, 1996;
Moulton, 1983; see also Kuokkanen, 2007; Latour, 2004a; McKinley &
Aikenhead, 2005). This, of course, is without putting into question the
very possibility of distance from one’s own matters of fact (Barad, 2007;
Butler, 2001, 2005; Foucault, 1997; Kirby, 2011; Latour, 2004a; Smith,
1999/2012). It is for this reason that Latour states that “there is no sure
ground even for criticism” (p. 227), and especially not for critique like
that.
For this reason, it is deeply productive to engage around Foucault’s
classic question of “What is critique?” (Foucault, 1997, p. 24, emphasis
in original). What if the norms surrounding the critical attitude, when
critiqued, revealed it to be but a critical spirit that, as Latour (2004a)
states, has run out of steam? What might it mean to be critical other-
wise, to engage in another critical mode that is productive rather than
protective (see Derrida, 1976; Spivak, 1976)? Furthermore, if “vision
requires instruments of vision” (Haraway, 2001, p. 681), how might a
differential consideration and understanding of the optical apparatuses
that we employ metaphorically inform and produce critically gazing (and
the critical gazer) otherwise? How might an understanding of the phys-
ical phenomena of optics (e.g., properties of light within geometrical and
physical optical configurations) entangled within critique re(con)figure
the possible possibilities for critical engagement? If “optics is a politics
of positioning” (Haraway, 2001, p. 681), how might we re-arrange the
subjects and objects of vision? How might we do so without falling
into the trap of going from partial and situated vision to an unsituated
“seeing everything from nowhere” (Haraway, 2001, p. 678)? I was eager
to explore what this might mean for decolonizing science education. In
order to engage with these questions, I explore critical and complicit
(mis)reading as a deconstructive approach that neither rejects the struc-
ture (as critique is still ever necessary) nor accepts it (as critique as it
stands has run out of steam).11
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Critical and Complicit (Mis)Readings of the Optics
of Critique: Science Education Under Erasure
To be at once critical and complicit methodologically is to engage in the
difficult task of a double(d) reading whose “interest is in complicit prac-
tices and excessive difference” (Lather, 2007, p. 105). To unpack how I
utilize the expression critical and complicit herein, it is also productive
to do a double(d) reading of complicity and the promiscuously entangled
ways in which they are articulated and enacted.
First, complicity signals the critical inhabitation that is required in a
project of working within and against science education. Such a critical
inhabitation resists both the critical rejection of the educational structure
as well as the complicity that protects rather than productively engages
with the problematics within it (Spivak, 1976). It is a research approach
that recognizes that constructs, categories and contexts are always already
rife with both problematics and possibilities at once. It is to “persistently
to critique a structure that one cannot not (wish to) inhabit” (Spivak,
1993/2009, p. 284) by taking a deconstructive stance and placing this
inadequate yet necessary structure under erasure. For Derrida (1976),
to put something under erasure “is to write a word, cross it out, and
then print both word and deletion. (Since the word is inaccurate, it is
crossed out. since it is necessary, it remains legible)” (Spivak, 1976, p.
xiv). Methodologically, this entails the deconstructive using and troubling
of concepts, categories and constructs while recognizing that they are
always already both containing and constraining while problematically and
productively exceeded (Derrida, 1976; Kuokkanen, 2007; Lather, 2007;
St. Pierre, 2011). This excess gestures towards the second meaning of
complicity.
Secondly, complicity signals towards the collusive relations that
concepts and categories hold to their constitutive exteriority. In short,
textuality is always already complicitous to its otherness (e.g., “the
complicity between yes and no” [Spivak in Derrida, 1976, p. 319]). Thus,
being critical and complicit is not only to critique this complicity, but
also a process of paying attention to the slippages in which complic-
ities surface. However, it is not only a question of witnessing these
deconstructive openings.
Thus, to place under erasure requires creative tinkering with/in those
moments when the inhabited structure is self-transgressing through a
two-part process. First, it entails locating a productive moment in which
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it reveals its undecidability. Spivak (1976) describes the process of bearing
witness to undecidability as such:
If in the process of deciphering a text in the traditional way we come across
a word that seems to harbor an unresolvable contradiction and by virtue
of being one word is made sometimes to work in one way and sometimes
in another and thus is made to point away from the absence of a unified
meaning we shall catch at that word. (p. lxxv)
In short, this entails paying attention to the ways in which concepts
and categories whose meanings vacillate (see Chapter 3 for the play of
(re)signification) between a meaning and its constitutive otherness. This
constitutive otherness can be read as a relation between binary and oppo-
sitional terms (e.g., life/death, familiar/strange) as well as similar yet
different terms (e.g., affect and effect, amoral and immoral). Secondly, it
involves the prying open of this methodological fissures or locations that
“harbor an unresovable contradiction” (Spivak, 1976, p. lxxv). In short,
this entails using that which exceeds it (i.e., the constitutive otherness,
whether oppositional or similar yet different) as a lever by substituting
it into the methodological “text”. This in turn reverses the hierarchy
between intended and unintended meaning, creating the possibility for
new meanings to potentially be inscribed over the trace of that which was
(partially) erased (Derrida, 1976; Spivak, 1976; St. Pierre, 2011).
Like any and every structure, there are many self-trangressive moments
in which the structure both encompasses and eschews itself that provide
important locations to work within and against. However, the space I
put under erasure within this text is the differing and deferring space
between what critique with/in science education is and is (not). The
formulation of is (not) is intentional and is utilized to signal the need for
“working with the resources of the old language, the language we already
possess, and which possesses us” (Spivak, 1976, p. xv) while engaging in
a disruptive “repetition [that] leads to a simulacrum, not to the ‘same’”
(Spivak, 1976, p. lxv). In other words, it is a commitment to working
within and against critique with/in science education by differentially
using the concepts, constructs, and categories available by (mis)reading12
them through substituting similar but different iterations of the optics of
critique that usually or typically frame critique with/in science education.
Critically and complicitly inhabiting this space offers rich possibili-
ties for disrupting, displacing, and differentially enacting critique with/in
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science education for two distinct yet interconnected reasons. First, within
the context of critique with/in science education, critique, and more
precisely the optics of critique presents itself as a signifier whose signified
is unstable and undecidable. As explored earlier within this chapter, the
optics of critique are often defined and deployed in a cursory and rapid
manner (i.e., vision as semiotically pervasive but often under-defined).13
While optics are gestured to and enacted within many critiques with/in
science education, it is not always clear as to which optics are being
referred to. Rather, the meaning always differs and is deferred (see
Derrida, 1976). As such, such a location presents itself as a site ripe for
productive (mis)readings and substitutions of differential and unintended
understanding of these critical optics.
Second, the disjuncture between what the optics of critique with/in
science education is and is (not) offers itself as a long, and ever-
lengthening lever to pry this space open while maintaining a critical
inhabitation of this educational space. What the optics of critique within
science education often is (i.e., the mirror) does not fully reflect the crit-
ical shifts, breaks, and developments with respect to ways-of-being-critical
both theoretically and in its practical applications. However, prying open
with what the optics of critique is (not) allows for a working within
and against critique with/in science education that does not jettison the
central metaphor of optics nor the impetus for critique that constitute it
but rather considers similar yet different understandings thereof.
For Derrida, “the signifier and the signified are interchangeable”
(Spivak, 1976, p. lxv). Within science education, the signifier that is the
optics of critique is already in a state of undecidable signification. Thus,
the task at hand herein is the rupturing of this space using the lever of
signified that is what the optics of critique is (not).
Mirror upon Mirrors: Matters of Fact,
Matters of Fiction, and Science Education
While the Enlightenment profited largely from the disposition of a very
powerful descriptive tool, that of matters of fact, which were excellent
for debunking quite a lot of beliefs, powers, and illusions, it found itself
totally disarmed once matters of fact, in turn, were eaten up by the same
debunking impetus. (Latour, 2004a, p. 232).
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Critique has been, for the most part, a process of disrupting and
displacing particularly problematic “beliefs, powers, and illusions”
(Latour, 2004a, p. 232) with matters of fact . While this mode has had
“prodigious efficacity” in the past, modernity’s “critical capacities are
waning” (Latour, 1993, p. 35). This largely, but not exclusively, has to
do with the notion that critique is all-too-often a process that is restricted
to fault-finding and passing negative judgement (Barad, 2012a; Bohm,
1996; Butler, 2001; Foucault, 1997; Kirby, 2011; Latour, 1993, 2004a;
Moulton, 1983). While this has been effective while operating within
particular disciplinary lines, when it comes to critical engagement at the
intersection of nature, culture, and politics such as is the case within
cross-cultural science education, the usual critical modes of naturalization,
socialization, and deconstruction begin to break down (Latour, 1993,
2004a, 2004b).
If we take seriously Latour’s (1993) eponymous thesis statement that
“We [the West/Global North] Have Never Been Modern”, then the divi-
sion between and mutual exclusivity of nature, culture, and politics that
shape understandings and enactments of modernity never fully became
actualized. In other words, even if modernity is treated as totalizing, it
has never fully totalized. This was in part because natural-cultural hybrids
have been an absent presence that “moderns” have been (un)consciously
relying upon since the proclaiming of nature and culture as being sepa-
rate and separable. Accordingly, it is not only the more obvious points
of convergence such as issues of science, technology, and society that are
to be included within this entanglement, but rather that everything is
always already within nature, culture, and politics. Thus, the entangle-
ment of nature, culture, and politics often refuse to be explained away by
such critical modes as they are always already exceeded by them (see also
Barad, 2007; Latour, 2004a, 2004b; Kirby, 2011). As Latour poses, “is it
our fault if the intersections of nature, culture, and politics are simultane-
ously real, like nature, narrated, like discourse, and collective, like society?”
(p. 6, emphasis in original).
The critical gazes offered by naturalization, socialization, and decon-
struction14 are never simple or passive operationalizations of metaphoric
vision (Barad, 2007; Haraway, 2001). They usually feed on the weak-
nesses of the other two modes in (re)presenting a truth about the world
(or in the case of deconstruction, an absence of stable natural and cultural
truth; see Derrida, 1976). In offering a privileged vantage point from
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which to state truths, naturalization states that nature is this by brack-
eting out culture, socialization states that culture is that by bracketing out
nature, and deconstruction states that society and nature are (not )15 by
denying the epistemological and ontological stability required for social-
ization and naturalization. These statements are, respectively, made at
the expense of their other(ed) statements and without taking seriously
the epistemic resources presented through other modes (Latour, 1993).
Herein lies the major critique of critique that I will unpack here,16 the
notion that the objects under and utilized to pursue critical inquiry are
attributed and granted either firm or flimsy positions but never viewed
as complex entanglements that encompass both positions, across multiple
critical gazes.
Through the mirror metaphor that is made operational in critique,
the objects of inquiry are almost “never complicated enough” (Latour,
2004a, p. 234). They are rarely allowed to exist as objects that are the
products of rich and ongoing complex natural and cultural histories, as
well as produced by, and producing various participating agents (see also
Barad, 2007, 2010; Cajete, 1994, 2000; Kirby, 2011). Rather, Latour
(1993) suggests that the majority (i.e., roughly 90%) of the contemporary
critical scene in the social sciences positions its objects of inquiry, whether
they are conceptual or concrete, in one of two positions: fait (i.e., fact)
or fée (i.e., fairy).17 In other words, they are presented as good reflec-
tions and bad reflections of reality, with the critic themselves acting as a
mirror of the observed phenomena by giving a “clear” and “accurate”
representation. Latour (2004a) quickly unpacks these two positions by
explaining how critics too often deploy them. First, the critic presents to
“naïve believers” that the object they are using and the way they are using
it are but a fairy, a fantasy or fetish created through the simple projection
of their wishes and desires onto the object. In other words, the first critical
gesture is in re-presenting a held belief or value as but a fairy. Second,
the fetishistic projection is “explained” through use of other objects of
inquiry. These other objects, presented and levied as indisputable fact,
defy the very possibility of the projected fairy from being an agential
choice as they are given a fully causal treatment. Accordingly, the “naïve
believer”, is twice slighted, once for investing belief in a fairy, and twice
for not being able to perceive the fact that shaped them to do so in the
first place.
Furthermore, critique through the mirror metaphor serves to mask
the practices of positioning through which the fact and fairy labels are
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applied through what Barad (2007) refers to as the “illusion of givenness”
that is mirrored correspondence. In short, Barad (2007) explains that the
illusion of givenness that is produced through a mirroring of one’s social
or natural reality begins to break down when we consider the ways in
which the mirror itself is not the thing it mirrors:
As with Magritte’s famous painting Ceci n’est pas une pipe, the point is not
that it really isn’t a pipe but only a representation of a pipe, but rather
that representations do not simply refer in ways that we have come to
expect, that in fact the entire question of referentiality seems to have lost
its self-evident nature and givenness has lost its transparency, and we can
no longer see our way through the game of smoke [and] of mirrors that
representationalism has become. Like a good magician, representationalism
would have us focus on what seems to be evidently given, hiding the
very practices that produce the illusion of givenness. (Barad, 2007, p. 360,
emphasis in original)
It is not that particular arguments can and cannot be “reflected” as fact
and fairy but rather that the illusion of givenness of the mirror metaphor
works to hide the ways in which such an optical apparatus was set up to
produce such a reflection by presenting the carefully produced reflection
as the referent.
To give an example of what is meant by the application of the mirror
metaphor within critique, we will consider a dominant and contested
belief that is often held within science education. As articulated in
Chapter 3, how we come to understand and know nature (i.e., science)
and how we use it (i.e., technology) are commonly viewed as almost
culturally neutral processes as the result of a primarily naturalistic
ontology.18 This configuration downplays, and often negates, the impact
that culture plays in the construction and implementation of modern
scientific and technological knowledge (e.g., Matthews, 1994; Siegel,
1997, 2001). A critical and, more specifically, decolonizing response
necessarily must make the argument that science education is cultural
in order to address the ways in which the culture of science education
is damaging to Indigenous knowledges and students, as well as other
students who have past and ongoing predominantly negative relationships
to the (neo-)colonial culture of “school science” (Barnhardt & Kawagley,
2005, 2008; McKinley, 2007; see also Harding, 2008). Utilizing the
above normative critical mode (i.e., critique) often entails, first, treating
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this belief as a fairy and presenting an oppositional claim: techno-
scientific practices are primarily cultural and secondarily naturalistic.
Second, this fairy is explained through facts: theories of Eurocentrism
produce the individuals enacting this belief (e.g., Sammel, 2009). Such
a critique obfuscates the possibility of diverse techno-scientific practices
having diverse degrees of natural and cultural production. Perhaps more
importantly, it produces a foreclosure in the very change that it advocates
for: if individuals enacting this belief are already bound by systems of colo-
niality, how might they be otherwise? Furthermore, by presenting fact
and fairy , the science education critic and the critique is either addressing
those who already agree or inviting those who disagree to treat them
with the same brush by reversing the fact and fairy positions to unravel
the argument, as explored in further detail in the following chapter. That
is, the counter-belief of techno-scientific knowledge as primarily cultural
is presented as fairy that can be “explained” by the fact of an agenda
of cultural politics.19 As Latour (2004b) states, dominant conceptions
of cultural politics and nature are exclusionary by their definition, one
cannot enact substantive claims about nature (i.e., scientific knowledge)
from such conceptions of cultural and political positions. Thus, within a
construction of science and technology as culturally neutral, such a fact
would disqualify the counter-belief as “counting” as or in the construction
of techno-scientific knowledge, thus re-inscribing science and technology
as negligibly cultural (e.g., Matthews, 1994; Siegel, 1997, 2001).
Accordingly, if the culture of debate around questions of epistemic
pluralism and questions of cross-culturalism within science education
seems to be at a standstill, locked in ongoing dialectical reversal (Aiken-
head & Ogawa, 2007; Alsop & Fawcett, 2010; Cobern & Loving,
2008; van Eijck & Roth, 2007; see Chapter 3), it is perhaps because the
normative critical spirit, as Latour (2004a) playfully mentions, positions
the critic and critique within an optics of appearing to be right and those
with whom they disagree as seemingly wrong. This occurs in part because
“there is never any crossover between the two lists of objects in the fact
position and the fairy position” (p. 241, emphasis in original). On the
one hand, this entails that the objects placed in the fact position are never
explored as if they were in the fairy position. By treating them as strictly
causal, their “origin, fabrication, [and] mode of development” (p. 238)
are left unexamined. On the other hand, objects in the fairy position are
not given the fact treatment. By treating them as strictly the result of a
fetishistic projection, the ways in which they could continue to be causal
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agents, after the anti-fetishistic move is made, are masked. However, once
this repertoire of critical approaches is shown to be contradictory, the
“poor trick that allows critique to go on” (p. 241) begins to break down.
Engaging in questioning that reverses and disrupts the fact/fairy binary
positions, the critical question of culture within cross-cultural science
education begins to open up. What would it mean to consider the prac-
tice of “culturally quasi-neutral” science as a fictional matter of fact ? What
if an exploration of its construction revealed this practice to have its own
cultural and political “origin, fabrication, [and] mode of development”
(Latour, 2004a, p. 238)? For example, what if the practice of “cultural
quasi-neutrality” was but a differential enactment of the highly political
sixteenth-century cultural practice of the “modest witness” in the labo-
ratory?20 Would the practice of “cultural quasi-neutrality” not then be
a significant cultural practice in and of itself? Would that not also mean
that this practice would disqualify it from counting in the production of
techno-scientific knowledge if the criterion of negligible or trace cultural
impact is infringed?
And what if the practice of “cultural quasi-neutrality” is treated as a
factual matter of fiction? What if a critical identification of this problem-
atic within a culture of science education (i.e., treating it as a fetish)
did not easily disallow for its rejection or did not allow for a move-
ment beyond?21 If critiques that “explain” science education as a primarily
cultural endeavour implicitly treat its culture as a matter of fiction rather
than account for the ways in which the “cultural quasi-neutrality” is
stubborn and sticky due to its own overarching systemic diffusion and
self-erasure (see Barad, 2007), would the proposed solution fall into some
of the same traps as the problem (see Bohm, 1996)? Does (re)presenting
something as untrue halt its (re)production?
It is for this reason that Latour (2004a) states that critique, of this
particular and normative kind, has run out of steam. This, of course,
does not negate the ongoing importance of and need for a critical spirit
around issues of inclusion, exclusion, and the norms that shape partici-
pation in science education. There are far too many students for whom
science education remains a form of epistemic violence that threatens
their ways of knowing and being with/in nature (Barnhardt & Kawagley,
2005, 2008; McKinley, 2007; Sammel, 2009). Because “the practice of
critique is not reducible to arriving at judgments (and expressing them)”
(Butler, 2001, p. 1) through this mode of mirror-upon-mirror, there are
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other metaphorical optical arrangements that are available and provide
differential potential and promise.
In the following sections, I present the prism and the diffraction
grating as alternative optical apparatus metaphors through which critique
in science education can be productively (mis)read. Such substitutions
act not only as a means of challenging the mirror metaphor’s implicit
operations (e.g., critique as presenting what one “sees” without coming
to present how one sees what they see), but also towards providing
alternatives that do not outright reject the structure of critique.
Foucault’s Prismatic Critique: Proximal
and Dispersive Critical Relationality
Foucault often invokes a form of the discursive, or a form of the non-
discursive; but these forms neither enclose nor interiorize anything; they
are ‘forms of exteriority’ through which either statements or visible things
are dispersed. (Deleuze, 1988, p. 43)
Foucault (1997), in his talk titled What is Critique? implicitly rejects
the mirror metaphor by problematizing its condition, offering instead
an optical configuration through which “statements or visible things are
dispersed” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 43). In particular, Foucault (1997) critiques
the possibility of distance between the subject and object of inquiry
(see also Barad, 2007, 2010; Smith, 1999/2012). As Haraway (2001)
reminds us, “the eyes have been used to signify a perverse capacity …
to distance the knowing subject from everybody and everything in the
interests of unfettered power” (p. 677). Significantly, this distancing is a
double(d) processes that also entails separation. The distancing required
for critique through an optics of mirroring makes it such that the critic
cannot be at once the subject and the object of one’s own critique (Barad,
2007; Bohm, 1996; Butler, 2005); it cannot and does not account for the
ways in which the critique and the critic are also formed with, in, and in
response to that which is under critique. This is not only important for the
status of critique in general, but also critique for decolonizing purposes
as well. Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999/2012) reminds us:
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One of the concepts through which Western [Modern(ist)] ideas about
the individual and community, about time and space, knowledge and
research, imperialism and colonialism can be drawn together is the concept
of distance…. Distance again separated the individuals in power from the
subjects that they governed. It was all so impersonal, rational and extremely
effective. In research, the concept of distance is most important as it implies
a neutrality and objectivity on behalf of the researcher. Distance is measur-
able. What it has come to stand for is objectivity, which is not measurable
to quite the same extent. (p. 58)22
Extending the earlier argument (i.e., critique as alternating flimsy and firm
positions; Latour, 2004a), it can be stated that it is often the case that
neither the critique nor the critic themselves are treated in the same anti-
fetishistic way that the negatively judged object under inquiry is treated
(i.e., the object placed in the fairy position). This is despite the respective
importance of both the critical apparatus and the critic within the produc-
tion of the optical arrangement, as well as phenomena under critique.
While not discussed at length within this chapter, the oft-cited solution
of placing the critic under the gaze to account for the critical produc-
tion of what is seen and how it is seen often reproduces the same optical
arrangement (i.e., mirror-upon-mirror), albeit differently.23
Foucault offers us the prism as a metaphoric optical technology for
informing the critical gaze otherwise (see Deleuze, 1988). Rather than
operationalize critique through distance and separation, as is the case
with the mirror-upon-mirror arrangement, Foucaultian prismatic critique
relies on subjects and objects being in porous and proximal relations.
Accordingly, Foucault invites us to consider the ways in which neither
the critique nor the critic are self-enclosed or interiorized, even when
brought back into the critical analysis. Because of this relational proximity
and porosity, subjects and objects disperse and are dispersed through the
critical process. Not only does this differentially shape subjects and objects
involved within the process, but also the process itself. Before addressing
how prismatic critique plays out in critical cross-cultural science educa-
tion, it is important to explore, outline, and situate Foucault’s (1997)
conception of what critique is and can be to ground the metaphorical
optical phenomena of prismatic dispersal.
As Butler (2001) states, for Foucault, “critique is always critique of
some instituted practice, discourse, episteme, institution… it loses its char-
acter the moment in which it is abstracted from its operation and made
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to stand alone as a purely generalizable practice” (p. 1). Critique is always
a critique of something, somewhere, and by someone: the norms under
critique come to shape the very critique itself. This is not to say that a
critical mode developed within a particular practice is a form of critical
relativism that wholly rejects translation (Latour, 1993, 2004a). Rather,
it is important to come to understand the qualities and conditions of that
mode of critique with/in the context in which it was developed if one
endeavours to remain faithful to the intent and possibilities of critique
when engaging in always already occurring process of transposing it into
an elsewhere and elsewhen.24
To frame prismatic critique, it is important to note that Foucault was
a scholar critical of the Enlightenment. In particular, Foucault’s (1997)
exploration centres the fundamental critical question characteristic of
Western Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth century of “how to govern”
(p. 27, emphasis in original), and its counter-question of “how not to
be governed” (p. 28) from which it cannot be disassociated. However,
Foucault did not only seek to critically engage with these questions, but
also engage critically with the critical process itself by seeking “to under-
stand the kind of question that critique institutes, offering tentative ways
of circumscribing its activities” (Butler, 2001, p. 2).
In his exploration of what critique is and can be around questions
of governmentality, Foucault (1997) identifies three historical anchoring
points. First, “critique is biblical, historically” (p. 30). As the art of
governance was tied to religion, critique during that period often
entailed questioning the truths that sacred texts (i.e., “the Scriptures”
[p. 30]) offered, and turning them on their head to disrupt the ways
in which power is maintained through these texts. Second, critique is
anchored in not wanting to be governed. This resistance to governance
is to address rules and laws that are unjust by putting forth irreversible
and unavoidable rights to which systems of government will have to
submit. Third, expanding upon not wanting to be governed, critique
entails not accepting the conflation between authority and truth. This
does not entail a full rejection of the truths offered by authority figures,
“but rather only accepting it only if one considers valid the reasons for
doing so” (Foucault, 1997, p. 31). Accordingly, as Butler (2001) states,
Foucault “is not posing the possibility of radical anarchy, and that the
question is not how to become radically ungovernable” (p. 6). Rather
Foucault (1997) asks how “not to be governed like that, by that, in the
name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and
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by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them”
(p. 28). Thus, we are to be “both partner and adversary” (p. 28) to the
very thing we are critiquing.
The shift from not being governed to not being governed like that
is significant for two entangled reasons. First, the former is a dangerous
proposition. To fully reject governability and to distance oneself from it
is to risk “letting someone else say ‘obey’” (Foucault, 1997, p. 35) by
unavoidably stepping into other regimes of governance (see also Spivak,
1976, 1993/2009). Secondly, Foucault (1997) presents the former as an
impossibility. As Butler (2005) elaborates on Foucault’s account,
There is no “I” that can fully stand apart from the social conditions of its
emergence, no “I” that is not implicated in a set of conditioning moral
norms, which, being norms, have a social character that exceeds a purely
personal or idiosyncratic meaning. (p. 7)
Thus, “to be governed is not only to have a form imposed upon one’s
existence, but to be given the terms within which existence will and will
not be possible” (Butler, 2001, p. 8). It is not only an impossibility to
stand outside of the social norms that shape one’s being, but it is also
an undesirability (e.g., exile, banishment; see Peat, 2002). To be fully
outside the norms by which one comes to be would entail becoming
wholly unintelligible as a subject and to go without the means of one’s
“cultural survival” (Butler, 1990; see also Butler, 2005).
If we are always already in a proximal relation to the things that we are
critical of and with, critique through a clear cut and distanced subject-
object relation begins to break down, as does the mirror metaphor it
makes operational. As Deleuze (1988) reminds us of Foucault, “these
forms neither enclose nor interiorize anything; they are ‘forms of exterior-
ity’ through which either statements or visible things are dispersed” (p. 43,
emphasis in original). The optical metaphor enacted through dispersal
can be productively explored and unpacked through Foucault’s (1977)
exploration of Bentham’s Panopticon in Discipline and Punish.25
In short, the Panopticon is an architectural structure that works to
produce the “automatic functioning of power” (Foucault, 1977, p. 201)
within the disciplinary space of the prison by reconfiguring the relation-
ship between the subject (i.e., the jailor) and object (i.e., the prisoner)
of power. For readers unfamiliar with Bentham’s Panopticon, it can be
described as such:
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At the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower
is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring;
the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the
whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside
corresponding to the windows of the tower; one on the outside allows the
light to cross the cell from one end to the other (Foucault, 1977, p. 200)
Unlike the dungeon, whose purpose is also to contain and discipline by
making the prisoner (socially) invisible, the Panopticon bathes the pris-
oners within a regime of visibility through which the jailor located within
the tower can potentially see any of the prisoners, but not vice versa.
Because the jailor does not possess the ability to see everything all of
the time (e.g., limited field of sight, not always being present within the
tower), this uni-directional sight is important manages “to arrange things
[such] that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if discontin-
uous in its action” (Foucault, 1977, p. 201). In other words, because
the prisoners may not be always watched but could be watched at any
point in time without their knowledge, “the inmates should be caught
up in a power situation of which they are themselves to be the bearers”
(Foucault, 1977, p. 201).
Here, it is no longer appropriate to state that the governmentality that
Foucault is so critical of (and in relation to) is located strictly within the
jailor who is traditionally conceived of as the contact point of power when
thinking about the dungeon. Furthermore, while it can be said that the
prisoners in this context practice self-discipline by inscribing “in [them-
selves] the power relation in which [they] simultaneously plays both roles
[i.e., jailor and prisoner]” (Foucault, 1977, pp. 202–203), this is not to
say that they have internalized and contain the discourse of power. Rather,
the architecture acts as an apparatus which places them all in proximal
relation through which disciplinary power and knowledge circulate in a
capillary manner, dispersing through and simultaneously (re)producing
them as subjects and objects of knowledge. As Butler (1990) states of
Foucault, “systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come
to represent” (p. 2, emphasis in original). These structures cause subjects
to be “formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the norms of
those structures” (p. 2). In his critique of governmentality through disci-
plinary forms of punishment, Foucault turns the “sacred text” of power
as individualistic and repressive (i.e., a Marxist conception of power) on
its head: disciplinary power circulates through nodes (i.e., subjects and
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objects) and is productive (e.g., produces and organizes subjects as well
as objects).26 Subjects do not unequally have access to power; rather they
are unevenly had by power.
The relation to critique and the point to be made here is not that
critics and their critiques are always already under a regime of visibility
through which disciplinary power flows in exactly the same ways as in
the example of an incarcerated prisoner. Rather, “the Panopticon…must
be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining
power [and knowledge] relations in terms of the everyday life of men
[sic]” (Foucault, 1977, p. 205). With respect to critique, panopticonism is
useful to think about the ways in which both the subject enacting critique
(i.e., the critic) and the objects of critique are within a proximal relation
through they are differentially produced and organized. It is useful to
think about the Panopticon as metaphor for disciplinary power and the
ways it circulates not only as a governmental mode of punishment, but
more broadly as the ways in which disciplinary knowledge (e.g., science,
education) disperse through, produce, and organize subjects and objects
of critique. Disciplinary knowledge is a productive double(d) meaning
as it need not only be read as the knowledge content of a discipline. It
can also be read as the ways in which knowledge is disciplined. Disci-
plinary subjects (i.e., both the curricular content and those conveying the
content) are produced (i.e., within norms) through the operationalization
as well as the possible application of panoptic disciplinary power.
As presented by Butler (2001), Foucault argues “critique will be
dependent upon its objects, but its objects will in turn define the very
meaning of critique” (p. 3). This is doubly important. First, this neces-
sarily entails giving the objects of critique a more robust treatment than
the matters of fact and matters of fiction that Latour (2004a) cautions
against as too simple a framing will result in too simple a critique. Second,
the very objects of critique also produce particular possibilities and posi-
tions for the “subjects” of critique, through subjectification of the critics
themselves. In other words, the critic does not come to critique with a
stable subject position/ality prior to the act of critique (i.e., being) but
rather the very norms which they are critiquing shape the position(s)
which they can take in relation to those norms (i.e., becoming) (see
Butler, 2001). The very norms that organize what is a matter of fact and
what is a matter of fiction produce (and are produced by) the critic and
the epistemological context (i.e., what and how the critique can know)
within which they are operating.
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With Foucault’s prism as an optical prosthetic technology, the task of
critique becomes not one of establishing or employing a “pregiven epis-
temological context” (Butler, 2001). Rather, critique is about exposing
the limits of the epistemological context. In turn, recognizing the limi-
tations of an epistemological context entails accounting for and being
accountable to the relationship between the subject and objects of critique
through which the context emerges. Thus critique, for Foucault (1997),
is “the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability”
(p. 32) through which the critic engages in a “practice that not only
suspends judgment, … but offers a new practice of values based on that
very suspension” (Butler, 2001, p. 1). This suspension is critical in both
senses of the word because it asks how the very judgements we make as
critical subjects are already produced and organized within the proximal
and prismatic relations between our/selves as critics and the objects of
critique we glorify and dismay (see also Bohm, 1996). If we engage in
critique as “the movement by which the subject gives himself the right
to question the truth on its effects of power and question power on its
discourses of truth” (Foucault, 1997, p. 32), would we still arrive at or
care to make the same judgements altogether?
Returning to the question of “what counts” as science within the
context of cross-cultural science education (from Chapter 3), considering
critique as prismatic opens up additional lines of questioning that can be
engaged critically. While questioning might open up new lines of critical
engagement, recall that questions that reveal the epistemological limita-
tions and shape (i.e., the lines delineating the interiority and exteriority
of truth) of a particular epistemic framework are for Foucault a form of
critique in and of themselves. Rather than engaging in acts of judgement
through which objects of critique are positioned as either matters of fact
or matters of fiction, Foucault’s prismatic critique invites us to consider
the relationships through which these judgements are produced through
optical inflection. If we revisit the earlier question regarding the matter
of science education as “culturally quasi-neutral”, rather than immedi-
ately framing this as good/true (i.e., a matter of fact ) or bad/false (i.e.,
a matter of fiction), it is worth momentarily suspending judgement to ask
how critique is formed with/in relation to these norms.
If we treat science as “culturally quasi-neutral” as a point of illumi-
nation, through what categories, constructs, and concepts is meaning
dispersed and inflected to produce this constellation of meaning? What
are the critical objects that are utilized to either uphold or question
4 MIRRORS, PRISMS, AND DIFFRACTION GRATINGS … 153
this norm? What objects are positioned as abject (e.g., how does “cul-
ture” come to be seen as problematic?) and which ones are positioned as
positive levers (e.g., how does method come into stand for and as quasi-
neutrality)? What optical geometries are required for these to come to be,
and to be sustained as such?
Recognizing that the light/prism relationship is often interchangeable,
how is it that “cultural quasi-neutrality” disperses and inflects its negative
and positive objects? Treating “cultural quasi-neutrality” prismatically also
invites the question of what it produces in turn when meaning is inflected
through it. For example, how is it that practices deemed cultural (rather
than quasi-neutral) are inflected in terms of their meaning when shone
through that prism? What about sanctioned scientific methods?
What about questions of curriculum and pedagogy? When science
education is filtered through the normative prism of “cultural quasi-
neutrality”, what kinds of pedagogies and curriculum are dispersed and
inflected through the other side? Which ways of learning and ways of
knowing are (re)produced? What is made possible and made impos-
sible (e.g., What conceptions of a learner can and do emerge when
cultural quasi-neutrality is part of the illumination)? What kinds of
learners and learnings as well as teachers and teachings are made intel-
ligible/unintelligible within this space?
Expanding upon the last question, how are the critics themselves,
as the subjects of critique, formed with/in theses multiple relationships
that often appear to be epistemologically pre-given? How are the critics
inflecting this vector of light not like that (e.g., What facets of the optical
arrangement are being deflected, inflected, inverted, and redirected;
which meanings are flow through, with minor refraction at most?)? How
do these inflections shape the critic whose self is in prismatic relation to
them (e.g., as critics, as educators, as researchers)? When considering the
ever-increasing ways in which the cross-cultural science education class-
room is presented with plural(istic) ways-of-knowing-nature, processes
and products that exceed the norms by which we frame science and
by which we are framed as science educators, it becomes important to
consider the rich luminescent web of dispersed meanings when thinking
about what is (im)possible within/as science education.
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Baradian Diffraction: Including the Critical
Apparatus in the Production of Critique
It is a well-recognized fact of physical optics that if one looks closely at
an “edge,” what one sees is not a sharp boundary between light and dark
but rather a series of light and dark bands – that is a diffraction pattern.
(Barad, 2007, p. 156)
While Barad (2007) does not explicitly make the act of critique a focus
of her scholarship in Meeting the Universe Halfway, she does speak to
critique in a more recent interview:
Critique is over-rated, over-emphasized, and over-utilized… Critique is all
too often not a deconstructive practice, that is, a practice of reading for the
constitutive exclusions of those ideas we can not do without, but a destruc-
tive practice meant to dismiss, to turn aside, to put someone or something
down. This is a practice of negativity that I think is about subtraction,
distancing and othering. (Barad, 2012a, p. 49)
Like Foucault (1997), Barad (2012a) is critical of distance and sepa-
ration as the (pre-)condition under which the critical spirit operates.
The othering of the object of critique obscures the ways in which the
subject of critique is indebted to its other through its proximal and
co-constitutive relationship (see also Barad, 2007, 2010); not only episte-
mologically, but also ethically and ontologically. For Barad (2007), such
critique cannot be disassociated from “long history of using vision and
optical metaphor [s] to talk and theorize about knowledge” (p. 29),
particularly the “well-worn metaphor of reflection” (p. 29). For her, the
commonplace understanding of reflection can be understood as such:
Mirrors reflect. To mirror something is to provide an accurate image or
representation that faithfully copies that which is being mirrored. Hence
mirrors are an often-used metaphor for representationalism and related
questions of reflexivity. For example, a scientific realist believes that scien-
tific knowledge accurately reflects physical reality, whereas a strong social
constructivist would argue that knowledge is more accurately understood
as a reflection of culture, rather than nature. (p. 86)
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For Barad (2007), the act of reflection is about mirroring sameness else-
where. As mentioned earlier within this chapter, this largely has to do
with the ways in which the mirror metaphor produces an illusion of
pre-givenness (i.e., presence) through which claims of correspondence
are masked. Thus, through reflection, patterns of difference are dialec-
tically subsumed into or sublated through sameness, making it difficult
to account for and be accountable to the enactment of difference (see
Chapter 2). As an alternative to reflection, Barad (2007, 2012a) proposes
diffraction as optical metaphor that attends to relations of difference, and
how they are differentially done and undone. In a nutshell, “diffraction
involves reading insights through one another in a way that help illu-
minate differences as they emerge: how differences get made, what gets
excluded, and how those exclusions matter” (Barad, 2007, p. 30).
Here, a rich possibility is offered through the metaphorical optical
alternative proposed for cross-cultural and decolonizing science educa-
tion. Given that cross-cultural science education endeavours to make
space for ways-of-knowing-in-being that are not typically included within
the curricular scope, the invitation to consider otherness without the
necessity of bringing it into frames of sameness and/or being account-
able to that which is exceeded by frames of sameness when applied
is of importance. Too often other(ed) ways-of-knowing-in-being (e.g.,
Indigenous) are placed in a relationship that dialectically reduces their
elements to those that they share with dominant WMS, at the expense of
their uniqueness and possibilities (e.g., ethics, balance, other-than-human
agency; Cajete, 1994, 2000). Furthermore, while the intent is not new,
the practice of diffractive critique can bring new ways to account for and
be accountable to relations of power between normative and alternative
ways-of-living-with/in-nature.
However, if we continue the work of labouring the metaphor of visu-
ality and technologies of sight with respect to critique, before applying
the optical metaphor of diffraction, it is important to have an under-
standing of the optical referent to which it refers.27 In short, Barad’s
metaphor of diffraction invites a more nuanced and complex under-
standing of the natural phenomena informing this referent: light. As
Barad (2007) reminds us, the optical mode through which most critique
operates is Euclidian (i.e., rectilinear). However, light does not always
act linearly: “under certain experimental circumstances, light manifests
particle-like properties [i.e., enacting Euclidian geometries], and under
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an experimentally incompatible set of circumstances, light manifests wave-
like properties [i.e., enacting non-Euclidian geometries]” (Barad, 2000,
p. 233). Accordingly, this is not an invitation to strictly consider light, and
according mediated visualities as non-linear, as they are still produced as
linear under particular experimental circumstances. Rather, it is an invi-
tation to consider light and properties of mediated vision interacting as
both particle and wave-like properties, as well as consider the conditions
under which they become particle and wave-like. To do so, Barad (2007)
introduces the physical phenomena of diffraction as useful in exploring
this referent.
Before considering light as both wave and particle as a metaphorical
referent for the practice of critique, it is worth quickly unpacking what it
means to consider light as demonstrating wave properties before moving
forward. Within classical physics, this phenomenon is called diffraction,
and it “has to do with the way waves combine when they overlap and
the apparent bending and spreading of waves that occurs when waves
encounter an obstruction” (Barad, 2007, p. 74). While some physi-
cists hold to a history in which the first phenomena (i.e., combining of
waves) are referred to as interference, Barad (2007) reminds us that both
phenomena have to do with the juxtaposition of waves. Since it is classi-
cally a property of all waves, I will give examples of both types of classical
diffractions with wave phenomena that might be more familiar: sound.
To demonstrate the first definition, imagine that you are at an outdoor
(soft) rock concert with two loud speakers at each end of the stage.
Should you have the freedom to walk about the area, you may come
to find that there are spaces where the music seems quieter, as well as
spaces where the music seems louder. This has to do with the principle
of wave superposition that states that when waves occupy the same posi-
tion or immediate local space, their amplitudes combine to create a new
wave. This new wave may be dampened through destructive interference
(i.e., when the waves’ amplitudes are opposite) or intensified through
productive interference (i.e., when the waves’ amplitudes align).
For the second instance, imagine that you are speaking into a card-
board tube. The sound that emerges from the other end does not follow
the linearity of the tube, but rather spreads out. This second type for
diffraction occurs when waves encounter a slit, a hole, or an obstacle
whose wavelength is no greater than their own (e.g., sending light waves
through the same cardboard tube would not produce any noticeable
ripples). While the tube prevents the sound to exit it anywhere but the
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opening, each and every point along a wave can and does act as a point
of origin which explains why it seems like the sound wave bends in all
directions once exiting the tube.
However, recall that Barad (2000, 2007) invites us to consider light
as both wave and particle. This requires us to explore diffraction as a
quantum phenomenon. Here, it is productive to discuss the experiment
that is emblematic of the collapse of classical Western metaphysics28:
the two-slit experiment. In this experiment, a single particle, such as an
electron is fired into the two-slit experimental apparatus that is config-
ured to observe wave phenomena. This is significant as within classical
physics, particles are largely thought to behave like other forms of matter,
in mechanistic, causal, and linear manners; that unlike waves, particles
as material phenomena entails spatial single occupancy (unlike the wave
superposition discussed earlier). Were this simply the case, this experi-
mental apparatus would have yielded no observation and would have been
largely forgettable. However, produced through this experiment were
diffraction patterns that indicate that under the right experimental condi-
tions, particles exhibit the behaviour of waves. It is also worth noting
that the corollary would also be shown to be possible as well in doing
similar experiments with light waves and creating experimental conditions
in which they would behave as particles. This is of deep importance as
these materialities (i.e., waves and particles) exhibit and enact properties
that are ontologically mutually exclusive within classical physics.
From this, a few theorists offered theories to attempt to explain this
wave-particle duality. Of note is Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle that
posits the wave-particle duality as epistemological, as a limitation to
knowability. However, Neils Bohr’s theorizing, which is the commonly
accepted theory, states that this duality is of ontological nature. The
phenomena is not simply presenting itself again by representing its
essence, but rather, the experimental conditions under which observation
occur shape the properties of what the phenomena can be (see Barad,
2010, 2011).
Working with physicist Neils Bohr’s journals, Barad extends his anal-
ysis by asking where the agencies of observation begin and where they
end, what is included, what is excluded, what matters, and what comes to
materialize. While Barad originally draws from Bohr’s work to theorize
materiality and materialization within the context of quantum physics,
she later extends these conclusions outwards.29 The role, the constitu-
tion, and the enactment of the apparatus is an important location where
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Barad’s work specifically deviates from and inflects Foucault’s. However,
this deviation is not one of critical negation, sublation, or subsuming (by
reducing her objects of critique to matters of fact or matters of critique),
but rather a diffractive reading. Recall that for Foucault (1977), apparatus
such as the Panopticon are at once physical, discursive, and organizational
structures, which are produced by and reproduce the capillary workings of
power within society. As Barad (2007) states, “although Foucault insists
that the objects (subjects) of knowledge do not pre-exist but emerge only
within discursive practices, he does not explicitly analyze the insepara-
bility of apparatuses and the objects (subjects)” (p. 201). In other words,
while Foucault considers the ways in which apparatuses of power such
as the Panopticon produces phenomena of subjectification, Barad (2007)
invites a consideration of how the phenomena of subjectification comes
to produce apparatuses such as Panopticon.30
Through a diffractive reading in which she reads Bohr’s insights
through Foucault’s, and vice versa, Barad (2007) produces new insights.
In particular, she reads Foucault’s insights into societal phenomena with
Bohr to postulates that the apparatus not only produces the phenomena
under observation but also that the apparatus is constitutive of and consti-
tuted by the phenomena as well.31 Thus, if for Foucault subjectivity is
not contained by the subject through interiority but rather a generative
enactment in relation to the norms which govern the possible possibili-
ties of who and what one can be (see Deleuze, 1988), Barad extends this
theorizing to the apparatus as well.
Asking the question of what constitutes “an apparatus” that comes to
produce and be produced by a phenomena, she reaches the conclusion
that an apparatus is observed is never simply a material tool or a discursive
concept through which the phenomena can be observed, but rather an
entangled and enacted network of agencies at play. One example of such
that Barad (2007) provides is that of the Stern-Gerlach experiment in
1922 in which Otto Stern and Walther Gerlach experimentally and empir-
ically made demonstrable the theoretical concept of “space quantization”.
This phenomena in which electrons made quantum leaps from one
discrete orbital or energy level to another within an atom was well devel-
oped within theoretical atomic models, however, classical understandings
of atomic configurations were reluctantly held onto until proof of some
sort was given to justify the theory (or debunk the theory as a temporary
stand in for another misunderstood phenomena). However, Stern and
Gerlach created an instrument that, “using a particular arrangement of
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magnets” (p. 163), would show the ways in which a beam of silver atoms’
electrons are differentially positioned, oriented, and configured within an
atom through deflection: some would be deflected upwards and some
would be deflected downwards. As Otto Stern recounts the experimental
event,
With Gerlach looking over my shoulder as I peered closely at the plate, we
were surprised to see gradually emerge the trace of the beam… Finally
we realized what [had happened]. I was the equivalent of an assistant
professor. My salary was too low to afford good cigars, so I smoked bad
cigars. These had a lot of sulfur in them, so my breath on the plate turned
the silver into silver sulfide, which is jet black, so easily visible. It was like
developing a photographic film. (Otto Stern in Barad, 2007, p. 164)
The experiment functioned. What Barad makes clear is that the very
boundaries that constitute the apparatus through which phenomena stabi-
lize and make themselves intelligible are not so easily determined, or at
least enclosed within that which is usually referred to as “equipment”
within a laboratory report. Here, when asking the question of what
constitutes the apparatus through which the phenomena was enacted,
we would necessarily have to consider not only the material agency of
the cigar, but also questions of gender, class, and economics through
which that particular type of cigar came to be included. As Barad (2007)
cautions, this “is not to say that all relevant factors figure in the same
way or with the same weight. The precise nature of this configuration
(i.e., the specific practices) matters” (p. 167). Accordingly, “apparatuses
are not static laboratory setups but a dynamic set of open-ended prac-
tices, iteratively refined and reconfigured”. (p. 167). The apparatus is
the enactment of a singular multiplicity that enfolds multiple bodies
of meaning and matter that comprises each of their respective mate-
rial and discursive historicities. As such, these constitutive bodies do not
simply interact between one another, but rather intra-act within this
re(con)figured body which is the experimental apparatus. Barad refers to
this type of co-substantiation that occurs with/in the apparatus, as well as
the phenomena under observation, as one of quantum entanglement:
Quantum entanglements are generalized quantum superpositions, more
than one, no more than one, impossible to count. They are far
more ghostly than the colloquial sense of ‘entanglement’ suggests.
Quantum entanglements are not the intertwining of two (or more)
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states/entities/events, but a calling into question of the very nature of
two-ness, and ultimately of one-ness as well. Duality, unity, multiplicity,
being are undone. ‘Between’ will never be the same. One is too few,
two is too many. No wonder quantum entanglements defy commonsense
notions of communication ‘between’ entities ‘separated’ by arbitrarily large
spaces and times. Quantum entanglements require/inspire a new sense of
a-count-ability, a new arithmetic, a new calculus of response-ability. (Barad,
2010, p. 251, emphasis in original)32
Returning to the question of what critique is and can be, Barad’s (2007)
notion of diffraction invites us to consider the ways in which the very
process of critique differentially produces the subject who critiques along-
side the object(s) of critique (as does Foucault). Uniquely, she also invites
us to consider the ways in which the norms of bodily production through
which these subjects and objects come into being through the enactment
of critique are not being pre-given. Just as Foucault’s critique invites us
to trouble the notion of an epistemological pre-givenness of the terms
through which the critique operates, Barad invites us to trouble an onto-
logical pre-givenness of the ways in which the usual subjects and objects
of critique are segmented and separated. It is a call to consider them
as superpositioned without the form of “a-count-ability” being one in
which superposition entails sameness (i.e., one-ness) or radical differenti-
ation (i.e., two-ness)33; it is a form of a-count-ability that accounts for its
own ontological cuts as well as the norms of inclusion/exclusion that are
shaped through this practice.
Along similar lines, Latour (2004a) states that:
The mistake we made, … was to believe that there was no efficient way to
criticize matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing
one’s attention toward the conditions that made them possible. But this
meant accepting much too uncritically what matters of fact were. (p. 231,
emphasis in original)
Latour (2004a), like Barad, reminds us here that critique need not only
be about the taking apart of constructs, constraints, and consequences of
particular matters of fact or matters of fiction. As these are always already
the product of entanglements which are enacted, there is always the possi-
bility of the very things that matter to us from being enacted in such a
4 MIRRORS, PRISMS, AND DIFFRACTION GRATINGS … 161
way that the very entanglement is re(con)figured to be a product of hege-
mony. If the very things we care for are constructed, it means that we are
to operate with care in how we (re)enact them.
Critique as diffraction, or diffractive critique, is then a process of
producing, and being responsive and accountable to non-negligible
patterns of difference that come to matter when two (or more) entan-
gled material-discursive phenomena are diffracted through one another.
This requires however that “we learn to tune our analytical instruments
(that is our diffractive instruments) in a way that is sufficiently attentive to
the details of the phenomenon we want to understand” (p. 73) and to pay
attention to the fine details that would otherwise be considered negligible
with/in conventional scientific and social scientific research methods.
Let us return to the question of “what counts” as science within the
context of cross-cultural science education and the dominant assumption
of scientific knowledge’s “cultural quasi-neutrality” (from Chapter 3).
Recall that like Foucault’s prismatic critique, Barad’s diffraction ques-
tions the a priori status of epistemology (e.g., concepts, constructs, and
categories). However, the dispersal, deferral, and displacement of culture
through discourse is further troubled by questioning the a priori status
of ontology (e.g., space, time, matter). This entails that the ontological
units onto which critical arguments are mapped are not passive (e.g., time,
causality) but rather are enacted, as are the cuts by which these units come
to be. Furthermore, in considering ontology as dynamic, Barad (2010)
invites a reconsideration of its dualistic or dichotomized relation to episte-
mology; “one is too few, two is too many” (p. 251). Accordingly, culture
is not only “internally” co-substantiated through superposition, but its
“exteriority” (i.e., nature) is active and agentic with/in this entanglement:
everything is within culture; everything is within nature (see also Latour,
1993; Kirby, 2011).
So, what does this mean for science and science education if the domi-
nant belief that nature produces the “quasi-neutral” cultural mediations
that are scientific knowledge? The lines of questioning shift from asking
whether WMS is or is not a (sub-)culture and cultural production (i.e.,
matters of fact and matters of fiction), as well as how cultural meanings
are inflected and dispersed through one another to produce a normative
web. If everything is within culture and nature in their totality, and the
two are co-substantiated rather than dualistic or monistic, then everything
comes to bear in the production of Western modern scientific knowledge.
To what degree do the multiple natural-cultural agents participate in the
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production of phenomena under observation? What ways-of-knowing,
ways-of-being, or perhaps more appropriately, ways-of-knowing-in-being
are enacted through such entanglements?
If we consider the ways in which the part is within the whole (see
Barad, 2007; Cajete, 1994, 2000; Peat, 2002), when scientific knowl-
edge derived from WMS is brought into the science classroom, what
is produced through such diffraction? What comes to matter (and to
what degree)? How do the ways-of-knowing-in-being enacted within the
laboratory by scientists, technological apparatus, and by agentic matter
intra-act within pedagogical entanglements with students (and other
natural-cultural agents within schools) when they too are considered as
a part within the whole? What occurs when other ways-of-knowing-in-
being are diffracted through these normative entanglements? If entan-
glement does not equate equality, sameness, or uniformity, what are the
patterns of difference that occur with/in? What types of negotiations,
navigations, and hybrids are (im)possible?
Also, if we consider WMS to always be an enactment of knowing
with nature rather than about nature (i.e., matter comes to matter
within experimental conditions), what is entangled within the production
that frames it to be knowing about ? Furthermore, if knowing is always
already knowing with nature if everything is always within nature, how
might we engage in the multiple possible possibilities of knowing with
nature without slipping into relativism? What are some of the systems
and approaches that shape WMS and its relation with/in nature? What
are other systematic and sustained engagements of learning with nature
and what can be learned from/with these enactments? What can be
learned from practices of a-count-ability already frame them as ways of
learning with and from nature (rather than about; e.g., quantum physics,
IWLN)? Lastly, if different ways-of-knowing-with-nature produce differ-
ently entangled possible possibilities, what might be desirable goals for
science education?
Conclusion: Re(Con)Figuring
Critique in Science Education
What would critique do if it could be associated with more, not with less,
with multiplication, not subtraction? (Latour, 2004a, p. 237, emphasis in
original)
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For scholars critical engaging at the intersections of science and society
(e.g., science education), critical resistance to scientific normalization
through modes of exposing that “there is no such thing as natural,
unmediated, unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of
language, that we always speak from a particular standpoint” (Latour,
2004a, p. 227) have, in the past, efficiently worked against problematic
“ideological arguments posturing as matters of fact” (p. 227). However,
these modes of critique have become the very tools working against
critics.34 In other words, the very tools of dismantling a normative centre
have been absorbed by the centre and have been redeployed against
the margins: the argument that the dominant position is but a situated
and partial position is, through metaphoric subtraction, being applied to
those who critique the norms of science. As the critical gaze is never a
passive operationalization of visual metaphors (Haraway, 2001), to posit
a geometric arrangement is to also put forth the very terms through which
your argument can be reversed, deflected, and diverted (see also Barad,
2007).
As an emerging de/colonizing science education scholar and prac-
titioner, my primary focus is on Indigenous science to-come: critically
engaging with (re)opening the structures and strategies of science educa-
tion so that Indigenous science might be other than excluded, differing,
and deferred. My critical engagements with/in pedagogical practices had
me slowly becoming worried about critical possibilities and the possi-
bilities of critique (see McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005); particularly if
decolonization would always be de/colonizing (i.e., always shaped in
response to and slipping back into colonialism; see Carter, 2004, 2010;
Higgins, 2014). Critiques through an optical geometry of matters of fact
and matters of fiction, could not fully contain the ways in which one would
flow into the other. When considered in tandem with an invitation to not
treat one’s negative objects of critique as one-dimensional and through
a (never fully achievable) process of negation, I began asking if the issue
at hand was not critique, but rather norms around critique which would
make it appear as if there is (only) a way of being critical.
Summing it up, three optical technologies which metaphorically
inform, shape, and (re)produce ways of being critical were explored in
this chapter: namely the mirror, the prism, and the diffraction grating.
While all three modes hold differential potential and promise, and the
intent herein is not to prescribe one critical metaphor at the expense of
another, Latour (2004a) invites us to consider the ways in which the
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mirror metaphor may simply have “run out of steam”. While there are
moments in which politically posturing as mirroring the truth is produc-
tive and of deep importance, it is nonetheless important to consider and
confound what the metaphor makes operational.35 By placing its objects
of critique in either a fact or fiction position, the mirroring critique and
critic becomes blind to the ways in which the matters of fact are fictional
as well as how matters of fiction are factual. The critique itself then is not
only easily taken apart by others who may not share the same point of
view, but it is also always already self-rupturing through its persistent yet
productive failure of containment.
The prism, informed by Foucault’s theorizing of critique, is not about
displacing sameness elsewhere through mirroring. Rather it is an invita-
tion to consider the ways in which the subjects and objects of critique are
dispersed through one another and, in turn, produce one another, albeit
differently. Within cross-cultural science education, this was explored
around questions surrounding claims of “cultural quasi-neutrality” which
shape dominant approach not as something that is or is not (i.e., achieving
epistemic a priori) but rather something that is (re)produced through a
complex multi-linear geometry of dispersed meanings which sustain it. It
becomes an invitation to think about how “cultural quasi-neutrality” is
dispersed through norms which sustain it (e.g., objectivity), how these
norms are in turn sustained (e.g., cultural quasi-neutrality and politics are
different arenas), and how such a norm flows through prismatic spaces
which might come to produce it differently (e.g., science as always already
being cultural).
The diffraction grating, while sharing similarities with the prism in terms
of its disruption of epistemic pre-giveness, also includes a troubling of
ontological pre-giveness within the scope of what is produced by critique.
Informed by Barad’s quantum ontology and exploration of the undoing
of classical optics, diffraction as critique is radical in its invitation to
not only consider how the subjects and objects of critique are produced
through their being in relation but that the very terms of a-count-ability
are enacted through the critique. Neither are they one (i.e., monism) or
two (i.e., dualism) prior the critique, but their entanglement of meaning
and matter is qualified and enacted through the critique rather than before
or after. In cross-cultural science education, this brings an important
lens to consider the ways in which culture and nature, epistemology and
ontology are co-substantiated without ever achieving one-ness or dualism.
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As science and science education practices are always already at the inter-
face between nature and culture, the inclusion of nature within the flux
makes it of greater consequence for and to critics who would dismay
cultural critiques of science and science education as not being able to
account for or be accountable to nature (e.g., Matthews, 1994). Further-
more, if the ways in which we know about nature are always knowing
with nature and are always ways-of-knowing-in-being: what are the entan-
gled epistemologies and ontologies enacted through such knowing? What
network of human and other-than-human agents are co-substantiated
within the production of such knowledge? If WMS considers itself as “cul-
turally quasi-neutral” and a human endeavour, what can be learned from
ways-of-knowing nature that actively consider the ways which they are
produced with/in culture and with/in nature?
For critique to “be associated with more, not with less, with multipli-
cation, not subtraction” (Latour, 2004a), there is an invitation to rethink
critique as the “addition” of statements of lack as a mode of engage-
ment as nothing new is added, never augmented. Latour (2004a), by
cheekily referring to this behaviour as sub-critical,36 asks us to not take
one idea and return less-than-one but rather bring it into conversa-
tion with more ideas that sustain it, and differentially shape it through
and with a new network of ideas. This might allow for the multi-
cultural science education debate to move beyond “what counts” as
science (and in turn science education) towards understanding how “what
counts” is produced and producible in order to (re)open the structure
of science education towards Indigenous science to-come. This might
include (re)considering the debate as operating through an adversary
paradigm (see Chapter 3), the role of (an) ontology within the construc-
tion of “what counts” (see Chapters 5 and 6), or even the complex
and complicated relationship between Indigenous and Western ways-of-
knowing-in-being (see Chapter 7). If the goal is to augment through
(re)placing our objects of critique with/in a complex and complicated
web of knowings and beings rather than foreclose them as matters of fact
or matters of fiction, then the use of multiple optical metaphors to achieve
this purpose brings resources, not liabilities towards unsettling science
education and (re)opening it towards Indigenous science to-come.
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Notes
1. An earlier and much shorter version of this chapter appears in the journal
Cultural Studies of Science Education, volume 13, issue 1 (pp. 185–203),
and is reprinted here with permission.
2. While not taken up in this chapter as such, the optical metaphors can
also be thought of as analogies and articulations of the metaphysics they
respectively articulate: humanism, anti-humanism, and post-humanism
(see Kirby, 2011). As such, this chapter employs its own thinking as
a meta-move to present entire metaphysics through their (prismatic or
diffractive) articulation: the whole is in the part and the part is in the
whole. Furthermore, given the adversarial nature of the multicultural
science education debate (and this chapter’s critique of critique as nega-
tion), presenting optical metaphors as possibilities is meant to act as an
invitation rather than present entire metaphysics and traditions through
lack and deficit.
3. The expression of a “thumbnail account” is a euphemism that Apffel-
Marglin (2011; see also Chapter 6) often uses that is not so dissimilar
from Spivak’s (1976) treatment of “in a nutshell” (i.e., attempting to
contain the uncontainable in the name of brevity). Here, the “thumbnail”
signals that the content and issues discussed are so complex, contradic-
tory, and convoluted that perhaps from our partial vantage points that we
may never see more than a “thumbnail”. Accordingly, to give anything
larger than a “thumbnail” is not only impractical, but also impossible as
we are always giving an account rather than the account (see also Butler,
2005). Furthermore, it is also move towards academic modesty: giving a
“thumbnail account” often requires bringing together multiple in perspec-
tives which we can never come to know fully but without which we could
not piece together an account. It is a recognition of those who precede
us in making an account.
4. The mantra of beginning some-where and some-time is not only a
persistent reminder that we are always already within the question of
Indigeneity within science education, but also an invitation to address
it as such. Similarly, we must address it some-way and that elsewheres and
elsewhens that come to bear on the very question are rife points of exam-
ination (here, in relation to criticality, we can trace back taken-for-granted
understandings and enactments to 15th or 16th century Europe).
Further, as Kuokkanen (2007) invites us to consider, in revisiting the
question of “debating” the inclusion of Indigenous science from the
previous chapter:
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What is required is openness to and responsibility toward the
“other”, and this in turn requires a certain level of comprehension
of indigenous epistemes. As importantly, it requires that individ-
uals and institutions commit themselves to a critical debate about
“cross-cultural” education, and that this education involves more
than just integrating new material into the curriculum. The academy
needs to recognize that the logic of the gift calls for changes
to the ways knowledge is perceived and approached; moreover,
well-intentioned individuals will need to be well equipped to deal
with the complexities that emerge when different epistemes meet.
(p. 108)
This is not to say that we should be debating whether or not Indige-
nous science is included, as is the central case of the multicultural science
education debate. Rather than a call for less critical debates, it is an
invitation to engage critically otherwise: moving from debates of inclu-
sion/exclusion towards more nuanced conversations about how we might
go about meaningfully including Indigenous science can be and should
be. However, to work beyond “integrating new material into the curricu-
lum” (p. 108) as critical engagement requires that we commit to critically
examining and “debating” the very terms that constitute the contempo-
rary conversation: the very notions of “cross-cultural education,” debate,
and every other relevant concept and practice that we inherit which shapes
our (in)ability to engage in the question of Indigenous knowledges within
science education.
5. For Foucault (1977), power is not located within subjects or objects but
is rather the relation between them through which power circulates.
6. See Chapter 2 for a lengthier, generative exploration of this problematic
rupture.
7. In Practice Makes Practice, Britzman (2003) cautions that:
… every curriculum, as a form of discourse, intones particular orien-
tations, values and interests, and constructs visions of authority,
power, and knowledge. The selected knowledge of any curriculum
represents not only things to know, but a view of knowledge that
implicitly defines the knower’s capacities as it legitimates the persons
who deem that knowledge important. This capacity to privilege
particular accounts over others is based upon relations of power.
Consequently, every curriculum authorizes relations of power…
(p. 39)
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To take Britzman seriously is to consider a curriculum that does not
indoctrinate an impossibility as they are always within and in turn
(re)produce particular relations of power. Within the context of decol-
onizing science education, this complex and contradictory space could
be read as de/colonizing (Higgins, 2014). This, however, does not
mean that every curriculum indoctrinates equally. Accordingly, like Lather
(2007) and Spivak (1993/2009), I am interested in what possibilities
become possible when we strive for the impossible (even when the very
things we use and which use us are problematic). I recognize that this, in
part, entails learning to differentially inhabit “the lines of making sense”
which shape what is possible within “the arrangement of those lines”
(Spivak, 1993/2009, p. 34).
8. For example, Foucault (1997) might not self-attribute to his work the
prism as an optical apparatus which informs his critique. Rather, this is an
insight that is offered by Deleuze (1988).
9. It is not that reflection and the mirrored apparatus it metaphorically
employs is wrong in and of itself, but as Barad (2008) posits “the
allure of representationalism may make it difficult to imagine alterna-
tives” (p. 148). Mirroring has become so normalized that reflection
has become taken-for-granted, sedimented into how we come to know
scientific phenomena.
10. Chapter 3’s dialogue in which both the cross-cultural and universalist
characters were engaged in reversing the optical configuration through
dialectic is exemplary of this (e.g., both work diligently to present the
other’s truth as a falsity).
11. As Spivak (1993/2009) suggests, the very act of using and troubling the
very tools with which one labours against structures of dominance (e.g.,
critique) is of particular significance:
One of Derrida’s most scandalous contributions is to begin with
what is very familiar in many radical positions and to take it with
the utmost seriousness, with literal seriousness, so that it questions
the position (de)constructively as the wholly intimate other. One is
left with the useful yet semimournful position of the unavoidable
usefulness of something that is dangerous. (p. 5)
As the tools with which resistance to dominance is laboured are at
once inadequate yet necessary, to engage in deconstruction is to allow
for the possibility of their reconstitution as something which does not
(re)produce (or to a lesser extent) the very systems against which they
are working. This is particularly relevant here as decolonizing tools are
currently and constantly being appropriated and (re)purposed as means
and ends for (neo-)colonialism (Smith, 2005).
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12. Furthermore, as the signifier and signified never achieve unity (Derrida,
1976), all reading is amiss and a miss. I use (mis)reading here to signal
the type of reading which intentionally utilizes the play of (re)signification
as a means to leverage the space between oft-intended and more-common
signified understandings and those which continue to occupy the structure
of the text but hold a radical deconstructive potentiality (e.g., unintended
meanings).
13. With respect to vision, Battiste, Bell, Findlay, Findlay, and Henderson
(2005) state, a “Eurocentric curriculum is hidden in plain view” with/in a
spectrum of educational institutions as they are often “founded on a vision
and visualization of education and culture that look to Europe as the
center of all knowledge and civilization” (p. 8). As vision is the primary
and centered sensory medium through which not only WMS operates but
also Western modern society in general (see Peat, 2002; Pink, 2006), it
often smuggles in naturalized and normalized dominant theory-practices;
it becomes a critical location to work within and against.
In turn, the importance of shifting the gaze from vision (i.e.,
sight, goals) to visualization (i.e., ways-of-seeing) cannot be understated,
because of the ways in which who and what is seen, as well as how and
where sight is regulated, both literally and metaphorically reinforce domi-
nant ways-of-knowing-in-being while diminishing and denying the validity
of others. For example, vision is often use as a tool of Western modernity
to define itself against its otherness in an oppositional manner:
It was believed that for civilized Europeans the “higher” senses of
sight and hearing were most important, in contrast associating the
“lower” senses of taste, touch, and smell with animality… [as well
as] “primitive” peoples [who] would show a predilection for the
“lower” or “animal.” (Pink, 2006, p. 5)
However, given “the plurality, hybridity, and ambiguity of visual prac-
tices,” attending to vision (either literal or metaphorical) provides a
significant critical and complicit location “for unpacking old and new
colonialisms” (Battiste et al., 2005, p. 9).
14. Within science education (Aikenhead, 2006a; Barad, 2000; Erickson,
2000), as well as within science (Barad, 2007, 2010; Latour, 1993,
2004b), the two predominant frames through which scientific phenomena
are explained, explainable, and taught are those of naturalization and
socialization. In other words, science education is explained through
frames in which nature and culture are the predominant and respec-
tive (but not exclusive) factors through which knowledge comes to be
known (see Aikenhead, 2006a; Barad, 2000, 2007; Erickson, 2000). As
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Barad (2007) explains, both naturalization and socialization are almost
always premised within a nature/culture binary in which the constitutive
other is treated as a passive surface upon which the dominant term is
(re)presented (i.e., claims about Nature as complex are framed against a
passive Culture; claims about Culture are framed against a passive Nature;
see also Apffel-Marglin, 2011).
With respect to deconstruction’s position (see Derrida, 1976) within
the space of science, Barad (2011) mentions,
Invoking Derrida—the ‘poster boy’ for social constructivism gone
wild (a misguided attribution if ever there was one, but so it is), the
one theorist nearly everyone but deconstructionists and poststruc-
turalists loves to use as a foil for their own supposed reasonableness,
the science warriors’ darling stand-in for all that is wrong with
the humanities—undercuts any pretense of a convincing straight
performance. (p. 448)
In other words, because deconstruction subverts often taken-for-granted
assumptions about mediated access to an external natural or cultural
reality (and, more recently subverts the binary distinction between the
two; see Barad, 2010, 2012b; Kirby, 2011) by subverting their stability,
it is often unwelcome within science or science education (Barad, 2000,
2011).
15. The parentheses here signals that deconstruction does not deny cultural
or natural reality but rather denies it stability by presenting it as vacillating
between being and not being within a classical epistemology and ontology
(see Barad, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Derrida, 1976).
16. Within Chapter 3, I address in greater length the notion that taking
an oppositional stance, what Moulton (1983) refers to as the Adversary
Method, is not only an ineffective mode of getting those who would
disagree with you to agree, but also acts as a dialectical move that fore-
closes the possibility of dialogue (Bohm, 1996; Kirby, 2011), whether
literal or metaphorical.
17. Latour (2004a) uses fact (fait) and fairy (fée) because of their similar
etymological roots. In short, both fait(fact) and fée(fairy) share a rela-
tionship to truth. Where they differ in meaning is in the type of truth
that they signal: fact signals a relation to observable, and verifiable truths
about the natural/physical world while fairy signals truths that are super-
natural, metaphysical, and often associated with fate. For WMS, given
its complex relation to the supernatural, metaphysics, and fate (e.g., the
supernatural as nature’s abject other; religion, the domain of fate, as the
abject other of science; see Chapter 6) as well as to truth statements that
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are unverifiable through empiricism, a fairy might as well be a fiction
(i.e., a non-fact ).Furthermore, as explored in the next Chapters (5 and
6), to decry the metaphysical as fairy in science and science education
effectively masks the ways in which both are always already metaphys-
ical (i.e., through Cartesianism; see Barad, 2000, 2007). In turn, this
obscures the workings of power that occur through the enactment of this
taken-for-granted and naturalized metaphysics (see Apffel-Marglin, 2011).
18. This is a feature that is often identified within science education: positively
by those who are proponents of science education “as usual” (e.g., Cobern
and Loving, 2001, 2008) and often negatively by those who endeavour
to open science education to cultural critiques (e.g., Aikenhead & Ogawa,
2007; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011).
19. For example, Le Grange and Aikenhead (2016) recently responded to
such a claim that decolonizing scholarship operates from a “politics of
resentment”. Rather, they remind that they do not refuse, refute, nor
resent Western knowledge traditions: “Western knowledge should become
one way of knowing and not the way of knowing” (p. 4, emphasis in
original). In turn, decolonizing is not a “politics of resentment” but rather
a “pursuing of cognitive justice” (p. 6).
20. The following is a thumbnail history of the “modest witness”. In Western
Europe in the seventeenth century, the state required a new form of
governance that was not religiously partisan as the result of many years
of religious wars. Turning from the church to science to keep the peace,
those working within the laboratory as third party observers – the practice
of the day for experimental verification – were required to abstain from
pronouncing or enacting religious affiliation when engaging in the act
of observation. They were to witness the experiment “modestly”. Worth
considering here is that the modest witnesses were all white men of signif-
icant status, which may signal to beliefs about who was immodest “by
nature” and therefore unable to participate in the cultural practice of
science (see Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Haraway, 1997; Latour, 1993). For
a more in-depth treatment of the “modest witness,” see Chapter 6.
21. For example, in previous research projects, I have witnessed in others and
in myself an inability to simply move beyond problematic and pervasive
colonial norms despite knowing about them (see Higgins, 2014; Higgins
& Kim, 2019; Higgins, Madden, & Korteweg, 2015). When these norms
come to constitute the possible positions one can hold, they also come
to relationally bear onto the ways in which they are worked against and
subverted (see next section on prismatic critique). Futhermore, as Spivak
(1993/2009) reminds, “merely knowing an ideology does not dissipate
its effect” (p. 5).
22. As Smith (1999/2012) states, such an enactment of distance (via sepa-
ration and seperability) cannot be torn asunder from the “specific spatial
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vocabulary of colonialism which can be assembled around three concepts:
(1) the line, (2) the centre, and (3) the outside” (p. 55). Not only do
these three concepts that are almost always at play in (neo-)colonial logics
produce notions of hierarchy through proposing a center and a margin,
the drawing of the line between them signals an oppositional difference.
In science education, we often see these logics atplay when the case for
WMS’ centrality is (increasingly implicitly) made: it is heralded as the way
of knowing nature because it is framed as not being the orientations that
it is defined against, such as TEK and IWLN.This is further complicated
by the ways in which (neo-)colonial logics and the metaphysics of clôture
simultaneously work “to make the ends coincide with the means” (Spivak,
1976, p. xx), as explored within the first chapter. Stated otherwise, the
practice of distancing which precedes hierarchizing is often naturalized and
normalized as being one and the same as its resulting knowledge claim
of distance. Such coalesced claims inevitably suture over the relations and
processes irreducibly enfolded within them. The desire to make the ends
coincide with the means results in the production of cultural difference
without needing to account for or be accountable to the ways in which
this difference is produced (e.g., Western modern metaphysics) or what
this produces in turn (e.g., Eurocentrism).
23. Reflexivity is the often-cited solution for taking into account the process
through which critics set up their optical apparatus, taking into account
one’s own situationality (e.g., epistemology, ontology). However, it
largely continues to operate through the reflective metaphor of the mirror
(Barad, 2007; Haraway, 1997; Pillow, 2003). If we require an additional
mirror to account for another process of reflection, then what accounts for
the mirror used for accounting, another mirror? As Barad (2007) explains,
“reflexivity is nothing more than iterative mimesis: even in attempts to put
the investigative subject back into the picture, reflexivity does nothing
more than mirror mirroring. … Mirrors upon mirrors, reflexivity entails
the same old geometrical optics of reflections” (p. 88). For an example
of how this plays out in de/colonizing science and technology education,
see Higgins (2014).
24. As Spivak (1976) reminds us, every translation is always already unfaithful
(i.e., never achieving sameness) due to the precariousness of intertextu-
ality.
25. While the work of Michel Foucault is relatively common within educa-
tion, it is less so the case within science education (see Bazzul &
Carter, 2018). As Latour (1993) reminds, post-structural approaches
often deconstruct by illuminating the contingency and partiality of the
very grounds upon which both naturalizing and socializing approaches to
knowing are founded. Because these two approaches come to inform the
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two primary research programs within science education (i.e., cognitivism
and socio-constructivism; see Aikenhead, 2006b, Erickson, 2000), post-
structural approaches are often un-welcome(d) (see Barad, 2000, 2011)
and, accordingly, under-explored.
26. Spivak (1988) offers an important cautionary note on this subject. If for
Foucault, power circulates through all nodes, and that accordingly, resis-
tance to power can happen at any node, Spivak reminds us that power
however does not circulate evenly; while resistance can happen anywhere,
some locations are nonetheless more significant than others.
27. I take the time to unpack the concept of diffraction here as the impact of
Karen Barad’s work and interrelated web of concepts (e.g., intra-action)
is only recently coming to bear on educational theory and practice (e.g.,
Lenz Taguchi, 2010), and even more recently within science education
(e.g., Milne & Scantlebury, 2019).
28. Recall that “Derrida uses the word ‘metaphysics’ very simply as shorthand
for any science of presence”. (Spivak, 1976, p. xxi). Within the sciences,
the “master-question is the same as that of all Western metaphysics: ‘What
is the being of the entity?’” (Spivak, 1976, p. xxxiii, emphasis mine). This
is to say that classically within the sciences, there is, generally speaking,
a way-of-being to the scientific phenomena under observation.However,
with the two-slit experiment, being (and in turn, ontology) is no longer
a singular affair to be observed: “so much for the solid confidence, the
assured certainty, the bedrock consistency of science, at the brink of a
new century… classical metaphysics has misled us” (Barad, 2010, pp. 252,
256). As a result, we are left with unsettling questions or, perhaps more
productively, an invitation to consider the ways in which nature decon-
structs extending far beyond the ways in which “nature” deconstructs (i.e.,
the ways in which socio-scientific cultural meanings are always-already slip-
ping into self-transgressive moments of irruption) (see Kirby, 2011), as
well as what this might mean for science education (see Wallace, Higgins,
& Bazzul, 2018).
29. For Barad (2007), materialization is a complex, non-linear, and
dis/continuous phenomena through which space, time, matter, and
meaning are differentially enfolded. In other words, it is an ongoing
process through which everything comes to bear and comes to be, in
which the co-constituting parts do not come to act in an equal or even
manner.
30. Barad (2007) invites us here to differentially consider the relation between
the literal or metaphorical observer, the apparatus of observation, and the
observed phenomena, not by collapsing them into one, but by considering
them as co-producing and inseparable. Since apparatuses are themselves
phenomena, even metaphorical apparatus that are the tools of critique
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come to produce and be produced by the subject of critique (i.e., the
critic) and the object of critique.
31. While beyond the scope of this chapter and book, Barad (2007) proposes
that while the panopticon may be exemplary of observational technolo-
gies of the eighteenth century, ultrasound technology can be thought of
as a more contemporary example of an apparatus of observation that is
produced by and producing the phenomena it is meant to observe (i.e.,
gendering).
32. While not taken up within this chapter, Barad’s (2010) “new calculus
of response-ability” resonates with Kuokkanen’s (2007) conception of
response-ability in that both invite us to respond to a world which
is rendered invisible through commonplace ways-of-knowing-in-being.
Reading one through the other, for diffraction patterns, invites consider-
ation of the ways in which Western modern science’s inability to respond
to naturalistic phenomena that do not fit within classical metaphysics
might be entangled with the inability to take seriously Indigenous ways-
of-living-with-Nature above and beyond (neo-)colonial socio-cultural
dynamics.
33. Similarly (but not identically), Bohm (1994) also resists the mirror
metaphor of sameness and its constitutive other of pure difference by
speaking to similar differences and different similarities. These similar
differences and different similarities are concepts used to talk about the
relations that are always already constitutive of an undivided whole(ness),
as well as the impossibility of achieving the total separation required for
pure sameness or difference to be achieved.
34. For me, attempts in identifying science as socially constructed through
Eurocentric norms have resulted in having the same logic returned my
way: through pointing out that my position too was constructed (in a
society in which construction equals fabrication). In other words, oppo-
nents would receive my jabs at universalism and return them to slide
debate into relativism, reversing the binary bring the possibility of critique
to a standstill (see Latour, 1993, 2004a; Haraway, 2001). Chapter 3 is an
example of how these logics permeate the multicultural science education
debate, unproductively.
35. Spivak (1993/2009) refers to this practice as “strategic essentialism”:
a critical inhabitation of truth-telling and representation through essen-
tialism that works relentlessly to undo its own essentializing. See
Chapter 6 for further discussion and use thereof.
36. Thinking with Alan Turing, Latour (2004a) defines a sub-critical engage-
ment as one in critique is done through substraction: “an idea presented
to such a [sub-critical] mind will on average give rise to less than one idea
in reply” (Turing in Latour, 2004a, p. 248). Latour (2004a), like Turing,
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asks if critique can be super-critical, in that critique would take one idea
and produces more than one rather than less than one.
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with/in theMulticultural Science Education
Debate
CHAPTER 5
Tinkering with/in theMulticultural Science
Education Debate: Towards Positing
An(Other) Ontology
The purpose of this chapter1 is to continue working within and against
the stratified and sedimented spaces of the multicultural science educa-
tion debate by sustaining the deconstructive play of (re)signification of
science education, labouring between what it is, is not, and could be(come).
This extends upon the previous chapters’ work of (re)opening this debate
by engaging in the play of (re)signification between the two predomi-
nant positions (i.e., cross-culturalist and universalist) as well as the modes
through which the debate operates (e.g., dialectic, debate, critique as
mirroring). Putting to work the alternative optical metaphors of the
previous chapter (i.e., prism and diffraction grating), I consider how these
common occurrences which present themselves with/in the multicul-
tural science education debate are co-constituted by the uncommon and
usually absent (see Derrida, 1976). This, in turn, allows for an exploration
of the absent yet present2 co-constitutive elements of the multicultural
science education debate that produces the ways in which Indigenous
science is to-come, deferring and differing its arrival.
Particularly, this chapter engages the ontological homework of
response-ability: addressing the ways in which ontology, as absent pres-
ence, is always already (re)shaping science education. As signalled in
Chapter 3, Cobern and Loving (2008) remind that attention to ontology
is uncommon within the multicultural science education debate. Where
Cobern and Loving (2008) conclude that knowing nature through WMS
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is universal and “common sense”, I latch onto the binary co-constitution
of common and uncommon, and moments in which they vacillate, as a
lever to (re)open spaces of science education to other meanings (e.g.,
Indigenous science to-come). Drawing from an ethic of deconstructive
tinkering (Derrida, 1976) by using concepts, categories, and constructs
that are uncommon to the context of science education to explore
that which is common,3 I tinker with/in Cobern and Loving’s (2008)
criteria of ontological alignment to unsettle and (re)situate their claim
of “common sense” towards (re)opening the logics of the multicultural
science education debate.
As tinkering is central to this arc, (i.e., Chapters 5 and 6), I begin this
chapter by quickly touching on what it means to engage with this process
before moving to the task of tinkering with/in the multicultural science
education debate.
A Preamble on Tinkering: Derrida on the Porous
Dichotomy Between Bricolage and Engineering
To frame the process of tinkering within this section, I turn to Derrida’s
(1976) (mis)reading of Lévi-Strauss’ La pensée sauvage in which he both
separates and blurs the distinctiveness between engineering and bricolage.
In short, both engineering and bricolage are processes of and for gener-
ating knowledge claims. Engineering is the movement from the ends to
the means, whereby the engineer makes appropriate selections from “the
discourses of formal logic, and the pure sciences” (Spivak, 1976, p. xix),
picking concepts, categories, and constructs already purposed for their
process. In contrast, “the bricoleur makes do with things that were meant
perhaps for other ends” (Spivak, 1976, p. xix). Through tinkering, brico-
lage reverses the ends/means hierarchy by privileging the means over
the ends or the process over the product, even if this entails the very
possibility of not achieving the specified goals.4 Significantly, as Derrida
(1976) argues, the ends (i.e., knowledge, truth) and the means of knowl-
edge production (i.e., methodology) never come to coincide. The goal
of (fully) achieving knowledge is not only empirically impossible, as Lévi-
Strauss posited, but also theoretically so. Thus, for Derrida (1976), “the
engineer should always be a sort of bricoleur” (p. 139) while coming to
recognize the very limitation of bricolage:
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The only weakness of bricolage – but, seen as a weakness is it not irre-
mediable? – is a total inability to justify itself in its own discourse. The
already-there-ness of instruments and of concepts cannot be undone or
re-invented. (pp. 138–139)
Just as the goals of engineering never come to be, Derrida cautions
against treating the bricoleur’s tools as if they themselves always were
(i.e., having reached the classical ontological status of Being). Instead, he
invites consideration of the tools themselves as the productive enactments
of bricolages past and to-come (see also Barad, 2010). There is always a
need for “simultaneously troubling and using the concepts [and concep-
tual lines] we think we cannot think without…, keeping [them] as both
limit and resource” (Lather, 2007, pp. 167–168). Furthermore, because
engineering/bricolage is always already a porous binary, this invites a crit-
ical consideration of bricolage vis-à-vis its ends, or what it produces: “all
bricolages are not equally worthwhile. Bricolage criticizes itself” (Derrida,
1976, p. 139).
Having and Being Had by “Common Sense”
During a Science Education Project in Nunavut
Because we must “begin” some-where and some-time, let’s “begin” (once
again)5 in Iqualuit, Nunavut in July of 2009.6 During the delivery of
a curriculum in the Canadian arctic in which Indigenous (i.e., Inuit)
and non-Indigenous youth explored differential cultural constructions of
science through videography (see Higgins, 2011, 2014), I took up the
call to examine and challenge the ways in which Eurocentrism “insidi-
ously … maintain[s] the status quo” (Sammel, 2009, p. 651; see also
Belczewski, 2009; McKinley, 2001, 2007) through involving youth in
revealing, (re)structuring, and (re)directing the multiple ways in which
dominance is maintained. I worked towards disrupting the concepts and
categories that tend to create, and are utilized to uphold, inequality
within science education, as well as the systems under which these
inequalities become possible. Through this project, the youth involved
learned and enhanced their movie-making skills and practices in order to
explore, define, and document the diverse ways-of-knowing-Nature (i.e.,
science) that were enacted in their community of Iqaluit, Nunavut. This
participant-directed videography work took various shapes: documentary-
style interviews with community members within science and technology
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fields, as well as their own short movies which were a form of digital story-
telling. Given that such an examination must also include the many bodies
that occupy and uphold these systems within science education, I decided
to engage simultaneously with the oft-cited “solution” of self-reflexivity
through video diaries to analyse my/self as decolonizing pedagogue.
Guiding this examination were questions into the ways in which I was
participating in, (re)producing, and (re)produced by the culture of power.
This was useful in creating partial and side-long glances rather than
penetrating gazes, producing complex and contradictory accounts of self.
I was able to reveal/learn from some of the ways in which I was produced
by and producing the culture of power within science education, and
inadvertently pivoting rather than “transforming” my pedagogies and
self as pedagogue. Nonetheless, through revisiting this data, it became
apparent that I was reifying Eurocentrism through the very process
of working against it. But then, as Battiste (2005) states, we cannot
treat Eurocentrism as a mere individually held prejudice that we can
easily cast aside with enough knowledge as its pervasiveness renders
it common sensical. As briefly mentioned in previous chapters, within
this major research endeavour the decolonizing curriculum (e.g., border
crossing) and “teacher-as-researcher” identities (e.g., culture broker)
available worked both within and against a problematic centre. As such,
curriculum, pedagogy, and pedagogue were exceeded in pedagogical prac-
tice by the very coloniality the approach worked against, thus becoming
de/colonizing (Higgins, 2014; see also Carter, 2004, 2010). One could
say that the common pervaded the uncommon; I held but was also being
held by “common sense”.
As stated earlier, the very concepts we hold are always already exceeded
by lived experience; lived experience provides deconstructive openings
to think and act otherwise (Bohm, 1996; Wildcat, 2005). More than
a niggling doubt about the porosity of that which earlier seemed solid,
this double(d) pattern of holding and being held by “common sense”
would become a location in which I would come to tinker. On being
held by “common sense,” Battiste (2005) reminds that Eurocentrism
is a “consciousness in which all of us have been marinated” (p. 124,
emphasis mine). This similarity is pronounced by difference in intensity,
degree, and duration such that it comes to produce us as de/colonizing
subjects differently. If how we think is part of the problem, as Lather
(2007) quizzically questions us, how do we, and can we, think about how
we think without using the thing with which we think? It is a project
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framed by at once by necessity and im/possibility: an impossibility that
when creatively strived towards reconfigures what critical possibilities are
possible (see Barad, 2007, 2010; Spivak, 1993/2009).
In attempting to think about how I think, one of the most significant
observations that I made through this analysis was that the continued
appearance of Cartesianism as a common thread. At the time, I under-
stood Cartesianism as “both the belief that various meanings and mate-
rialities are discrete quantities (e.g., mind/body) as well as the process
through which they are separated from that which co-constitutes them”
(Higgins, 2014, p. 164, emphasis added). Like others (e.g., Pillow,
2003), I saw Cartesianism as a belief relegated to the realm of episte-
mology (i.e., knowledge about ontology, rather than or in addition to an
enactment of ontology).
However, these qualities come to describe ways-of -being (i.e.,
ontology) instead of, or in addition to, ways-of -knowing (i.e., episte-
mology). Thus, what might it mean to take insights from the previous
chapter (e.g., epistemology and ontology as co-constitutive and not
pre-existing practice) and come to see Cartesianism not (only) as an epis-
temological facet of science education but (also) as one that is ontological?
While questions of epistemology often take primacy due to uneven
inter-cultural interfaces (i.e., dialectic rather than dialogue), it is often
productive to tinker with/in windy, indirect, and side-long approaches
when the most direct path seems over-travelled without yielding the
desired outcomes. Responding to Lather’s (2007) question, it might be
one approach to thinking without using the very thing with which you
think (when the thing with which you think is part of the problem),
recognizing that such is never (fully) achieved. Thus, what might it mean
to (re)consider the multicultural science education debate with ontology
in mind?
Tinkering with/in “Common Sense,” Ontology
and the Multicultural Science Education Debate
Science and justice, matter and meaning are not separate elements that
intersect now and again. They are inextricably fused together, and no event,
no matter how energetic, can tear them asunder. (Barad, 2010, p. 242)
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If we take seriously that “science and justice… are inextricably fused
together” (Barad, 2010, p. 242), the ferocity with which the multicul-
tural science education debate rattles taken-for-granted assumptions can
be, to some, surprising (see van Eijck & Roth, 2007). At the epicentre
of this debate are questions of “what counts” as science within school-
based curriculum. Largely at stake is the inclusion or exclusion of TEK
and IWLN alongside WMS, as well as the norms through which they
are included, excluded, and juxtaposed. This unresolved and unresolv-
able debate often presents science educators with diverse and difficult
queries regarding what it means to respect students and the diverse ways-
of-knowing-nature that they bring with them: can science (i.e., knowing
nature) and justice (i.e., respecting diverse cultural knowledges) co-exist
within the science education classroom?
Between science educators who champion the inclusion of TEK and
IWLN as equally valid7 ways of knowing nature (i.e., cross-culturalists;
for example, Snively & Corsiglia, 2001; Stanley & Brickhouse, 2001)
and those who do not consider these ways-of-knowing-nature as equally
valid to the “universal” standard of WMS (i.e., universalists; for example,
Cobern & Loving, 2001; Siegel, 2001), this aforementioned question
(and false dichotomy; see Chapters 3 and 4) continues to produce fric-
tion that is not always generative. As there continues to be an ongoing
and ever-present need to respond to the conflicting and potentially
incommensurable demands between epistemological validity and ethical
responsiveness in science education, there have been multiple attempts to
resolve the debate (see Chapter 3), by working towards producing modest
intermediary positions that attempt to develop and enhance potential
points of agreement between positions (Alsop & Fawcett, 2010; Cobern
& Loving, 2008; van Eijck & Roth, 2007). An example of such a point
of agreement is that while universalists and cross-culturalists generally do
not agree whether or not science education is or is not a frequent site
of scientism, indoctrination, or imposition, they both agree that it should
not be. In the last few years, attempts to labour from shared assumptions
towards intermediary positions have included: (a) positing an ethics of
incommensurability or co-existence (e.g. El-Hani & de Ferreira Bandeira,
2008; El-Hani & Mortimer, 2007; van Eijck & Roth, 2007), (b) consid-
ering diverse and competing scientific knowledges as (re-)contextualized
processes rather than inert knowledges (van Eijck & Roth, 2007), and
(c) pedagogically enacting an ethics framed by the vulnerability of not
knowing (Alsop & Fawcett, 2010).
5 TINKERING WITH/IN THE MULTICULTURAL SCIENCE EDUCATION … 189
However, in this section, I take up the possible pathway put forth by
Cobern and Loving (2008). In short, Cobern and Loving (2008) posit
that most proposed and partial responses to the multicultural science
education debate largely centre upon questions of epistemology. Given
the predominantly socio-cultural characteristics of the debate, this is not
without cause. However, Cobern and Loving come at the debate side-
ways by tinkering with that which remains uncommon to questions of
and in science education: ontology. In response to epistemic primacy, to
explore how scientific knowledges might have “characteristics of verisimil-
itude, vis-à-vis the real world” (p. 440), Cobern and Loving suggest
that the “real world” too must be seriously considered in the equation.
Thus, instead, or in addition to strictly epistemological undertakings,
Cobern and Loving (2008) propose that this debate be addressed through
a (re)consideration of how the subject of scientific knowledge aligns
with its object, or how epistemology (i.e., Culture) aligns with ontology
(i.e., Nature). Through an exploration of ontological situatedness, and
within the context of the multicultural science debate, the conclusion that
Cobern and Loving (2008) reach is that “epistemological realism [i.e.,
epistemology of WMS] is literally the common ground—the common
sense—we all share” (p. 443).
Drawing from insights from the previous chapters, the purpose of this
chapter is not to deny the claim made by Cobern and Loving (2008)
that “Epistemological Realism Really is Common Sense” (p. 425) by
presenting it through a metaphorical mirror as either fact or fairy (see
Latour, 2004a). Rather, it is to tinker with this uncommon approach to
justify common sense; there are productive insights to be gained through
using and troubling the notion that they put forth. In particular, drawing
from the Chapter 4’s optical metaphors, what would it mean to treat the
statement as more than true or a false reflection of reality? What insights
could be gained by (re)situating a “mirroring” statement (i.e., “character-
istics of verisimilitude, vis-à-vis the real world” [Cobern & Loving, 2008,
p. 440]) by thinking prismatically and diffractively with and about it? In
particular, what would it mean to focus on how epistemological realism
as “common sense” inflects and is inflected, how it is produced and what
it produces? If epistemological realism is “common sense”, to whom is it
common (e.g., is the “we” in the “common sense – we all share” [Cobern
& Loving, 2008, p. 440] in fact all of us or but a particular group)? For
epistemic realism to be “common sense”, what epistemological and onto-
logical criteria need to be in place? How did this “common sense” come
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to be (made) common (i.e., through dialectic rather than dialogue)?8
What does this “common sense” produce? Is “common sense” something
we have, are had by, or a combination of both? Lastly, as “science and
justice, matter and meaning are not separate elements that intersect now
and again” (Barad, 2010, p. 242),9 what does it mean to consider ethics
and justice as co-constitutive elements of ontologically situated scientific
epistemologies?




Cobern and Loving (2008) state in “Epistemic Realism is Common
Sense” (p. 425) that a collusion of forces have made it such that there
seems to be less discussion within science education with respect to
how epistemological frameworks align with the ontological reality that
they attempt to represent. These factors include, but are not limited to:
the move towards constructionism and socio-constructionism in science
education as well as education writ large, a growing doubt towards WMS
following a series of public opinion altering watershed moments (e.g.,
Agent Orange, napalm, Hiroshima), as well as a Kuhn’s introduction
of paradigms and the sudden appearance of a plenary of competing
paradigms due to an increasingly multicultural social reality. The argu-
ment made is that the move to make space for what Cobern and Loving
(2008) refer to “ideas that heretofore would have been called ethno-
science and folklore, pseudoscience, and even quackery” (p. 435) has
meant that the focus of science education has shifted towards epistemo-
logical pluralism as a means of attempting to account for these diversely
positioned ways-of-knowing-nature. While Cobern and Loving (2008)
might bemoan the impact that these diverse educational and social shifts
have had, and how they have reshaped science education as it is today,
others have seen these as deeply productive locations and levers to pry
open the spaces of science and science education (e.g., Haraway, 1997;
Latour, 1993; Snively & Corsiglia, 2001). While I stand with the latter
and disagree with the premise that Cobern and Loving (2008) put forth,
there is nonetheless some merit in exploring their argument: not neces-
sarily to prove it right or wrong, but rather to explore how it is produced,
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producible, and what it produces with/in discursive spaces of science
education.
Cobern and Loving (2001, 2008) argue that questions of cross-
cultural integration, interfacing, and understanding often neglect asking
questions about how these meanings necessarily interface with the nature
of Nature. They state, given the plurality of epistemic frameworks, that
there needs to be pragmatic criteria through which systems of knowing
nature (i.e., science) are deemed valid and valuable:
Interpretations of experience are all one can know… One accepts the
validity of interpretations in so far as they are pragmatically viable… Histor-
ically we [Western modern scientists and science educators] have believed
in the ontological reality of the world and trust our epistemological efforts
to describe that reality and yet always do our epistemologies fail to demon-
strate that what we think we know really is what is. (Cobern & Loving,
2008, p. 433, emphasis in original)
For Cobern and Loving (2001, 2008), among many other science educa-
tors, that criterion is experience: a statement that both universalists (e.g.,
Matthews, 1994; Siegel, 1997, 2001) and cross-culturalists (e.g., Aiken-
head & Michell, 2011; Barnhardt & Kawagley, 2005, 2008; Cajete, 1999;
Snively & Corsiglia, 2001) would agree with. However, there is a signifi-
cant point of deviation in how experience is both understood and enacted
(e.g., experience as Truth, experience as situated and partial, having and
being had by experience,10 experience as relationality). Whether inten-
tional or unintentional, Cobern and Loving (2008) utilize this conceptual
plurality and undecidability as location to present a false dichotomy:
It is true that we cannot know with certainty that perceptual and experien-
tial experiences are significantly grounded in ontological reality. However,
it is equally true that we cannot know for certain that perceptual and expe-
riential experiences are not significantly grounded in ontological reality.
(p. 441)
The false dichotomy presented here is either one in which episte-
mology is ontologically situated within “ontological reality” by utilizing
an “ontological realism that very few educators would reject” (Cobern
& Loving, 2008, p. 437, emphasis in original) or the meaning made is
anti-ontological and not grounded in reality in as meaningful a way or at
all. This (false) dichotomy relies upon the absent yet present a common
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sense assumption that “ontological reality” precedes meaning making, is
singular, unified, and is the ontological reality defined and enacted by
WMS (see Chapter 3). Thus, by (re)presenting and casting approaches
that don’t fall into the classical cannon of epistemic realism into (abso-
lute) relativism, a “a pejorative as far as [they] are concerned” (p. 437),
the alternative they present is but a strawman or a trick of smoke and
mirrors as discussed within the previous chapter.
Further, it can be argued that the approach presented by Cobern and
Loving (2008) does not bring us closer to resolving the multicultural
science education debate: it simply displaces the terms of the debate else-
where (i.e., ontology rather than epistemology). Such a displacement
(re)produces a similar but different argument whose goal is to dialecti-
cally negate, subsume, or suture over the opposing view rather than create
something else, something in-between through dialogue. In other words,
the ontological situatedness that Cobern and Loving (2008) call for is but
another means of reaffirming science, or WMS to be specific, as universal.
However, considering the notion of ontological situatedness can still
bear fruit in the context of science education: what if epistemic realism
best aligned with an ontology rather than simply “ontology”?
From Ontological Alignment to Positing
an Ontology in Science Education
How reality is understood matters. There are risks entailed in putting
forward an ontology: making metaphysical assumptions explicit exposes
the exclusions on which any given conception of reality is based. But
the political potential of deconstructive analysis lies not in simply recog-
nizing the inevitability of exclusions but in insisting on accountability for
the particular exclusions that are enacted and in taking the responsibility
to perpetually contest and rework the boundaries. (Barad, 2007, p. 205,
emphasis in original)
Cobern and Loving (2008) highlight that “we face a metaphysical choice”
(p. 441) in science education: a choice bearing significance if “how reality
is understood matters” (Barad, 2007, p. 205, emphasis in original). This
choice is situated within the realm of metaphysics as it asks us to consider
the relationship between epistemology (i.e., Culture) and ontology (i.e.,
Nature). Within science and science education, this relationship between
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epistemology and ontology has been understood through competing
claims of weak and strong forms of relativism and realism. In other words,
the way in which this has primarily been taken up by science and science
education scholars is through the critical and metaphysical questioning of
the extent to which epistemology aligns with ontology.
Within the context of science, as Latour (1993) posits, most scientists
reject absolute relativism (i.e., everything is cultural) as it requires the
bracketing out of Nature. Similarly, scientists often also reject absolute
realism (i.e., everything is natural) as it wholly brackets out Culture. Thus,
as scientists generally agree that scientific knowledge is shaped by both
natural and cultural factors, scientists more frequently adopt a weaker
form of relativism or realism. While Nature and Culture are kept sepa-
rate for both realists and relativists, there is always a relationship between
Culture and Nature such that diverse cultures have different modes
of accessing Nature. What is contested between the two approaches is
whether knowledge about nature can be explained primarily but not
exclusively through natural factors (i.e., weak realism) or through cultural
factors (i.e., weak relativism). Within science education, similar discussions
of realism and relativism take place (see Chapter 3) and are often included
in curricula through exploration of the nature of science (NOS). In short,
NOS addresses how the culture of science epistemologically understands
and comes-to-know the nature of Nature, or ontology (e.g., Holbrook &
Rannikmae, 2007; Plakitsi, 2010; Rudolph, 2000).
However, “as soon as Nature comes into play without being attached
to a culture, a third model is always secretly used” (Latour, 1993, p. 104).
Latour (1993) refers to this as “particular universalism”: a framework
in which Nature is stable and outside of Culture and diverse cultural
positionings mediate access to knowledge about Nature. The caveat, and
mean through which WMS maintains primacy, is that “one society - and
it is always the Western one - defines the general framework of Nature
with respect to which the others are situated” (p. 105). In other words,
defining how Nature operates11 is established as and establishes epistemic
privilege for WMS. Again, as Barad (2007) states, “how reality is under-
stood matters” (Barad, 2007, p. 205, emphasis in original); importantly,
not only in terms of significance but also in terms of the materialization
of its consequences.
Furthermore, for reasons that include but go beyond the troubling
of this epistemic privilege, many critical science scholars (e.g., Barad,
2007; Kirby, 2011; Latour, 1993) have begun to examine and cast
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doubt upon the framework(s) through which questions of relativism and
realism come to be argued. Under critical examination is the oft taken-
for-granted assumption that many realist and relativist frameworks rely
upon: Nature as a stable backdrop upon which Culture plays out. Critical
science scholars, such as Haraway (1997) and Latour (1993), have long
challenged the oft-accepted notion that “epistemology models ontol-
ogy” (Polkinghorne, 1991, p. 304 in Cobern & Loving, 2008, p. 442).
Returning to the metaphors explored in the previous chapter, it could be
stated that the notion of epistemology mirroring ontology is suspended.
As Barad (2007) reminds, critical science scholarship has been labouring
to displace these arguments by reading them through cultural lenses to
explore what it means to inflect ontology prismatically through episte-
mology. By showing how the culture of science has an active role in
producing scientific knowledge, this opened up rich lines of questioning
regarding epistemology as always situated and partial, as well as the
development of an ethics that might go alongside (e.g., Harding, 1986,
1993/2004; Latour, 1993). However, as discussed in Chapter 4, what
if the nature of Nature, or ontology, were not stable and passive (i.e.,
the condition required for both the mirror and the prism) but rather
dynamic, agentic, self-differentiated, and in an ongoing state of becoming
(see Barad, 2007, 2010)?12
Within what is being referred to as the “ontological turn,” Barad
(2007) draws from Neils Bohr’s philosophy-physics to posit that ontology
is not something that exists a priori. This is to say that scientific
phenomena under observation do not pre-exist their observation, rather,
they are enacted with and through observation. Ontology is not separate
or separable from epistemology, but rather is always entangled, superpo-
sitioned, and diffracted. Matter comes to matter in both senses of word:
it is at once important and worthy of consideration; as well as something
that comes into being rather than remaining inert, static, and unagentic
(see also Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Barad, 2000, 2010; Kirby, 2011).13
While the realm of matter and materiality (i.e., Nature) has always been
the primary focus and domain of science education, a (re)consideration of
how matter comes to materialize has important consequences for science
education in terms of epistemology, ontology, as well as ethics (see Bang
& Marin, 2015; Bazzul & Kayumova, 2016; Higgins, 2016; Kayumova,
McGuire, & Cardello, 2019; Milne & Scantlebury, 2019). Of particular
importance, and a focus in this chapter, is that problem and possibility
that ontology is not, and has never been, a singular affair (Barad, 2007).
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Rather, it is always already plural and becoming differential through the
working and reworking of metaphysical cuts (e.g., the norms of bodily
production—subjects and objects).
To situate science and science education ontologically requires one
to posit an ontology, as opposed to simply situating within “ontology”
(read: singular). An ontology is an ever-partial (i.e., having exclusions)
but never relativistic accounting for an always shifting Nature. Barad
(2007) reminds us that part of the positing of an ontology goes
beyond naming which ontology is at work: the “accountability for the
particular exclusions that are enacted” through our metaphysical choices
includes “taking the responsibility to perpetually contest and rework the
boundaries” (p. 205).
To posit an ontology thus requires, as Barad (2010) states, to consider
how “science and justice” as well “matter and meaning are not separate
elements that intersect now and again” (p. 242). If competing ways-of-
knowing-nature are separated from their co-constitutive ontology and
required to align with an ontology, specifically the ontology of WMS,
then what does it mean to account for and being ethically accountable to
this new entanglement? What is produced and what is producible?
Why Positing an Ontology Matters: Towards
Accountability for How Reality Is Understood
The positing of an ontology and striving towards accountability for onto-
logical enactments is of importance for scholars working within science
education, as well as those which continue to inherit its legacies. To take
up the call to posit of an ontology would necessarily require moving from
questions of epistemology to questions of epistemology and ontology,
or even onto-epistemology (i.e., the co-constitutive entanglement of
knowing and being; see Barad, 2007, 2010)14 to ask the question of how
epistemology and ontology come to co-constitute one another.
Thus, returning to the “metaphysical choice” that Cobern and Loving
(2008) present, one that asks which scientific epistemology best aligns
and correlates with “ontology” (read: singular), it is fair to state that no
choice is offered at all. They put forth, “there is simply no other rational
way to account for human ability to increase instrumental epistemological
power other than that knowledge has the characteristics of verisimili-
tude, vis-à-vis the real world” (p. 440). Here, because an enactment
of the “real world” is already chosen by and/or for them, the “rational
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way” that Cobern and Loving’s (2008) “common sense” metaphysical
choice suggests is, again, WMS. Rather than present a modest interme-
diary position, I suggest that Cobern and Loving (2008) simply displace
the terms of the multicultural science education debate by (re)presenting
them anew, albeit elsewhere (see van Eijck & Roth, 2007).15 However,
what occurs to ways-of-knowing-nature that are not WMS when they are
asked to “mirror” a Cartesian ontology?
While there have been invitations to position diverse ways-of-knowing-
nature ontologically, their alignment with the ontology of WMS produces
a problematic configuration. It explicitly enunciates and upholds the
often-implicit message that approaches other than WMS are lesser means
of knowing nature by continuing to not only centre this ontology but also
failing to acknowledge that it is but one possible ontological possibility
among many. Take for example Siegel’s (1997) positioning of diverse
ways-of-knowing-nature other than those of WMS:
Science education must … treat members of minority, dominated cultures
with respect. And it must treat the scientific ideas of these cultures with
respect. But so treating these cultures and their scientific beliefs and ideas
does not require those ideas be treated as correct or as correct as the
scientific ideas of the dominant, hegemonic culture. (p. 101)
Such often unacknowledged and taken-for-granted ontological posi-
tioning and posturing continues to have adverse effects on if, and how,
TEK and IWLN are included within science education (see Aikenhead
& Michell, 2011; Sammel, 2009). In short, when TEK and IWLN are
articulated within and/or in relation to WMS’s ontology, they are not
only fragmented but also potentially produced as lesser means of knowing
Nature through Cartesianism.
The ontology through which WMS comes to be, Cartesianism, is the
classical Western modern ontological process through which meaning
and matter are individuated through separation from that which co-
constitutes them (e.g., mind/body dualism). TEK and IWLN, due to
their particular relational entanglements of matter and meaning, fail to
(fully) fit the constructs, categories, and concepts enacted by such an
ontology; making Cartesian cuts renders many aspects of TEK and IWLN
absent presences (e.g., Nature as agentic; see Cajete, 2006). While many
science educators have argued that TEK and IWLN stand up to the
5 TINKERING WITH/IN THE MULTICULTURAL SCIENCE EDUCATION … 197
terms of WMS (e.g., validity, reliability, empirical observation, repeata-
bility), they never stand up as well as WMS on WMS’ terms (Aikenhead
& Michell, 2011; Cajete, 1994, 2000). Furthermore, such a deficit-based
framing (i.e., how it fails to fit WMS’s epistemological and ontological
enactments) obscures the importance distinctions, as well as rich contri-
butions that TEK and IWLN have to offer from that which exceeds WMS
(e.g., ethics of regeneration, spirituality; see Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Cajete,
1994, 2000).
TEK and IWLN’s alignment with Cartesianism will always result in
theories that are viewed as not “as correct as the scientific ideas of
the dominant, hegemonic culture” (Siegel, 1997, p. 101, emphasis in
original). They fail to cleanly fit the separate and mutually exclusive onto-
logical and epistemological categories established by WMS because TEK
and IWLN do not make such clean and clear cuts between epistemology
and ontology and their constitutive domains. This is not to state that it
is inherently wrong in an absolute sense to centre Cartesianism,16 and
that there are not moments in which it is an appropriate ontology to
posit (e.g., when considering WMS).17 However, to posit an ontology is
to be held accountable to the patterns of difference, the lines of inclu-
sion/exclusion that are produced through the “metaphysical choice[s]”
that we make. Thus, to posit an ontology invites a differential consid-
eration and an ongoing accounting for and ethical accountability to the
ontological norms through which TEK and IWLN have been included
or excluded from science education. To posit an ontology also invites a
curricular investigation of how diverse knowledges are ontologically situ-




Pluralism in Science Education
One does not make the subject matter relevant by starting with an
unchanged traditional curriculum and coating scientific facts with “rele-
vant examples” to make them go down easier. In teaching for agential
literacy, science is understood (not “in context”) but in complex intra-action
with other practices. (Barad, 2000, p. 238, emphasis in original)
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To posit an ontology within science education is to recognize that diverse
ways-of-knowing-nature are not simply different ways of reaching the
same ontological goal within the oft taken-for-granted or unacknowl-
edged ontology of Cartesianism. Teaching a culturally pluralistic science
classroom must go beyond the “candy coating” of the standard onto-
logical account, “starting with an unchanged traditional curriculum and
coating scientific facts with ‘relevant examples’ to make them go down
easier” (Barad, 2000, p. 238). Rather, thinking with Barad (2000), if
we are to teach in a way that encourages students to understand ways-
of-knowing-nature as the enacted entanglement of epistemology and
ontology, then we must come to understand them as complex and co-
constituted practices. In part, this entails pedagogical exploration of
diverse ways-of-knowing alongside the ways-of-being that co-constitute
them (e.g., Barad, 2000).
To posit an ontology is significant within the multicultural science
education debate, and beyond, because it can be said that, using the
language of the ontological turn, matter has always mattered to Indige-
nous peoples in the ways in which they come to know Nature (i.e.,
TEK and IWLN). In other words, Indigenous peoples have never fully
enacted the nature/culture binary (i.e., the mutually exclusive bracketing
of nature and culture) that is commonly accepted as a defining charac-
teristic of Western modernity, its ontology of Cartesianism, and WMS
(see Bang & Marin, 2015; Cajete, 1994, 1999, 2000; Peat, 2002). For
example, Cajete (2000) highlights the ways in which animal-human rela-
tionships conventionally map onto Nature/Culture breaks down within
Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being:
Most Native languages do not have a specific word for ‘animals.’ Rather,
when animals are referred to they are called by their specific names. That
fact that there are no specific generic words for animals underlines the
extent to which animals were considered to interpenetrate with human
life. (p. 152)
Beings that are often considered within the realm of Nature (e.g.,
animals, plants, mountains) have always been agents within the realm of
Culture (see Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Bang & Marin, 2015; Barnhardt &
Kawagley, 2005; Cajete, 1994, 2000). Thus, to posit an ontology rather
than presenting ontology as singular, universal, and pre-supposed invites
a differential consideration of and an ongoing accounting for, and ethical
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accountability to, the ontological norms through which TEK and IWLN
have been included or excluded from science education.
To consider ontological plurality is not a renewed commitment to rela-
tivism. Rather, there are multiple and meaningful “points of resonance”
(Peat, 2002) between WMS, TEK, and IWLN. Despite these points of
resonance between ways-of-knowing-in-being, this is not to suggest that
there is an external reality that we can differentially access through diverse
cultural frames (see Latour, 1993). Again, plurality need not be though
and enacted as relativism (see McKinley, 2007). Rather than relativism, to
account for and to be accountable to ontological situatedness (i.e., the co-
constitutive relation between an epistemology and an ontology) might be
a way of enacting what Barad (2007) asks of a re(con)figured objectivity –
an accounting of and for the diverse network of agents, forces, and flows
which locally and globally come to produce the scientific phenomena that
we seek to explore within science and science education (see also Barad,
2000).
It is nonetheless important to note that science education will be at its
most fruitful when it works to engage with spaces of difference between
diverse ways-of-knowing-nature to work against the ever-present risk of
conflating diverse systems into sameness. This includes, but should not
be limited to, the ways in which ontological sameness produces dialectic
negation as discussed herein. Accounting for and being accountable to
ontological difference is not only ethically significant, but epistemically
generative as well: the distinctions within this plurality can help (re)shape
rich and robust knowledge traditions, as well as foster the possibility of
inter-cultural hybrids that bring with them the best of both worlds (e.g.,
Barnhardt & Kawagley, 2005).
Conclusion: Positing an
Ontology as an Ethical Call
It is not possible to extricate oneself from ethical concerns and correctly
discern what science tells us about the world. Realism, then, is not about
representations of an independent reality but about the real consequences,
interventions, creative possibilities, and responsibilities of intra-acting
within and as part of the world. (Barad, 2007, p. 37)
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While it is not “it is not possible to extricate oneself from ethical concerns
and correctly discern what science tells us about the world” (Barad,
2007, p. 37), the relationship between science (i.e., knowing nature) and
justice (i.e., respecting diverse cultural knowledges) often continues to
be dichotomized within the context of science education. This make it
such that the debate between the pre-dominant universalist and cross-
culturalist positions rarely produces productive intermediary positions
from which to fully take up both of these competing claims in the ways
in which they are articulated. While there is a responsibility to be simul-
taneously accountable to both how we know and who we teach in science
education, such should not foreclose the ability to respond. However,
the entangled binary framings between Nature and Culture, epistemology
and ontology, realism and ethics are notably framings: configurations
open to being reconfigured.18 As Barad (2007) invites, realism need not
strictly be an epistemological question but can also be about the “real
consequences, interventions, creative possibilities, and responsibilities”
(p. 37) that come with teaching and learning within science education.
Here, part of this ontological homework of response-ability is learning
to account for and being accountable to the “incarnate relation that
precedes the intentionality of consciousness” (Barad, 2010, p. 265) that
many science educators inherit: Cartesianism and the Nature/Culture cut
that it enacts. Given that the Nature/Culture binary makes science and
cultural politics incommensurable (see Latour, 2004b), response-ability
requires “an iterative (re)opening up to, an enabling of responsive-
ness” towards other-than-Cartesian possibilities. Thankfully, as Latour
(1993) reminds, the Nature/Culture binary is never fully achieved or
achievable. “We Have Never Been Modern”, as the eponymous title of
Latour’s (1993) book proclaims, there is always already the possibility for
knowing-in-being otherwise.
Towards this end within this chapter, I tinkered with Cobern and
Loving’s (2008) suggestion that the primary and almost exclusive focus
on epistemologies within the multicultural science debate has detracted
from considerations of how epistemology aligns with ontology. As is
demonstrated herein, Cobern and Loving use this (re)signified natural-
cultural interplay to make a stronger case for universalism (i.e., “Epistemic
Realism Really is Common Sense” [p. 425]). However, in using and trou-
bling their claim, there is the possibility for something else to emerge from
this insight by differentially engaging with it, particularly if we also take
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seriously the notion that ontology is not a singular affair. Such differen-
tial arrangement can support us to recognize plurality can be achieved
not by refuting Cobern and Loving’s claim but rather by (re)situating it
within a context: an epistemology of epistemic realism (i.e., the episte-
mology of WMS) really does align best with an ontology of Cartesianism
(i.e., the ontology of WMS). To recognize that Cartesianism is but an
ontology creates space in which WMS achieves “distinction not privilege”
(Cobern & Loving, 2008, p. 444), not requiring universalists’ claims of
onto-epistemic alignment to be refuted.
Notably, this potential for science without scientism requires science
educators’ response-ability towards positing an ontology, accounting
for, as well as being accountable towards how it is produced
and what it produces. Given science education’s norms and history
of inclusion/exclusion around traditional ecological knowledges and
Indigenous ways-of-living-with-nature, positing an ontology invites a
(re)consideration of science education’s complimentary and supplemen-
tary spaces of knowing nature. Specifically, this calls for a renewed
engagement with TEK and IWLN: they have their own distinct onto-
epistemological alignments or entanglements, positing an ontology calls
for an ethical response-ability to account for the relational ontologies
which come to constitute them rather than requiring them to align with
Cartesianism. To engage in such ontological pluralism need not rely on
ontological or epistemological relativism as there continue to be mean-
ingful patterns of differentiation and similarity that can be productively
engaged with (see McKinley, 2007).
I conclude this chapter with further questions about the space of
ethical response-ability offered by positing an ontology: if how we
think (e.g., Nature/Culture binary) is the very thing preventing forward
momentum within the multicultural science education debate, how do
we think about how we think without using the very thing with which
we think? How might science educators move towards ethical response-
ability when responsibility is not something that we simply have that
pre-exists our engagements but rather is also something by which we
are had, that is produced in its complex flow through and by us? What
further homework might allow us to be accountable to how we are
always already (re)produced by science education as educators? Similarly,
how can we foster response-ability to what we produce within the ever-
changing field of possible possibilities of science education (as part of
the world’s ongoing becoming)? Lastly, what types of theory-practices
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might facilitate the im/possible but necessary accounting for what our
onto-epistemological enactments produce within science education?19
Response-ability, as Barad (2010) reminds, is not achieved “through
the realization of some existing possibility, but through the iterative
reworking of im/possibility” (p. 265). While there is no singular solu-
tion to such questions, positing an ontology paves pathways to engage
with the im/possibility of being wholly accountable and ethically respon-
sive. To reiterate, situating science education ontologically by positing
an ontology is not about who is right or who is wrong, nor is it about
a renewed commitment to relativism. Rather, it is about coming-to-
recognize a plurality of possibilities, and in turn, it means being account-
able to how scientific knowledge is produced, produce-able, and what
it produces in turn within and beyond the science education classroom.
Because “how reality is understood matters” (Barad, 2007, p. 205), the
(re)working of lines of inclusion/exclusion that such understandings and
enactments produce are always already becoming something else, and this
(re)working towards positing an ontology is an ethical call which we must
all heed, albeit differently.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this chapter appears in Milne’s and Scantlebury
(2019) Material Practice and Materiality: Too Long Ignored in Science
Education (pp. 67–79), and is reprinted with permission.
2. Recall from Chapter 3 that the interplay of absence and presence signals
the play of (re)signification. Absent presences are other(ed) signified
meanings that might nonetheless retain the structure of the signifier that
act as the constitutive otherness of that which is usually signified (see
Spivak, 1993/2009). However, absent presences are not an unproblematic
panacea: they are at once both unstated and un-assumed meanings (e.g.,
how claims of science education without scientism have not wholly done
away with it) as well as those whose potentiality might allow for justice to-
come (e.g., such as pedagogical plurality, allowing for Indigenous science
to-come).
3. As Dr. Apffel-Marglin offers in the interview in the next chapter, it is
always important to remain open to knowledge outside of one’s particular
disciplinary pathway. Drawing from that which is uncommon (i.e., other
disciplines) can become productive tools to tinker with to (re)open the
common (i.e., the occupied disciplinary space).
4. Further, if the goal is to (re)open science education, part of tinkering
might entail either: (a) utilizing tools and techniques intended for science
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education, but refusing to use them in intended ways; or, (b) putting to
work tools and techniques not intended for use within science education
(see Higgins, Wallace, & Bazzul, 2018 for exemplars of this in STEM
education).
5. See Chapter 2 for a more fulsome account of this narrative vignette, albeit
one differentially situated in relation to the content of that chapter (i.e.,
towards introducing and thinking with response-ability).
6. Once more, this mantra is to remind that with respect to the question
of Indigeneity within science education, there is no “beginning”: we are
always already in relation. Accordingly, the plurality of “beginnings” from
which we can account for and be accountable to are a resource rather than
a liability.
Further, the invitation within this chapter signals the ways in which
metaphysics of Western modernity makes itself common, to the extent
that it is often, and (too) simply, referred to as common sense. For
example, the (neo-)colonial desire for and production of origins (see
TallBear, 2013). Within the metaphysics of clôture, the process is
rendered one and the same as its product (see Derrida, 1976). This is
to say that origins are treated as if they were and could only singular
in nature: this is their ontological status (where ontology here is to be
read exclusively as the Being of beings). To say the least, this makes
it difficult to account for and be accountable to the agencies that are
active in the production of an origin. For example, TallBear’s (2013)
research complicates the common sensical notion that who Indigenous
people are (Being) originates in their DNA. She does this not only
by offering an Indigenous conception of Being that is (ontologically)
relational, but calling into question the ways in which this “common”
(read: made common through colonialism) sense shapes problematic
extractivist genetic practices (i.e., taking genetic samples from Indigenous
peoples to save them, rooted in an image of “vanishing Indian” that is
disassociated from Western modernity’s complicity in the production of
this image, or the genocides which may have come to inform it).
Which is to say, yet again, that we, who identify and are identifiable
as science educators, are already within relation with Indigeneity, even if
most of us are not Indigenous; that deferring and differing an origin is
not strictly a theoretical move for theory’s sake, but one that has effects
that come to matter, in both senses of the word.
7. Reminder from the previous chapter that equally valid does not signify
that TEK and IWLN achieve equivalence or sameness with WMS, and
particularly not necessarily on the same terms. Rather that they offer
something that is of differently significant and productive (see Aikenhead
& Ogawa, 2007).
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8. Latour (2004b) reminds that common sense and good sense are often
opposed rather than one and the same. However, he goes on to suggest
that if the “good-ness” of sense is pre-supposed, the possibility of
meaning being made through common understanding (i.e., dialogue)
rather than made common through dialectic is (fore)closed.
Also, the question of how this particular “common sense” is produced
and what it produces in turn is taken up in far greater detail in the latter,
and more substantive, half of this section (i.e., Chapter 6).
9. This is to be differentiated from the taken-for-granted relationship that
Barad (2000) alerts us to: one in which scientific literacy is perceived as
always already ethical. As she states, it is often assumed that:
[There is an] equivalence relation between the possession of
scientific knowledge and being socially responsible [that] is often
implicit in discussions about scientific literacy: this is the notion
that familiarity with the facts and the methods of science is all
that is required for socially responsible decision-making concerning
science- and technology-related issues. (Barad, 2000, p. 227)
This ontological pre-determination of ethicality masks the ways in which
the (im)possibility of ethics is never fully achieved or achievable as well
as how science and science education must always remain ethically on the
move and vigilant to respond to an ever-evolving set of ethical problems
and possibilities (see also Roth, 2003).
10. With experience being a central concept here, as well as the larger field of
education, it is important to recognize that we may not all be referring to
the same understanding and enactment of the concept: experience comes
to take many forms (above and beyond its doubly settled meaning).
For example, being had by experience might signal at once the ways in
which experience “gets the best of us,” as well as the ways in which we
might not “have” experiences (as possession). Rather, due to not “having”
a static body of meaning or matter (i.e., the meaning and matter which
makes us is never fully ours; distributed agency; see Barad, 2007; Butler,
2005; Chapter 2 on moving beyond the “I” as subject of ethics and
inquiry). What remains from experiences (e.g., learnings), when we are
had by them, are the marks left on our body (of meaning and matter) from
the intensities and flows within the multiple assemblages we find ourselves
in and the affective movement of meaning, matter, spirit with/in/around
the re(con)figured body we are part of (see Apffel-Marglin, 2011).
11. Notably, particular universalism dictates how Nature operates without
Nature’s consent (see Barad, 2007, 2012). As Latour (1993) and Cajete
(1994, 2000) state, this double(d) othering of Nature and of other-than-
Western cultures are not separate nor separable enactments but rather
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differential enactments of the same, intertwined through a practice of
cultural “transcendence” in which WMS sees itself as neither having a
culture nor being part of Nature.
12. This is of particular significance as Nature as agentic, differentiated, and
fluid is important to how an Indigenous “sense of place” is understood
and enacted (see Bang & Marin, 2015; Cajete, 2006).
13. Recall, from the preface, that the “ontological turn” is not wholly a
panacea when responding to the question of Indigeneity; it is also a
poison. As Barad (2007) invites, positing an ontology is also about
“insisting on accountability for the particular exclusions that are enacted
and in taking the responsibility to perpetually contest and rework the
boundaries” (Barad, 2007, p. 205); here, the ontological turn is not
excluded within the critical gaze. Specifically, this turn in educational
research (and the broader humanities) often fails to acknowledge the
ways in which many Indigenous peoples have been thinking about and
practising with the other-than-human world since time immemorial,
and also have rich conceptions of ontological fluidity and relation-
ality. Whether intended or not, a citational politics at the ontological
turn that does not acknowledge Indigeneity reproduces, albeit differ-
ently, (neo-)colonial logics by suturing over and sublating Indigenous
ways-of-knowing-in-being.
At the same time, a significant part of the homework of response-
ability is work to within and against the language that we inherit, here
it is that of science (e.g., here, drawing from critical science studies),
as a means of simultaneously coming-to-know the location from which
knowledge is constructed and (re)opening the ability to respond. Further,
as Kuokkanen (2007) invites, including the work of (relatively) well-
known scholars into the conversation can “summon” connections and
connectivities that might otherwise dismiss questions and considerations
of Indigeneity. Lastly, as Spivak (1994) reminds, to denegate a particular
theory or approach based on its cultural location alone can create habits in
which we too simply dismiss what a particular theory might offer (partic-
ularly in terms of undoing its own situationality) while simultaneously
uncritically embrace theories from the “correct” location. This has the
likely unintended, but not unproblematic effect, of leaving many off-the-
hook if the implicit message that they are inherently incapable of escaping
their own positionality: this is not insignificant considering that the field
of science education is mostly based in a Western training in science and
that there are many who are white (and/or are complicit in whiteness).
14. Onto-epistemology can neither be adequately referred to as both ontology
and epistemology, nor the two as one, but rather a state of superposition
and co-constitution (see Barad, 2007, 2010).
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15. While this is (what I imagine to be) the intended purpose of their contri-
bution to the science education literature, to tinker is to purpose-fully
(i.e., intentionally and with purpose) (mis)use tools and concepts.
16. It is important to note however that Cartesianism and Eurocentrism
co-constitute one another and that particular attention needs to be paid
to how these produce science education and educator, as well what such
a science curriculum and pedagogy might come to produce (see Higgins,
2014; see also Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Battiste, 2005; Cajete, 1994).
17. Part of the reason for this, if we take Barad’s (2007) notion of onto-
epistemology seriously, is that the epistemology and ontology of WMS are
always already simultaneously enacted (see also Latour, 1993, 2004b).
Furthermore, it has been argued that the two were also historically
co-developed (see Apffel-Marglin, 2011).
18. Recall from the previous chapter that distance and separation are never
neutral: they are part of the (neo-)colonial grammar and practice which
comes to constitute the centre (e.g., WMS) and the margins (e.g.,
IWLN). In turn, these configurations are not only open to being
re(con)figured, but that part of the work of hospitably receiving Indige-
nous ways-of-knowing-in-being in science education is to address this
part of our homework: coming-to-know and address the ontological
“home” which complicates and forecloses the possibility of Indigenous
science to-come in science education.
19. For example, Lather (2007) suggests a double(d) reversal of the
ethnographic gaze to consider not only the ways in which thought is
prismatically inflected, but also the entangled apparatus through which
thought it is produced and producible. Such a double(d) reversal entails
both the literal reversal of studying those who do the studying (i.e., in
order to reverse the direction of the ethnographic gaze), as well as the
study of the way in which those who do the studying study (i.e., in order
to reverse the way in which the ethnographic gaze is produced). In the
second and more substantive part this section (i.e., Chapter 6), I engage
with and through an interview with Dr. Apffel-Marglin who engaged
in the difficult task of a double(d) reversal around how Cartesianism is
produced and what it produces.
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CHAPTER 6
Positing Cartesianism as anOntologyWithin
Science Education: Towards aMore
Response-Able Inheritance with Dr.
Frédérique Apffel-Marglin
Inheritance is never a given, it is always a task. It remains before us just
unquestionably as we are heirs…, even before wanting or refusing to be,
and, like all inheritors, we are in mourning… To be, this word… means,
…to inherit. All of the questions on the subject of being or of what is
to be (or not to be) are questions of inheritance. (Derrida, 1994/2006,
p. 76, emphasis in original)
Before getting on to the work of positing an(other) ontology that might
be more commensurate with Indigenous science (to-come) in the next
chapter of this book, the purpose of this chapter is to continue the task
undertaken in the previous chapter: tinkering with/in the multicultural
science education debate using ontology towards a more response-able
science education. As “all of the questions on the subject of being or
of what is to be (or not to be) are questions of inheritance” (Derrida,
1994/2006, p. 76), the task of this chapter is to engage in the histor-
ical homework of response-ability by archaeologically digging into the
historicity and operationalization of our ontological inheritance: Carte-
sianism. In order to investigate the question of what might it mean to
account for and be accountable to an ontology of Cartesianism?, we must
also ask productively entangled questions such as: How, where, and when
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did Cartesianism as “common sense” become common? How was Carte-
sianism produced?, How did we come to inherit Cartesianism?, and What
does it make producible? These questions bear significance as Cartesianism
is not only the ontology of WMS, but also deeply shapes the ways
in which science education attempts to engage with the very ways-of-
knowing-in-being that it continues to Other. We are its inheritors in
science education, “even before wanting or refusing to be” (Derrida,
1994/2006, p. 76)—our relation to this ontology is irreducible, whether
we acknowledge it or not, desire it or not. To account for and be account-
able to Cartesianism is part and parcel of science education’s homework
of response-ability: this ontology lingers and lurks even as we attempt to
move within, against, and beyond it. To leave Cartesianism unaddressed
risks rendering decolonizing moves, de/colonizing.1
Thus, in order to continue this tinkering (i.e., using that which might
be intended for other uses) with ontological absent presences, I trace our
ontological inheritance. Specifically, how multiple there-thens of Carte-
sian “origins”2 are haunt the here-now of science education: passed over
pasts which constitute our inheritance. However, inheritance and respon-
sibility are irreducibly related: “there is no inheritance without a call to
responsibility” (Derrida, 1994/2006, p. 114). It is call to engage in “cre-
ative archeology, a performative reinvention, of the received wisdoms
that constitute our cultural inheritance” (Kirby, 2012, p. 198) which
(re)produces who science educators are and can be. It is to engage in the
homework of response-ability with attentiveness to our history; particu-
larly, the ways in which past is not yet past and should not be passed
over.
Significantly, “inheritance is never given, it is always a task” (Derrida,
1994/2006, p. 67, emphasis in original): the task of inheritance is not
one that is straightforward when our onto-epistemic inheritances present
themselves as absent presences, normalized and naturalized through
centuries of Eurocentric thought and colonial practice (such as is the
case in science education; see Higgins & Tolbert, 2018).3 Thus, to
engage with the task of (re)opening the norms of responsiveness towards
Indigenous science to-come, attention is brought to how Cartesianism
plays, has played, and will play an active role in the (fore)closure of
response-ability: the task of inheritance. To undertake this ontological
homework of response-ability, I draw from a series of expert inter-
views with Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin’s that unpack the historical,
geographical, political, economic, and religious forces of the “birth of
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modernity” and reveal the ways in which this “common sense” went from
being uncommon to common and continues to persist. In turn, these
insights are read, or more specifically diffracted, through the multicultural
science education debate in order to (re)open the space for responsiveness
therein. In thinking with Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin, I make the argu-
ment that the making common of Cartesianism not only (fore)closes the
possible possibilities for responding to Indigenous science to-come, but
also to account for and be accountable to the ontology of WMS and what
it produces.
Before this diffractive reading, I present a positional vignette to both
introduce the work to come and my (co-constitutive) relation to the
work herein. A methodological section on (re)thinking expert interview
diffractively follows.
Pathways of Chance: Encountering
Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin
What if we leave room in our lives for chance and the unexpected?….
Instead of seeing’ one’s life planned out into the future like a vast highway,
life only makes sense to us when we look back to the past and see the path
we have taken with all its diversion, U-turns and side roads. There may
have been no fixed plan for the future but looking back at the map of
one’s life journey it almost seems as if there had indeed been a goal all
along, but a goal that had been concealed at every step of the way. (Peat,
2007, pp. 15–16)
Because we must “begin” some-where and some-time, let’s “begin” in
Lamas, Peru in June of 2013.4 Then and there, I would have the plea-
sure of interviewing Dr. Frédérique Appfel-Marglin on her work around
deconstructing the metaphysics of modernity as well as what can be
learned through attending to ritualized action. For me, this would be
what Peat (2007) refers to as a “pathway of chance”.
As Peat (2007) elaborates in his “little” autobiography, our lived expe-
riences cannot be mapped so easily: we are always walking along pathways
of chance. A probabilistic approach might see us treading common paths
more often than those uncommon. However, when we encounter the
uncommon “do we compensate as best we can in an attempt to remain on
our predetermined track?” (p. 15). Peat suggests that if “we leave room
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in our lives for chance and the unexpected” (p. 15), we may come to
encounter new relationships as well as old relations anew. Such encounters
can gently inflect our life’s journey or throw into new directions alto-
gether, into unanticipated spaces and places that we may only be able to
make sense of in retrospect, if at all. Just as Peat’s life was thrown into
another orbit altogether through meeting his mentor-to-be David Bohm,
as well as the Blackfoot peoples (and Blackfoot scholars like Leroy Little
Bear), my encountering Dr. Frédérique Appfel-Marglin was a meeting of
the latter pivotal type.
I first textually encountered the work of Dr. Apffel-Marglin in the fall
of 2010 during an assigned reading in a graduate class on Indigenous
education within her edited collection The Spirit of Regeneration. This
opened my eyes to the incredibly useful potential of thinking about ques-
tions of (neo-)coloniality and Indigeneity anew by considering the global
South and those working with the global South when thinking about
and with questions of de/colonizing education. I would not meet her
in person until the spring of 2012, during an invited talk at the Univer-
sity of British Columbia. During this talk, she was showcasing her (then
recently released) book Subversive Spiritualities: How Rituals Enact the
World that, as she states, was “the fruit of a lifetime of anthropological
practice” (Apffel-Marglin, 2011, p. 7). Centring the pedagogical poten-
tiality of ritual enactments, the purpose of the talk and of her book, as
she states:
is an effort to articulate the nature of the kinds of beings I spoke with
and gave gifts to in rituals. Here I attempt to articulate for people like
myself what my new manner of practicing rituals has revealed to me about
our (i.e., the modernist) way of representing reality. (Apffel-Marglin, 2011,
p. 8)
Her life’s work has not only focused on understanding ritual enactments,
but also what ritual enactments reveal about Western modern ways-of-
knowing-in-being (e.g., how Western modernity produces matter and
meaning and what these in turn produce). Thus, during this talk, she
spoke of “twin journeys” which are highly commensurate with Battis-
te’s (2013a, 2013b) conception of decolonizing as deconstruction and
reconstruction: a double(d) reversal which she referred to as “reverse
anthropology”:
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By “reverse anthropology,” I do not mean [strictly] engaging in ethno-
graphic research on some aspect of American or European culture or
society. Rather, I mean an understanding of the processes that have
brought about our way of seeing reality – all of it, not just a single,
particular aspect. By “our way of seeing reality,” I mean what we take for
granted; by “we” I mean people like me, educated in the modern educa-
tional system that by now is hegemonic and thus no longer tied to any
specific region or ethnic group; by “reality” I mean things as fundamental
as time, space, and nature as opposed to culture, the human person, and
so forth. (Apffel-Marglin, 2011, p. 11)
In other words, this double(d) reversal entails both the literal reversal
of studying those who do the studying (i.e., in order to reverse the
direction of the ethnographic gaze), as well as the study of the way in
which those who do the studying study (i.e., in order to reverse the way
in which the ethnographic gaze is produced). It is a differential means
of working towards thinking without the thing with which we cannot
think without (Lather, 2007). Furthermore, this double(d) reversal is
not without significance: to make rituals and the insights they provide
“understandable and credible requires nothing less than a deconstruc-
tion of the modernist onto-epistemology” (Apffel-Marglin, 2011, p. 14)
which render ritual Other. These include addressing a constellation of
interconnected concepts enacted through practice, including the separa-
tion of Church and State in most Western modern contexts as well as
the multiplicitous ways in which most non-Western, non-modern ritual-
ized spiritual enactments are often exoticized and branded as “irrational
animism” (see also Cajete, 1994, 2000; Marker, 2006). In order to make
space for spirituality, she delivered a rich and robust critique of moder-
nity, its teleology of progress, and its narrative of development by coming
at modernity via multiple angles: social, political, religious, military,
historical, and economic. From here, she laboured within, against, and
beyond modernity by employing a reconstructive frame that interfaced
quantum ontologies (to work within and against modernity) and Indige-
nous ways-of-knowing-in-being (to work within and beyond modernity).
This framework was primarily offered as a way to think and enact the
world otherwise through ritualized action.
Turning towards Dr. Apffel-Marglin’s work around ritualized actions
that “enact the world in concert with its humans, non-humans, and other-
than-humans” (Apffel-Marglin, 2011, p. 15) might seem uncommon for
a science educator or within science education. Apffel-Marglin (2011),
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like Peat (2002, 2007), reminds that it is always important to remain
open to knowledge outside of one’s particular disciplinary pathway. She
highlights the importance of being inter- or trans-disciplinary as “it has
the distinct advantage of being less prey to the tacit knowledge hidden
in entrenched fields and subfields of European studies and in particular in
the boundaries creating such fields and subfields” (p. 14). However, there
were far more spaces of potential connection and commonality than I had
or could envision at the time of first encountering her work. For one,
ritualized action has many connections to how IWLN are articulated:
Ritual is the medium for communicating, reciprocating, creating, and
working with the other-than-humans, who daily remind the humans that
the world is not for humans’ exclusive use. It is the other-than-humans
who make clear to the humans that human desires are not the only ones.
In other words, they make clear that humans are not the masters of this
world, and in turn that this world is not agency-less and voiceless, a sum
of natural resources to be indefinitely mined to feed the supposedly infinite
desires of human beings. (Apffel-Marglin, 2011, p. 6)
These formalized processes and protocols of and for communal (inter-
)being have the aim of (re)generating and the sustaining of “the iterations
of the cycles of life” (p. 41), reminding that we are not passive observers
outside of the world but rather active participants within. Similarly, with
respect to Indigenous science, Cajete (1994) states that:
Scientists study the tracks of subatomic particles that exist only a millionth
of a second. They find the human observer influences the energy rela-
tionships and even the nature of existence of these subatomic particles.
Humans do participate with everything else even at this level of natural
reality. Indigenous people understood this relationship of human activity
as concentric rings that extend into the spirit realm. (Cajete, 1994, p. 55)
As Cajete articulates further, “it is no accident that learning and teaching
unfolded in the context of spirituality in practically every aspect of tradi-
tional American Indian [Indigenous] education” (Cajete, 1994, p. 41).
If I found many productive points of resonance with Frédérique Apffel-
Marglin’s work, and could learn much form her, it is because the degrees
of separation between the spaces we, respectively, attempt to foster were
far smaller than disciplinary borders presented at first. Furthermore,
and of equal importance, the locations that Dr. Apffel-Marglin laboured
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within and against in order to make space for Indigenous ritualized enact-
ments were even closer: as this involved critically inhabiting and tinkering
within the spaces of and related to WMS. There was much I could and
can still learn from her life’s labour in this arena.
Encountering Dr. Apffel-Marglin was an unexpected turn along my
own personal pathways of chance; it was an encounter that subverted the
very ways in which I could be in the world, I could not (not) take up
what she had offered. This (re)ignited my own interest in metaphysics,
the cross-cultural space between Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being
and quantum ontologies, as well as the importance in coming-to-know
the very space that I am operating within and against to allow for a
possible possibility of there being a beyond. This encounter also sparked
my imagination with respect to the educational possibilities laying therein,
which come to inform the later chapters of the book. It so happened
that Drs. Peter Cole and Pat O’Riley were hosting a University of British
Columbia summer institute in Peru the summer after which Dr. Apffel-
Marglin visited the University of British Columbia to give her talk. This
would be located at the Sachamama Center that she ran, located in
the San Martin Department of Peru and on the ancestral territories of
the Kichwa-Lamista peoples. Attending this summer institute meant that
there would be a possibility to engage with Dr. Apffel-Marglin in person
but also a possibility of holding an expert interview.5 Sensing an oppor-
tunity that should not be missed, I had a desire to document to allow for
these rich teachings to disperse: I would interview Frédérique as part of
a tinkering process in which I did and would not know the end result.
In turn, I sent out an invitation to do so; the same day, she replied: “I
would be delighted to participate in a dialogue or interview with you and
very much look forward to it” (Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marlin, personal
communication, February 14th 2013).
Tinkering with/in Expert Interview:
De/Signing Research Methodology
Wanting to recognize Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marlin’s “lifetime of anthro-
pological practice” (Apffel-Marglin, 2011, p. 7), the methodological
structure with which I sought to tinker was that of expert interview. As
Bogner, Littig, and Menz (2009) state, “there is no such thing as the
expert interview” (p. 6, emphasis in original). Rather, they are differen-
tial inflections on more general interview practices that predominantly
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hinge upon conceptual considerations of “what counts” as “expert”,
“expert knowledge”, as well as what the aims and purposes of an expert
interviews might be. Thus, expert interview presents itself as a method-
ological structure that is constituted by the ways in which the key
concepts are understood and enacted. As Bogner et al. (2009) frame,
a topology of expert interviews would primarily include, but would not
be limited to: (a) expert interview as exploratory, to provide orienta-
tion into further inquiry; (b) expert interview as systematic retrieval, to
acquire “expert knowledge” from an “expert”, and; (c) expert interview
as theory-generating interactive exchange.
Working towards the third type entails working within and against the
second type: where notions of fact and fairy come to haunt accounts
as adequately or inadequately mirroring reality (see Chapter 4), putting
into question the status of and possibility of ever achieving “expert” and
“expert knowledge”.
Regardless of what might be myth and what is reality, the anticipated
promise of rapid and unproblematic access to objective data makes expert
interviews an extremely appealing option for empirical social researchers.
But is the expert interview method really quite so simple and uncom-
plicated? If so, does this then render methodological considerations
superfluous? Or are expert interviews in some ways just too tempting? Do
they not – in their naïve belief in the totality of expert knowledge – harbour
the danger of advocating a pre-reflexive definition of what constitutes an
expert? (Bogner et al., p. 2)
In turn, the practice of methodological tinkering continues to bear impor-
tance and relevance6: methodology is always already a space with/in
which to tinker with purpose but without guarantee.
Expert interview as methodology would require tinkering with so that
it was not presented as the truth, but rather a truth with which to think; a
truth through which could be productively inflected or with which others
could be diffracted (see Chapter 4). As such, I worked towards achieving
this through three interconnected rounds of tinkering: before, during,
and after. Before, I tinkered with the content of the expert interview.
During, the expert interview tinkered with itself in its enactment. After,
I tinker with the (re)presentation of the expert interview by pulling from
insights generated through the theory-generating exchange.
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Before: Tinkering with/in Expert Interview Content
When designing the series of expert interview questions, the original
intent was to create a three-part expert interview series that would
differentially represent three major themes or threads that were being
pulled through Dr. Apffel-Marglin’s 2011 book Subversive Spiritualities.
Namely, these themes were: (a) her methodology of reverse anthropology;
(b) working within and against Cartesianism, and lastly; (c) working
beyond Cartesianism by considering the spaces of ritualized enactments.
In other words, the interviews as designed were not to repeat that which
was already there, but rather tinker within the already existing narratives
in Frédérique’s book to connect differently, more loosely, to allow for the
possibility of something else to emerge.
This began with the notion that despite the cohesive and complete
appearance of the narratives within her book, like any and every text, they
were and continue to be open to being tinkered with/in.7 Consisting of
loosely assembled partial, situated, and relational meanings, any and every
narrative is but a series of meanings that are held together by “scandalous
sutures” (Derrida, 1976): what Spivak refers to as the “rage for unity”
(Spivak, 1976, p. xvi). Thus, narratives are always already open to being
irrupted, ruptured, and torn asunder in order to differentially sequence
its frayed and fraught meanings to produce new narratives which, in turn,
never achieve unity. Thus, when I was developing the questions for the
interview that is featured within this chapter, I centred her work on the
entangled political, economic, religious, scientific, and military practices
that led to the birth and operationalization of Modernity within Western
Europe. I gripped and pulled at these threads from her book Subversive
Spiritualities to (re)constitute a narrative around this theme. However, in
practice, this narrative was never fully achieved either, as the very practice
of expert interview exceeds itself to produce something that is within and
beyond the narrative framework available to it.
During: Expert Interview Tinkering with/in Itself
In practice, expert interviews come to be an enactment or practice that is
and is not its research design: both the expected and the unexpected come
into proximal relation to de/sign any possible expert interview method-
ology design. The arguments that scholars make in interviews are always
situated within a real and/or imagined scene of address: what is said, what
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can be said, and how it is said is always in part produced and producible
in relation to the audience to which it is intended as well as the constel-
lation of concepts which are entangled with/in (see Chapter 4 on the
prism; see also Butler, 2005; Kirby, 2011). To elaborate upon this point,
Judith Butler in an interview with Vicky Kirby speaks to how possibili-
ties of ever shifting cultural and natural norms dis/allow modes of being
critical:
I think perhaps mainly in gender Trouble I overemphasize the priority of
culture over nature… At the time of Gender Trouble, … it seemed to
me that there was a cultural use of ‘natural’ arguments to provide legiti-
macy for natural genders or natural heterosexuality. But that criticism did
not take into account of a nature that might be, as it were, beyond the
nature/cultural divide, one that is not immediately harnessed for the aims
of certain kinds of cultural legitimation practices. (Butler in Kirby, 2011,
p. 93)8
Expert interviews are then a site for things to be thought anew, albeit
not for the first time, within a differing web of relationships that comes
to bear with differing intensities.
At the Sachamama Center in Peru, where the three interviews of
roughly two hours with Frédérique occurred, each interview became an
opportunity for something that was and was not her book Subversive Spir-
itualities: no two “readings” are ever the (self-)same (see Spivak, 1976).
Dr. Apffel-Marglin and I, but her more so than I, narratively pulled at the
anticipated threads differently in order to make new meanings: that which
was already came to be in new relations by differentially centring how they
were included or excluded, and to which degree. While the questions
generated were derived from her book, this did not constrain the inter-
views, especially towards the end of the interviews. The expert interview
alternated from being within the script, to being exceeded by the script,
from being an expert interview to a dialogue in which I was also a partic-
ipant: what Bogner and colleagues (2009) refer to as a “quasi-expert”.
This participation was nonetheless shaped by the relational elsewheres and
elsewhens that exist within and beyond the interview (e.g., Frédérique’s
reading recommendations might be an inflection of a teacher–student
relation held in other spaces). Furthermore, comfortably seated outside
her modest abode within the Sachamama centre, Frédérique and I were
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also often audibly joined by other members of the ecology of relation-
ships that shaped that place: the birds chirping, the dogs barking at one
another through the nearby fence, the traditional Peruvian three-piece
band practising down the road, the wind, among other things. These
other-than-human beings that she refers to so often in her book Subver-
sive Spiritualities were not simply metaphorically signified and absent, but
were rather physically present and active agents in the production of the
interview (Higgins & Madden, 2019; see also Barad, 2007, 2010; Cajete,
1994, 2000).
After: Tinkering with/in Expert Interview (Re)Presentation
As the interview with Dr. Apffel-Marglin presents a partial, situated,
yet rich and nuanced account of how Cartesianism is produced and
producible, the interview itself invites other ways of being (re)presented
within, against, and beyond Cartesianism. Accordingly, I turn to Barad
(2007)’s post-Cartesian extension of diffraction as metaphor for method-
ology to inform how I work with Frédérique’s interview.
Recall that for Barad (2007), diffraction asks us to consider where the
agencies of observation begin and where they end, what is included, what
is excluded, what matters, and what comes to materialize. Important to
note here is that, for Barad (2007), the experimental apparatus through
which any phenomena manifests is never simply a material tool or a discur-
sive concept, but also includes multiple material and discursive agencies
of observation, and extends to include each of their respective mate-
rial and discursive historicities. This network of bodies of meaning and
matter become the experimental apparatus through a differential enact-
ment of the norms of bodily production. As such, these bodies do not
simply interact between one another, but rather intra-act within this
re(con)figured body which is the experimental apparatus. Lastly, through
intra-action, materiality and discourse, the domains of ontology and epis-
temology, are not mutually exclusive but rather co-constitutive. Or, as
Barad (2007) states “phenomena are differential patterns of mattering
(‘diffraction patterns’) produced through complex agential intra-actions
of multiple material-discursive practices or apparatuses of bodily produc-
tion” (p. 140).
Diffractive methodology is thus a practice of knowing-in-being with/in
the production of patterns of difference that emerge when two or more
phenomena, or entangled bodies of matter-meaning, are read through
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one another (Barad, 2007). This is in stark contrast to the optical
metaphor of the mirror that operationalizes the production and reproduc-
tion of sameness through representationalism. Diffractive methodology
is a process of producing, and being responsive and accountable to
non-negligible patterns of difference that come to matter when two or
more entangled material-discursive phenomena are diffracted through
one another. This requires however that “we learn to tune our analytical
instruments (that is our diffractive instruments) in a way that is sufficiently
attentive to the details of the phenomenon we want to understand”
(p. 73) and to pay attention to the fine details that would otherwise
be considered negligible with/in conventional scientific and social scien-
tific research methods. Barad (2007) poses diffractive methodology as
an engaged and enacted ethico-onto-epistemological research stance that
takes seriously the entanglement of ethics, materiality, and discourse as
well as the patterns of difference that emerge through their ongoing
diffractive intra-action.
Here, diffractive methodology comes to inform the ways in which the
ways in which Dr. Apffel-Marglin’s interview is read through the multicul-
tural education debate to produce patterns of difference that might come
to inform how science education might be thought otherwise. Particu-
larly, as diffraction is about producing differences that matter, there is
an emphasis on what it means to be accountable to and for ontolog-
ically positioning science with/in Cartesianism. With/in any diffractive
methodology, Barad (2007) reminds that:
We are responsible for the cuts that we help enact not because we do the
choosing (neither do we escape responsibility because “we” are “chosen”
by them), but because we are an agential part of the material becoming of
the universe. (p. 178)
One such set of cuts enacted herein are the editorial cuts which come
to produce the textual presentation of the work as expert interview. In
producing the text as an articulation of (quasi-)expertise (e.g., expert as
rational subject), many agential engagements have been excised. These
include, but are not limited to, the now-absent presences of other-than-
humans (e.g., dogs, wind), other humans (e.g., those labouring at the
Sachamama Center), human-other-than-human hybrids (e.g., Peruvian
three-piece band, blaring radio), as well as moments in which speech is
interrupted by thoughtful pauses, stuttering, stammering, ums and ahs.
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Both Frédérique and I have engaged in this act of narrative “cleaning” in
order to produce a text that might be more cohesive, and intelligible as
expert interview, to an audience to-come.9
Furthermore, the interview that follows is split into four parts. The
cuts enacted here are emergent (i.e., a “choice” that emerges with/in
relations that extend beyond me; see Barad, 2007), producing rich
patterns of resonance and divergence when read through the multicul-
tural science education debate. There is nonetheless a cautionary note
that different cuts produce and make possible a different set of meaning-
making phenomena, this is but one possible possibility or configuration.
Each cut is divided into two smaller parts: the interview with Frédérique
always preceding the later diffractive analysis.
To give a quick overview of content addressed by Dr. Apffel-Marglin,
the first cut, Nature/Culture, addresses how she understands this
dichotomy with respect to her own field of anthropology as well as how
she strategically goes about addressing it. The second cut, Descartes , Boyle,
and Newton, speaks to three important figureheads not only in the devel-
opment of Cartesianism, but also the ways in which they operationalize it.
The third cut, The enclosure, the double-sided ledger, and the laboratory,
situates Cartesianism with/in the material practices of Western Modern
Europe with which it could not be disentangled and which lead to its
operationalization. The fourth and final cut, The modest witness, when One
Truth becomes two, and the Thirty Years’ War , positions the practices of
the individual within the scientific laboratory within a larger and uneasy
socio-political context.
Diffracting an Interview with Dr.
Frédérique Apffel-Marglin: On
the (Re)Production and Operationalization
of Cartesianism and What It Produces
First Cut: Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin on Nature/Culture
M. HIGGINS: Within your 2011 book Subversive Spiritualities, you speak
to the multiple dichotomies (e.g., mind/body, male/female, colo-
nizer/colonized) that you are working within and against in order to
enact a double(d) reversal of anthropology (i.e., subverting the gaze
as well as the concepts, categories, and constructs through which the
anthropological gaze operates). Recognizing that to disrupt one binary
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is to disrupt others that are related to it (see Barad, 2010; Lather, 2007;
St. Pierre, 2011a), one of the key dichotomies that you center in your
work is that of Nature/Culture. Could you quickly describe how you
understand Culture and Nature within this binary pairing?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : I have to preface what I’m going to say by saying
that my understanding is totally coloured by training as an anthropolo-
gist; so what you are getting is the view that currently still, I could say,
operates within anthropology. Anthropology has really made the term
Culture what it is, so I should begin with that. Before anthropology
defined the term Culture as we know it today during the turn from
the nineteenth to twentieth century, culture was something held by a
“cultured person”. This usually entailed people going to the symphony,
to the fine arts museum, to classical plays; that is what having culture
meant. It is still used like that by people who are not reading anthro-
pology; it is still used vernacularly like that. However, anthropology has
democratized the term such that it means that everyone, anywhere in
the world, has culture and that anthropologized meaning of “culture”
has deeply penetrated our vernacular language. There are no people in
the world that do not have culture. It is human to have culture, just as
it is human to have language and to speak. Furthermore, language and
culture are totally integral to one another.
Anthropology, as a discipline, takes as its object of study Culture.
Studying “culture” is what anthropologists do, and the discipline has
developed an understanding of Culture as an exclusive dichotomy. By
exclusive dichotomy, I mean the following: that Nature is what Culture is
not and Culture is what Nature is not. They determine each other nega-
tively. It is very important to understand what that means and why it is
significant. Exclusivity means that there is an absolute boundary between
the two terms. While there are a plethora of dichotomies that enact a
tension between two poles in which things move from one pole to the
other relating to each other as a continuum, that is not the case with
an exclusive dichotomy. That is a very different kettle of fish. I call the
former polarities, or sometimes simply dichotomies, and the latter exclu-
sive dichotomies. While there are exclusive dichotomies as well as plain
dichotomies or polarities I reserve the term dualism to refer to exclu-
sive dichotomies. The Nature/Culture exclusive dichotomy can be said
to have dominated the field of anthropology.
M. HIGGINS: Within your book, you address the notion that the first
term of any dichotomy is dominant over the latter, and that this is
achieved and upheld, as you mention through a metaphysics of mutual
6 POSITING CARTESIANISM AS AN ONTOLOGY WITHIN SCIENCE … 225
exclusivity and separation. Usually this entails that the first term is
constructed in opposition to the second, making the latter its abject
other or its object of lack. What consequence does this bear upon
Nature as well as those who are considered “natured” (i.e., rather than
“cultured”)? Furthermore, how has this been troubled?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : The troubling of the Nature/Culture dichotomy
has always been important within the second wave of feminism and
beyond. Feminism is an important site for this troubling because women
in the Western traditions, such as Christianity and Judaism (except for
the mystical traditions), have been associated with Nature (i.e., defined
in opposition to Culture).
Within anthropology, this exclusive dichotomy has started to be troubled
around the notion of gender, especially by a wonderful British woman
anthropologist, Marylin Strathern. She does this work in her book The
Gender of the Gift on her fieldwork within Melanesia. That was an early
book that really is brilliant in troubling the relationship between gender,
Culture, and Nature. Following this, more and more scholars in anthro-
pology have troubled this exclusive dichotomy. Interestingly enough, in
feminist approaches to anthropology, there is, from my point of view, a
sharp divide between those who reject the troubling of that dualism and
those who trouble it. The most well-known of those who reject the trou-
bling of the Nature/Culture dichotomy is Sherry Ortner. Ortner maps
the relations of male/female onto Nature/Culture. In her widely influ-
ential essay “Is Female to Male as Nature to Culture?”, she simply takes
it for granted that the Nature/Culture dualism is of the same kind as the
female/male one; she assumes that there is such a division and that you
can map gender on it.
This gender mapping has been crucial in exploring the Cartesian-
Boylian-Newtonian paradigm. This is the work of Donna Haraway and,
also extremely importantly, of Shapin and Schaffer on Hobbes and the
air pump. So the whole Nature/Culture dualism is completely entangled
with gender issues, and debates in feminism. That’s why I was, from day
one, deeply and personally involved.
M. HIGGINS: There is often a relationship between different dichotomies
that allows the productive tinkering within one to have deconstructive
effects within others.
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Right.
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M. HIGGINS: You’ve begun speaking to this here with respect to
the Nature/Culture binary in relation to male/female, what other
dichotomies might Nature/Culture be entangled with to produce
particular bodies as “natured” and what consequences does this yield?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : While I talked about the case of gender, the UR
[i.e., original], the basic, fundamental trope or metaphor, even if it
is not seen as that, is of Nature to be controlled by Man. I deliber-
ately use the masculine here because men developed it. They excluded
women in that newly minted epistemological paradigm known as Clas-
sical Science, an exclusion that continued until the twentieth century. It
really is Man, the masculine European, Western European male. So if
Nature is to be controlled by Man, this also means that all other humans
are closer to Nature. We talked about women, but also included within
what Judith Butler has called “the abject other” are those perceived as
“primitive”, the “savage”, and lower class. Diasporic people, Indigenous
people, and other colonized people are often seen as “closer to Nature”
because of a perceived inability to control themselves, their biology, or
their nature. These tropes are still fully operational in the world today
even if not everyone subscribes to them; they unfortunately have not
disappeared. In my context of working with the Kichwa-Lamista, the
Indigenous peoples in what is now the Peruvian High Amazon, they
are often treated as “wild people” who have no civilization or language,
amongst other lacks.
M. HIGGINS: In considering exclusive dichotomies, it is always productive
to look at both sides of the binary division. If those who are perceived
as “being closer to Nature” are being treated in these ways, what does
that mean for those who are perceived or self-perceived as “cultured?”
How is the Eurocentric, patriarchal and masculine human body, or Man,
and his way of being in the world shaped and affected by this exclusive
dichotomy?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : That’s a lovely question. I’m so glad that you are
asking that and I would recommend a book to you. My very good
friend Ashish Nandy addresses this topic in his first book called The
Intimate Enemy published in 1983. In short, it is about colonialism but
it also addresses how colonialism finally hurts the colonizer as well as
the colonized. When I heard your question, I immediately thought of
Ashish Nandy’s work. About this, I would certainly say that this way of
being is one of being déchu [i.e., having lost dignity]. It is an ethical
fall from grace, or a form of self-perversion.
M. HIGGINS: Paulo Freire, in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, speaks to a similar
notion: to dehumanize the Other is dehumanizing in and of (it)self
through a failure to recognize the humanity of the Other.
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F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Exactly.
M. HIGGINS: This very much speaks to the notion that exclusive
dichotomies are porous rather than hermetic. If we take the work
of Jacques Derrida seriously, despite the prevalence and pervasiveness
of this exclusive dichotomy, like other binaries, it is déjà toujours or
always already deconstructing. In other words, it is never fully achieved
as it is a myth or an imaginary. In your book Subversive Sprituali-
ties, you explore and leverage some examples within recent scholarship
that you develop within your work that speak to the porosity of
the Nature/Culture dichotomy (e.g., Cultured Nature and Natured
Culture—such as cultural landscapes). Can you speak to why this is
important to your work?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : I begin with this recent scholarship around
cultural landscapes for strategic reasons. Just like the Gedanken exper-
iments (i.e., thought experiments) in quantum physics have been
empirically proven; the undoing of Nature/Culture has been enacted
empirically and you cannot deny it. If you are using the language of the
mainstream, it is harder to deny. Because scientists have already shown
that the Amazon forest is anthropogenic [i.e., produced through and
with human interaction], all I need to do is provide the data to make
my point. I start with this because it is an easier way of entering into
that topic. It is easier for people who are not inclined to hear your
message [i.e., those who might disagree] because you are giving empir-
ical evidence [i.e., and speaking on their terms]. Start where it is very
hard to deny: empiricism. Because if I begin with more philosophical
discussions around themes people do not want to hear, people close
down before I’ve even begun. I have seen that happen in meetings and
conferences.
M. HIGGINS: That’s a very interesting strategy that you utilize
throughout your book. On one hand, you’re rejecting the universality
and the privileging of WMS and its ongoing supersessionism (i.e., the
double(d) process of WMS acting as the metre stick against which
other ways-of-knowing-Nature are judged, as well the ways in which
WMS supplants and displaces other ways-of-knowing-Nature; see Lewis
& Aikenhead, 2001). On the other hand, you are strategically using
that same structure all at the same time.
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Right, but only when it is to my purposes.
Because of my relationships to people within the mainstream, I’ve
learned to use these arguments. But it is important for me not to stay
there, and only use it as an entry point to my argument.
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First Cut—Nature/Culture and the Multicultural Science Education
Debate
As Dr. Apffel-Marglin’s segmented interview is diffracted with the multi-
cultural science education debate, it comes to produce particular patterns
of dynamic resonance and dissonance with one another around three
key nodes: (a) Nature/Culture as mutually exclusive dichotomy; (b)
problematic natural-cultural hybrids (e.g., “naturalized facts”) and, (c)
productively using natural-cultural hybrids.
The notion of Nature/Culture as mutually exclusive has much bearing
on both the fields of anthropology and science. It is the “founda-
tional” cut of Western modernity that puts both fields into dynamic
and resonating relationality (Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Barad, 2007; Kirby,
2011; Latour, 1993, 2004). As Dr. Apffel-Marglin articulates, the mutu-
ally exclusive dichotomy between Nature and Culture can be enunciated
such: “Nature is what Culture is not and Culture is what Nature is not”
which is further qualified by “an absolute boundary between the two
terms”. As mentioned earlier within this chapter, this is deeply entan-
gled with/in the practices of validating what one might consider valid
or worthwhile (i.e., “what counts” as science) in terms of meaning-
making practices with/in Nature; within this framework, all knowledge of
Nature must be made from a mutually exclusively cultural position (see
Barad, 2007; Latour, 1993, 2004). Through patterns of similar differ-
ences and different similarities, as Frédérique articulates, meaning-making
practices within the social sciences (such as anthropology) are similarly but
differently entangled with/in the Nature/Culture exclusive dichotomy.
Through the capillary circulation of scientificity, meaning-making prac-
tices within the social sciences are often (re)shaped such that knowledge
of Culture must be made from a mutually exclusive cultural position (see
Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Lather, 2007; St. Pierre, 2011a, 2011b).
Recall that Smith (Smith 1999/2012) posits that distance is a key orga-
nizing concept for understanding how Western modernity is enacted. She
expands upon this by stating that distance becomes the enactment of
the “specific spatial vocabulary of colonialism which can be assembled
around three concepts: (1) the line, (2) the centre, and (3) the outside”
(Smith, 1999/2012, p. 55). The dividing line of mutual exclusivity is a
(supposed) hermetic safeguard which masks the ways in which the outside
and the inside are always already in proximal relation. Within the sciences
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as well as the social sciences, one consequence of such a mutual exclu-
sivity is the inability to account for the ways in which Nature comes
to bear upon Culture, how Culture comes to bear upon Nature, and
an extreme difficulty in occupying both spaces simultaneously (Barad,
2007, 2010; Kirby, 2011; Latour, 1993, 2004). Through scientificity, the
mutual exclusion of Nature and Culture translated into research practices
in which cultural locations of observer and observed could be conceptual-
ized and enacted as separate and separable: discounting the ways in which
there is no outside of Culture.10
With/in the multicultural science education debate, such mutual exclu-
sivity makes difficult even the task of engaging in the question can science
(i.e., knowing nature) and justice (i.e., respecting diverse cultural knowl-
edges) co-exist within the science education classroom? As Latour (2004)
reminds us, “the notions of nature and [cultural] politics had been devel-
oped over centuries in such a way as to make any juxtaposition, any
synthesis, any combination of the two terms impossible” (p. 3, emphasis
in original). As explored within Chapter 3, such a dichotomized relation-
ship makes it such that one can ask ethical questions of science or scientific
questions of ethics, but never fully arriving at something that effectively
straddles and occupies both spaces simultaneously within the terms artic-
ulated by both: the production of an ethical science that is the product of
both yet still retains sameness. Such is, as Spivak (1976) refers, an infinite
dream of plenitude (as the concept of an ethical science would produc-
tively exceed conceptions of both ethics and science), it is an impossibility
that is nonetheless worth striving for.
The goal of ethical justice-to-come within science education, or a way
of knowing nature that can account for or be accountable to its cultural
politics, is all the more prescient when considering what Latour (1993)
refers to as particular universalism. Recall, as Latour (1993) states, one
cultural location always comes to be deemed as the valid location from
which to make meaning of nature: that of Man (“the masculine Euro-
pean, Western European male” as Frédérique states).11 It has been and
continues to be articulated both within the sciences and the social sciences
that the Nature/Culture binary has and upholds a Eurocentric legacy
(Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Latour, 1993). As an in-between space, the same
has been argued many times over that the multicultural science educa-
tion debate is one that, at its very roots, operates within and against
the bounds of Eurocentrism (Aikenhead & Michell, 2011; Lewis &
Aikenhead, 2001; McKinley, 2000; Sammel, 2009); an entangled part
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of the whole that even some scientists are beginning to comment on
(e.g., Mazzocchi, 2006, 2008). Lewis and Aikenhead (2001) summa-
rize Eurocentrism as “the idea that the people, places, and events of
Western European cultures are superior and a standard against which
other cultures should be judged” (p. 53). Within this debate and similar
others in which epistemological claims are being made across cultural
contexts, it is important to consider both the relationships, and the
processes of translating, between cultural spaces. This becomes all the
more pressing when the West is included within this act of translations as:
Eurocentrism is the colonizer’s model of the world in a very literal sense:
it is not merely a set of beliefs, a bundle of beliefs. It has evolved, through
time, into a finely sculpted model, a structured whole; in fact a single
theory, a general framework for many smaller theories, historical, geograph-
ical, psychological, sociological, and philosophical. This supertheory is
diffusionism. (Blaut, 1993, pp. 10–11)
As James Blaut (1993) explains, through this diffusionist12 model of
dissemination, Eurocentric modes of thought centre themselves and prop-
agate, all the while subjecting, assimilating, and subsuming other modes
of thought (see also Battiste, 2005). “Universalism”, which is one of the
many faces or applied strategies of Eurocentrism, is achieved through
diffusionism and the ways in which Western knowledge comes to be
positioned against other systems of knowledge as the norm. Within the
multicultural science education debate this relational positioning produces
“the implicit curriculum message… that the only science is [W]estern
science” (Hodson, 1993, p. 686, emphasis in original).
This becomes all the more complex when considering that
Nature/Culture as a mutually exclusive dichotomy that is but one onto-
logical configuration among many, as explored earlier with this chapter.
As Latour (1993) reminds, the Nature/Culture binary is never fully
achieved or achievable. “We Have Never Been Modern” as the epony-
mous title of his book proclaims. There have always been natural-cultural
hybrids existing in the space(s) between Nature and Culture as the result
of the ways in which Nature and Culture always already flow into one
another: we are always already in a space of account-ability towards and
for the ways in which ontological configurations (e.g., Nature/Culture
binary) coalesce with epistemology and ethics (e.g., particular univer-
salism). Science and science educational spaces are not exempt from
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this occurrence. While some are problematic and some offer productive
possibilities, when the world is conceived of and enacted through a mutu-
ally exclusive binary, ways-of-knowing nature cannot account for or be
accountable to natural-cultural hybrids.
As Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin spoke, one of the greatest conse-
quences of the particular universalism (Latour, 1993) through which
science endeavours to mirror Nature from its cultural location is that
some bodies are proclaimed as being “closer to Nature”. Such “natu-
ralized facts” come to be double(d) diminishing: the ways of knowing
articulated from these positions are denied validity (see Chapter 3), such
as TEK and IWLN, as they fail to achieve the normative and “necessary”
criteria of distance through which a mirroring of nature is achievable
(see Chapter 4); but furthermore, it is to deny the humanity of Man’s
“abject other” (e.g., Indigenous peoples, women, etc.) as it relies upon a
conception of Nature (i.e., ontology) as static, uniform, and unflinching
such that Man’s “abject other” become but uni-dimensional people (see
Higgins, Wallace, & Bazzul, 2019; McKinley, 2000, 2007).
Within other fields, responses to “naturalized facts” have been
to reverse the Nature/Culture binary or to abandon Nature alto-
gether. However, such anti-ontological stances that circulated with
the social sciences with a bit more ease (e.g., “too simple” readings
of Butler’s [1990] Gender Trouble)13 would not find a welcome,
frequent, or widespread home within the sciences and science
education despite their overlapping spaces of meaning-making (see
Barad, 2000, 2011). The reversal of the resident hierarchy between
Nature and Culture would not suffice or be viable to many within
science education. This can be attributed to the holding and being
held by knowledge of nature as separate and separable from cultural
politics, often times antagonistically; they are most commonly defined
and enacted through a mutually exclusive Nature/Culture dichotomy
(Latour, 2004). For many scientists and science educators, the false
binary choice of renouncing science to strive for ethics produces an
unintelligible scientific subject (see Chapters 3 and 5). These continue to
complicate questions of accounting for and being accountable to Culture
(or even culture) in the process of meaning-making with Nature.
However, as Frédérique Apffel-Marglin posits within the interview, and
as explored within the Chapter 3, not all positions need to be antagonistic.
There are productive intermediary positions that can operate simulta-
neously within and against such that it productively retains a degree
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of intelligibility and desirability. Thus, speaking to productive natural-
cultural hybrids, recall that deconstruction is a two-part process which
must necessarily begin with the reversal of the hierarchy but must then
undo the hierarchy altogether by paying attention to the moments in
which the hierarchy altogether vacillates between its constitutive terms.
Dr. Apffel-Marglin’s quick but incisive pointing towards her work, (see
Apffel-Marglin, 2011) and that of others, with regards to anthropogenic
(or cultural) landscapes opens up productive natural-cultural locations on
terms that act as an invitation to dialogue rather than a dismissal. In
other words, as anthropogenic landscapes are within the realm of scien-
tific discovery, they cannot be so easily dismissed as being “antagonistic”
cultural politics (e.g., in the case of the critical reversal of critiques of
“naturalized facts”; e.g., Siegel, 2001), and furthermore act as an invita-
tion to reconsider the very terms under which science operate within the
very linguistic practices that science utilizes: it is a critical inhabitation.
Continuing this critical inhabitation, Dr. Apffel-Marglin begins to
articulate in the following sections, the way in which the Nature/Culture
mutually exclusive dichotomy (i.e., what is traditionally referred to simply
as “ontology”) is not something that strictly is or is not but rather in a
state of ongoing becoming by highlighting processes and peoples involved
in its operationalization.
Second Cut: Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin on Descartes, Boyle,
and Newton
M. HIGGINS: Within the Nature/Culture dichotomy, even as it always
being produced anew through a continued entanglement with other
binaries such as masculine/feminine, one of the common threads being
pulled through is dualistic thinking. While the origin of dualistic
thinking (if we can say there is one) is largely, and often, attributed
to René Descartes, you extend this to also include the seventeenth
century scientific revolution as well as the work of Robert Boyle and
Isaac Newton. Why are these three key figures in the production of
what is often referred to as a mechanical, clockwork universe, as well as
dualistic thought?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : First, I want to preface this by saying that the
new (new of course in the seventeenth century) Cartesian-Boylian-
Newtonian paradigm, has of course much deeper and wider historical
roots. In my book, when I discuss representationalism [i.e., the episte-
mological and ontological web of concepts and categories enacted and
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operationalized through representation], I go all the way back to Plato
and the Greek alphabet. So there are deep roots that are entangled
within the Cartesian-Boylian-Newtonian paradigm, even if you stick
with the birth of modernity. Not as deep as Plato, but certainly a few
centuries preceding the scientific revolution. Of course this is simpli-
fying it. Nevertheless, there is something very special and key about
these three. They might not have created it whole cloth [i.e., entirely
responsible for its fabrication] but it would not have had the power,
particularly the persuasive power, were it not for those three because at
the time it was a highly debated and contested new paradigm.
Descartes was the first philosopher of materialism. He was very system-
atic in his approach to establishing res cogitans [i.e., epistemology] and,
by extension through separation and mutual exclusivity, res extensa [i.e.,
ontology]. So Descartes is writing in the early 1600s, and most of his
writing is around 1620–1630 and he died in 1650. Descartes was a
philosopher, so he is making a thought structure; he systematized this
philosophy before Boyle comes along.
Boyle is mid seventeenth century (i.e., 1650s). He is doing his exper-
iments with the air pump but he probably only started in the 1640s; for
him the key period are the 1650s. Why is Boyle important? Boyle oper-
ationalizes Descartes. How did Boyle do this? He creates the laboratory,
the modest witnesses, and a literary technology, as Shapin and Schaffer
have brilliantly shown. He is important because he invents these practices
that constitute the scientific experimental method. How key can you be?
He is operationalizing Descartes’ systematization of thought by making
it work in action. Boyle was an actor in the creation of The President,
Council, and Fellows of the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural
Knowledge, also known as the Royal Society . He did this because he had
to. At the time, universities were a monopoly of the church; this new
knowledge had to happen outside. At the same time as the Royal Society,
there was also an Italian academy, as well as l’Académie Française started
by Mersenne and Descartes. However, within a few decades, the Royal
Society quickly became the dominant academy of science as the king of
England was funding it. To open up a new academic space outside of
the church was absolutely key when it came to operationalizing Cartesian
materialism.
Why Newton is so important is because he brought together
Descartes and Boyle by establishing the mathematical relationship
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between Descartes’ philosophy and Boyle’s practice [i.e., through what
is commonly referred to as Newtonian physics today]. Canonically, the
age of the scientific revolution is seen as starting with Copernicus mid-
sixteenth century with his On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres that
was published posthumously in 1543. Newton, with his Principia Math-
ematica in 1687, just clinched it. He was absolutely brilliant, and also
very powerful. He was lionized. He is buried where the kings are buried
in England. He was the most famous man of his time. He had advised
the king and he had enormous power, power that he nurtured very care-
fully. He knew perfectly well, that there were certain things he could not
make public, such as his engagement in practices of hermeticism [i.e.,
non-Cartesian Western ways-of-knowing-Nature which blended scientific
practices with “magical” ones such as alchemy and astrology].14
Second Cut: Descartes, Boyle, Newton, and the Multicultural Science
Education Debate
From Dr. Apffel-Marglin’s critical inhabitation of a historical narrative
of modernity, what we begin to see emerge here is that Cartesianism
is not something that is but is rather becoming. As van Eijck and Roth
(2007) remind within the context of the multicultural science educa-
tion debate, it is important to consider science not as knowledge but
as knowledge-processes that are highly contextualized and situated. One
such consideration for Cartesianism as becoming rather than being is to
refuse its frequent positioning as naturalized within an ahistorical present
(see Spivak, 1999). However, even if we trace its historicity, it cannot
simply be referred to as knowledge originating from and obtained by
René Descartes that, as the truth, mirrors metaphysics. Rather, it is a
knowledge-process that is without an origin (e.g., Plato): its meaning and
matter are always deferred and differing such that it forms an ongoing
citational chain (see Barad, 2007, 2010; Derrida, 1976). Cartesianism,
as Dr. Apffel-Marglin explains, is not created “whole cloth” by René
Descartes, nor by Thomas Boyle, or Isaac Newton: Cartesianism is some-
thing that precedes, lives alongside, and outlives all three through its
circulation and differential enactments across a multiplicity of spaces.
Nonetheless, these three do come to be key actors in the operational-
ization of Cartesianism such that it is widespread, commonplace, and
“common sense”; something one has and by which one is had (see Barad,
2007; Higgins, 2014).
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Diffracting Frédérique’s account of Descartes, Boyle, and Newton with
and through the multicultural science education debate again reinforces
the notion that the Nature/Culture mutually exclusive dichotomy is but
a configuration among many and that it is an onto-epistemological enact-
ment that we are responsible for; even if, as Barad (2007) states, we
choose and are chosen by such configurations (see also Butler, 2005).
However, what significantly begins to resonate with this vignette is
that Cartesianism, when considered through distributed agency (Barad,
2007), can be considered as a “regime of truth” (Foucault, 1977, 1979).
In other words, through their respective metaphysical framework, labora-
tory practice, and mathematics, Descartes, Boyle, and Newton implicitly
enact theory-practices that implicitly come to support one another. As
Foucault (1979) explains, “‘truth’ is linked in a circular relation with
systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power
which it induces and which extend it” (p. 47). The example at the begin-
ning of this chapter could be stated as a singular application of such
a regime of truth: Cobern and Loving (2008), in their argument for
(re)considering and supporting an epistemology of “epistemic realism”,
pivot and side-step to “ontology” (read: singular; i.e., Cartesianism)
without being accountable to or for the ways in which the two share a
co-constitutive onto-epistemic relationship. This is often the case when
and where it comes to the defence of WMS as the way of knowing
nature: these diverse knowledge claims which come to reinforce WMS
almost always operate through the differing similarity through an implicit
assumption that Cartesianism is the (only) ontology. It is no surprise,
as Dr. Apffel-Marglin continues to expand upon this, that Cartesianism
comes to be (re)presented as “common sense” (as Cobern & Loving
(2008) define it), holding the ahistorical appearance of stability, neutrality,
and normality.
Furthermore, as indicated here and expanded upon within the next
section, knowledge and power share a co-constitutive relationship and
important role in the dispersal of such knowledge-practices (Foucault,
1977, 1979). For example, the earlier footnote regarding Newton’s
dual positioning with respect to modern science and hermeticism reveals
Newton to having, and being had, by power. He is being produced as a
scientific subject that simultaneously upholds and is upheld by systems of
power.15 However, as discussed in the following section, such a dispersal
of knowledge-practices comes to bear at a larger scale when considering
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the technologies which operationalize this way of knowing-in-being (e.g.,
the enclosure, the double-sided ledger, and the laboratory).
Third Cut: Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin on the Enclosure,
the Double-Sided Ledger, and the Laboratory
M. HIGGINS: While we are on the subject, within your book, you make
clear that “the scientific revolution was not the result of decades
of discoveries, but was in the making for centuries” (Apffel-Marglin,
2011, p. 33). While ideas and ways-of-thinking, like the Cartesian-
Boylian-Newtonian framework, are always being (re)generated, those
that “stick” (and stick around) are those that are operationalized and
become embedded within the matrix of power/knowledge. It is impor-
tant to speak of Descartes, Boyle, and Newton when tracing or retracing
the production of the Nature/Culture exclusive dichotomy, as they were
key players in making operational this dualism. However, this is not
to say that the scientific revolution to which Nature/Culture is often
attributed origin was not entangled with and in the social, political,
religious, economic and other events, tensions, and forces that were
happening at the time as well as the time which preceded it. Could you
give a thumbnail account of the state of the European subject histori-
cally around and preceding the “tipping point” of modernity [i.e., the
scientific revolution]?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : There’s two ways I can answer that question.
I could answer it in terms of the forces that killed hylozoism [i.e.,
a Western European relational way-of-knowing-in-being of the time
premised around the notion that all matter is in some sense alive;
shares a relation with hermeticism] and made what Descartes or Boyle
called the molecular or atomic model of the world, and human-
istic/materialistic dualism the dominant and winning view.
Another way to answer this question is to go historical and speak to the
history of the fall of the manorial system, sometimes called the feudal
system, and all the conflicts that emerge. I have to preface this by saying
that I owe a serious intellectual debt to my ex-husband Stephen Marglin’s
work, as he’s done a huge amount of historical work on the birth of
capitalism. Drawing from literature on economic anthropology, historical
economics, and such works, I have come to the view that the enclo-
sure movement is associated with the birth of Cartesian dualism. What I
argue is that it is that economic context of the emergence of mercantilism,
which isn’t yet capitalism, but rather proto-capitalism. It is a proto-market
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economy that comes to replace the manorial system that begins with
the enclosure of the commons. The enclosing of the commons started
in Western Europe, continued through colonialization, and now persists
through globalization. It is incredibly relevant when you’re dealing with
Indigenous peoples, places, and protocols as this enclosure movement
has continued. The enclosure of the commons is for me the key thing
that gives the social, political, and religious context that gives credit
and credence to Descartes’, Boyle’s and, Newton’s intellectual work and
makes it stick.
M. HIGGINS: As you state in your book Subversive Spiritualities, under-
standing the enclosure movement and the encloser’s advantage are
important in setting the stage for and are entangled within the opera-
tionalization of the Nature/Culture dichotomy. Could you speak more
to this movement and its consequences?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : At the time of the enclosure movement, there
was a lot of conflict. It was a time of peasant wars in France and in
England. There was tremendous social and political conflict. However,
the enclosure movement was simply a power play.
This plays out similarly today: governments in the global South are
currently signing the Free Trade agreement with the United States in
which the small print says that you have to make land available to busi-
nesses, that land being the commons for Indigenous peoples. Because
Indigenous peoples don’t have title to it, the governments can say “no,
we’re giving it to the oil companies, the mining companies, the timbering
companies, the agri-chemical companies, etc.”. That is currently what is
going on, and it is going on everywhere in the global South.
This is what happened, first in England, France, and a few other coun-
tries in Western Europe. The rich powerful merchants simply bullied
others to get their way through the local courts. Because they had money
and connections, they could make it stick. They gained title to the land,
and then they actually put up a fence: that’s what enclosure means. So
you put a fence, and say: “this is mine”. Then you use the land as you see
fit. At the beginning, it was because the price of wool cloth went up and
the world was trading wool cloth, so they wanted to get into that trade
by raising and pasturing sheep. So they simply bullied everybody with the
support of the aristocracy because many merchants were aristocrats. They
made it stick legally through the courts but also through direct violence.
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M. HIGGINS: One of the things I appreciate in this discussion and in your
book is that the enclosure is not only a figurative or epistemological
form of separation but rather or also one that is literal and material.
Part of this comes into play in your exploration the enclosure as an
enactment through the calculation of the encloser’s advantage in which
you make clear that the calculation not only exerts power following its
enactment, but also through its enactment; the calculation itself and
that which is entangled with/in it is important.
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : This is directly related to the beginning of banks.
I’ve fallen by chance on this while exploring the history of mathematics.
In my discussion of the whole history of mathematics within Subversive
Spritualities, an important moment is when one becomes a real number.
One is what you use for counting; when one becomes a number, it
creates a new category, that of magnitude.
The first banks emerged in the great merchant cities of Italy. The Latin
word ratio, while I didn’t do the philology [i.e., the study of language
in written historical sources located between history and linguistics] of it,
I understand it to mean double-entry book-keeping from its use at the
time. It also bears a relationship to rationality. Ratio becomes rationality:
that’s the way it is born. The double-entry ratio-based calculation [e.g.,
quantifiable equivalencies], that’s what makes rationality possible.
To calculate one’s advantage, you have to remove yourself. Remove
yourself from the land and the community. The people and the land are
no longer one thing, belonging to each other sharing and living together.
If you go into Indigenous communities, people usually do not calculate
like that, even among small farmers in India. That’s where I first encoun-
tered it. In the Indigenous communities here (Peruvian High Amazon),
it’s glaring: no one calculates in these ways. You do things to live and to
regenerate life.
It goes together with my argument about the Burning Times when
they exterminated hylozoism, hermeticism, alchemy, and various other
ways-of-knowing and -being. The peasants, the so-called witches, and
the so-called magicians were very close with each other and constantly
sharing knowledge through contact with each other. Therefore, calcu-
lating the encloser’s advantage has political, economic, social, and spiritual
consequences. They are all entangled.
The mutually exclusive Nature/Culture dichotomy has its birth in
removing the people from the land, and using the land as an economic
asset. Land becomes a thing, an object on or through which, depending
6 POSITING CARTESIANISM AS AN ONTOLOGY WITHIN SCIENCE … 239
what you do with it, one generates an economic profit based on and
derived through calculations of an advantage accruing to a single (male)
owner and along with it excluding the other members of the land, the
non-humans, the other humans in the community and the other-than-
humans, namely the earth beings. Advantage was the term that they used
at the time. This is the beginning of the end.
M. HIGGINS: Could you speak further to the consequences of the enclo-
sure movement for those who were unwillingly entangled? What did
this mean for those who might not have had the privilege of being an
encloser?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : The herbalists, like Indigenous peoples and their
relationship to Land, depended on being able to live in the forest and
knowing the forest very well, its animals and plants, in order to know
how to heal people. However, once the commons were enclosed, they
were no longer allowed access. They could not continue their prac-
tice. The church backed the powerful by calling the commoner women
witches, and by calling them heretics. At the end of the fifteenth century,
in 1484, the Pope in Rome declared witches to be heretics. If they could
be proven to be witches, they were to be burned. This was the Burning
Times. Witches, however, had always existed, why declare them heretics
at the end of the fifteenth century when they had always been around?
The short answer is that they were no longer tolerated. I argue that the
main reason why the inquisition set on them at that particular time in
history is to be correlated with the enclosure movement.
At the time the process of enclosing the commons was going on hylozoist
experimenters and Cartesian-Boylian experimenters were having debates.
When discussing enclosures, you had those who were criticizing and those
who were defending this practice. Critics and defenders could be from the
same class; it depended on one’s politics. But not unlike today, those who
defended the enclosure tended to be landowners: wealthy merchants and
aristocrats. While there was this tendency, you cannot say ‘always’ here
because people did not always act according to their class.
It is not unlike what’s going on today in the Global South in general.
Recently, in Bagua, Peru, a similar debate was public. It was amazing
to see that everyone who was criticizing the enclosure of land professed
that everyone has a right to the commons. That is the meaning of a
commons, belonging to everyone. The vulnerable, the old, the widows,
those who are unlucky, and etc. are assured of their daily bread; they
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can live because they have access to the commons. The calculation of
the encloser’s advantage begins with the enclosure of land and thereby
making land an exclusive property of the encloser.
I’m now writing for an encyclopedia of Hinduism on how food was
seen in pre-colonial times in India. Everyone has a right to life by virtue
of being born: that is how the polity [i.e., local government] was orga-
nized, and how people behaved. If you are alive, you deserve to eat.
What emerges through the enclosure of the commons is that you eat
only if you work earning wages with which to purchase food which
implies the associated need of creating labour as a commodity. You have
to sell your labour because it is the only way you can access food. Selling
one’s labour requires a previous transformation which consists in owning
your individual body whose labour power is something that you can sell
because you are its exclusive owner. Before the enclosure movement, and
in today’s Indigenous and small peasant societies, your labour is not some-
thing for which you get paid. Instead, your neighbours and your relatives
get together everyday and work on your land and tomorrow you’re going
to work on their land—that kind of principle. You can extend it to other
and bigger things, but that is how people do things; labour is not a
commodity or something you sell.
M. HIGGINS: The creation of the body as labour speaks to the operation
of what Karen Barad (2007) refers to as a “metaphysics of individu-
alism”. In other words, a body, be it human, other-than-human, or
more-than-human that is separate and separable. This, as you state,
disrupts relationships of community between human, non-human and
other-than-human. Could you elaborate more on the notion of closure
and boundedness of the human body and how it ties into this separation
and separability?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : The non-porous body bounded by the skin is
necessary for the emergence of labour as a commodity because you
have to own your body, its power and its force, in order to sell it. The
body as a biological bounded separate entity that you own so that you
can sell it implies a capitalist market economy. Labour is, according to
Karl Polanyi, one of the three forces of production [i.e., land, labour,
and capital], without which you would not have capitalism.
If you insist on the biological boundedness of bodies and you teach
that to kids, you implicitly reproduce the capitalist mode of production.
This entails a devalorizing of the commons and what I call the cosmo-
centric economy, the exchange of gifts within the human, non-human
and other-than-human communities and everything that these represent.
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Accordingly, it is a statement that Indigenous and rural peasant people are
backwards and superstitious, while simultaneously opening a wide space
for the entrance of a profit-motivated market economy. This closes the
door to non-modern ways of life in which the commons are central. Not
only commons as land but its web of interconnected commons: food as
commons (i.e., one person starves, everyone starves; one person eats,
everybody eats), water as commons, air as commons, knowledge as a
commons.
M.HIGGINS: In your book, you speak of this with respect to the spirit of
the gift and communal labour. It is not the measuring or quantification
of labour that is important but rather it is the act of coming together
and working towards common goals that is important.
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Exactly, and you can extend that. The labour is
not only to cultivate the neighbour’s field or your relative’s field, but
it is also for festivals. In medieval Europe, all the cathedrals were built
that way. All the non-modern great works, like the pyramids in Egypt
and in meso-America, they were built in that way. It was not paid
labour because there was no labour as a commodity; you do it for
the community, not only of humans but also for the non-humans and
other-than-humans.
Accordingly, there are important ties between labour as commodity and
land as commodity. Through the enclosure of land, land emerges as a
commodity. Becoming private property, you can buy and sell land because
it belongs to somebody. It is the same thing with labour as a commodity.
It makes the body a form of property. You own your body; and because
you own your body, you can sell your labour power on the market.
It’s a profound transformation. However, it took a long time to change
the habits of people, to make people develop the habits necessary to create
labour as a commodity within these new norms. Nonetheless, because
labour as a commodity is an abstraction, this profoundly transformed the
sense of what a person is and can be.
Schooling plays an important and ongoing role with this. It was and is
through schooling, especially early nineteenth century and the end of the
eighteenth century during the period when schooling became obligatory,
that you learn the disciplines necessary to sell your labour power. In many
Indigenous communities, you typically did not or do not do this. The
transitions that occurred during the modernization of Western Europe
continue to be relevant today, even if these transitions happened in other
parts of the world at another time.
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M.HIGGINS: This is certainly a double(d) form of disciplining bodies
within schools. Students are not only learning the disciplines (e.g.,
sciences, arts), but also learning as a form of discipline in and of itself.
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Of course, through many bodily cues: the bells
which reinforce punctuality and a disciplining of time, bodies sitting at
a desk in a row of desks for so many hours engaged in mental focus, all
of these things and more.
M.HIGGINS: Foucault’s Discipline and Punish does a terrific job of
unpacking the normative organization of bodies within systems of
schooling and the modernist values at play there.
Directly related to this is the question of Boyle’s laboratory. While
Descartes is often attributed dualistic thought (i.e., cogito ergo sum), you
state that it was Boyle who operationalized it through his “technologies”
of the scientific laboratory. What did these entail and how did this work
towards the operationalization of the Nature/Culture binary?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : I have to preface this by stating that Boyle used
to be an alchemist, which is a form of hylozoism. But, in the transition
to the laboratory, he shifted from a hylozoist practice to a dualist one.
The work of Elizabeth Potter is key here because she shows that he
was a big landowner. He was politically motivated by the possibility of
losing his land. That’s the beauty of this kind of work. It shows that the
scientific method and the experimental scientific method had everything
to do with politics, economics, and religions of the time and place.
Getting back to your question, this is pure Shapin and Schaffer and the
work they do in their book Leviathan and the Air Pump. In their work,
they identify three technologies which I mentioned earlier. One was the
creation of the laboratory. Prior to the scientific revolution, the hylozoist
or hermeticist (known under the more general term of “occult philoso-
pher”) worked in private in a secret cabinet. There he did all sorts of
alchemical experiments, as well as other kinds of things. He would use
a variety of instruments to conduct experimentations. However, a crucial
shift was when the lab became a public space. Why did it have to be a
public space? For several reasons; one of which being that by making it
a public space you are stating that you are not an occult philosopher.
Making the laboratory a public space is equivalent to declaring that “I’m
not an Occult Philosopher”. While it was still a choice to be a hylozoist
at the time since there were active debates at the time between hylozoists
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and mechanicists, the hylozoists were still being persecuted by the inqui-
sitions of both Protestants and Catholics. Second, it had to be public in
order to establish what Shapin and Schaffer call the social technology.
This second technology, the social technology, was utilized to estab-
lish the facts, which was called the “matter of fact” or the scientific fact,
within the laboratory. The model for this system being the court,16 and
the court being a system of witnesses, facts would be established through
witnessing. To do this, you had to have witnesses to the experiment
and have a discussion about what was witnessed. Only when there was
a consensus of what they had seen could the matter of fact be established.
To achieve this what was needed was a public space with several witnesses.
Key to the act of witnessing is what Boyle called the “modest witness”.
The modesty, what did it entail or mean? It meant that the witnesses
had to be reliable people who would not let their personal preferences,
personal desires, personal biases influence what they saw, and what they
would say they saw. That is what excluded women because the belief at
the time was that the modesty of a woman was of the body, that she did
not have modesty of the mind.
The third technology is a literary technology. It was for those who
could not be there, present to witness the experiment whether they lived
in some other country or simply could not come. They had to develop
a technology that could describe what happened without interjecting any
opinion. This literary technology came to be known as the objective style
of writing. “It has happened”, that type of linguistic construction. It was
so that those who were not present could have what came to be called
a precise and objective account of what happened. The remaining tech-
nologies had to do with the distribution of these texts. So those are the
three technologies.
Third Cut: The Enclosure, the Double-Sided Ledger, the Laboratory,
and the Multicultural Science Education Debate
A notion that persistently resonates as the multicultural science education
debate is diffracted with this segmented cut of Dr. Apffel-Marglin’s inter-
view is that, as Aikenhead (2006) reminds us, “natural philosophy [is]
the handmaiden of technology” (p. 11). Scientific technologies are never
simply the applied form of science knowledge: they always come to co-
constitute one another. Further, technologies are never simply neutral nor
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passive cultural surfaces, they are both products and producers of cultural
values.
Expanding upon the lines of thinking followed within the second cut,
not only is the operationalization of Cartesianism an enactment that is
distributed among a series of agents, but it is also distributed among a
series of increasingly “common” technologies which precede, live along-
side, and succeed Boyle, Netwon, and Descartes. If we think diffractively
with technologies (and not only scientific ones concerned with generating
or applying knowledge about nature) then: Nature, metaphysics, as well
as how they are understood and enacted through knowledge-practices
always come to bear. Social, political, and economic technologies come
to be ontological enactments; as well as epistemic ones in which social,
political, and economic dimensions come to coalesce without ever fully
achieving sameness (see Barad, 2007; Kirby, 2011). The technologies
of the enclosure, the double-sided ledger, as well as the laboratory are
all supported by particular ways-of-knowing-nature such that they are
produced by and (re)produce a “metaphysics of individualism” (Barad,
2007): knowing-in-being premised upon matter and meaning being sepa-
rable and individuated through mutual exclusivity. Such ontological cuts
are never neutral, but are always already entangled with culture and
ethics; even if the enactment is (re)producing epistemic, ontological, and
ethical separation, it is nonetheless placed within a set of relations, even
if the relationships go unaccounted for and unaccountable within said
framework.
This includes, of particular significance to the multicultural science
education debate, the very practices of the laboratory.17 The practices of
knowing nature within WMS are often premised upon scientists operating
from a culturally unbiased, neutral, and detached position (see Aikenhead
& Michell, 2011; Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; Siegel, 2001), and are
supported by social and literary technologies which assist in the produc-
tion of such (e.g., the laboratory as public space, objective writing style,
and modest witness). However, as Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin states,
“the scientific method had everything to do with politics, economics, and
religions of the time and place”. As mentioned herein, Thomas Boyle, a
key figure in the development of the laboratory as a technology, was also
a landowner. In turn, his politics outside the laboratory came to shape his
politics inside the laboratory even if the laboratory were to be promoted
as an apolitical space; he would implicitly and explicitly be bringing in
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and enacting the technologies of the double-sided ledger and the enclo-
sure within the laboratory whether they could be or were accounted for.
Note that one should not confuse the practices of the laboratory with
those of the enclosure or the double-sided ledger, but rather, thinking
diffractively (or even with prismatic dispersal) speaks to the ways in which
these practices intra-act with one another in non-negligible and dialog-
ical manners: creating something that is not dialectically mirroring one or
the other through sameness but creating a complex hybrid practice whose
historical and agential constitution often goes unaccounted for.
Recall that, as mentioned earlier within the chapter, attempting to
make sense of and act with TEK and/or IWLN through a Eurocentric-
Cartesian framework almost always results in the perception of these
knowledge-practices as lesser alternatives to WMS. Thinking with
Frédérique here expands upon that notion: a Eurocentric-Cartesianism
framework does not only come to devalue other ways-of-knowing-nature.
When considering its operationalization as well as its entangled practices,
it also comes to disrupt their (re)generation. Dr. Apffel-Marglin makes
the case above that the entangled practices of the enclosure and the
double-sided ledger come to produce destabilizing patterns within TEK
systems within Western Europe at the turn of modernity, patterns which
would and do continue through the imperial cum capitalist project of
(neo-)colonialism.18 First, through the practice of the double-sided
ledger, land can be assessed as through a reductionistic logics of equiv-
alence and sameness through quantifiability. In the short physical space
between one side of the ledger and the other, the human, other-than-
human, and more-than-human ecology of relationships is reduced to both
a spatial area and a fiscal value which are given the status of equivalency:
a veritable trick of smoke and mirrors. Secondly, by making the commons
private through the enclosure, the unaccounted for relationships which
shape entire lived knowledge systems are disrupted. Knowledge holders
no longer have the same type of access to the landscapes with and
from which they learn (see Cajete, 1994); furthermore, the relational
and ethical knowledge-practices through which these ecologies are
(re)generated are not sustained. Lastly, when the enclosure and the
double-sided ledger are metaphorically inflected through human bodies
that live(d) in and with the commons, they too become commodities.
The biological boundedness of the human body and the economic logics
of sameness (re)shape labour as commodity rather than something that
one gives and receives unequally but rather equitably within a reciprocal
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gift-based economy: “You own your body; and because you own your
body, you can sell your labour power on the market”. As these values
came to permeate the social, political, and economic facets of Western
modern life, it “profoundly transformed the sense of what a person is
and can be” by (re)shaping the norms of subjectification.
While these social, cultural, political, and economic values slip their way
into scientific practice unnoticed and unnoticeably due to its framings as
apolitical, the apolitical stance of the modest witness is also produced by
the social, cultural, and political climate of the time, as explored within
the next section.
Fourth Cut: Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin on the Modest Witness,
When One Truth Becomes Two, and the Thirty Years’ War
M.HIGGINS: Regarding the modest witness and the norms that shape who
can be a witness, you’ve mentioned that women were excluded on the
basis of the gendered understandings of modesty at the time. Were there
other people who were excluded and on what basis?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Yes, there are absolutely others. In the laborato-
ry’s beginning, to be in the lab, you had to be independently wealthy
to participate. This was for two reasons. First, you had to be wealthy
because it was personally expensive: you had to have the time, as well
as have education that entailed knowing mathematics and a few other
things. Only the wealthy people could be educated; they were all men.
As such, the “modest witness” excludes not only all women but also a
lot of men such as the lower classes and the uneducated ones.
Secondly, it was systematically expensive. This was because the university
was church business. One of the fundamental characteristics of the lab,
as Boyle set it up, was that within that space it was absolutely forbidden
to talk about religion and politics. Now why do you think that was? Why
do you think he made that rule if we’re talking about the seventeenth
century and what was going on in the seventeenth century?
M.HIGGINS: There were still witch-hunts going on, right? There would
be politico-religious consequences for those who might be hylozoists
and hermeticists, which go far beyond attempting to be “modest” in
one’s assumptions and biases, correct?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Yes, and what else?
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M. HIGGINS: There also would have been the politics of land ownership
I gather, but I’m guessing that there is something even more critical
than this.
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Wars of religion. They are also key in under-
standing the birth and operationalization of the Boyle-Newtonian-
Cartesian framework. It started with the Reformation in 1510 with
Martin Luther. Protestants immediately had a following amongst the
merchant and certain aristocratic classes, and even among some royal
families. It divided countries between regions that were Protestant and
regions that were Catholic.
The Catholic Church is a centralized church which has a pyramidal hier-
archy with the Pope at the top. Because of its pyramidal and international
organization, as well as its domination of education at all levels, they could
decide what people should and could think and read, as well as what they
should not think or read. It still exists today, the means through which
a dominant curriculum was established and monopolized: what they call
Librorum Prohibitum. It tells you what is what, what is true, what is super-
stitious, and what is false. They also have the power of excommunication,
which was very powerful at the time. It is not like today.
The problem then and there was the following. The reformation spread
very quickly. Protestants stated “we have the truth; the Catholics are
mistaken; what they do is magic”. In Western Europe, the One Truth
became two. Both Catholics and Protestants each said they had the One
Truth. It was explosive. Indeed, it created mayhem. They killed each other
with gusto, brutality, and horror.
In the early seventeenth century, they assassinated Henri IV, King of
France [not to be confused with Henry IV, king of England from 1399
to 1413]. He was Protestant but to be king he had to be Catholic. That is
what he meant by his famous line: “la France vaut bien une messe”. It was
well worth going to mass in order to be the king of France. There were
8 bloody civil wars in the sixteenth century, in the 1500s, so he made a
very famous law: the Édit de Nantes in 1598 [the Edict of Nantes]. It
was a very modest proposal to live together without killing each other.
In regions in which the majority was Protestant, the Catholic had the
right to have their religion albeit not display it publicly. In regions in
which the majority was Catholic, it was the reverse. They had the right
to practice, but not to display; not rub it in the face of the other. While
it was a minimalistic accommodation, it worked. However, there were 10
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assassination attempts against Henry IV, and finally the last one worked:
he was killed in 1610. His second successor, not the next king but the
king after that, Louis XIV eventually threw all the Protestants, known as
“huguenots”, out of France.
This is a thumbnail outline of something that is, in my opinion, funda-
mental to understanding the birth of modernity in the West. This is in
relation to how it related to Christianity, and the One Truth; as well as its
shift to having, all of a sudden, two One Truths. But there can’t be two
One Truths, right?
What Boyle did with the laboratory, why it worked, and why it became
the prevalent approach in that day and age by accruing the most political
and economic power, was because it solved something that was unsolv-
able. This unsolvable issue was the One Truth becoming two truths with
each religious organization saying: “we have the One Truth and you are
heretics”. When echoed, this led to killing each other. When Boyle created
the lab and stated that you could not talk about religion within that space,
he created the germ or seed of secularization. The lab, and with it all of
Nature, became a neutral domain outside of religio-political domains, a
new neutral domain upon which the lost certainty to which Europe was
addicted could be safely reconstructed.
The lab was the first neutral, or in other words, secular place in Europe.
Before that, you could not be a secular person; it did not exist in Western
Europe or anywhere else. That is the birth of religion as a category. Before
this, spirituality was interwoven into the fabric of life: it was one seamless
way of life. That is the way it was. So this was the first time that you had a
space where you could not talk about what pervades life or has pervaded
life for everyone.
Speaking of religion was simply forbidden. And why was it forbidden?
It was very simple: if you talked about religion, you might kill each other.
The reason why politics could not be discussed within the laboratory is
because politics and religion went hand in hand. They could not be sepa-
rated. The Protestant had their political leaders and the Catholics had the
king. Politics and religion were one and the same.
What Boyle was creating was a separation for a very pragmatic reason.
He was creating a space where you could argue in a friendly, non-
conflicting, and accordingly non-lethal way about other matters. What
are the other matters? What you have witnessed within the laboratory.
Because the model is the court, there is one more reason why he used
the judiciary model of argument. Within the laboratory, everyone had a
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right to participate if you did not touch upon topics of politics and/or
religion. Because they had a right to opine, the consensus that emerged
around what happened through experimentation would be strong.
At the time, his greatest competitor, Thomas Hobbes was arguing
for a new model in which people would not disagree. This was seen
as dogmatic. Boyle was trying to get away from the dogmatism of the
Catholic Church and the Protestants. He was attempting to get away
from the idea that people have no choice because of dogmatic state-
ments “this is how it is” whether Protestant or Catholic. He was moving
away from that while strengthening truth claims through encouraging
disagreement within very strict boundaries. When you allow people to
disagree within bounds, the consensus is strong without being dogmatic.
It became a very powerful solution that addressed and solved the issues
of the times within the privileged space of the laboratory.
M. HIGGINS: If I understand this correctly, this would also have conse-
quences for what was intended by modesty at the time. As you speak
to in your book Subversive Spiritualities, secular modesty put forward
by Boyle in the laboratory is very different than the religious modesty
put forth by the Christian church before it. Religious modesty entailed
not being a spiritual usurper, not having too many belongings in this
world, or to be a martyr of sorts. Secular modesty, in contrast, largely
meant being “modest” in one’s beliefs by abstaining from talking about
religion or politics. However, if the secular modest person also had to
be wealthy as an entry point to participation, this circumvents ethical
questionings of wealth altogether.
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : You simply did not discuss those things in the lab.
M. HIGGINS: The process of supersessionism, or the ways in which
WMS supersedes Indigenous and other ways-of-knowing-Nature, could
be said to have an almost religious quality to it. However, this is
not because of ties to the church, but as you identify, this largely
has to do with what you identify as an addiction to certainty and
objectvity/subjectivity as one of the ways in which the Nature/Culture
binary plays out. Could you elaborate upon this process?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : As I mentioned earlier, the social-political-
religious landscape of Western Europe in the seventeenth century was
one of raging religious wars and the Burning Times which came to an
end in the second half of the seventeenth century. As I like to say, irrev-
erently, Europe was addicted to the One Truth because it had lived
with it for 15 centuries or more with Christianity. Europe required
certainty to restore law and order, as Stephen Toulmin has shown in his
book Cosmopolis. A new neutral—and very separate—domain of inquiry,
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Nature, and with it a new epistemology, were required. That new epis-
temology needed to have its life in a new neutral space, that of the
laboratory. While there are exceptions, this is still true today. The One
Truth is an addiction.
So in order to resolve the impossibility of two One Truths in Europe,
a circumscribed space that was neutral vis-à-vis both the Protestants
and the Catholics was invented. Within this space, a certainty that was
not religious was created. It was desperately needed and it was a very
circumscribed space. Hence, the laboratory took off.
At the time, religious wars were international. The Thirty Years’ War,
which lasted from 1618 to 1648, was the internationalization of what I
described in France earlier. Similar things were also happening in England
and Germany. The Treaty of Westphalia was signed to bring an end to
the Thirty Years’ War. This process creates, invents, and necessitates the
nation state.
Immediately, the nation state needed a science to function and to
govern. Here, I draw from the work of James Scott and his book Thinking
like a State addressing why the nation state cannot function without
science. I cannot simplify that story for you, but I will attempt to give a
quick and partial view. In a nutshell, the state has to manage two things.
First, it has to manage conflict, which was religion-based. Secondly, the
state had to generate revenue. To get revenue, you have to systematize
and quantify. It is like what the encloser would do when calculating his
advantage but now this logic is playing out at the national level. This, of
course, is a partial view.
M. HIGGINS: This addiction to certainty certainly has persisted strongly
within Western modern(ist) traditions—to which it has had its own
internal challenges (e.g., the crisis of representation in the 1990’s).
However, it is not uniquely internal to Western traditions as the
addiction to certainty is being exported and culturally transposed…
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Through the hegemony of modern education
worldwide!
M. HIGGINS: In your book Subversive Spiritualities, you speak to the
addiction to certainty and how WMS (i.e., agricultural models in partic-
ular) supersedes Indigenous local, longstanding, and intergenerational
models due to the ways in which it is framed or enacted as holding a
high degree of certainty. Could you speak to the ways in which certainty
was and continues to be constructed?
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F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Here is the way I’ve come to see it. The founding
myth of Modern science is the trial of Galileo vs. the Catholic Church.
Here you have rationality and belief. Of course, this myth was carried
forward into and leads to the progressive secularization of society
through the laboratory later through the Nation State. This created
certainty on a whole new basis: the experimental method, deduc-
tion, rationality, logical thinking, objective writing, and all; the whole
package.
What I see when I take that long view is that religious certainty has been
transposed into a new key, to use a musical metaphor. Scientific certainty is
the same thing but, of course, the new key is crucially different. The key is
crucially different but the tune is the same. It is similar in its absoluteness
in the sense that its method is the only valid one, its claim to the One
Truth: Science gives you the One Truth but in a new language and on
a new basis. In the process it had to disenchant nature, as Weber put it,
and with that move transmute all other ways of knowing-being as “pre-
scientific” in need of progress. Because Western Europe was addicted to
certainty and the One Truth, it had recreated it in a new secular key with
Modern science.
That is why the “universal” given-ness of Nature is so pernicious.
Scientific rational superiority became a deliberate part of an educational
campaign to inculcate in the European youth, and to shape percep-
tions about those who Europe colonized. Colonialism is justified through
statements such as “this is right because we are enlightening these
unenlightened people; we are bringing them not just civilization, we
are bringing them knowledge, True knowledge”. Of course, such is
predicated on seeing Nature as universal.
As Karen Barad says, you can never separate or disentangle the discur-
sive from the material. This disentanglement, however, is key to the
formulation of certainty. The issue for me is that it is very difficult to have
people understand this because it goes against the grain of everything they
likely have been taught.
M. HIGGINS: Dualistic thought is not something that can simply be
turned on or off.
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : Exactly. You can say it conceptually in all its impli-
cations. However, what happens in practice is otherwise and extremely
difficult.
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M. HIGGINS: Which dualisms are we reproducing as we try to work
against others?
F. APFFEL-MARGLIN : It is always a process; an unfinished work.
Fourth Cut: The Modest Witness, When One Truth Becomes Two,
the Thirty Years’ War, and the Multicultural Science Education Debate
Reading the insights provided by Dr. Apffel-Marglin in this this vignette
through those of the multicultural science education debate begins to
reveal the ways in which the apolitical stance of cultural quasi-neutrality
explored within chapter is a process which comes to mask the flow of
common-place cultural power and politics into the laboratory, but also
the ways in which this stance is produced by the social, economic, and
political forces of the time. What might appear as an individualistic choice
here could be (re)thought as having and being had by common sense.
This stance, as Frédérique enunciates it, is one of being a modest
witness. The modest witness, as one of the multiple technologies that
come to constitute laboratory practice requires that the individual whom
is witnessing be educated, as well as “modest of mind”. Here, we come to
see the Foucaultian circularity of knowledge comes to rear its head again.
First, recall that the Nature/Culture exclusive dichotomy, with/in which
WMS is entangled, comes to negatively position Man’s (human) Other
as “closer to nature”. Accordingly, women, racialized bodies, Indigenous
peoples, amongst others, as being perceived as possessing “modesty of
the body” rather than that of the mind,19 were generally not included
in the very processes which would implicitly (and eventually explicitly)
come to position them as having lesser ability to bear witness to natural
phenomena. By focusing on the Other, this has the further effect of
normalizing and naturalizing the ways in which science is dominion of
Man:
In order for the modesty… to be visible, the man – the witness whose
accounts mirror reality – must be invisible, that is, an inhabitant of
the potent “unmarked category,” which is constructed by the extraordi-
nary conventions of self-invisibility… This self-invisibility is the specifically
modern, European, masculine, scientific form of the virtue of modesty.
(Haraway, 1997, p. 23)
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Secondly, as Dr. Apffel-Marglin states, one must also be educated to
participate. As this required access to wealth, those of lower class would
also be excluded (see also Haraway, 1997; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985).
While one could say that that was there-then and this is here-now, it is
nonetheless important to consider how science and science education’s
historicity continues to shape the here-now and the there-thens to-come
as we move forward. While science education is increasingly perceived
as being enacted as a practice for all students (see Aikenhead & Elliot,
2010), it is nonetheless important to continue considering how the all in
such statements are articulated, especially when science education scholars
continue referring to WMS as white male science (Pomeroy, 1994; see also
McKinley, 2000; Sammel, 2009).
Accordingly, while the practices of who gets to do science have explic-
itly changed, many of the implicit meanings remain when we consider
the ways in which the how of science were and continue to be framed. As
Frédérique makes explicit, the practice of being a modest witness cannot
be separated from the socio-political context of the time in Western
Europe: particularly from what was happening within the sphere of the
Church. Following the establishment of the Protestant Church, Western
Europe was thrown in turmoil: a powerful addiction to certainty and
competing claims of holding the One Truth would see Catholics and
Protestants kill each other “with gusto, brutality, and horror” for a thirty
year period. Following the Thirty Years’ War, there was need of a system
of governance that would not bound to either religion: in the creation
of the scientific laboratory, we would also see the birth of secularism.
As Dr. Apffel-Marglin puts it, this came to shape the very practice of
the laboratory in its infancy in profound ways: “it was very simple: if you
talked about religion, you might kill each other”. However, as mentioned
earlier within this chapter, the creation of secularity as mutually exclu-
sive from spirituality had consequences then and now: practices, like
TEK and IWLN, that do not see separate spirit and matter are implic-
itly (and sometimes explicitly) not welcome within the formal spaces of
science. This trend, while far less explicit continues to bear on educa-
tional spaces today20: recall from Chapter 3 that there continue to be
many science education scholars, as well as science educators who frame
practices other-than-WMS as less valid (e.g., Cobern & Loving, 2008;
Siegel, 2001).
In these instances, it can be said that there continue to be traces of
what Frédérique refers to as the One Truth: “religious certainty has been
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transposed into a new key, to use a musical metaphor”.21 The aforemen-
tioned claims of validity do not come to frame WMS as being more valid
in particular moments within the multicultural science education debate,
but rather as a general and a “universal” which is a priori to knowing and
being. It could be stated that the transposition of power from the Church
to the laboratory as instrument of the State did not address or redress
Western Europe’s addiction for certainty at the time, but rather resituated
and differentially produced the ways in which one had access to the One
Truth. It is for this reason that Spivak (1976) cautions against the (too)
rapid evacuation of a concept, category, or framework: left unaddressed,
its problematics often follow us in ghastly and ghostly manners to reassert
themselves elsewhere albeit differently (see also Derrida, 1994/2006).
The calling into question of the claim of “most valid” is not to deny
it, but rather resituate it by asking the questions of when and where it is
most productive; few science education scholars deny the pragmatic effec-
tiveness of WMS in making knowledge claims about nature. However,
science is indebted to and weighed down by the ways in which the One
Truth continue to (re)shape it: science education continues to be a space
which dialectically subsumes and sutures over TEK and IWLN as a means
of resolving difference and reasserting WMS as a more nuanced version
of the One Truth in an ever-diversifying world.
Conclusion: Positing, Accounting for and Being
Accountable to an Ontology in Science Education
To address the past (and future), to speak with ghosts, is not to entertain or
reconstruct some narrative of the way it was, but to respond, to be respon-
sible, to take responsibility for that which we inherit (from the past and
the future), for the entangled relationalities of inheritance that “we” are, to
acknowledge and be responsive to the noncontemporaneity of the present,
to put oneself at risk, to risk oneself (which is never one or self), to open
oneself up to indeterminacy in moving toward what is to-come. Respon-
sibility is by necessity an asymmetrical relation/doing, an enactment, a
matter of différance, of intra-action, in which no one/no thing is given in
advance or ever remains the same. Only in this ongoing responsibility to
the entangled other, without dismissal (without ‘enough already!’), is there
the possibility of justice-to-come. (Barad, 2010, pp. 264–265, emphasis in
original)
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To posit Cartesianism as an ontology in science education is to inevitably
speak with ghosts: that which we inherit from science’s “beginnings”
haunt us. Because the homework of response-ability begins from where
we are, it is not only significant to engage in a creative archaeology dig
into the pasts passed over that constitute us, but it is part of our respon-
sibility as it is to “take responsibility for that which we inherit” (Barad,
2010, p. 264): what we inherit is irreducibly part of who we are and
who we are becoming as science educators. Repeating a question posed
earlier in this chapter, when pasts are passed over, but still come to constitute
the here-now of contemporary practice, what ghosts which continue to haunt
science education are being chased away?
As explored through tinkering with an expert interview with Dr.
Apffel-Marglin, Cartesianism cannot simply be reduced to set of belief
that are individually held but rather a structure: the scientific revolu-
tion operationalized and naturalized Descartes’ epistemology through
the technological practices of the laboratory, the modest witness, and
the objective style of writing. More significantly, these practices cannot
and should not be so easily disentangled from socio-material practices
of Western Modern Europe which lead to and surrounded its opera-
tionalization (e.g., the enclosure movement, the Thirty Years’ War). The
making common of Cartesianism not only (fore)closes the possible possi-
bilities for responding to Indigenous science to-come, but also the ability
to account for and be accountable to the ontology of WMS and what
it produces: repeating the mantra of the last chapter, “how reality is
understood matters” (Barad, 2007, p. 205).
Significantly, in this contemporary moment in science education, the
presented and enacted conceptions of nature-cultures makes possible and
palatable the ongoing dispossession and devastation of Indigenous Land,
as well as the erasure of Indigenous peoples (see Bang & Marin, 2015).
Diffracting Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin’s account through the logics of
the multicultural science education debate reveals this dispossession and
devastation to have been the case from the very “beginning” of Western
modernity: Indigenous erasure is not strictly a feature of contemporary
science education, but rather part of the inheritance which shapes who we
are and can be. The scientific revolution could not be separated from the
removal of peoples from Land and (forceful) denegation of their ways-
of-knowing-in-being. These logics which would later come to inform
ongoing practices of (neo-)colonialism. It bears repeating, the task at
hand the task at hand is not to begin a new relation but rather to engage
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the relation anew: WMS and Indigenous science are always already in
relation.
It is for that reason that responding to Indigenous science to-come
is not achieved “through the realization of some existing possibility,
but through the iterative reworking of im/possibility” (p. 265): we are
working against centuries of history in which Cartesianism and its conse-
quences have been normalized and naturalized. While there is no singular
solution to (re)opening the norms of responsiveness towards Indigenous
science to-come, positing an ontology paves pathways to engage with the
im/possibility of being wholly accountable to and ethically responsive by
coming-to-perceive the very possibility of ontological otherness, as well as
accounting for the ways-of-knowing-in-being which foreclose such possi-
bility. To reiterate from the previous chapter, situating science education
ontologically by positing an ontology is not about who is right or who is
wrong, nor is it about a renewed commitment to relativism. Rather, it is
about coming-to-recognize a plurality of possibilities (and problematics),
and in turn, it means being accountable to how scientific knowledge is
produced, producible, and what it produces in turn within and beyond
the science education classroom. For example, thinking with Frédérique
Apffel-Marglin allowed for differential considerations in the conceptual
baggage that comes with the metaphysics of modernity, not to dismiss or
do-away with these ways-of-knowing-in-being but rather come to work
with/in the structures that (re)produce and are reproduced by science
education in order to (re)open them to Indigenous science to-come.
These include the ways in which the home in the homework of response-
ability manifests as absent presences: “uncommon” political, religious,
economic, and military practices (e.g., the enclosure) that are enfolded
and co-constituting “common” scientific technologies and practices (e.g.,
modest witness) of a non-dissociable past and present.
As the ability to respond to Indigenous science to-come requires
an “ongoing responsibility to the entangled other, without dismissal
(without ‘enough already!’)” (Barad, 2010, pp. 264–265), the task of
de/colonizing our inheritances within science education is never fully
over.
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Notes
1. As Spivak(1976) reminds us, the language we possess also possesses us: to
(too) simply abandon a particular does not mean that it has abandoned
us. If the thoughts we have and by which we are had are part of the
problem, it is not so simple to think about how we think without using
the thing with which we think. This is to say that science education is
irreducibly related to Cartesianism and that attempts to move beyond this
ontology and its consequences must simultaneously work to understand
and address it, as well as its entangled productions.
2. The scare quotes here are intentional as origins are forever deferred
and differing (see Derrida, 1976; Kirby, 2011). Further, as signalled
in the previous chapter, the fetish for origins is irreducibly bound to
(neo-)colonial ways-of-knowing-in-being (see TallBear, 2013). Dr. Apffel-
Marglin makes explicitly clear that the “birth of modernity” is not an
“origin” in the conventional sense but rather a partial and contingent
origin: a historical moment in which modernist thinking is operationalized
(see Apffel-Marglin, 2011).
3. Along similar lines, Sara Ahmed (2006) succinctly states:
The word inheritance includes two meanings: to receive and to
possess. In a way, we convert what we receive into possessions, a
conversion that often “hides” the conditions of having received, as
if the possession is “already there.” (p. 125)
The task of inheritance is to also consider that which we have received
which no longer appears as such, specifically that which we receive from
(or, more precisely, at the expense of) the other.
4. Once again, the mantra of beginning some-where and some-time is a
reminder that we are always already within the question of Indigenous
ways-of-knowing-in-being within science education. In turn, there is a
multiplicity of locations (both temporal and geographical) from which we
can approach the question productively.
Furthermore, this specific reminder, returning to the introduction of
the very first chapter, also serves to hint at the ways in which the present
is not only here-now but is always entangled with/in various there-thens:
that these elsewheres and elsewhens are not strictly cognitive objects to be
known (i.e., historical and geographical facts) but are ontologically co-
constitutive of our contemporary present, here and now. As Karen Barad
(2010) states, “to address the past (and future), to speak with ghosts,
is not to entertain or reconstruct some narrative of the way it was, to
respond, to be responsible, to take responsibility for that which we inherit
…” (Barad, 2010, p. 264, emphasis in original). This bears particular
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significance as we take up and are called to take seriously pasts already
passed over which continue to haunt science education’s present, as if a
spectre or a ghost, reaching out to future(s)-to-come. This is to say, to
take the task of attending to the absent presences within the history of
science (or at least those that are usually absent within the common sensical
narrative of science): as they also have bearing on what science education
was, is, and is becoming. As the absent present relationships between
science and Indigeneity is always already, the work of attending to the
inheritances which haunt science education is not without significance:
they are “entangled relationalities of inheritance that ‘we’ are” (Barad,
2010, p. 264, emphasis in original).
This work of inheritance as responsibility at the ontological turn
points towards Derrida’s (1994/2006) concept of hauntology, a (near-)
homonym to ontology that is meant to defer and differ ontology’s
conventional “discourse on the Being of beings” (p. 63) to embrace
that which exceeds it: the spectral. Significantly, hauntings are not simply
concepts: Barad (2010) provides empirical evidence via quantum field
theory. Hauntings are indeterminacies in the ways in which space-time-
matter materializes: a particle can be in a state of superposition such that
it is simultaneously here, there, now, and then (including a there-then in
the future tense, see Barad, 2010for further). Importantly, hauntology
troubles the possibility of ontology being a singular (Cartesian) affair:
To haunt does not mean to be present, and it is necessary to intro-
duce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every
concept, beginning with the concept of being and time. That is
what we would be calling a hauntology. Ontology opposes it only
in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration. (Derrida,
1994/2006, p. 202)
Barad further suggests that: “every concept is haunted by its mutually
constituted excluded other”. (Barad, 2010, p. 253). Where ontology
often comes to stand in for epistemic realism, as explored within the
previous chapter, it becomes useful to think with and through the
notion of ontology as conjuration or exorcism. Throughout Specters of
Marx, Derrida (1994/2006) invokes multiple meanings to the concept
of conjuring. It is at once the oath solemnly sworn in secrecy to struggle
against a greater power, an incantation or summoning of a spirit, as well
as an exorcism. Importantly, an “effective exorcism pretends to declare
the death only in order to put to death” (Derrida, 1994/2006, p. 59).
When pasts are passed over, but still come to constitute the here-now of
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contemporary practice, it is worth asking: what ghosts might have science
education been chasing away?
5. Further, it became an opportunity to experiment with more creative ways
of representing, and more specifically storying, Indigenous place-based
education (see Higgins & Madden, 2019).
6. As explored in Higgins, Madden, Bérard, Lenz Kothe, and Nord-
strom (2017), methodological research “design” often prescriptively and
prohibitively continues to act as a signifier that sutures over the signi-
fied processes of designing and doing research. “Design” often signals a
method that is exists a priori to research, “a stand-alone, instrumental set
of research practices” (St. Pierre, 2011b, p. 52). This also includes and
encompasses all of its conceptual apparatus (such as, in this case, “expert”
and “expert knowledge”).
Rather, the practice of methodological de/sign differs and defers that
which design comes to signify: design as pre-existing, design as sepa-
rate or separable from other aspects of research, and design as a means
to achieve and justify the ends (see also Derrida, 1976; Spivak, 1976).
Because methodological fabric is also a fabrication—a performative and
non-separable enactment of the interconnected space between theory,
practice, and ethics—methodological design is always already open to
be deconstructed and re(con)figured.This is of particular significance in
spaces of de/colonizing education. Highlighting the ways in which the
disciplines discipline what counts as knowledge and, more to the point,
knowledge production processes, Smith et al. (2016) ask, “are method-
ologies simply new technologies of cultural assimilation?” (p. 133). To
(re)open the conceptual apparatuses of methodology allows for the possi-
bility of addressing lingering colonial referents within science education
(see Higgins & Kim, 2019).
7. Such a tinkering can be understood both as tinkering within the narrative
presented throughout her book, but also tinkering with it in relation to
the multicultural science education debate.
8. Butler’s criticism of particular cultural uses of “natural facts” still stands
today as “natural facts are always informed by cultural bias” (Butler in
Kirby, 2011, p. 94). As this is “one of the most important contributions
that scholars such as Butler have made, … any return to the question
of Nature will need to accommodate such insights rather than put them
aside” (p. 94). Nonetheless, the opening of other possibilities beyond
the natural/cultural divide allowed by this minor concession sees produc-
tive uses in her later work (e.g., Butler, 2010); with an always present
cautionary note against the “seductive slide that conflates representation,
models, and signs that substitute for material objects, with the objects
themselves” (Butler in Kirby, 2011, p. 74).
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9. This can be read as a form of strategically occupying an essentializing
space (see Spivak, 1993/2009). However, Spivak (1993/2009) reminds,
“the strategic use of essentialism can turn into an alibi for proselytizing
academic essentialisms” (p. 4) without the persistent critique of that
which is being essentialized throughout, “even when it seems that to
remind oneself of it is counterproductive” (p. 4). Where Frédérique’s
interview challenges throughout the production of the academic subject
of knowledge (i.e., expert), the strategic use essentialism remains nonethe-
less fraught, being a pharmakon: at once panacea and poison (see Spivak,
1976).
10. See Chapter 7 for a lengthier discussion on the ways in which the
Derridean statement that il n’y a pas de hors-texte is a complex one
within science and science education spaces. Importantly, there not being
an outside of Culture does not preclude Nature unless with subscribe
to a mutual exclusivity to two (see Kirby, 2011). Rather, it invites a
consideration of the ways in which nature is not only within the realm
of Culture at the individual cognitive level and the social discursive level
(via the concepts we hold that also hold us, but also that nature is rarely
“pure” and beyond the effects of culture (e.g., anthropogenic landscapes)
or unable to produce cultural meaning. This latter is of deep significance
to (re)opening science education to Indigenous science to-come (e.g.,
other-than-humans as teachers).
11. It is important to distinguish between a Man (i.e., a Western European
male), the Man, (i.e., the shadowy figure in Marxist nightmares which
appears to control nearly all from behind the scenes), and Man as artic-
ulated here. The first two emerge from use of the representational logic
of the mirror such that they are representative of an individual, whether
real or imagined, who is a separate or separable agent (i.e., what Niet-
zsche refers to as the “individual of will”) benefitting from the power
systems articulated. The latter term speaks to the complex and capillary
circulation of ways-of-knowing-in-being that uphold and operationalize
systems that center Man and Western modernity (e.g., Eurocentrism,
anthropocentrism, patriarchy).
12. Diffusion can be understood as a scientific phenomena and concept which
describes the movement of a substance from an area of high concentra-
tion to an area of low concentration. Importantly, where a diffusionist
model (e.g., Blaut, 1993) employs the concept of diffusion productively
to describe the colonizing movement of Western thought outwards of
Europe, it is also important to not conflate the passive qualities of the
scientific phenomena and the ways in which Eurocentrism operate actively:
ongoing (neo-)colonial practices are not experienced as passive “transmis-
sion” of Euro-Western values, beliefs, and traditions. As explored in the
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previous chapter (i.e., the ways in which common sense is made common),
it is important to recognize that Eurocentrism is active, forceful, and
violent (both literally and otherwise); it is also agentically distributed,
albeit differentially: Eurocentrism is a “consciousness in which all of us
have been marinated” (Battiste, 2005, p. 124, emphasis mine).
13. As Colebrook (2008) suggests, Butler’s (1990) Gender Trouble is often
(too simply) read as anti-ontological as it resituates that which is prob-
lematically enacted as biological determinism (i.e., sex) into the realm
of discourse (i.e., through gender performativity). Taking a cue from
Foucaultian critique (see Chapter 4), it is fair to state that Butler does
not wholly jettison ontology altogether, but rather ontology like that
(i.e., a Cartesian ontology in which matter precedes meaning). In turn,
Colebrook’s (2008) reading of Butler suggests that materiality (i.e.,
ontology) emerges as co-constituted by discourse (i.e., epistemology),
subverting dominant epistemological and ontological constructions and
enactments rather than negating them.
14. During our interviews, Frédérique Apffel-Marglin shared the following
regarding what Newton had to forego to maintain epistemic power and
privilege within his geo-temporal contexts:
It was just delightful for me to learn of that, by reading Isabelle
Stengers’ (2001) little play about Newton titled La Guerre des
Sciences aura-t-elle lieu?, that one of Newton’s descendants needed
money in 1930 and found in Newton’s attic unpublished papers,
manuscripts, and other works. He auctioned them to make money.
So it was then bought and studied. This work was spiritual in tone:
gravity was a spiritual power. Of course, he could not go public
with this. So it was not to be found out or made public until these
papers were sold and people took time to study them.
Deeply intrigued, I began to read Stengers’ (2001; Prirogine & Stengers,
1984) work, and deeper into the question of Newton and his complex
and complicated relation to science. Elsewhere (Higgins & Tolbert,
2018), writing up nascent leads on the this, I ask:
… what might it mean to recast science as a practice that is not
oppositionally defined against spirituality and attend to the ways
in which spirituality always already been included within WMS?
Prigogine and Stengers state that this is the case for one of the
most emblematic men of science whose way-of-being-scientific has
acted as differential mould for what it means to be a scientist:
Isaac Newton. They state that many “did not know the strange
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story behind the Newtonian forces! For behind Newton’s cautious
declaration-‘I frame no hypotheses’-concerning the nature of the
forces lurked the passion of an alchemist.” This came to light last
century when one of Newton’s descendants, Gerald Wallop, the
9th Earl of Portsmouth needed funds in the midst of a costly
divorce and put up Newton’s unpublished papers for auction in
1936. Following their purchase and analysis, John Maynard Keynes
would go on to state that Newton was “not the first of the age
of reason” but “the last of the magicians.” Stated otherwise, his
approach to science was not devoid of spirituality, but rather the
norms of becoming-scientist at the time made it such that he could
not openly discuss the multilogical approach that informed and
fueled his thinking (as part of the practice of modest witnessing).
His unpublished work along these lines would be hidden and stored
by generations of family in hopes that a time would arrive in which
it might be received: a latent safeguard that he perhaps hoped
would allow us to dispel the myth the Isaac Newton was Newto-
nian. Stengers invites us to consider if the science wars over “what
counts” will have had happened if this insight and rupture would
allow us to complicate science’s ongoing relation to Newton by re-
inserting the ways in which the man exceeded the concept. (p. 283)
Here, we have yet another rich example of how science is always already
entangled with/in and prismatically producing its own norms of articu-
lation (i.e., what can be said and done, and what cannot). Importantly,
if we continue to produce scientists (as well as science educators) in the
image of Newton, it bears leveraging his hope for a science-yet-to-come
in which logics deemed other might come to bear on the knowledge
production process. While we need unsettle our inheritances in science
education, some inheritance unsettle themselves if we learn to attend to
the ways in which deconstruction always already happens.
15. Furthermore, while Newton’s subject position is produced by the
there-then of the time and place, knowing Newton as scientist cannot
be disentangled from the here-now: he continues to be, after Stengers
(2001), the mould from which scientists are cast.
16. Considering science and science education as entangled with/in legal-
juridical modes provides insight into the ongoing practice of dialectic
rather than dialogue, as explored within Chapter 3, as scientific subjects
are required to dismantle their opposition’s arguments before a “court”
of their peers (e.g., peer review).
17. Recall that, as explored within Chapter 4, the laboratory is always already
the context in which scientific knowledge-practices are produced and
enacted, whether the lab be real or imaginary. As van Eicjk and Roth
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(2007) suggest, the generation of scientific knowledge requires that
the context under observation be transcended and treated as if it were
static, singular, and homogenous. In turn, scientific knowledge praxis
requires that the context of its application also be treated as such. When
considered as a practice which is also translated into science education,
it is important to consider the (re)production of the double(d) subject
of the laboratory: both Nature as subject of inquiry and scientist (or
student-thinking-like-a-scientist) as inquiring subject.
18. Apffel Marglin (2011) states that if colonization was so effective, it was
because it was perfected through its internal application within Western
Europe before it was exported to Western Europe’s Others. Along similar
notes, during her talk titled Four Theses on Posthuman Feminism at UBC,
Rosi Braidotti stated that the Holocaust was “colonialism coming home”
(28 January 2015). The point to be made here is that (neo-)colonial
systems come to affect us all, even if they do not affect us all in the same
way (see Battiste, 2005, 2013b; Donald, 2012; Freire, 1973/2000):
they differentially inflect our respective (re)production as de/colonizing
subjects.
19. In turn, it is productive to address the ways in which the mind/body
binary come to operate within science education when working within
and against Cartesianism. For example, recall that in Chapter 3 you were
encouraged, as a reader, to also pay attention to the affective ways (e.g.,
emotive, sensory) in which information registered upon their body. If
science is to be framed as a human practice (see Aikenhead, 2006), it is
worthwhile and important to consider, account for, and be accountable
to the plural and diverse ways in which we are human.
20. While not directly discussing spaces of science education, Marker’s (2006)
After the Makah Whale Hunt is a rich exemplar of the complexities and
complications which arise when bringing in Indigenous knowledges and
knowledge holders into schools to discuss other-than-human members
of a local ecology. As school spaces are secular (through separation of
Church and State), but seen as neutral and the norm, the inclusion
of IWLN and its interconnectedness of spirit and matter is brought
into sharp relief and becomes a site in which Eurocentrism plays out in
diverse manners (e.g., excluding knowledge and knowledge holders, only
including such lesson if it omits its co-constitutive spiritual dimension).




Ahmed, S. (2006). Queer phenomenology: Orientations, objects, others. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Aikenhead, G. S. (2006). Science education for everyday life. London, ON:
Althouse Press.
Aikenhead, G. S., & Elliot, D. (2010). An emerging decolonizing science educa-
tion in Canada. Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology
Education, 10(4), 321–338.
Aikenhead, G. S., & Michell, H. (2011). Bridging cultures: Indigenous and
scientific ways of knowing nature. Toronto, ON: Pearson Canada Inc.
Aikenhead, G. S., & Ogawa, M. (2007). Indigenous knowledge and science
revisited. Cultural Studies of Science Education, 2(3), 539–591.
Apffel-Marglin, F. (2011). Subversive spiritualities: How rituals enact the world.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Bang, M., & Marin, A. (2015). Nature–culture constructs in science learning:
Human/non-human agency and intentionality. Journal of Research in Science
Teaching, 52(4), 530–544.
Barad, K. (2000). Reconceiving scientific literacy as agential literacy. In R. Reed
& S. Traweek (Eds.), Doing Science+Culture (pp. 221–258). New York, NY:
Routledge.
Barad, K. (2007). Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the
entanglement of matter and meaning. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Barad, K. (2010). Quantum entanglements and hauntological relations of inher-
itance: Dis/continuities, spacetime enfoldings, and justice-to-come. Derrida
Today, 3(2), 240–268.
Barad, K. (2011). Erasers and erasures: Pinch’s unfortunate ‘uncertainty princi-
ple’. Social Studies of Science, 41(3), 443–454.
Battiste, M. (2005). You can’t be the global doctor if you’re the colonial disease.
In P. Tripp & L. J. Muzzin (Eds.), Teaching as activism (pp. 121–133).
Montreal, QC: Queen’s University Press.
Battiste, M. (2013a). Deconstruction and reconstruction: Roles, responsibilities
and implications of a decolonizing framework. Retrieved from http://www.
indigenouseducation.educ.ubc.ca/transformation/indigenous-perspectives/
on 11/22/2012.
Battiste, M. (2013b). Decolonizing education: Nourishing the learning spirit.
Saskatoon, SK: Purich Publishing.
Blaut, J. (1993). The colonizer’s model of the world: Geographical diffusionism and
Eurocentric history. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Bogner, A., Littig, B., & Menz, W. (Eds.). (2009). Interviewing experts.
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble. London, UK: Routledge.
6 POSITING CARTESIANISM AS AN ONTOLOGY WITHIN SCIENCE … 265
Butler, J. (2005). On giving an account of oneself . New York, NY: Fordham
University Press.
Butler, J. (2010). Frames of war: When is life grievable?. London, UK: Verso.
Cajete, G. (1994). Look to the mountain: An ecology of indigenous education.
Durango, CO: Kivaki Press.
Cajete, G. (2000). Native science: Natural laws of interdependence. Santa Fe,
NM: Clear Light Books.
Cobern, W. W., & Loving, C. C. (2008). An essay for educators: Epistemological
realism really is common sense. Science & Education, 17, 425–447.
Colebrook, C. (2008). On not becoming man: The materialist politics of unac-
tualized potential. In S. Alaimo & S. Hekman (Eds.), Material feminisms
(pp. 52–84). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Derrida, J. (1976). Of grammatology (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore, MD:
John Hopkins University Press.
Derrida, J. (1994/2006). Specters of Marx: The state of the debt, the work of
mourning, & the new international (P. Kamuf, Trans.). New York, NY:
Routledge.
Donald, D. (2012). Indigenous Métissage: A decolonizing research sensibility.
International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 25(5), 533–555.
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. London, UK:
Allen Lane.
Foucault, M. (1979). Truth and power. In M. Morris & P. Patton (Eds.), Power,
truth, strategy (pp. 29–48). Sydney, NSW: Feral Publications.
Freire, P. (1973/2000). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York, NY: Continuum
International Publishing Group.
Haraway, D. (1997). Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_
OncoMouse. New York, NY: Routledge.
Higgins, M. (2014). De/colonizing pedagogy and pedagogue: Science education
through participatory and reflexive videography. Canadian Journal of Science,
Mathematics and Technology Education, 14(2), 154–171.
Higgins, M., & Kim, E. J. (2019). De/colonizing methodologies in science
education: Rebraiding research theory-practice-ethics with indigenous theories
and theorists. Cultural Studies of Science Education, 14(1), 111–127.
Higgins, M., & Madden, B. (2019). Refiguring presences in Kichwa-Lamista
territories: Storying with Indigenous place. In C. Taylor & A. Bayley (Eds.),
Posthumanism and higher education: reimagining pedagogy, practice and
research (pp. 293–312). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Higgins, M., Madden, B., Bérard, M.-F., Lenz Kothe, E., & Nordstrom, S.
(2017). De/signing research in education: Patchwork(ing) methodologies
with theory. Educational Studies, 43(1), 16–39.
Higgins, M., & Tolbert, S. (2018). A syllabus for response-able inheritance in
science education. Parallax, 24(3), 273–294.
266 M. HIGGINS
Higgins, M., Wallace, M., & Bazzul, J. (2019). Staying with the trouble in
science education. In C. Taylor & A. Bayley (Eds.), Posthumanism and
higher education: reimagining pedagogy, practice and research (pp. 155–164).
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hodson, D. (1993). In search of a rationale for multicultural science education.
Science Education, 77 (6), 685–711.
Kirby, V. (2011). Quantum anthropologies: Life at large. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press.
Kirby, V. (2012). Initial conditions. Differences, 23(3), 197–205.
Lather, P. (2007). Getting lost: Feminist efforts toward a double(d) science. New
York, NY: State University of New York.
Latour, B. (1993). We have never been modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Latour, B. (2004). Politics of nature: How to bring the sciences into democracy.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lewis, B., & Aikenhead, G. (2001). Introduction: Shifting perspectives from
universalism to cross-culturalism. Science Education, 85, 3–5.
Marker, M. (2006). After the Makah whale hunt: Indigenous knowledge and
limits to multicultural discourse. Urban Education, 41(5), 482–505.
Mazzocchi, F. (2006). Western science and traditional knowledge. EMBO
Reports, 7 (5), 463–466.
Mazzocchi, F. (2008). Analyzing knowledge as part of a cultural framework: The
case of traditional ecological knowledge. Environments Journal, 36(2), 39–57.
McKinley, E. (2000). Cultural diversity: Masking power with innocence. Science
Education, 85(1), 74–76.
McKinley, E. (2007). Postcolonialism, Indigenous students, and science educa-
tion. In S. K. Abell & N. G. Lederman (Eds.), Handbook of research on science
education (pp. 199–226). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Peat, D. (2002). Blackfoot physics: A new journey into the Native American
universe. Newbury Port, MA: Weiser Books.
Peat, F. D. (2007). Pathways of chance. Pari, IT: Pari Publishing.
Prigogine, I., & Stengers, I. (1984). Order out of chaos. New York, NY: Bantam
Books.
Pomeroy, D. (1994). Science education and cultural diversity: Mapping the field.
Studies in Science Education, 24, 49–73.
Sammel, A. (2009). Turning the focus from ‘other’ to science education:
Exploring the invisibility of whiteness. Cultural Studies of Science Education,
4, 649–656.
Shapin, S., & Schaffer, S. (1985). Leviathan and the air-pump. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Siegel, H. (2001). Multiculturalism, universalism, and science education: In
search of common ground. Science Education, 86, 803–820.
6 POSITING CARTESIANISM AS AN ONTOLOGY WITHIN SCIENCE … 267
Smith, L. T. (1999/2012). Decolonizing methodologies: Research and Indigenous
People (2nd ed.). London, UK: Zed Books.
Smith, L. T., Maxwell, T. K., Puke, H., & Temara, P. (2016). Indigenous
knowledge, methodology and mayhem: What is the role of methodology
in producing Indigenous insights? A discussion from mātauranga Māori.
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Given the pervasiveness of assimilationism in Western science education
(assimilation of all students, including the Other, into the dominant
ontology, and epistemology), it is not surprising that most science educa-
tion articles include the mandate of improving scientific literacy and then
proceed to define it, or refer to it by way of usual contemporary science
education definition. (Sammel, 2009, p. 653)
The purpose of this chapter is to revisit response-ability, with a focus on
enfolding the homework of previous chapters into working towards a
response within science education which is more hospitable to Indigenous
science to-come. This response takes the form of questions of tinkering
with/in curriculum and pedagogy around the singular node that is scien-
tific literacy as “most science education articles include the mandate of
improving scientific literacy and then proceed to define it, or refer to it
by way of usual contemporary science education definition”. (Sammel,
2009, p. 653). Recall that response-ability, in its most succinct itera-
tion, is “an ability to respond, to respond to the world beyond oneself,
as well as a willingness to recognize its existence” (Kuokkanen, 2007,
p. 39). As explored within earlier chapters, there are multiple facets that
shape how science education and educators are produced, producible, and
thus (un)able to respond to (and enact responsibility towards) Indige-
nous ways-of-knowing-in-being.1 While responsibility always precedes
our coming-to-knowing-in-being, the space of response-ability from
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which we can account for and be accountable to these responsibilities
is highly productive as it invites and requires us to consider that which
shapes our very ability to respond. Yet, the space of response-ability is
ever in need of an ongoing unsettling the conditions which shape our
ability to respond.
However, the (re)opening of science education as a location in and
from which responsibility is both perceptible and potentially enacted is
not as simple as desiring it to be so. Rather, the cut between what
science education is and is not must continue to be laboured in order
to allow for the possibility of what science education could become: a
“common ground and a basis for dialogue” (Cajete, 2006, p. 248).
This, as Barad (2010) reminds, comes-to-be through the ongoing process
of reworking the norms of im/possibility to alter or and altering the
possible possibilities (see also Spivak, 1993/2009). In response to the
complexities of the space between Indigenous and Western ways-of-
knowing-in-being, the following questions guide ethical examination and
design: How might science education account for and be accountable to
these uneven and unequal relations of power? What kind of curriculum
and pedagogy might open a space of response-ability in science education
towards Indigenous science to-come? “What kind of [curriculum and] peda-
gogy would help students to learn about practicing responsible science?”
(Barad, 2000, p. 239, emphasis mine). As the space of response-ability
is always already at risk, I also ask the following herein: What kind of
science education might consistently rework itself to be accountable for and
towards its co-constitutive exclusions?2
In order to engage these questions, I braid in the work of Torres
Strait Islander scholar Martin Nakata’s (2007a, 2007b) theorizing of
the cultural interface, which accounts for the ways in which hybridity
between ways-of-knowing-in-being are unequal, problematic, and yet rife
with possibility. Recognizing that the cultural interface is never sepa-
rate from its materiality (Nakata, 2007a, 2007b), there is a continued
commitment to taking seriously the role of ontology. This bears particular
significance as a Cartesian ontology is rife with onto-epistemic enactments
that threaten to (fore)close the ability to respond towards a space of
dialogue between TEK, IWLW, and WMS. Notably, one of the conse-
quences of Eurocentrism and Cartesianism shaping nearly all facets of
science education is that science education is often culpable of deferring
and differing its attempts to work towards inclusivity by employing its
associated concepts and enactments as usually defined.
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In turn, I revisit and expand upon response-ability, weaving in
Karen Barad’s (2010) work around this concept, as a means of further
(re)opening the space of response-ability by working within, against, and
beyond a primary curricular node of science education: scientific literacy.
This is of particular significance as its a location in need of unsettling : it
is at once upholding settler colonialism (e.g., Sammel, 2009) and sedi-
mented (e.g., Bang, 2018). Hospitality requires that “we work constantly
towards reconceptualizing our thinking and reconsidering our values”
(Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 163), which becomes all-the-more important when
concepts that are absently present (fore)close the possibility of hospitably
receiving Indigenous science to-come.
Therefore, in four movements, I: (a) identify scientific literacy as a
central yet uncertain concept whose critical inhabitation is ripe for other
meanings and enactments; (b) explore Karen Barad’s subversion of scien-
tific literacy as agential literacy as a productive location to rework the
connectivity towards IWLN and TEK; (c), utilize agential literacy as
proximal (yet differing) relation to bring in Gregory Cajete’s concep-
tion of Indigenous science as ecologies of relationships; and (d) explore
the generative points of resonance between agential literacy and ecologies
of relationships. The chapter concludes with a cautionary note on points
of convergence and points of divergence, wherein I use and trouble the
proximal relation between agential literacy and ecologies of relationships
by suggesting that this should not be recoded as but a new location for
the mirror of sameness to take hold.
Revisiting Response-Ability at the Cultural Interface
We must abandon the common (often unconscious) colonial ideas about
keeping the “[I]ndigenous” (epistemes, peoples, or anything else) sepa-
rate or uncontaminated to preserve its archaic nature and thereby extend
its inability to intervene, dialogue, participate and disrupt. It can and it
must operate within those systems, because [decolonization] is a theory
and practice of transforming the academy at the level of its intellectual
procedures and traditions. (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 146)
Because we need to “begin” some-where and some-time, let’s “begin”,
right here, right now, by engaging in a fulsome and differential (re)visiting
of response-ability in science education.3 In moving towards a response,
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it is important that “we abandon the common (often unconscious)
colonial ideas about keeping the ‘[I]ndigenous’ (epistemes, peoples, or
anything else) separate” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 146) as response-ability
is not simply or only the taking up of the responsibility that always
already lay before us and constitute us, but also the iterative (re)opening
of responsiveness towards the potentiality of perceiving and differently
enacting possibilities and problematics within the distributive relations
that we inherit. As a white, Euro-settler trained within the physical
sciences (specifically physics) and education, I recognize the importance
of not simply rejecting my tradition’s epistemic, ontological, and ethical
commitments and enactments even (and especially) when they become
problematic as this contextual vector always comes to bear on the poten-
tial (re)opening of responsiveness: “the process of decolonization can only
emerge from within those structures of domination, from inside the insti-
tution” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 146). To attempt to move beyond science
education without simultaneously working within and against it runs the
risk of reproducing its structures, strategies, processes, and practices else-
where, albeit differently (see Higgins, 2014a; McKinley, 2001; Sammel,
2009; see also Higgins, Madden, & Korteweg, 2015). Response-ability is
a deconstructive move, an ongoing process of accounting for and being
accountable to the absent yet present knowledge-practices that contin-
uously (re)produce educational research and science education, be they
problematic or rife with possibility. Even when engaging in the work
of reconstructing something that is beyond what science education is
and is not, the work must nonetheless, and paradoxically, be within and
against simultaneously. This is of particular significance given the deep
gravitational pull of Cartesianism that makes it difficult to break from
its epistemological and ontological orbits (Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Barad,
2007; Battiste, 2005; Braidotti, 2013). Further, this signal the irreducible
relation between reconstruction and deconstruction: the homework of
response-ability must also take seriously unsettling the very tools with
which we work in designing and developing curriculum, pedagogies, and
methodologies in science education (see Higgins & Kim, 2019; Higgins,
Wallace, & Bazzul, 2018; Higgins et al., 2017).
As Kuokkanen (2007) identifies, one important location in engaging
in the (home)work of response-ability is by disrupting and displacing
the (neo-)colonial desire to keep Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being
separate from those of educational institutions, as the consequence of
this move “extend[s] its inability to intervene, dialogue, participate and
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disrupt” (p. 146).4 Thankfully, as the mantra of beginning some-where
and some-time has been ceaselessly reminding us throughout is that
Indigenous and Western ways-of-knowing-in-being are always already
in relation. As Blackfoot Elder and scholar Leroy Little Bear (2016)
signalled in his talk, Blackfoot Metaphysics is Waiting in the Wings,
there is no metaphysics that exists outside of its relationship to others.
However, it is not enough to reverse this binary (i.e., replace absence
with presence), it must be disrupted and displaced as well (see Spivak,
1976). When the relationship between Indigenous and Western ways-
of-knowing-in-being is recognized, it is most often one that is troubled
and troubling. Notably, this relationship is prevalently and problemati-
cally attributed to a decontextualized and ahistorical account of difference
within many spaces, where dichotomous differences are conceived and
Indigeneity is presented as deficient otherness (Donald, 2012; see also,
Spivak, 1988a, 1999). However, neither Indigenous nor Western knowl-
edges are “immune” to the influence of the other knowledge system
(Harding, 2008; Little Bear, 2000, 2016). Even if it were organized as a
dichotomy, it is porous and always already deconstructing in an ongoing
cross-cultural becoming. Therefore, the task is not to place Indigenous
and Western ways-of-knowing-in-being into relation, but rather address
the (neo-)colonial structures which (re)produce this relation as one of
Othering or as absent presence. Importantly, the latter is also a form of
colonial containments rooted in sublating, subsuming, or suturing over
Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being.
Further, as Tewa science educator Gregory Cajete (2006) states,
“Native and Western cultures, with their seemingly irreconcilably different
ways of knowing and relating to the natural world, must search for
common ground and a basis for dialogue” (p. 248). There is at once a
need and a possibility for dialogue across Indigenous and Western “ways
of knowing and relating to the natural world” (Cajete, 2006, p. 248)
despite their “very different orientations to the natural world” (Cajete
2000, p. 13). As he elaborates,
All the basic components of scientific thought and application are
metaphorically represented in most Native stories of creation and origin.
Indeed, both Native science and modern science have elements of the
primal human story in common. They have, however, evolved very
different orientations to the natural world and very different expressions
of thought regarding the role of humankind in coming to know our place
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and our responsibility to the creative unfolding of the greater story of the
universe. As we enter the… new millennium, Native and Western cultures
and their seemingly irreconcilably different ways of knowing and relating
to the natural world are finding common ground and a basis for dialogue.
(Cajete, 2000, pp. 13–14)
The necessity bears repeating: the relationship between Indigenous and
Western knowledge systems is often referred to as one of “Jagged World-
views Colliding” (Little Bear, 2000), one that is at best as tenuous, and
at worst as “seemingly irreconcilably different” (Cajete, 2000, p. 14).
However, the possibility for meaningful and respectful dialogue desires
further engagement, despite there already being points of resonance
between IWLN, and WMS. In the next section, I think with Nakata
(2007a, 2007b) in order to engage with the possibility of placing TEK,
IWLN, and WMS in dialogical relation in and as science education.
Considering Methodologies and Pedagogies for/at the Cultural
Interface
For spaces that are always already at the cultural interface like Indigenous
knowledge systems and practices in the academy, there is perhaps a need
for a “different conceptualisation of the cross-cultural space, not as a clash
of opposites and differences but as a layered and very complex entangle-
ment of concepts, theories and sets of meanings of a knowledge system”
(Nakata, 2006, p. 272). While there are increasingly points of resonance
within this in-between space (Peat, 2002), one should not be overly or
only romantic about the possibilities (Carter, 2004, 2010). Furthermore,
just as one should always be alert to the ways in which these poten-
tially productive hybrid spaces remain contested and complicated, it is also
problematic to (too easily) write them off altogether (Ahenakew, 2016;
Donald, 2012; Kuokkanen, 2007; see also Spivak, 1993/2009, 1994). In
other words, there continues to be a need to remain critical and complicit
towards these possibilities. I agree with Nakata (2007b) who states, “not
opening up theoretical positions for more complicated discussion means
that the cultural interface is sutured over in favour of the Western order
of things and its constitution of what an Indigenous [and ally] opposition
should be” (pp. 10–11), as well as possibilities beyond opposition such as
dialogue.
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The cultural interface according to Nakata (2007a, 2007b) are partic-
ular discursive nodes where competing and contesting knowledge systems
are positioned alongside and against each other in ways that are shaped
by various discursive practices (e.g., theories, epistemic regulation, social
imaginaries) that dynamically intersect with the materiality of place, space,
and time. As Nakata (2007a) states, these nodes:
inform, constrain or enable what can be seen or not seen, what can be
brought to the surface or sutured over, what can be said or not said,
heard or not heard, understood or misunderstood, what knowledge can
be accepted, rejected, legitimized or marginalized, or what actions can be
taken or not taken on both individual and collective levels. (p. 199)
Not unlike Butler’s (e.g., 1993, 2005, 2010) theorization of performa-
tivity, Nakata invites us to consider that the cultural interface is not a
totalized or deterministic space in which agency is foreclosed. More-
over, the interface is something you do (as knowledge-practice) rather
than something that is (as knowledge) (see Chapter 3). Agency is framed
by the possibilities and limitations of the cultural interface. In particular,
considering agency at the cultural interface invites us to consider how the
plurality of coalescing and competing forces and flows produce “the very
conditions to what is possible between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
positions” (Nakata, 2007b, p. 13) in their dis/continuity and uneven rela-
tionality. Negotiating these spaces is not a question of who can know
or do, but rather what can be known and done through negotiating,
navigating, and exploring this lived everyday tension while recognizing
that:
People’s lived experience at the interface is the point of entry for investi-
gation, not the case under investigation. It is to find a way to explore the
actualities of the everyday and discover how to express them conceptually
from within that experience, rather than depend on or deploy predeter-
mined concepts and categories for explaining experience. (Nakata, 2007b,
p. 10, emphasis mine)
Not unlike Kuokkanen’s (2007) conceptualization of the homework of
response-ability, the work must begin from who and where we are. Impor-
tantly, it must also not end there either. For example, drawing from
personal lived experience as a point of departure, I have argued with
respect to decolonizing pedagogies that every attempt to work against
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colonization is also within colonization and inevitably reifies (neo)colonial
constructs, concepts, or structures through the process (Higgins, 2014a;
see Chapter 2). In turn, the cultural interface provides a rich conceptual
location to consider decolonizing pedagogies as de/colonizing to explore
the (neo)colonial complexities and complications that emerge through the
practice of decolonizing pedagogies (see also Carter, 2004, 2010). It has
been argued that the cultural interface is an incredibly productive and apt
concept for situating Indigenous learners within teaching methodologies
(Nakata, 2007a, 2007b),5 as well as non-Indigenous learners engaging
with Indigeneity (McGloin, 2009).6 Lastly, I have also argued elsewhere
(Higgins, 2014b), that this co-constitutive location is also a productive
site from which to consider de/colonizing research methodologies as well
as pedagogies.7
Thus, the task of placing TEK, IWLN, and WMS in dialogical relation
in and as science education requires something akin to suspended action
to engage with the double(d) practice of deconstructing and recon-
structing science education.8 Recall from Chapter 3 that suspended action
is a lived practice of dialogue and a (partial) coming-to-awareness of what
we think, as well as how what we think is produced and producible
(Bohm, 1996; see also Patel, 2016; Stengers, 2018). The latter entails
considering how values are inflected, deferred, and deflected through our
selves. This double(d) movement, which bears resemblance to Apffel-
Marglin’s (2011) “reverse anthropology” (see Chapter 6), might allow us
to rethink and displace the self-in-relation to the norms that shape how,
who, and what we can be and do with explicit attention to the ways-
of-knowing-in-being which produce Indigenous science as to-come. To
engage with this task of thinking-about-how-we-think-while-we-think-it,
learnings of how WMS is co-constituted by Eurocentrism and Carte-
sianism through the pathways tactically wandered with/in this book are
enfolded into exploring a pathway forward (e.g., the practices entangled
with/in WMS such as the modest witness, the enclosure, and the double-
sided ledger); we move from the homework of response-ability towards
and as a response. Further, my partial and contingent knowledge9 of
Indigenous science also supports the (re)opening of science education for
Indigenous science to-come. Such an attempt recognizes that Indigenous
science and WMS are not simply different natural-cultural articulations,10
but also within unevenly distributed relations of power.
In the next section, response-ability is revisited as a means of further
labouring the interface at which pedagogical and research design occur. As
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a continued commitment to taking seriously the role of ontology and how
it shapes the what possibilities are possible with regards to the question of
Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being within science education, I inflect
the previous exploration of response-ability (see Chapter 2) with Barad’s
(2010) understanding of the concept.
The Homework of Response-Ability Revisited: Towards a Reconstructive
Response
To reiterate, response-ability is not responsibility in the conventional
sense; it is not something that one can simply take, give, or even have.
Rather, response-ability is the double(d) process of (re)opening the space
of responsiveness in order to enact that responsibilities towards the co-
constitutive relationships we always already find ourselves in. As signalled
in Chapter 2, this process must entail addressing the ways in which
science education is marked by epistemic ignorance. This is a relation
with Indigenous knowledges that is not only marked by what science
education does not know but also by what it refuses to know and what
it cannot know. This is to say, knowledge alone is not enough when
not knowing is also produced by structurally sanctioned forms of igno-
rance and discursively conditioned (fore)closure making coming-to-know
Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being an impossibility (see Kuokkanen,
2007, 2010).
Entangled within questions of epistemic ignorance are also the ques-
tions of ontology and metaphysics. To assume that the Western modernist
concepts we hold mirror the being of Nature problematically (fore)closes
response-ability, not only by creating a dichotomy which perpetuates a
deficit view of any other-than-Cartesian relation between epistemology
and ontology, but this has negative consequences for ways-of-knowing-
and-being that do not fully fit within the model. Furthermore, it
(fore)closes the (re)opening of concepts we inherit that are both prob-
lems and possibilities to the task of responding to Indigenous science
to-come. For example, and significantly, the “I” as the ethical subject of
response and the larger metaphysics of individualism to which it adheres.
Rather, response-ability invites a conception of subject that is distributed
along, within, and throughout the relationships through which we are co-
constituted. There is no transcendental “I” who can irrupt the space of
responsibility from outside: the work of response-ability is always within,
against, and beyond the co-constitutive relations of the “I”. In turn, the
280 M. HIGGINS
“I” of science education research (i.e., the researcher) cannot be thought
or enacted of without the co-constitutive vectors that come to shape
response-ability (i.e., the home of homework: discipline, history, culture,
etc.).
In addition, as Peat (2002) reminds us, some natural-cultural loca-
tions are more in/hospitable than others when it comes to the work
of response-ability (see also Kuokkanen, 2007; Spivak, 1988a). Points
of resonance offer themselves, not as panaceas, but as vacillating spaces
of possibility for the work of response-ability (see Ahenakew, 2016).
Lastly, as response-ability is an ongoing and enacted process, it is gener-
ative to consider it with/in the space of theory-practice-ethics that is
methodology. Response-ability is a methodological concept that not only
allows for a productive deconstructive pause, but also offers a pathways
towards a response: it is a rich concept with which to think in the
(im)possible reconstruction of science education to allow for Indigenous
science to-come.
This brings us back to and has bearing on what it means to engage
in the methodological process(es) of decolonizing science education.
Recall that decolonizing science education entails the double(d) process
of deconstructing and reconstructing (see Battiste, 2013a, 2013b). This
entails at once (re)opening (neo-)colonial structures and strategies that
leverage incommensurability as a means of enacting an uneven flow of
power, while simultaneously (re)constructing in a way which refuses
commensurability while seeking to centre and take seriously Indigenous,
diasporic, and other post-colonial ways-of-knowing-in-being in reshaping
its processes and priorities. However, the very possibility of this responsi-
bility is directly tied to the ability to respond (Kuokkanen, 2007, 2010).11
This ability to respond is, in turn, tied to the past (and future-to-come) as
inheritance: not as possession, but that by which we are possessed (Barad,
2010; Derrida, 1994/2006). It is for this reason, and worth recalling,
that decolonizing science education must always be both a process of
deconstructing and reconstructing (and not deconstruction and recon-
struction; see Jackson & Mazzei, 2012): the very tools with which any
reconstruction are engaged with must also be under erasure.
In engaging with this task of response-able reconstruction, I turn
to Barad’s (2010) understanding of response-ability; without too easily
calling Kuokkanen’s (2007, 2010) understanding of response-ability
commensurate with Barad’s (2010), or refusing the call to attempt to
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place the two in dialogical relation (as they are always already in rela-
tion). Providing rich inroads towards ethically, epistemologically, and
ontologically responding (and being able to respond), Barad (2010) states
that,
Responsibility is not an obligation that the subject chooses but rather
an incarnate relation that precedes the intentionality of consciousness.
Responsibility is not a calculation to be performed. It is a relation
always already integral to the world’s ongoing intra-active becoming and
not-becoming. It is an iterative (re)opening up to, an enabling of respon-
siveness. Not through the realization of some existing possibility, but
through the iterative reworking of im/possibility, an ongoing rupturing, a
cross-cutting of topological reconfiguring of the space of [response-ability].
(p. 265)
As Barad (2010) suggests, response-ability is the double(d) process of
enabling responsiveness to enact the responsibilities which precedes and
produces the “I” of responsibility. Response-ability, as an always itera-
tive process without an origin that enfolds and unfolds the here-now and
there-then, “is a relation always integral to the world’s ongoing intra-
active becoming and not-becoming” (Barad, 2010, p. 265). In turn,
as Barad (2010) suggests, the theory-practice-ethics of response-ability
never achieves the calculable prescriptivity of conventional conceptions of
responsibility but rather “require[s]/inspire[s] a new sense of a-count-
ability, a new arithmetic, a new calculus” in which “one is too few, two is
too many” (p. 251).12 She offers us methodological orientations towards
doing the homework of response-ability and the means to consider it
as a (deconstructive/)reconstructive methodology. Of particular signifi-
cance here is the final sentence in which she states that response-ability
is enacted “not through the realization of some existing possibility, but
through the iterative reworking of im/possibility, an ongoing rupturing, a
cross-cutting of topological reconfiguring of the space of response-ability”
(p. 265). For each of these insights, I will place them in conversation with
previous chapters’ deconstructive approaches to differentially build upon
them in relation to the ongoing project of (re)opening responsiveness
towards Indigenous science to-come. Furthermore, I address how these
entangled insights are taken up herein.
Response-Ability as Ongoing Rupturing. The notion of ongoing
rupturing here signals, yet again, and unavoidably, deconstruction.13
282 M. HIGGINS
However, in marking and making the turn towards reconstruction, it
is important to note the relationship between the two while chasing
the possibility that, as Barad (2010) states, one is too few and two
is too many. Deconstruction “is not about de-construction and re-
construction” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. 15, emphasis in original);
it is not a process of separation in which a separate agent brings in
separable constituents. Rather, it is a process of differently arranging
relations of co-constitutive otherness to which there is no outside from
which total separation could occur. Thus, we can engage in the “undoing
yet preserving of the opposition” (Spivak, 1976, p. xix) between this
deconstructive/reconstructive binary opposition as they were never sepa-
rate, nor separable. Not two, yet, importantly not one: there are still
differentiations that come to mark the ways in which deconstruction
differentiates itself from itself (i.e., never comes to be an is; see Spivak,
1993/2009; St. Pierre, 2011a). As Spivak (1993/2009) suggests, such
a trajectory was marked in the way in which deconstruction was always
already on the move within Derrida’s work: “the economy, in the early
work, of protecting and preserving (garder) the question and, in the
later, of its transformation into the call to the wholly-other (tout-autre)”
(Spivak, 1993/2009, p. 109, emphasis in original). Following a similar
yet differing trajectory within this book, response-ability as ongoing
rupturing builds upon and differentially enacts the deconstructive moves
of previous chapters. Notably, I differentially apply the deconstruction as
critical and complicit (mis)readings put to work in the fourth chapter.
Recall that critical and complicit (mis)reading is to work within and
against a structure by differentially occupying it, by substituting what
a concept, category, or construct is with what it is (not).14 By substi-
tuting what it is (not), that which could be signified by a signifier but
usually is not (e.g., diffraction and prismatic dispersal as metaphors that
come to replace and otherwise signify the optics of critique which operate
through mirroring; see Chapter 4), differential possibilities emerge which
are neither same nor wholly different by retaining (a partially erased trace
of) the structure (see Derrida, 1976; Spivak, 1993/2009).
Furthermore, the task of deconstructive (mis)readings requires locating
self-transgressive moments (i.e., where meaning vacillates intended mean-
ings and its excessive constitutive otherness) to pry open the structure
under erasure (Spivak, 1976). As discussed in Chapter 4, such locations
are ripe for (mis)readings as that which it is (not) already comes to bear
as excess; an intentional (mis)reading becomes but a leveraging of the
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deconstructive possibility to (re)open the structure under erasure. As
deconstructive reconstruction must inevitably be within the very struc-
ture that (re)produces me, I draw from these insights to continue to
critically and complicitly occupy science education, targeting the “home”
of homework that is response-ability. In particular, I look to differentially
signify a key location with/in science curriculum and pedagogy that are
paradoxically central yet taken-for-granted: notably scientific literacy (the
most frequent curricular goal of science education). This is to be achieved
by doing the labour of (mis)reading these locations by substituting that
which each is (not). This work begins by substituting that retains a trace of
the (partially erased) structure by drawing in strongly similar yet different
iterations of that which is being substituted.
However, “deconstruction is [and can be] more than working within
and against a structure” (St. Pierre, 2011a, p. 613) by substituting similar
yet different meanings that retain the resources of the structure; “it is
also the overturning and displacement of a structure so that something(s)
different can be thought/done” (St. Pierre, 2011a, p. 613). The previous
deconstructive approaches are not sufficient if the reconstructive orienta-
tion is to bring in Indigenous priorities, pedagogies, and protocols so that
they might come to bear; requiring of science educators that “we radically
de-naturalize what we’ve taken for granted. Here we refuse alternatives
and pursue the supplement [i.e., the wholly other, the to-come], what
always already escapes the structure” (St. Pierre, 2011a, p. 613). Here,
we can turn to Barad’s second suggestion.
Response-ability as a cross-cutting of topological reconfiguring.
Barad (2007) suggests that the potentiality of deconstructive work does
not lay strictly in its ability to identify the constitutive otherness of
concepts, categories, and constructs. Nor does its possibility wholly reside
in the always already occurring rupturing and shifting of meaning. Rather,
deconstruction acts as an ongoing invitation towards an engaged act of
account- and response-ability towards constitutive otherness, as well as an
ever-present possibility to re(con)figure the lines of inclusion/exclusion,
(re)constructing with that which was excluded. As the exclusion of consti-
tutive otherness always comes-to-be, the work of deconstructing and
reconstructing continues to be a recursive, iterative, and co-constitutive
process which stems from the possibilities that arise from relationality.15
The task of response-ability is not to place peoples, places, and
processes in relation: they are always already in or as relation.16 These
relations, as Barad (2010) reminds, are shaped by a constant reworking
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of the norms of exclusion and inclusion that come to form a topology of
cross-cuts,17 lines that come to shape what (temporarily) is and is not, as
well as could be and the degree to which parts of the whole come to be
on another part. However, because the cuts are agential, there is always
the possibility of reworking how, where, and when they are made to bring
seemingly distant natural-cultural elements into a relation of proximity.
To do this (home)work of response-ability, I extend the decon-
structive tinkering of Chapters 5 and 6.18 Response-ability as recon-
figuring a topology of cross-cutting encourages a (re)consideration of
inside/outside: there is no “outside” from which to draw the tools
with which the bricoleur (i.e., the tinkerer) labours but rather only new
ways of differently connecting that which is already there. Within this
chapter, I tinker with Indigenous-ways-of-living-with-nature not as the
end result (although bricolage is always to be criticized by what is and
can be engineered), but as part of the process as these ancestral and long-
standing practices were never developed for the purpose of school science.
Nonetheless, they offer rich tools for school science to be (re)thought and
enacted otherwise.
This is of particular significance as these previous chapters also explored
the technologies of power that produced metaphysical distance between
that which was in a relation of natural-cultural proximity (e.g., abstracting
one’s own body as labour in the proto-market economy, the enclosure
and the encloser’s advantage; see Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Chapter 6); the
(home)work of response-ability can be thought of and enacted as a prac-
tice that works to bring that which is distant into proximal relation. As
Barad (2010) asks, “what if we were to recognize that differentiating is
a material act that is not about radical separation [and distance], but on
the contrary, about making connections and commitments?” (p. 266).
Such a deconstruction of the topological norms of inclusion/exclusion
is, as explored in the previous approach for (re)opening response-ability,
a way of working not only within and against a structure but also beyond
(a beyond that is nonetheless with/in the whole). However, while decon-
struction is always already happening (whether we witness it or not),
what comes to occupy this differential opening is often but a simu-
lacrum: a different similarity or a similar difference (see Higgins et al.,
2015; Mazzei, 2007).19 While Barad (2010) suggests that, “only in this
ongoing responsibility to the entangled other, without dismissal (without
‘enough already!’), is there the possibility of justice-to-come” (pp. 264–
265), there is nonetheless strategic and tactical locations from which to
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do the (home)work of responsibility. Here, a third approach can help in
reworking and leveraging this open-ended closure.
Response-Ability as the Iterative Reworking of Im/possibility. As
mentioned within the very beginning of the chapter, dialogue between
IWLN and WMS is in a perpetual state of im/possibility: they are not
and never will be (fully) commensurate (see Cajete, 1994, 2000; Barn-
hardt & Kawagley, 2005, 2008; McKinley & Stewart, 2012; Peat, 2002).
This, in turn, complicates the possibility of if and how IWLN and TEK
are included with/in school science. Generously and generatively, Spivak
(1993/2009) asks, What becomes possible when we persistently labour the
conditions of im/possibility? In considering response-ability as the iterative
reworking of im/possibility, it is important to recognize that the “field of
possibilities is not static or singular but rather is a dynamic and contingent
multiplicity” (Barad, 2007, p. 147). In other words, possibilities do not
sit still and some possibilities are more possible than others.
Locating such possible possibilities is the work of what Cajete (1994)
refers to as “creative acts of perception” (p. 19). Elsewhere, Cajete
(2000) qualifies that “the idea of moving around to look from a different
perspective… is contained in the creative process. Indigenous logic moves
between relationships, revisiting, moving to where it is necessary to learn
or to bring understandings together” (Cajete, 2000, p. 210). This idea
of approaching from multiple angles provides a productive extension to
the play of (re)signification that was called upon in Chapter 3. In short,
the play of (re)signification signals the ways in which deconstruction is
an always extended invitation to consider other possible possibilities that
might take hold stemming from the inevitability of theory-practice being
exceeded and self-deconstructing. Drawing from Barad, and extending
my own deconstructive work that began elsewhere (see Higgins et al.,
2015), we can consider deconstruction of not only binary nodes (e.g.,
self/other and familiar/strange), but also of binary relationships between
multiple binaries (e.g., self+familiar/other+strange).
Drawing on these insights, I was on the lookout for moments in
which science education’s meanings vacillate in ways that might (re)open
its structures through deconstruction. While on the lookout for snags
within the structure of science education (eventually identified as scien-
tific literacy and visuality), I held awareness of the possibility of a reversal
of a (porous) Western/Indigenous binary. In other words, I revisited the
questions, Where might tinkering with IWLN allow for the most produc-
tive (mis)readings of science education? Where might similar yet different
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Indigenous theory-practices come to differentially occupy this (re)opening so
that Indigenous science to come might take hold? I was inevitably searching
for productive points of resonance that could be levered to prevent the
structure from too easily suturing itself over, reverting to a state of self-
sameness. However, iteratively, it is important to note the dangers of
subsuming otherness into sameness:
the wholly other, le tout-autre, cannot be selved or samed. It is not suscep-
tible to ipseité or mêmeté. The face of the wholly-other is without a name.
The “other” that we narrativize or grasp consolidates the self, through a
kind of stade du miroir [Mirror stage20]. (Spivak, 1993/2009, p. 238,
emphasis in original)
That which is (not) science, such as IWLN and TEK, simultaneously
existing with/in science education and yet not, as always to-come, loses
its radical potentiality when it comes to bear through dialectic rela-
tions (see Chapter 3). More importantly, as Spivak (1993/2009) offers,
when Otherness becomes “selved or samed,” it is because it has been
subsumed, sublated, or sutured over by the same (neo-)colonial systems
that rendered it Other in the first place; what is known or knowable is
within the (fore)closure of Western modern thinking (see also Ahenakew,
2016). Such a sameness must be used and troubled; refusing the (full)
reversal of difference as (wholly) separate, separable, and outside of
relationality.
Science Curriculum and Response-Ability:
Re(Con)Figuring Scientific Literacy
Putting to work the above orientations, I labour the space of response-
ability within, against, and beyond the primary curricular node of science
education: scientific literacy. As Sammel (2009) suggests, scientific literacy
presents an important location to critically inhabit as its centrality often
becomes a point in which efforts to disrupt and displace science education
often become re-settled in both senses of the word:
science education may be celebrating a move towards a form of multicul-
turalism where ethnic differences are maintained, supported, and welcomed
within the rhetoric, but in reality the infrastructural and ideological reasons
for exclusion remain unchallenged and unchanged. (Sammel, 2009, p. 253)
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In order to engage in the double(d) movement of unsettling science
education through disrupting and displacing scientific literacy, the afore-
mentioned three moves are put to work. Within the first part (i.e.,
response-ability as ongoing rupturing), I identify scientific literacy as a
central yet uncertain concept whose critical inhabitation is ripe for other
meanings and enactments. In the second part (i.e., response-ability as the
iterative reworking of im/possibility), I identify Karen Barad’s subversion
of scientific literacy as agential literacy as a productive location to rework
the connectivity towards IWLN and TEK. In the third section (i.e.,
response-ability as the cross-cutting of topological reconfiguring), I utilize
agential literacy as proximal (yet differing) relation to bring in Gregory
Cajete’s conception of Indigenous science as ecologies of relationships.
Lastly (i.e., response-ability as putting to work points of resonance), this
(re)opening of responsiveness made possible with agential literacy and
ecologies of relationships is explored as a means of moving towards a
more response-able science education.
Response-Ability as Ongoing Rupturing: Scientific Literacy as Central
yet Uncertain
As Barad (2000) states about scientific literacy, its importance to science
education is central while its very purpose is always on the move:
There has been no shortage of rationales given on behalf of the national
need for scientific literacy. Scientific literacy has been hailed as: the basis
for democratic decision making about public issues; necessary for global
economic competitiveness and national security; crucial for the promo-
tion of rational thinking; a condition for cultural literacy; necessary for
gainful employment in an increasingly technological world; the basis for
personal decision making about health-related issues; and necessary for the
maintenance of the public image of science. (Barad, 2000, p. 225)
Scientific literacy has become ubiquitous within and almost synony-
mous with science education (Aikenhead, 2006; Bang, 2018; Barad,
2000; Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2007; Roth, 2003). Following over four
decades of use, it has become unavoidable, central, as well as the “conven-
tional” goal of science education (Aikenhead & Elliot, 2010; Holbrook &
Rannikmae, 2009). Almost anthemic, call for scientific literacy for all rings
out across educational institutions and levels (e.g., curricular resources,
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policy). As Barad (2000) states above, there is no lack of reasons for
which scientific literacy is leveraged and centred within science educa-
tion; however, she asks: “what does it mean to be scientifically literate?”
(p. 225).
As Roth (2003) states, “the concept of scientific literacy is itself not
at all clear” (p. 11). This is not to say that it holds a meaning that is
itself blurry, rather, one that might be described as ambivalent, plural-
istic, and in ways that come to occasionally contradict themselves.21 As
Holbrook and Rannikmae (2009) state, scientific literacy is inhabited by
a multiplicity of conceptual components:
(a) Knowledge of the substantive content of science and the ability to
distinguish from non-science; (b) Understanding science and its appli-
cations; (c) Knowledge of what counts as science; (d) Independence in
learning science; (e) Ability to think scientifically; (f) Ability to use scien-
tific knowledge in problem solving; (g) Knowledge needed for intelligent
participation in science-based issues; (h) Understanding the nature of
science, including its relationship with culture; (i) Appreciation of and
comfort with science, including its wonder and curiosity; (j) Knowledge
of the risks and benefits of science; and (k) Ability to think critically about
science and to deal with scientific expertise. (p. 276)
The conceptual components found within this non-exhaustive list are
not only differentially included/excluded but also non-uniformly enacted
through following the curricular goal that is scientific literacy. It is for
this reason that they state scientific literacy has been so successful in its
proliferation: it “avoids the use of distracting detail and, as such, convinc-
ingly portrays a complex idea which intuitively appears to be correct”
(Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009, p. 275). Here, we find resonance with
Davis (2008) who states that some of the concepts that are the most
successful in achieving a degree of everywhere-ness by reaching wide
academic audiences and circulation are those that are at once ambiguous
and incomplete.22
Despite the conceptual ambiguity presented with/in scientific literacy,
Barad (2000) states that, “most commonly, scientific literacy is thought
of in terms of the successful transmission of knowledge about scien-
tific facts and methods from knowing scientists to the ignorant masses”
(p. 226, emphasis mine).23 Most commonly here signals the ways in
which there is a (i.e., singular) common sense: a common sense that is at
once held and by which science education and educators are held (see
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Chapter 5). As van Eijck and Roth (2007) remind us, drawing from
Foucault (1977, 1979), the logics of science education can often be
characterized as a “regime of truth”. As explored in Chapters 4 and 6,
regimes of truth are marked by circular relations: each “truth” is but a
differential articulation of the systems of power which produces it, whose
articulation in turn (re)produces the systems of power. Such a circular
relation can be read in two ways: first, as signalling a hermetic circle,
a (fore)closure of knowledge (see Chapters 2 and 3); and second, as
the capillary circulation of power from one conceptual node to another
(see Chapter 4).24 Despite its ambivalence and the ever-present possi-
bility of deconstructive (re)signification, it is no surprise that scientific
literacy is, for the most part, (re)produced within and reproducing the
norms of power of science education (see Higgins, 2014a; McKinley,
2001, 2007; Sammel, 2009; van Eijck & Roth, 2007). There has been
a major paradigmatic shift in science education in the last decades which
shifts the emphasis from coming to know what scientists know (i.e.,
cognitivism, intra-personal learning, scientific knowledge as represen-
tation of nature) to enculturation into how scientists come-to-know
(i.e. socio-constructivism, inter-personal learning, scientific knowledge as
representation of culture) (see Barad, 2000; Erickson, 2000; Aikenhead,
2006). As Holbrook and Rannikmae (2007) state: “no content is funda-
mental, but rather the content needed for enhancing scientific literacy is
dependent on the culture and society in which the science education is
implemented” (p. 1352). However, the “teaching practices have changed
little and remain based on traditional, universalist views of science and
science education” (McKinley, 2007, p. 219); common sense understand-
ings of science, scientist, and science education most commonly come to
fill these (re)opening locations (see also McKinley, 2001; Sammel, 2009).
Paradoxically, in light of the ambiguity of scientific literacy, only a small
fraction of the population can be said to be scientifically literate (Barad,
2000, 2012a). Barad (2000) states:
Viewed in this way, the problem of scientific illiteracy is seen as a massive
transmission failure… In light of the extraordinary monetary and intellec-
tual resources that have been and continue to be committed to solving this
problem, it is perhaps not unreasonable to ask if the metaphor itself isn’t
sending the wrong signal. (p. 226)
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As Holbrook and Rannikmae (2009) suggest, “the core of the idea
behind scientific literacy lies in its analogy with literacy” (p. 275). By
invoking literacy as a metaphor, we invoke a common sense notion that to
be scientifically literate is to be able to read, interpret, and determine the
validity of a multiplicity of scientific texts: scientific documentation and
instrumentation, reporting on past, current, and future socio-scientific
issues, the cultural practice of science, as well as Nature itself. This, as
Barad (2000) states, might be “sending the wrong signal” (p. 226): a
signal which (re)produces science education as an enactment of what
Barad (2007) refers to as a metaphysics of individualism (see Chapters 5
and 6). This makes scientific literacy a location that is at once inade-
quate yet necessary, and ripe for the ongoing rupturing of response-ability
through critical inhabitation for (at least) three reasons.
First, the metaphor of literacy invites a metaphysics of individualism by
calling upon reading and hermeneutics: the reader is both separate and
separable from the scientific “text”, both of which ontologically precede
the act of reading. Furthermore, interpretive readings in/of science gener-
ally require that the reader learns through mirroring the text (when
decreed as valid science) or dialectically negating the text.
Secondly, the metaphor of literacy reinforces the notion that learning
to be scientifically literate is an (metaphysically) individual affair. Compa-
rable to the ways in which we consider the act of reading as a mathe-
matical set in which there is one reader and one text, the oft-exclaimed
scientific literacy for all presupposes that each and every learner has
an individualistic relationship with scientific literacy and that each and
every text is separable and separate. As Roth (2003) states, this educa-
tional separation between both learner, text, and other texts produce the
precondition for a problematic double(d) effect:
Scientific literacy currently means to question nature in ways such that
do not, reflexively, also question science and scientists. However, worse
is the other part of the current rhetoric about scientific literacy—it is to
be for all. All individuals (e.g. Americans), so goes the idealist rhetoric,
have to learn and exhibit certain ‘basic’ facts and skills. Just imagine,
every individual taking the same (‘scientific’) perspective on GMOs, genetic
manipulation of the human genome, or use of drugs (such as those used
to dope certain kinds of children, labelled ‘ADHD’ (i.e. Attention-deficit,
hyperactive disorder) to make them compliant). (p. 11)
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In other words, the focusing of each and every student on “one” text (i.e.,
the science-as-usual curriculum)25 that is treated as separate and separable
from other texts (e.g., scientific ethics) produces scientific literacy as, by
design, un-self-reflexive. While the possibility of ethical self-reflexivity is
not wholly foreclosed, it is evident that practices of scientific-literacy-as-
usual focus primarily on the ways in which different students (through
standardized testing) achieve different levels of attainment of the same
curricular content. Furthermore, Roth (2003) appeals to curricular reason
when he states that “we [science educators] all know that there simply
exists too much specific knowledge for any individual to know the relevant
facts even in more constrained contexts” (Roth, 2003, p. 19).
Third, like with reading, texts can be selected to be relevant to each
and every reader in order to achieve scientific literacy for all. However,
Barad (2000) cautions that “there’s something paradoxical about the
notion that something can be ‘made’ relevant – as if relevancy could be
imposed or added onto an existing structure” (p. 221). This signals the
differentiation between how relevancy often plays out between theory
and practice26; scientific texts can become what Barad (2000) refers to
as “context-coated”. This, as signalled within the previous chapter, can
reduce epistemic pluralism in science education as but different ways of
achieving the same ontological location: knowing nature with/in Carte-
sianism. In turn, as Roth (2003) suggests, “there is more than one reason
to rethink scientific literacy and to see it as an emergent collective praxis”
(p. 21); scientific literacy need not presuppose a metaphysics of indi-
vidualism from the get-go. Rather, “if we think of scientific literacy in
different terms, as choreography of a particular kind in which we learn to
participate by participating from the beginning, we take radically different
approaches to teaching science in schools” (Roth, 2003, p. 19). Not
unlike Chapter 4, in which critique is re(con)figured to address its norma-
tive enactments of distance and separation as the condition for knowledge,
as well as the pre-epistemic and pre-ontological status of the object and
subject of critique, I turn to Barad (2000, 2007, 2012b, 2012c) to think
scientific literacy otherwise.
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Response-Ability as the Iterative Reworking of Im/Possibility: Karen
Barad’s Shift from Scientific Literacy to Agential Literacy
Drawing from quantum physics, Barad’s (2007) theory of agential
realism provides a rich location to iteratively rework the norms of
im/possibility by working within and against science and science educa-
tion to produce a location that might differentially allow IWLN to take
hold (i.e., in ways in which it has not already, beyond integration and
tolerance). Agential realism, as Barad theorizes it, questions the humanist
a priori status of Nature before Culture, as well as the anti-humanist
corollary statement of Culture before Nature (Barad, 2007, 2012b,
2012c; Kirby, 2011). This work disrupts the notion that Cartesianism
is the (only) ontology, not by negating it but rather by positioning it
as one ontological configuration among many. These configurations are
presented and produced as open-ended processes that are enacted rather
than static. In particular, Barad’s concept of intra-action enables us to
gain insight into how relationality, flux, and process are conceptualized
and enacted:
The neologism ‘intra-action’ signifies the mutual constitution of entangled
agencies. That is, in contrast to the usual ‘interaction’, which assumes that
there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the
notion of intra-action recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede,
but rather emerge through, their intra-action. (Barad, 2007, p. 33)
In other words, intra-action accounts for and is accountable to the various
ways in which bodies of meaning (e.g., social, cultural, political, historical)
and bodies of matter (e.g., biology, ecology, physics, engineering, archi-
tecture) are co-constitutive. This acts as an invitation to consider the ways
in which these bodies of meaning-matter are not only produced through
Cartesian norms of bodily production (i.e., subjects and objects) but also
through other-than-Cartesian entanglements that would comprise and cut
across multiple Cartesian subjects and objects. This is not simply a way of
redrawing the lines of bodily production (e.g., researcher + instrument
interaction –> researcher-instrument intra-active entanglement), it is also
a (re)consideration of how they come into being. As Barad (2012c) states,
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A quantum ontology deconstructs the classical one: there are no pre-
existing individual objects with determinate boundaries and properties
that precede some interaction, nor are there any concepts with deter-
minate meanings that could be used to describe their behavior; rather
determinate boundaries and properties of objects-within-phenomena, and
determinate contingent meanings, are enacted through specific intra-
actions, where phenomena are the ontological inseparability of intra-acting
agencies. (pp. 6–7)
Accordingly, the production of natural-cultural bodies and their bodily
norms are enacted, in flux, process-based, and performative rather than
something that always already is (or is not ). Because phenomena are
constitutive of reality, being can be thought as a performative and co-
constitutive becoming: “reality is composed not of things-in-themselves
or things-behind phenomena but of things-in-phenomena” (Barad, 2007,
p. 140).
The consequences of agential realism for scientific literacy are
drastic. The task of epistemologically establishing a representational (i.e.,
humanist) relationship of equivalence with either nature (i.e., through
cognitivism) or culture (i.e., through socio-constructivism) breaks down
because their separation was never a priori. Rather, Barad (2000) invites
us to consider how “scientific literacy becomes a matter of agential literacy
– of learning how to intra-act responsibly within the world” (p. 237)
around the matters of science (i.e., space, time, and matter). This is
significant as agential literacy goes beyond scientific literacy’s accounting
for the diverse natural and cultural agents that constitute experimental
phenomena studied and produced within the context of science educa-
tion.27 First, it considers the ways in which agents are always already
natural-cultural. Secondly, it accounts for the ways in which these agents
not only constitute but are also constituted by phenomena. Third, agen-
tial literacy ethically re(con)figures accountability as a process of not only
accounting for, but also being accountable to these agents and their
intra-action in the world’s ongoing becoming.
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Response-Ability as the Cross-Cutting of Topological Re(con)figuring:
Gregory Cajete’s Indigenous Ways-of-Knowing-in-Being and Science
Curriculum as All my Relations
Leveraging this differential opening into WMS and, in turn, science
education allows for the possibility to cross-cut the topology which
presents WMS and IWLN as distant by bringing them into proximal
relation. Articulating relationality, flux, and process differently and for
different purposes, Tewa science educator Gregory Cajete (1994, 1999,
2000) proposes that we consider ways-of-knowing-in-being—that is, the
co-substantiation of epistemology and ontology—as ecologies of relation-
ships. These ecologies of relationships that are enacted with/in these
ways-of-knowing-in-being are often referred to as both external and
internal to a human(ist) subject, while noting that some of the rela-
tions external to the subject do not require a subject at all.28 Externally,
we often speak of relationships with other humans, relationships with
other-than-human bodies (e.g., plants, rivers, mountains), as well as rela-
tionships with more-than-human bodies (i.e., spiritual beings) (see also
Apffel-Marglin, 2011). Internally, the relationships between heart, mind,
body, and spirit are often called upon.
Furthermore, the boundary between exteriority and interiority is one
that is porous, and it is this porosity that allows us to be with/in relation.
This ontological porosity extends to space and time to make being in the
world a question of process, flux and holistically being of the world rather
than in. As Cajete (1994) states, “a constant building upon earlier realities
is a basic characteristic of Indigenous processes… [in which] we engineer
the new reality built upon earlier ones, while simultaneously addressing
the needs, and acting in the sun, of our times” (p. 27). The intentionality
here signals that Cajete’s ecology of relationships (sometimes referred to
as “sense of place”) is not simply a way-of-knowing-in-being in which the
world is enacted through the flux of relationships, but that there is also
an ongoing accounting for and accountability to the ecology of relation-
ships such that it is (re)generated and sustained.29 It is for this reason
that Cajete (2000) reminds us that within many Indigenous languages
there is an expression akin to “all my relations” (e.g., Mitakuye Oyasin in
Lakota). “All my relations” is an epistemological, ontological, and ethical
accounting for and being accountable to the ecologies of relationships
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we find ourselves in and constituted by which extends beyond the imme-
diate present to include generations past and those still yet-to-come. It
is a metaphysical principle through and by which Indigenous “people
understood [and understand] that all entities of nature – plants, animals,
stones, trees, mountains, rivers, lakes and a host of other living entities –
are embodied [and co-constitutive] relationships that must be honoured”
(Cajete, 2000, p. 178).
An Indigenous science education curriculum of “all my relations” has
been in place since time immemorial in the form of land- or place-based
education (Cajete, 1994, 1999, 2000; see also Aikenhead & Michell,
2011; Kawagley, 2006). Despite disruption by ongoing (neo-)colonial
practices, Cajete (2000) reminds us that Indigenous knowledge holders
continue to engage these traditional yet ever-evolving contemporary
ways-of-knowing-in-being by “seeking, making, sharing, and celebrat-
ing” (p. 178) the ecological relationships they find themselves with/in.30
Accordingly, with/in Cajete’s (1994, 1999, 2000) conception of Indige-
nous science education, scientific literacy would not simply be a task of
knowing about nature but rather knowing-in-being with nature as an
inseparable and co-constitutive part of the ecologies of relationships in
order to learn “the subtle, but all important, language of relationship”
(Cajete, 2000, p. 178).
This teaching of knowing-in-being with is woven into and enacted
through traditional Indigenous approaches to teaching and learning,
such as Indigenous storywork (e.g., Archibald, 2008). As Barnhardt
and Kawagley (2008) remind us, while Indigenous stories hold rich
representations of nature (i.e., knowledge about nature when read
with/in Cartesian representationalism), their potential lies in honouring
a knowing-in-being with the plants, the animals, and a wide range of
other-than-human bodies that are teachers with/in the ecologies of
relationships particular to a place. As a pedagogy through which Indige-
nous peoples “came [and come] to perceive themselves as living in a sea
of relationships” (Cajete, 2000, p. 178), it is a way to witness already
existing relations and foster the possibility of new ones.
This is significant within science education wherein, as explored within
the previous curricular section, to be scientifically literate largely becomes
a function of being able to “read” nature (and others’ accounts of nature).
However, to know with nature rather than about as a pedagogical framing
(re)opens the space of response-ability for both educators and students,
albeit a potentiality that is not always actualized.
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Response-Ability as Putting to Work Points of Resonance:
(Re)Thinking Scientific Literacy at the Cultural Interface
Through the potentiality of this proximal relation between Barad’s agen-
tial realism and Cajete’s ecologies of relationships, it becomes productive
to explore and leverage both their similar differences and differing
similarities (see Bohm, 1994) in working towards a response, a more
response-able science education.31 Notably, thinking with both, and the
points of resonance between, encourages considering the ways in which
bodies that are typically considered natural, rather than cultural, to have
agency. To begin to consider other-than-human beings as agentic is a
deeply productive step in the direction of taking seriously Indigenous
science to-come, particularly the Indigenous notion that the plurality of
other-than-human bodies such as animals, plants, rocks, rivers, constitute
a sentient landscape which is always already teaching us, should we choose
to and/or be able to listen with (Cajete, 1994, 1999, 2000; Marker,
2015). As Leroy Little Bear puts it “trees talk to you, but you don’t
expect them to speak in English or Blackfoot” (in Peat, 2002, p. 288).
Articulated otherwise, place can be thought of as anthropogenic (i.e.,
cultural landscapes that are not “pure” of human interaction; e.g., spectres
of humanity across the Amazon rainforest; see Apffel-Marglin, 2011); but
it is important to simultaneously recognize that its agency in producing
meanings and matterings does not solely reside in its hybrid human-other-
than-human relations. This is significant to taking seriously as a “sense of
place” is central to Indigenous science to-come: landscapes remember as
they bear the markings of their own entangled becomings (see Apffel-
Marglin, 2011; Barad, 2007; Cajete, 2000). “Hearing” the stories that
place might tell requires attunement to the unique relationships that
shape the ecologies of relationships we find ourselves in, an attunement
Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being that have practiced in places that
have co-constituted these practices since time immemorial (Cajete, 2000,
2006).
Further, thinking with ecologies of relationships and agential literacy
disrupts and displaces the metaphysics of individualism. Again, it is
through the metaphysics of individualism that the humanist subject main-
tains and (re)produces power through distance and separation, as well
as how humanism separates, distances, and organizes space, time, and
matter (i.e., Nature). Significantly, it obscures and obfuscates ongoing
accounting for and accountability to the ways in which we are always
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already iteratively, epistemologically, and ontologically co-constituted
(Barad, 2007, 2010, 2012b). Thinking with both Cajete and Barad invites
us to think about the ways in which agency is distributed and enacted
intra-actively across all my relations. Barad (2007) refers to the “doing”
and “undoing” of intra-action as posthumanist performativity .32 In turn,
this grants materiality a similar flux and undecidability, and in the process
extends the range as to which bodies can and do engage in performa-
tivity, as well as the norms by which bodies come into being.33 As Barad
(2007) reminds us, the ways in which we enact our intra-actions matter
because “each one reconfigures the world in its becoming – and yet they
never leave us; they are sedimented into our becoming, they become
us” (p. 394). In other words, it speaks to all my relations: the ways in
which we enact our ecologies of relationships leave their marks upon the
bodies connected with/in the entanglement. Importantly, disrupting and
displacing the metaphysics of individualism is refusing and resisting its
(fore)closure of ongoing and ever-needed possibilities for ethics (see also
Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Cajete, 1994, 1999, 2000; Peat, 2002).
Further, thinking with posthumanist performativity helps us think
about non-linear temporality and its subversive potentiality through onto-
logical indeterminacy. Rather than using the language of predictability
and certainty implied through a linear and causal relationship between
past natural and cultural events towards an ever-certain present, consid-
ering time as an ontological indeterminacy invites thinking with a natural-
cultural future as a possible possibility that shapes the present with/in a
non-linear causal relationship: Does the past produce the present? Does the
present shape the past? What about the relationships with the future? On
time, Barad (2007) states:
Time is not a succession of evenly spaced individual moments. It is not
simply there as substance of measure, a background uniformly available to
all beings as a reference or an ontological primitive against which change
and stasis can be measured. (p. 180)
For Barad, time is performative and comes into dis/continuous being
through its enactment. This dis/continuous being, or to vacillate between
being and not being, is, in short, what it means to be ontologically
indeterminate. If even the past is open to being re(con)figured (e.g.,
quantum tunneling; see Barad, 2007) in the present, then what happens
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to the temporal linear causality that WMS relies upon to make knowl-
edge claims? What if time were always already an entangled variable to
account for and be accountable to rather than a control (or controllable
substance)?
This resonates with Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being that recog-
nize that the world itself is in flux and in process such that it might be
more appropriate to state that it is ontologically becoming rather than
being. Such ontological indeterminacy has significant consequences for
pedagogy. For Cajete (1994), “learning involves a transformation that
unfolds through time and space” (p. 54) and that enfolds space and time
(see also Peat, 2002). This is significant as it makes space for a plurality
of ways-of-knowing-in-being to include other ways of enacting tempo-
rality such as Indigenous forms and flows of time such as non-Euclidian
circularity (Cajete, 1994, 2000; Peat, 2002). Also, considerations of time
as enfolded and time as always already more than an inert, immutable,
and linear backdrop upon which nature and culture play-out invites an
ongoing consideration of the ways in which time makes itself intelligible
through its entangled performativity with other agencies. This becomes
all-the-more meaningful when considering the ways in which a future
temporalities are often overcoded by a singularizing (neo-)colonial settler
futurity.
The ways in which multiple space-time-matterings make their presence
known in singular instances in bi-directional causal ways invites us to not
only consider how the past shapes the present and the futures-to-come,
but also how the plurality of undeterminable futures shape the present, as
well as the past. This non-linear causality invites us not only to consider
how we are shaped by potential futures-to-come, but more importantly,
how we are always already ethically bound to these potentialities that we
can never fully come to know. As Cajete (1994) states, “everything leaves
a track, and in the track is the story: the state of being of each thing in
its interaction with everything else” (pp. 55–56). Potential futurities are
always already with/in us. In turn, there is always an ethical hope in the
subversive potentiality of the future as it is always at once yet-to-come
and not-yet-to-come.
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Conclusion: Response-Able Design as a Hospitable
Move Towards Indigenous Science to-Come
The question of hospitality will never come to a close, nor should it –
the moment we consider the problem solved, we arrive at a totalizing
closure…. Hospitality is a productive crisis in which we work constantly
towards reconceptualizing our thinking and reconsidering our values – in
other words, we move beyond the disruptive, hegemonic, and exploitative
exchange paradigm and its priorities towards a new relationship in which
the academy is compelled to recognize and accept its responsibility toward
the “other.” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 163)
The potentiality of deconstructive work lays neither strictly in its ability to
identify the constitutive otherness of concepts, categories, and constructs,
nor in meaning that inevitably ruptures and shifts what science is and
is (not). Rather, the key ongoing possibility towards an engaged act of
account- and response-ability towards constitutive otherness is an ever-
present invitation to reconstruct with that was excluded. In other words,
after Kuokkanen (2007), it is an ongoing call to hospitality, one which
“will never come to a close” (p. 163). As we continue moving towards
curricular and pedagogical practices of science education that productively
and respectfully inhabits the cultural interface between WMS and IWLN,
it is important to remember that pluralism in science education does not
simply imply there are different epistemological means of approaching the
same ontological reality to generate similar results. To this, Latour (1993)
reminds that some epistemological means are nonetheless positioned as
superior to others through particular universalism (some usually being
Western modern epistemologies). As St. Pierre (2011a) suggests:
We move away from Plato’s gift of ontological determination, a logic of
identity [i.e., self-sameness] and prediction – science is this; science is not
that – toward a logic of the “and” – This and this and this and this…
(p. 613, emphasis in original)
We can move away from ontology (as the Being of beings) not through
negation, but as a coming to recognize it as but one ontological possibility
among many. It is for this reason that Barad (2000) claims adaptation
of science education is never simply one of “candy coating” the content
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with relevant material; rather, “questions of relevancy are intertwined with
questions of subjectivity and epistemic responsibility” (p. 222).
However, responsibility and responsiveness are not enough for hospi-
tality to take hold. Rather, responsibility and responsiveness also require
the ability to respond. This insight became the methodological drive
herein via the concepts of the cultural interface (Nakata, 2007a, 2007b)
and, again, response-ability (see Barad, 2010; Kuokkanen, 2007, 2010;
Spivak, 1994). Braiding in Barad’s (2010) conception of response-ability,
as well as the previous deconstructive approaches in previous chapters,
(re)opening the space of response-ability was explored through three
co-constitutive strategies: (a) response-ability as ongoing rupturing; (b)
response-ability as the cross-cutting of topological re(con)figuring; and
(c) response-ability as the iterative reworking of im/possibility. These
three approaches were then leveraged to re(con)figure curriculum and
pedagogy around the central yet conceptually ambiguous node of scien-
tific literacy; a generative snag in the fabric of science education.
Identifying scientific literacy’s necessary yet inadequate, prevalent yet
ambiguous, status within science education made it a rich curricular loca-
tion from which to engage in the work of response-ability. As “learning
and teaching are occurring at all times, at all levels, and in a variety
of situations” (Cajete, 1994, p. 40), science curriculum could be then
re(con)figured with/in the relational ways-of-knowing-in-being that co-
substantiate it. Agential realism and Indigenous science here provide
important insights into the entanglement of knowing and being, as well as
how we might imagine them otherwise in the pursuit of knowing nature
(i.e., scientific literacy).
There are rich points of convergence between Barad’s agential realism
and Cajete’s ecologies of relationships which offer themselves as locations
to labour in the name of hospitality towards Indigenous science to-
come. Namely, both are ways-of-knowing-in-being that are shaped by
ethics, accountability, and responsibility to the (re)generation of that
which we, as humans, co-constitute and are co-constituted by. However,
to only focus on commensurability is to employ the metaphor of the
mirror; commensurability then becomes an act of mirroring sameness
elsewhere, dialectically subsuming into or sublating through sameness
patterns of difference, as well as making it difficult to account for and
be accountable to the enactment of difference. Further, while there
are deep and productive points of resonance between quantum and
Indigenous ontologies, there are still patterns of difference that matter.
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Significantly, where quantum physics is a recent phenomenon in which
WMS is irrevocably facing its ontological limits and limitations (see Barad,
2007, 2010; Peat, 2002), Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being have
been developed, practiced, and honoured since time immemorial with a
built-in ethic of (re)generation and sustainability (see Cajete, 1994; Kawa-
gley, 2006). Constitutive of these ways-of-knowing, and also another
difference that matters, is the relationship to spirituality and more-than-
human beings. Placing the two in relation without conflating them has
great consequences for what scientific literacy is, is not, and, perhaps
most importantly, could be: a site which recognizes that “the question
of hospitality will never come to a close” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 163).
Notes
1. Notably explored herein: (a) enactments of adversarial dialectics that place
science and ethics as binary opposites (see Chapter 3); (b) the mirror
metaphor that comes to mask epistemic and ontological becomings, while
protecting (from) critical engagement (see Chapter 4); as well as (c)
the ways in which “common sense” create a circular logic that comes
to simultaneously uphold and conceal an ontology of Cartesianism and
its inseparable ethical and epistemological assumptions and enactments
(Chapters 5 and 6).
2. Significantly, asking questions of ethics before-the-fact (i.e., what would
be or might be responsible) rather than after-the-fact (i.e., what is or has
been responsible) is in alignment with being accountable to the agential
cuts that we enact (see Chapter 6) and attempts to heed Barad’s (2012a)
cautionary note that the “notion of consequences is [often] based on the
wrong temporality: asking after potential consequences is too little, too
late” (p. 53). To uphold these commitments to ethical questions focus on
pedagogical design, rather than simply or only those of delivery.
Nonetheless, delivery is a component of any curriculum or pedagogy:
the lived enactment of either always exceeds the ways in which they are
planned for (see Aoki, 1991/2005). Part of the challenge is designing
pedagogies that work towards (re)opening spaces that are (fore)closed
so that there may be the possibility of radical hospitality in the lived
encounter.
Furthermore, as explored in Chapter 6, “design” (i.e., research design)
is a notion that is often overcoded by a theory/practice binary (which
is co-constituted with/by a Nature/Culture binary) in which design
often pre-exists practice, rather than always already being entangled
within its production. In turn, this chapter is not about translating
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“theory into practice” (which presupposes separation and separability) but
rather translating the theory-practice of earlier chapters into a differen-
tially contextualized theory-practice (see Higgins, Madden, Berard, Lenz
Kothe, & Nordstrom, 2017).
3. Whereas the refrain of beginning some-where and some-time has been
utilized throughout the book to generally signal the ways in which we are
all always already within the question of Indigeneity and that there are
a multiplicity of spatial and temporal locations to critically inhabit, there
are moments in which right-here, right-now is also a generative point
of engagement that should not be dismissed, particularly if it accounts
for and is accountable to a futurity which cannot yet be anticipated, that
which is to-come.
With respect to higher education generally, Kuokkanen (2007) states,
“if the academy only welcomes what it is ready to welcome – that is, what
it recognizes and what it considers it must welcome – it is not hospi-
tality” (p. 131). Rather, what is needed is an unconditional welcome.
Such an unconditional welcome is not only the possibility of (re)opening
the norms of responsiveness towards a (co-)constitutive yet othered body
of knowledge (here, Indigenous ways-of-living-with Nature), but also
the very possibility of a continued existence: If disciplinary spaces such
as science education profess an “unlimited commitment to the truth”,
(Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 139) it cannot do so without explicitly recognizing
the plurality of ways-of-knowing-in-being and taking seriously what they
have to offer in terms of pursuing truth-finding. Here, the temporality of
a future to-come marks not only an arrival that cannot be predicted (which
will require radical hospitality), but also the temporality of the continued
existence of disciplinary spaces:
The ethics and the future of the academy require hospitality.
Without openness to the “other,” responsibility toward the “other,”
there can be no future of and in the academy. The future of
the university will be found in its openness to the “other.” This
openness will have to involve more than merely opening doors to
[I]ndigenous peoples while dismissing or failing to recognize their
epistemes. (Kuokkanen, 2007, pp. 139–140)
Again, for this work of hospitality to manifest, there is homework to be
done to (re)open spaces foreclosed by epistemic ignorance. The work of
a response in a future-to-come cannot be separated from the homework
of response-ability; in a future-to-come in which homework has been
engaged with, there will be no possibility of disavowal. That part of this
(home)work is coming to know the limits to what is and can be known
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from within our spaces: the threshold of knowledge. As Kuokkanen
(2007) states, “in order to have a future, the academy will have to
acknowledge the threshold; only in this way will it accept its responsibility
and be able to respond” (p. 141). Similarly, within science education,
our ability to respond to Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being shapes our
very ability to have a future: the irreducible link to Indigeneity through its
othering also binds the disciplinary space to what it can be and become.
The homework of response-ability is not only a radical reversal of the
gaze, but also a commitment to the sustaining of a home (and also one
that might be hospitable towards Indigenous science to-come).
4. Recall from Chapter 3, and its cultural homework of response-ability, that
one of the ways in which scientific knowledge could be (re)considered
as a knowledge-practice (among many) was to extend science’s internal
dynamism and heterogeneity outwards by considering the complex and
conflicting ways in which WMS, IWLN, and TEK interact and interface.
As a knowledge-practice, this interface is not a location that simply is but
rather is a doing. It is an enactment that is often marked by the assumption
that cultural traits are separate and separable. This renders invisible: (a)
the many elements of WMS that stem from non-Western cultural sciences
and vice versa, as well as their respective historicities; (b) the complex co-
constitutive and cross-cultural scientific knowledge production processes;
and, (c) the complexities that occur at the currently lived and differently
situated cultural interfaces that both they and their students occupy (see
Belczewski, 2009; Snively & Corsiglia, 2001; van Eijck & Roth, 2009;
see also Kuokkanen, 2007).
5. For Nakata (2007a), this is the work of engaging with Indigenous
standpoint theory ,
a method of inquiry, a process for making more intelligible ‘the
corpus of objectified knowledge about us [Indigenous peoples]’ as
it emerges and organizes understanding of our lived realities. [It
is] theorizing knowledge from a particular and interested position
— not to produce the ‘truth’ of the Indigenous position but to
better reveal the workings of knowledge and how understanding of
Indigenous people is caught up and implicated in its work. (p. 215)
6. McGloin (2009) adds the rejoinder that the labouring of one’s position
vis-à-vis the cultural interface is a task that befits not only Indigenous
peoples as the tensions at the interface affect each and everyone one of us
(as we are always already in relation), albeit differentially. Particularly, she
states that for Western academics and educators, forging a standpoint by
criticaclly engaging with the ways in which the self at the cultural interface
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is produced and producible allows for the possibility of differently inhab-
iting this Indigenous-Western interface that is often characterized by a
unidirectional dialectic negation.
7. Specifically, I argue that the cultural interface is a useful concept for
considering similarly situated research methodologies because the suturing
over at the cultural interface does not only occur on any particular
(human) body but also occurs upon many bodies of knowledge. As these
include bodies of methodological knowledge, the complex and compli-
cating ways in which this over-writing occurs need to be worked within
and against (see also Higgins & Kim, 2019).
8. While not dismissing the importance of finding ways of relating Indige-
nous and Western ways-of-knowing-in-being through complementarity
rather than contradiction (i.e., dialogue), and highlighting the need
for suspended action, Ahenakew (2016) cautions that this “becomes
a problem when we cannot recognize what is lost in translation”
(Ahenakew, p. 333). To animate translation as a significant, yet complex
and complicated node of the cultural interface, Ahenakew (2016) uses the
metaphor of grafting:
Grafting is used in biology as the process of transplanting something
from one organism into another (e.g., hybrid plants or cell/skin
implants). Grafting, in itself, is neither good nor bad. Indeed,
hybridity can be a generative process. However, in the context
of grafting Indigenous knowledges into non-Indigenous ways of
knowing, we are operating with severely uneven environments
shaped by historical circumstances where the grafting/hybridizing
does not happen as a mutual exercise, but as assimilation. Grafting,
in this sense, can further contribute to the elimination of Indige-
nous peoples as distinct Indigenous peoples both in their relation-
ship with the state, in their relation to the land, and in terms of the
perceived worth of their knowledge. (Ahenakew 2016, p. 325)
For example, the presupposition that ontology precedes epistemology
(so that all knowledge claims map onto the same ontological reality)
would act as a form of knowledge-as-ignorance. This would result in an
enactment of “a kind of grafting that seems to maintain primary loyalty
to accepted notions of time, progress, reality, and being” (Ahenakew,
2016, p. 333). In turn, Ahenakew’s (2016) concept of grafting invites
an ongoing rethink(ing) of the very possibility of braiding together these
paradigms with decolonizing goals in mind, without abandoning the
project.
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Rather, there is a need to (at)tend to the graft. Here, the word play
is productive, because not only does Ahenakew invite us to attend to the
ways in which grafting becomes a site in which (neo-)coloniality plays
out, but also signals the ways in which there is simultaneously a tendency
towards these dynamics as well. Importantly, this impossibility does not
let us off the hook (as what becomes possible when we strive towards
the impossible?). Rather, it is a call to be cognizant of “the utilitarian
risk to all-too-quickly instrumentalize and embrace Indigenous research
methodologies as quick-fix solutions to or escapes from deep-rooted and
ongoing (neo)colonial thinking” (Ahenakew, 2016, p. 323).
What would it mean to engage in a less innocent cross-cultural
methodological design that accounted for and was accountable to what
is lost through grafting in science education? Ahenakew (2016) suggests
transforming this impossibility into a generative indeterminacy:
For those of us writing within academia, the first small step we need
to take is to make grafting visible. Making grafting visible means
writing in a way that makes what is invisible noticeably absent so
that it can be remembered and missed. (Ahenakew, p. 333)
It is a call to not make visible that which is absent (and made absent
through colonial logics) but rather make visible its absence so that it
can be missed and remembered, as the attempt to narrativize the un-
narrativizable (within the grammar of Western modernity) only traps us
in positions where we think we have represented but rather we have lost
things in translation. (At)tending to the graft is a form of response-ability
that accounts for and is accountable to the very limits of the systems that
we inherit and inhabit.
9. Partial knowledge does not reduce or dismiss responsibility: all knowings
are partial and contigent. Furthermore, partial knowings are nonetheless
knowings (see Butler, 2005).
10. Further, it bears repeating that they are also not differing cultural articula-
tions of Nature, particularly as this framework almost always becomes what
Latour (1993) refers to as particular universalism: a relativist approach
in which one position (that of Western modernity) comes to be the
(most) correct one from which to observe the phenomena. Further,
it dictates Nature’s operations without Nature’s consent. This matters
greatly in learning (from) Indigenous science: coming-to-know partially
entails learning from what other-than-humans have to teach (e.g., Cajete,
1994, 2000).
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11. Recall from the first chapter that fully embracing incommensurability
brought with it its own set of challenges: the possibility of response
requires a certain commitment to a certain degree of commensurability
(e.g., dialoguing across difference). As Kuokkanen (2007) puts it: “even
if one is sometimes tempted to embrace more pessimistic view that
modern and Indigenous epistemes are incommensurable, the academy
will move forward only by committing itself to responsibility and thus,
responsiveness” (p. 101).
12. Here, the sense of one being too few and two too many is a criticism
of the ways in which Western modern thinking, and even some of its
responses, has a difficult time conceptualizing a response beyond wholistic
one-ness and dichotomous two-ness such that more subtle and nuanced
forms of difference might exist such that multiple partial connections exist
and proliferate.
13. Ongoing rupturing, here, also signals the ways in which deconstruction
happens: the structure under erasure is always already in a state of ongoing
rupturing (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). As such, the structure of science
education cannot and should not be recognized as a closed form whose
knowability precedes rupturing (despite claims otherwise). However, as
with other deconstructive moves which stem from witnessing deconstruc-
tion, it is to pay attention to the deconstructive potentiality of irruptions
as not all irruptive possibilities are desirable and not all are critically gener-
ative. This is why Derrida (1976) reminds us that deconstruction critiques
itself.
14. Recall that is (not) signifies that which is otherwise unintended but
still retains, albeit differently, the structure being critically inhabited (see
Chapter 4).
15. On the subject of relationality, Kirby (2011) reminds us that:
Relationality is not an “in-between” the de-tailing of entities. If
the Earth’s grammar is necessarily internal, a shifting algorithm,
than any “part” of the Earth would be a virtual geometry with
hologrammatic resonance rather than a separated entity, broken off
from its larger and now absent, or perhaps still attached totality.
(p. 39, emphasis in original)
In Quantum Anthropologies, Vicky Kirby (2011) re-reads Derrida’s (1976)
iconic statement that “there is nothing outside the text” (Derrida, 1976,
p. 163) by juxtaposing it to the earlier one that there is “[no] outside of
metaphysics” (Derrida, 1976, p. 19) to consider the ways in which “there
is no outside of Nature” (Kirby, 2011, p. 38). This is of particular signif-
icance within science education where post-structuralism’s primary focus
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on Culture and cultural indetermination have made it such that a too
simple reading of these approaches can be read as a jettisoning of the very
concept of science: knowing nature, as well as knowing Nature (i.e., the
metaphysical relation between space, time, and matter; see Barad, 2011).
This is “not to suggest that we need to ‘get real’ and add Nature’s author-
ship to this strange text as if Culture’s inadequacies might be healed by
a natural supplement” (p. 13). Rather as in the above block quotation
by Kirby, it is to explore a relational conception of the world in which
Derridean relationality does not preclude Nature. By refusing to revert
Nature to a pre-critical status and to consider Nature and Culture as sepa-
rate and separable, Kirby (2011) suggests Nature-Culture as a constitutive
wholeness that never achieves one-ness. From this, relationality emerges
not as the by-product of entities (i.e., de-tailing) but is the always already
active constitution of a co-constitutive part/whole (see also Barad, 2007,
2010; Cajete, 1994; Peat, 2002).
16. As Donald (2012) remarks, because there already exists an Indigenous-
Western relationality which is often but not always marked by coloniality,
there is always the possibility of enacting it anew, differently, with a decol-
onizing ethic. Furthermore, as explored within the previous chapter, even
the “One Truth” of science is inevitably related to the very things that it
oppositionally defines itself against (e.g., Indigenous science, metaphysics).
17. This is not unlike the current geopolitical lines that are entangled with/in
nationhood. These, as Marker (2015) reminds by drawing from Coast
Salish peoples’ navigation of the US–Canada border, are cultural enact-
ments that do not transcend culture but are rather entangled with/in
culture (i.e., Coast Salish people enact a differential spatial enactment
of who they are which exceeds and is exceeded by current geopolitical
conditions).
18. To quickly recap (from Chapter 5), deconstructive tinkering is first and
foremost a process of reversing and (re)opening the engineering/bricolage
binary through: (a) the use of tools otherwise unintended for the task
at hand; (b) using intended tools in ways they were not intended; and
privileging the process over the product as the “product” of knowledge
creation never (fully) comes to be (see Derrida, 1976).
19. While one of the ways in which the deconstruction that is always already
happening can be read is in the inevitable rupturing of any and every
structure, it does not always come to present the norms of power through
which the structure comes to (re)produce itself as a simulacrum of its
former self. Elsewhere (Higgins et al., 2015), I noticed the ways in
which educators who began the inclusion of Indigenous materials in
their teaching practice differently articulated coloniality (e.g., presenting
an image of Indigenous peoples as pan-Indigenous and of a past already
past). Such rearticulates the need to continuously focus on a process as
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opposed to a product (e.g., a “decolonized” curriculum which may come
to mask the ways in which it continues to uphold colonialism; see also
Carter, 2004, 2010).
20. The mirror stage, drawing from Lacanian psycho-analytics, is when the
Imaginary we hold dialectically (in)takes the Real, producing cuts which
prevent the wholly other from being anything more than what can already
be known. This is of particular relevance considering the ways in which
IWLN and TEK are often only considered science when they fit the
criteria of “valid” science (which often happens to be that of WMS).
21. So much so that Holbrook and Rannikmae (2009) go on to state that
despite or because of the prevalence of the term (i.e., scientific literacy),
there are science educators who would prefer the adoption of more
conceptually precise terms in its stead.
22. Davis (2008) makes the case for the popularity and pervasiveness of the
concept of intersectionality in the social sciences.
23. Not only this, but Roth (2003) reminds us that these facts are often but “a
faint and distorted image of scientists’ science”. (p. 10; see also Aikenhead
& Michell, 2011; Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; McComas, 1998). Further-
more, scientific literacy is complicated by the notion that “it is assumed
that it is the scientists’ place to define what should be known in the field.
Why should this be when at other times and places scientists claim a lack
of interest in how science is used and taught?” (Roth, 2003, p. 12; see
also Barad, 2000). The stance of Modest Witness (see Chapter 6) that is
often held by the subject of scientific inquiry is diametrically at odds with
the subject of education to whom they are accountable to(wards).
24. It is not uncommon to see statements like the following: “A common
rationale given for studying science subjects in school is the achieve-
ment of scientific literacy” (Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2007, p. 1347).
However, when the most common understanding of scientific literacy is
“studying science”, such statements achieve a certain circularity (in both
senses) by distributing its collective meaning across its similar yet different
articulations of science-as-usual (Roth, 2003; van Eijck & Roth, 2007).
With respect to circularity, Bang (2018) suggests that scientific literacy
has become so dogmatic that it is not only circular, but also ouroborossi-
fied (in the image of a snake eating its own tail), only accepting to
intake itself in a monstrous cycle of associated with “greed, appetite,
self-destruction, and endlessness” (p. 809) as well as an ahistorical self-
genesis (p. 809). Further, Bang (2018) makes the case that scientific
literacy is an example what Deleuze (1994) refers to as a “dogmatic
image of thought”. In other words, “what has developed sociohistorically
to represent thought and stop people from thinking beyond a sedi-
mented, stagnant, and stratified notion of the ‘actual’” (Bazzul, Wallace,
& Higgins, 2018, p. 824). Resonant with the post-colonial notion of
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foreclosure (e.g., Spivak, 1999), the result of such an image of thought
is that “these unchallenged, basic definitions [of scientific literacy] exist
even in (the most) well-intended science curriculum” (Bazzul et al., 2018,
p. 826).
25. However, even a science-as-usual curriculum fails to achieve one-ness as
it is always already co-constituted by a variety of texts: both intentionally
(e.g., sources) and unintentionally (e.g., the relational act of reading is
inter-textual and brings other texts to bear on the meaning made).
26. Or more appropriately how, as Lenz Taguchi (2010) suggests, theory is
always already entangled within practice (see also Carter, 2010; Spivak,
1988a).
27. It is worth noting that Barad (2007) encourages anthropomorphism (i.e.,
attributing cultural values to otherwise deemed acultural bodies) if it
can be put to the service of working against anthropocentrism (i.e., the
centring of humans).
28. As Cajete (2000) states, Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being entail a
“reciprocal compact of care and responsibility” (p. 183) that is an ongoing
enactment (rather than an ontologically pre-existing quality) that is deeply
creative, co-constitutive, and relational. However, this enactment is not
one that is only human, or necessarily co-constituted with humans:
Creative use of the environment guaranteed its continuity, and
Indigenous peoples understood the importance of allowing their
land its rich life because they believed their land understood the
value of using humans. If humans could use the land, the land
would also use them to enrich it and keep it alive. They and the
place they lived were equal partners in life. (Cajete, 2000, p. 204)
It is one that is also co-constitutively enacted by the various beings,
both other-than-human and more-than-human, which come to inhabit
an ecology of relationships (see also Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Cajete, 1994).
29. As Cajete (2000) suggests, such accounting for and accountability to
the ecology of relationships has much to do with the notion that these
relations are the precondition for Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being
rather than simply a choice that is chosen or taken up by separate and
separable entities:
The land nurtures humans and humans nurture the land, the foun-
dation of a reciprocal compact of care and responsibility, which is
continually reaffirmed through the various expressions of Native
technology. Given this special relationship, the separation of culture
and nature would be considered unnatural. Likewise, the separation
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of humankind from nature and the creation of discrete categories
for viewing nature inherent in [most of] the disciplines of Western
science would be viewed as equally unnatural and arbitrary (p. 183).
Extending this, the Nature/Culture binary is not only a (neo-)colonial
imposition, but furthermore, as mentioned throughout, reading the world
through such a binary fails to account for the ways in which knowing (i.e.,
epistemology) and being (i.e., ontology) are entangled within Indigenous
ways-of-knowing-in-being (Cajete, 2000; see also Apffel-Marglin, 2011;
Bang & Marin, 2015).
30. Castellano (2000) outlines three foundations of Indigenous knowledge:
traditional knowledge (intergenerational), empirical knowledge (gained
through careful observation), and revealed knowledge (acquired through
dreams, visions, and intuitions). To these three Cajete (2009) added a
fourth: modern knowledge. This last foundation involves the participation
in “modern” practices so that it may complement the other founda-
tions. It is important to recall that modernity does not always entail
Western modernity. As scientific and technological products and processes
are taken up, the often-held assumption is that they remain unaffected.
Instead, what traditions these scientific technologies suture over and, more
important, how these technologies are shaped by these traditions should
be considered (see also Harding, 2008; Nakata, 2007a).
31. Importantly, Kuokkanen (2007) suggests that the homework of response-
ability is marked by “more than new pedagogy, although pedagogical
changes would follow as a result” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 153). For
example, these insights were woven into a pedagogical response in the
form of an interdisciplinary curricular inquiry that is beyond the scope
of this book. Named Visually Storying Relationships with Nature, this
was a pedagogical project involved two middle-school classes in an urban
school in Metro Vancouver for a one-month period. It encouraged partic-
ipants not to “read” nature through scientific literacy but rather to narrate
with nature as a form of agential literacy that fostered an ecology of
relationships: producing photography-assisted comic books which told
such relational stories with Nature (see Higgins, 2016a; see also Higgins,
2014b, 2016b).
32. This extends the Butlerian notion that epistemology is always already
performative. Performativity, a persistent theme through Butler’s work,
is the anti-ontological doing and undoing of epistemological categories,
concepts, and conditions such as identity (e.g., Butler, 1990), ethics (e.g.,
Butler, 2005), framings (e.g., Butler, 2010). For Butler, there is no doer
behind the deed or foundational essence behind epistemology, but rather,
knowing and ways-of-knowing are always enactments within a citational
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chain. Barad (2007) extends Butler’s notion of performativity by including
materiality as performative and co-constitutive of discourse.
33. Although, as Barad (2007) reminds us, while everything comes to matter,
not everything matters and comes to matter equally.
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CHAPTER 8
Towards BeingWounded by Thought:
IndigenousMetaphysics Is (Still) Waiting
in theWings of Science Education
Any act of reading is besieged and delivered by the precariousness of
intertextuality. And translation is, after all, one version of intertextual-
ity…. heavy-handedness cannot punctuate an entire text where “penser”
(to think) carries within itself and points at “panser” (to dress a wound);
for does not thinking seek forever to clamp a dressing over the gaping and
violent wound of the impossibility of thought? (Spivak, 1976, p. lxxxvi)
While the purpose of this chapter is to conclude this book, how does one
go about “closing” a book whose primary task is to unsettle the meta-
physics of clôture (i.e., as double(d) closure [verb] and enclosure [noun])?
When “each act of reading the ‘text’ is a preface to the next” (Spivak,
1976, p. xii), a conclusion (as with an introduction; see Chapter 1)
must always be open at both ends, provisional, and contingent as “any
act of reading is besieged and delivered by the precariousness of inter-
textuality” (Spivak, 1976, p. lxxxvi). Translating text into the context of
(a) conclusion does not necessitate its (whole) surrender to the context:
a conclusion remains open to (its own) intertextuality, never (fully)
achieving closure.1
As Spivak (1976) implicitly asks, how could a conclusion ever achieve
closure? The heavy-handedness of the metaphysics of clôture can never
fully foreclose the possibility of thought (penser) that confronts from
outside the concepts, categories, and constructs that we hold and that
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hold us. This confrontation always retains the possibility of rupturing
the clôture of metaphysics, leaving us wounded by thought (see also
Britzman, 2003; Lather, 2007) and (re)opened by that which is to-come.
However, this potential is never fully achieved, “for does not thinking
[(i.e., penser)] seek forever to clamp a dressing over the gaping and
violent wound [(i.e., panser)] of the impossibility of thought” (Spivak,
1976, p. lxxxvi)? In other words, not all thought (re)opens: thought is, at
once, both the possibility of thinking anew and thinking again. As poison
and panacea, it is nonetheless a necessary and unavoidable pharmakon:
“thinking about science is part of doing science” (Barad, 2000, p. 245).
Thinking, both penser and panser, are never disentangled from relation-
ships (e.g., Indigenous science) to-come that vacillate between becoming
and unbecoming, being and non-being beyond the clôture of metaphysics
(see Barad, 2012a).
Again, even if the metaphysics of clôture is totalizing, it is never total-
ized: the possibility of being wounded by thought, such as Indigenous
science to-come, is always already present. Also, such can also be said
for the entangled (neo-)colonial logics by which it is entangled and
(co-)constituted. Importantly, such a radical openness is at the core of
both Indigenous science and quantum mechanics. It is how relationships
are (re)generated through the world’s ongoing becoming (see also Apffel-
Marglin, 2011; Cajete, 1994, 2000; Little Bear, 2016). Further, as Barad
(2012a) states, “ontological indeterminacy , a radical openness, an infinity
of possibilities, is at the core of mattering” (p. 16, emphasis mine), in
both senses of the word (i.e., materializing and coming-to-significance).
Accordingly, Kuokkanen (2007) reminds that disrupting and displacing
the violence of metaphysical clôture as both process and product, as well
as the ontological indeterminacy (rather than epistemological uncertainty;
see Barad, 2011) generated by this task are the necessary conditions for
the spirit of the gift to circulate, for new relations to be formed and
for relations to be formed anew (see also Apffel-Marglin, 2011). For
Kuokkanen (2007), such rupturing is in itself a gift, albeit a difficult
one. As Indigenous science continues to be, in many ways, considered to-
come,2 this book centres the invitation to (re)open the spaces of science
education (through a double(d) inversion of the gaze back onto itself; see
Lather, 2007) so that science education might be wounded by thought
and open(ed) to new and renewed relationships to Indigenous science
(to-come).
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Thus, the task within this conclusion is not to strive for the “rage for
unity” (Spivak, 1976); that is, the tidying up of untimely and disorderly
loose ends to achieve the closure typically presumed of concluding. Rather
than tuck, trim, and tidy away the partially extended relationalities(-to-
come) with which we have journeyed, this chapter is presented as an
open-ended conclusion whose possible possibilities also reside in (and
beyond) what may have been and what may yet be actualized. Towards
this end, this open-ended conclusion explores two parts and processes.
First, I offer a summary and synthesis of the book to highlight the
ways in which Indigenous science is to-come. However, this potentiality
is not transcendental. Rather, it occurs within relationship, where you—
the reader—are entangled (recognizing that the “you” addressed here
is subjectively (un)done in material-discursive relations as the language-
practices you possess also possess you). You are encouraged to pay
attention to the ways in which thought manifested throughout: (How)
Did it wound, allowing for the possibility of Indigenous science to-come (i.e.,
penser)? (How) Did thought work to cover the wound, leaving Indigenous
science as yet-to-come (i.e., panser)?
Second, the notion of being wounded by thought (i.e., penser and
panser) is quickly revisited once more to conclude by turning the message
of Indigenous metaphysics still waiting in the wings of science education
(see Little Bear, 2016) on its head to (re)open this closing with a message
of affirmation.
Summary of the Argument so Far (For Readers
in a Hurry…)3: Mapping Pathways
Travelled upon and Those (yet-)to-Come
Because we must begin some-where and some-time, let’s begin by recap-
ping the central premise of this book4: working towards the radical
potentiality of thinking (penser) Indigenous science within the context of
science education, rather than upholding thinking (panser) that, through
foreclosure, excludes, differs, and defers Indigenous science. This matters
as, currently and often within science education, Indigenous science is
either excluded or included in ways that differ from or defer its intended
meanings, as well as its pedagogical potentiality for all students. As the
goal of science-education-as-usual is to bring students to know what
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scientists know (i.e., scientific facts) or enact how scientists know (i.e.,
scientific methods), science education often continues to naturalize and
normalize the subject position of “scientist” which is emblematic of the
masculine, Eurocentric, and anthropocentric subject of Western moder-
nity. When presented as the (only or most valid) way-of-knowing-Nature,
students’ learnings are perpetually inflected and inflicted by the ways in
which (neo-)colonial logics and Western modern metaphysics (fore)closes
the possibility of being and becoming otherwise. The most signifi-
cant consequence of this is that “school science” potentially produces
experiences of cultural assimilation and acculturation rather than encul-
turation for the vast majority of students (i.e., ~90% of students, see
Aikenhead & Elliot, 2010). However, for students whose daily lived expe-
riences continue to be negatively impacted by Eurocentrism (re)produced
with/in (and beyond) science education, learning with/in the cultural
practice of “school science” largely continues to be a form of epistemic
violence (Bang & Marin, 2015; McKinley, 2001, 2007).
As such, the questions engaged herein are not those of empowering
those excluded from science to participate, particularly if the culture
of science and school science remain unperturbed by the effort. As
Kuokkanen (2007) reminds, such efforts can be “more patronizing than
helpful and… do not lead to any real transformation” (p. 152). Rather,
after Kayumova, McGuire, and Cardello (2019), this book embraces
a recent move in science education “from empowerment to response-
ability” (e.g., de Freitas, Lupinacci, & Pais, 2017; Higgins & Tolbert,
2018; Wallace, Higgins, & Bazzul, 2018). This is particularly signifi-
cant given the stakes: science education makes palatable and possible the
ongoing dispossession and devastation of Indigenous Land, as well as
erasure of Indigenous peoples (Bang & Marin, 2015). One more time:
science education has a responsibility, but is it able to respond?
Towards this end, the central question guiding this entire inquiry has
been how is Indigenous science to-come with/in the context of science educa-
tion? Recall that this central question is understood and has been explored
in through three guiding inflections that are inseparably entangled. First,
to-come continues to signal that Indigenous science, in the context of
science education, has not yet (wholly) arrived. Secondly, to-come signals
ethical indebtedness: How might the structure, culture, and discipline of
science education be (re)opened and re(con)figured to receive Indigenous
science to-come, on its own terms, and in ethical relation? Thirdly, to-come
entails a responsibility (and response-ability) for and towards that which is
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to-come: What types of practices might allow for and nurture the possibility
of Indigenous science to-come?
While Indigenous science is still to-come—in all three inflections—
upon conclusion of this book,5 I continue to be driven by the goal
of exploring what possibilities are made possible through the labour of
attempting to be response-able and accountable (see Barad, 2010) to
Indigenous metaphysics waiting in the wings. As a means of responding
to this guiding question and goal, I translate the pathways6 of science
education journeyed upon in each chapter into the format of a rough
sketch.7 These sketches offer a synthesis of Indigenous science to-come
in one or more of its inflections, as well as an overview of the chapter
contributions to the field of science education. Further, the decon-
structive methodologies employed throughout the book will be revisited
for their significance with respect to the larger project of unsettling
science education.8 As these sketches are enactments, they are mappings
that are meant to invite relation as living, breathing concepts rather
than (re)tracings who are epistemologically and ontologically foreclosed
through representationalism.
Chapter 1: Unsettling Metaphysics in Science Education
The trailhead of this journey introduces and frames the simultaneously
co-constitutive and othering relation between Western modern science
and Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being as it manifests within spaces
of science education. This chapter asks: What does metaphysics (i.e., the
co-constitutive space of epistemology, ontology, ethics, among others) have
to do with science education and the ways in which Indigenous science
remains (yet-)to-come? And provides multiple tools to equip oneself for
the remainder of the journey. Most notably, unsettling science education
is presented as a double(d) approach to address the ways in which settler-
colonial logics linger and lurk within and as sedimented and stratified
knowledge-practices (Bang & Marin, 2015; Bang, Warren, Rosebery, &
Medin, 2012). As a more nascent approach to the question of Indige-
nous science within science education, this work is supplemented by
two larger orientations that address its double(d) meaning. The first
orientation addresses settler colonialism by providing an overview of
similar yet different pathways explored with/in science education: decol-
onizing (e.g., Aikenhead & Elliot, 2010; Chinn, 2007) and post-colonial
(e.g., Carter, 2004; McKinley, 2007) approaches to science education in
response to the metaphysics of modernity. In particular, this overview
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maps the ways in which Eurocentrism operates (e.g., mis- and under-
representation, deficit thinking, universalism) and how decolonizing
and post-colonial science respond through curricular deconstruction
and reconstruction. Accordingly, the second orientation addresses settled
meanings. It unpacks deconstruction (e.g., Spivak, 1976) in relationship
to decolonizing methodologies, as well as decolonizing science educa-
tion, as a (meta-)methodological approach to (re)open the metaphysics
of modernity. Of particular importance to this book is the displacement
and disruption of the self/other, nature/culture, and ethical possi-
bility/impossibility binaries. Importantly, this sets the stage for bearing
witness to the ways in which settler coloniality often manifests as absent
presence and to (re)open the space of response within science education
towards Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being.
While this first chapter’s primary purpose is to provide a general
orientation for the work that is to come within the remainder of the
book, a significant contribution that emerges is (re)positioning decolo-
nizing science education at the ontological turn (e.g., Kayumova et al.,
2019; Higgins & Tolbert, 2018). The critical call to decolonize has been
primarily taken up by extending the openings produced through treating
both science, and science as problematic cultural spaces, to be examined
through socio-cultural approaches (e.g., sociology of science). As cultural
and socio-cultural approaches offer both methodological possibility and
problematic when they interface with the metaphysics of modernity
(see Carter, 2010; Latour, 1993), moving towards ontological plurality9
and deconstructing ontology-as-usual (i.e., Cartesianism) (re)opens the
conversation beyond the question of which epistemology best fits the
ontology of Nature.
While there is no specific deconstructive practice conceptually sketched
out within this chapter, to introduce deconstruction into a field where it is
under-employed and -explored bears significance. In turn, this contributes
specifically to a small yet growing body of research that engages in
(mis)reading science education texts for their settled (neo-)colonial refer-
ents (e.g., Carter, 2004, 2005; McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005). Further,
these insights are employed to frame de/colonizing in a fulsome way
within the field of science education10 to make explicit the ways that
ways in which decolonizing and colonizing discourses cannot be wholly
framed in opposition as they are always already co-constitutive (e.g.,
(neo-)colonial logics even seep into decolonizing efforts).
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Chapter 2: The Homework of Response-Ability in Science Education
Continuing to journey with the insight from the previous chapter that
science education has a responsibility towards Indigenous science (to-
come) as the result of its exclusionary practices rooted in Eurocentrism
and (neo-)colonialism, this chapter engages with the differential ques-
tion of the degree to which science education has the ability to respond
towards Indigenous ways-of-living-with-nature (IWLN) and traditional
ecological knowledge (TEK). Through revisiting a significant personal
pedagogical encounter (see Higgins, 2014), I make the case that having
a responsibility and being able to respond are not one and the same,
particularly when the very systems that exclude Indigenous science (e.g.,
Eurocentrism) (fore)close the ability to respond as well as how we come
to understand responsibility.
Thinking with the work of Sami scholar Rauna Kuokkanen (2007,
2008, 2010), attention is brought to unsettle responsibility: disrupting
and displacing the ways in which responsibility is often and inadvertently
overcoded by the (neo-)colonial logics that it sets out to refuse and resist
as the result of epistemic ignorance.11 Significantly, epistemic ignorance
is not strictly a lack of knowledge—it can also be the result of knowledge
that acts as resistance, which (fore)closes the possibility of knowing other-
wise (Kuokkanen, 2008). For there to be responsibility, there must be an
ability to respond: there is a “homework of response-ability” required to
(re)open the norms of responsiveness towards the possibility of heeding
the call of Indigenous science from within the structure of science educa-
tion (see Kuokkanen, 2007, 2010). The “home” part of homework can
take many meanings: home as cultural, disciplinary, geographical, histor-
ical, epistemological, and ontological, among others. The “work” part
involves coming to understand how these multiple “homes” foreclose the
ability to respond to Indigenous science to-come).
The most significant contribution to science education from this
chapter is the translating of Kuokkanen’s (2007) homework of response-
ability for the context of science education. While it is not new to study
the “home” of this field (be it historical, philosophical, cultural, or other),
Bazzul (2017) suggests that this homework is rarely employed to put
science education back into its contemporary context: “science education
seems to ignore the social, historical, and political realities that give shape
to its practices, knowledges, and literatures” (p. 67). Significantly, the
homework of response-ability is not only a call for engaging with the ways
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in which science education is always already a situated knowledge (see
van Eijck & Roth, 2007), but that its multiple and co-constitutive homes
are rich sites for critical labour, such as (re)opening science education
to Indigenous science to-come. In turn, as many of science education’s
multiple homes are absent presences which are often sedimented and
stratified, as well as locations in which (neo-)colonial referents linger and
lurk, the homework of response-ability is also the primary deconstructive
tool put to work and offered by this chapter to unsettle science education.
Chapter 3: Serious Play: Inflecting the Multicultural Science
Education Debate Through and for (Socratic) Dialogue
Wandering through the pathway(s) presented by the multicultural science
education debate, the most glaring feature of the scholarly literature is
strongly conflicting epistemic demands on “what counts” as science (and
in turn school science curricula) and respectful education within multi-
cultural science education classrooms (see Lewis & Aikenhead, 2001;
McKinley & Stewart, 2012; van Eijck & Roth, 2007). At stake is the
inclusion of TEK and IWLN alongside WMS. This highly contested
commitment and practice nearly (wholly) polarizes the field, resulting in
two seemingly diametrically opposed positions. Cross-culturalists advocate
for the inclusion of TEK and IWLN on the basis that they are equally (but
not similarly) valid; universalists do not consider these placed-based ways-
of-knowing- nature as equally valid to the “universal” standard of WMS.
These positions directly impact conceptions and enactments of respecting
and including diverse knowledge traditions that students bring and, in
turn, students themselves.
Mapping the contours of the path, the culture of the debate can
be said to deploy both dialectic negation (see Bohm, 1996), as well as
adversariality (as method; see Moulton, 1983). This regularly brings the
potentiality and possibility of creative movement through the field of
science education to a viscous stasis, although never achieving a grinding
halt. On this note, Southerland (2000) commented early on that the
multicultural science education debate was, “generating a lot of heat, but
very little light” (p. 289). While the critical task of addressing conflicting
values “head on” is a one of necessity and importance, the literature
seems to indicate that changes through current modes of engagement
have been, and continue to be, slow and partial. This invites an important
question that is revisited in many ways throughout the book: How might
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coming at these issues of metaphysical closure and seemingly sedimented
knowledge-practices sideways and obliquely provide new (re)openings?
A central contribution to science education that is produced through
this chapter is (re)considering the multicultural science education debate
obliquely through its antagonism. While I am not the first and likely
will not be the last to consider the antagonistic nature of the multi-
cultural science education debate (e.g., McKinley & Stewart, 2012; van
Eijck & Roth, 2007), putting theories, strategies, and practices of conflict
resolution to work are notable (e.g., dialogue; see Bohm, 1996). A multi-
plicity of tools, practices, and considerations are provided for attending
to, and reconfiguring, the (re)production of adversariality. These include
consideration of meaning-making as relational and embodied (e.g., paying
attention to emotions and physical responses as indicators of the move-
ment of thought), as well as seeking out shared meanings as productive
pathways and paths of lesser resistance. Examples of shared meanings
sought in Chapter 3 include knowledge as knowledge-practice (van Eick
& Roth, 2007); and knowledge-practices as epistemologically situated
(van Eick & Roth, 2007), ontologically situated (Cobern & Loving,
2008), and culturally hybrid (van Eijck & Roth, 2009).
The deconstructive tool put to work within Chapter 3 was the play of
(re)signification. As the first of many deconstructive strategies employed
and leveraged throughout this book, the play of (re)signification invites
the reader to consider the ways in which textual realism (i.e., representa-
tional fidelity; see Carter, 2004) is a cultural myth that diverts and at times
disallows the wandering of the pathways of science education otherwise.
Chapter 4: Mirrors, Prisms, and Diffraction Gratings: Placing
the Optics of the Critical Gaze in Science Education Under Erasure
(After the Critique of Critique)
Following the orientation provided by the trailhead of Chapters 3 and
4 asks if the metaphors through which the field of science education
critically engages are (re)shaping the possible pathways for, and ways-
of-navigating, inclusion of Indigenous science. (Re)considering critique
within this chapter began with the notion that critique—the conventional
mode through which the culture of dominance (e.g., Eurocentrism)
within science education is challenged—has run out of steam (Latour,
2004a). As Latour (2004a) states, the very tools employed by critics
have been appropriated by those who have been and continue to be its
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intended targets. As such, critique is easily reversed and brought to a
standstill (as evidenced within Chapter 3). Thus, critique becomes protec-
tive (of positions, concepts, and categories) rather than productive (in
seeking shared meanings) (see Spivak, 1976), unfortunately contributing
to the (re)production of Indigenous science as yet-to-come within science
education (see McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005; see also Kuokkanen, 2007;
Spivak, 1994).
Critique (in the conventional sense) is meant to (re)open possibilities
for knowing and being otherwise. However, it presents itself as already
prescriptive as a result of proposing particular ways of navigating its path-
ways. Such operationalization of critique enacts and upholds the very
metaphysical structures worked against within this book. Critique-as-usual
(re)naturalizes many of the tools and strategies of (neo-)colonization
and clôture (e.g., distance, separation, hierarchy, sameness/difference).
Nonetheless, critique should not, and cannot, be dismissed. Its role
continues to be central and critical in terms of (re)opening possibilities
for Indigenous science to-come.
Considering critical engagement as epistemologically situated and
metaphorically mediated allowed for the possibility of it to become other-
wise. Approaching conventional critique as mirrored correspondence (see
Barad, 2012b; Latour, 2004a) opened up space to differently journey the
path of critique. This entailed contemplating optical metaphors whose
differential metaphysics might allow: (a) Indigenous science (to-come) to
be more intelligible from within spaces of science education; (b) for the
potential to reveal, as well as displace, (neo-)colonial structures and strate-
gies that (re) centre WMS (both implicitly and explicitly); and, (c) for the
production of differential modes of critique that might be more produc-
tive in being response-able and accountable towards Indigenous science
to-come.
Through deconstructive (mis)reading, what science education is (e.g.,
critique as mirrored correspondence) was substituted with what it is (not)
(e.g., Foucaultian prismaticity, Baradian diffraction). Such deconstruction
works to displace and disrupt, all the while upholding the structure one
is working within. The re(con)figured practices of critique (i.e., prism
and diffraction grating) differentially reveal otherwise taken-for-granted
concepts, categories, knowings, and beings operating with/in multi-
cultural science education.12 These optical metaphors present unique
contributions to the field. As Bazzul and Carter (2018) state in their liter-
ature review of Foucaultian application in science education, there are but
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a few examples of Foucaultian critique within science education in general
and, I would suggest, much less with respect to the particular context of
Indigenous science. Inclusion of diffraction grating as critical metaphor
is all-the-rarer as Barad’s (2012b) articulation of diffraction as critique is
but recent, and the ontological turn only beginning to bear upon science
education (see Milne & Scantlebury, 2019).
Chapter 5: Tinkering with/in the Multicultural Science Education
Debate: Towards Positing an(Other) Ontology
The continued excursion through science education presented with/in
Chapter 4 entails wandering the pathways of multicultural science askew
and obliquely by considering uncommonly considered, but ever-present,
ontology. Journeying with insights garnered from the previous chapters
reveals that ontology as singular, naturalized, and taken-for-granted
comes to bear on the ways in which Indigenous science is to-come. In
short, ontology at once acts as the handmaiden of Eurocentric and
the (cultural) meter stick through which epistemological realism (i.e.,
the epistemology of WMS) is upheld and (re) centred. Here, Cobern
and Loving’s (2008) call for ontological situatedness as a means of
resolving the multicultural science education debate simply displaces the
terms (e.g., presenting WMS as universal) rather than disrupting them:
alignment assumes and presupposes separation and separability, as well as
requires mirrored correspondence (extending Chapter 3’s metaphor of
the critical mirror).
By extending critical alternatives from the previous chapter, science
education is (re)opened to a differential consideration of ontology. They
include: (a) ontology as plural rather than singular; (b) ontology as
a metaphysical choice rather than pre-supposed; and (c) the situation
where the aforementioned ontological conditions are cuts one colludes
in making, and such metaphysical choosing (re)opens ontological agency
to one’s (distributed) ethical responsibility (see Barad, 2007). This invites
the positing of an ontology and may begin by naming ontology, and
produce movement towards accounting for and being accountable to
what is produced and producible within the (never-fully-stable) ontology
of teaching, learning, and meaning-making with/in science education.
The deconstructive practice of tinkering (i.e., using tools intended for
other tasks) utilized in Chapter 5 invites the reader to pay attention to
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the ways in which the ends and the means never fully coincide. One
such consideration that is noteworthy is how tinkering asks for atten-
tion to practice, particularly those that get labelled as non-practices (see
Spivak, 1976, 1988, 1993/2009). A highly significant example here is
the enactment of ontology as practice (see Barad, 2007, 2010; Cajete,
1994, 2000), rather than pre-supposed.
Chapter 6: Positing Cartesianism as an Ontology Within Science
Education: Towards a More Response-Able Inheritance with Dr.
Frédérique Apffel-Marglin
Chapter 6 extends the wanderings presented in Chapter 5 through
continuing the work of tinkering within what it means to posit an
ontology. Particularly, it explores what it might mean to position Carte-
sianism—the ontology of WMS—as an ontology in order to account
for and be accountable to what it produces and makes producible. A
series of expert interviews with Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin reveals that
Cartesianism came to be operationalized in sixteenth and seventeenth
century modern Europe as the result of a confluence of inseparable forces:
economy, geography, military, politics, religion, as well as science. These
inseperable forces come to constitute a metaphysics of clôture which,
there-then, created multiple forms of separation and separability. Notably,
for the status of Indigenous science to-come, is the separation (and
distance) produced between people who worked the land as knowledge-
practice, from the land (i.e., the commons) and the knowledge-practices
that were enacted through the spatial-economic practice of the enclo-
sure (see Apffel-Marglin, 2011). Furthermore, through the birth of
the laboratory and its associated technologies (e.g., modest witness in
concert with other forces), science comes to be constructed as a-cultural
and a-political, etc; it appears to transcend bias. Considering diffraction
invites attention to the ways in which these there-thens transposed into
here-nows, as well as the (neo-)colonial knowledge-practices through
which this multiplicity of entangled knowledge-practices have been
diffused and distributed (see Battiste, 2005; Blaut, 1993; Spivak, 1999).
While the contributions of this chapter are multiple given Dr. Apffel-
Marglin’s expertise on the “birth of modernity”, as well as why the
metaphysics of modernity is a significant location to labour in accounting
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for and being accountable to Indigenous science to-come, I wish to high-
light two orientations to decolonizing and post-colonial science education
that diffractively emerge from this series of expert interviews. The first is
the importance of privileging transdisciplinarity (see also Battiste, 2013;
Smith, Maxwell, Puke, & Temara, 2016). Science, science education,
and Indigenous science (to-come) are irreducible, always failing to fit
within a single discipline. While this is a well-recognized quality of
Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being (e.g., Battiste, 2013; Cajete, 2000;
Smith, 1999/2012; Smith et al., 2016), science and science education are
more likely to be framed with/in disciplinary logics (as a form of disci-
pline, through the logics of self-sameness and not-otherness). Remaining
open to knowledge outside of one’s disciplinary tradition is not only an
ethical move, but it is also one that is productive as knowledge-practice
(see Bazzul & Carter, 2018). To follow the lived life of concepts and
categories into other spaces allows one to consider their differential being
and becoming (e.g., Battiste, Bell, Findlay, Findlay, & Henderson, 2005).
Tinkering, as leveraging the un/common, is a remarkable practice of
pursuing this productive supplement.
The second orientation, related to the productive supplementarity of
transdisciplinarity, is considering the multiplicity of ways in which the
metaphysics of individualism work to separate and make separable ecolo-
gies of relationships, as well as the ways in which they (inseparably)
complement one another. One of the ways that this can be put into prac-
tice is, as signalled on the first page of the introduction, by considering
entanglements and ecologies of relationships as extending beyond a here-
now to a multiplicity of there-thens. In turn, the move towards Indigenous
science to-come cannot and should not be considered a response to
curricular place-less-ness, but rather place-full-ness. While place may not
considered through an Indigenous sense of place, or even actively consid-
ered at all, place (i.e., proximal Nature-Culture, space-time-mattering) is
never absent: place has its own agency that always comes to bear (see
Barad, 2010; Cajete, 2000). The question of place becomes which place
comes to bear (as well as when, where, and how)? As demonstrated
within Chapter 6 (and introduced in Chapter 3), dominant conceptions
of knowing Nature cannot be so easily disentangled from a laboratory
there-then, which always already comes to bear on a here-now. To (too
easily) suggest a conception of place without attending to the ways in
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which Nature-Culture already comes to manifest runs the risk of masking
the workings of power (see McKinley, 2001).
While there are a few deconstructive tools put to work within this
chapter above and beyond tinkering, diffraction as methodology is worth
highlighting. As means of “reading insights through one another” (Barad,
2007, p. 30) to account for and be accountable to patterns of differ-
ence that are produced, diffraction was an invaluable tool to reveal the
ways in which seemingly disparate historicities are always already entan-
gled within contemporary science education: it is to do the (home)work
of inheritance (see Barad, 2010; Derrida, 1994/2006). Again, this
bears significance as concepts and practices from the ontological turn,
particularly those that are methodological rather than substantive, are
only beginning to gain traction within science education (see Milne &
Scantlebury, 2019).
Chapter 7: Response-Ability Revisited: Towards Re(con)figuring
Scientific Literacy
As the logics through which the metaphysics of modernity are
(re)produced are circular, walking the pathways of science education may
often feel as though it is a form of déjà-vu—although what seems as
sameness is always already differential. In turn, breaking from modernist
orbits requires sustained and focused efforts to work against slippage
into processes through which (neo-)coloniality is maintained (e.g., the
dialectic negation of othernesss). Nakata’s (2007a, 2007b) concept of the
cultural interface provides a rich lived-conceptual location from which to
consider the multiplicity of conflicting, contradictory, and co-constitutive
interactions that occur between Indigenous metaphysics and the meta-
physics of modernity. While such circularity is a boon, it is also a gift:
resistance to dominance can happen in (almost) any location through
which power circulates. This is, of course, with the cautionary note that
not all locations are equally productive, and that some locations are a
privilege to inhabit even if inhabitation is critical (see Spivak, 1988).
Furthermore, not all locations are equally pliable and pry-able.
To be responsible for the complex nature of the culture interface,
one needs to be able to respond, to be response-able (see Kuokkanen,
2007; Spivak, 1994). However, to be able to respond to that which is
to-come requires that one be able to respond to that which one does not
already know (Barad, 2010). Stated otherwise, one must be wounded
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by (the impossible) thought (i.e., penser) and forego the urge to clamp
a dressing over the wound (i.e., panser). To work the possibility of
getting lost beyond the circularity of the pathways of science and to
be wounded by thought, I targeted a location that is central to science
education; one which displayed indeterminacy, thus making them pliable
and pry-able and open to response-ability as deconstruction: scientific
literacy. Significantly, scientific literacy is a sedimented location which
(re)produces settler colonialism (see Sammel, 2009): unsettling is indis-
pensable. (Re)opening scientific literacy to other possibilities of “literacy”
that work towards plurality and dialogue (i.e., not needing to negate other
forms, but rather to situate them): agential literacy and ecologies of rela-
tionships (i.e., an Indigenous “sense of place”). Both of these productive
(mis)readings allow for the possibility of responding to forms of Indige-
nous science that are often to-come: community as more than a collection
of individuals (which extends beyond humans), other-than-human agency,
and non-linear temporalities (see Cajete, 1994, 2000).
The primary deconstructive tool employed within this chapter is
response-able reconstruction, which takes seriously the notion that decon-
struction and reconstruction are neither separate nor separable (see
Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). Rather, drawing from Barad (2010), response-
able reconstruction is a recursive, iterative, and co-constitutive process
which stems from the possibilities that arise from the relationality between
the two. Notably, it is a practice of re(con)figuring which can productively
leverage the openings generated by homework of response-ability towards
enacting science education otherwise.
An Open-Ended Conclusion: Indigenous
Metaphysics Is (Still) Waiting
in the Wings of Science Education
This book is now reaching its close. Indigenous metaphysics is still
waiting in the wings of science education, and is neither wholly nor
hospitably received on the main stage of science education. Nonetheless, I
conclude with a message of affirmation. What appears as a partial absence
is not lack, a mere criticism, nor a critical negation. Rather, it is a potential
relationality, a co-constitutive moment, and movement to-come.
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As Barad (2012a) suggests us in What is the measure of nothingness?,
even nothingness is itself is a doing that is rife with possibility and poten-
tiality. This is even the case for what is classically understood as “pure”
nothingness: the vacuum of space. As she states,
From the point of view of classical physics, the vacuum has no matter and
no energy. But the quantum principle of ontological indeterminacy calls the
existence of such a zero-energy, zero-matter state into question, or rather,
makes it into a question with no decidable answer. Not a settled matter,
or rather, no matter. And if the energy of the vacuum is not determinably
zero, it isn’t determinably empty. (Barad, 2012a, pp. 8–9)
Rather than this determinability being a question of epistemological
uncertainty, it is one of ontological indeterminacy, “the indeterminacy of
being/non-being, a ghostly non/existence” (Barad, 2012a, p. 12, emphasis
in original). Even the smallest of particles vacillates between being a some-
thing and a nothing. It is rife with potentiality as it is never “just itself”;
it is co-constituted and co-constituting a plurality of other particles and
particles-to-come. As she states, “even the smallest bits of matter are an
enormous multitude. Each ‘individual’ is more up of all possible histo-
ries of virtual intra-actions with all Others. Indeterminacy is an un/doing
of identity that unsettles the very foundation of non/being” (p. 15).
This has consequences for ethics (as co-constituted by epistemology and
ontology, of course): “individuals are infinitely indebted to all Others,
where indebtedness is not about a debt that follows or results from a
trans/action, but rather, a debt that is the condition of possibility of
giving/receiving” (pp. 15–16).
As Indigenous science already displays and has always deployed “inge-
nuity, creativity, resourcefulness, and ability of people to learn and to
teach a harmonious way of existence with Nature” (Cajete, 2000, p. 78),
the possibility of hospitably receiving Indigenous science is not only an
ethical call; science education can learn much from Indigenous ways-of-
knowing-in-being and its practices of relational balance, (re)generation,
and renewal. Thus, wandering the pathways of science education to heed
the call of Indigenous science to-come matters even if it is but a possible
possibility: “matter is never a settled matter. It is always already radically
open” (Barad, 2012a, p. 16, emphasis mine). Nature (i.e., space, time,
matter) is and was never fully totalized within (neo-)coloniality. It is with
hope and affirmation that I end: Indigenous science is still yet-to-come.13
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Notes
1. In other words, the task of a conclusion is “daring to repeat the book and
reconstitute it in another register” (Spivak, 1976, p. xii); it is an audacious
yet impossible act of translation. As Derrida (1976) reminds more gener-
ally, translation is never fully achieved or achievable: meaning is always
differed and deferred. Just as there is no originary text there can also
be no terminal form of textuality; “there is no exception to this rule”
(Spivak, 1976, p. xii), even when presented otherwise. Importantly, this
perpetual (re)opening relates explicitly to questions of science education’s
ability to receive Indigenous science to-come on its own terms: “the ques-
tion of hospitality begins with the question of translation” (Kuokkanen,
2007, p. 137). Importantly, translation is both possibility and problematic:
it is at once the grounds for dialoguing across difference and, yet, “hospi-
tality is not possible when the guest is required to speak the language of
the host” (Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 76). This becomes all-the-more signif-
icant when the (neo-)colonial demands of translation make it such that
the effort of putting knowledge-practices into relation (re)produces the
erasure of Indigenous peoples, places, and practices. Accordingly, there
remains the need to be hyper-vigilant in the work of leveraging the
productive im/possibilities of translation in creating spaces of dialogue
between Indigenous science to-come and WMS within science education
(see also Ahenakew, 2016; Higgins & Kim, 2019).
2. It bears repeating: the notion of to-come says more about the inhos-
pitability of science education than the ways in which Indigenous peoples
have been practicing ways-of-living-with-Nature since time immemorial.
This is to say that Indigenous science remains “waiting in the wings” of
science education.
3. A conclusion is conventionally (and often conveniently) the end or
finish of a given task, event, or process: it often synthesizes what has
already come. While conclusions hold the potentiality for a differential
engagement with that which has preceded it, they can also work to
(fore)close the possible possibilities of meaning-making. In turn, I borrow
Latour’s (2004b) cheeky formulation of a conclusion as a “summary of
the argument (for readers in a hurry…)” (p. 231). While conclusions
hold the potentiality for a differential engagement with that which has
preceded it, they can also work to (fore)close the possible possibilities of
meaning-making.
However, given the contemporary pressures of educational institutions
which are often busy by design (and all-the-more-so for those who individ-
ually do the work of being the bridge over the gaping disjuncture between
commitments to diversity and how inclusion is enacted), the above is not
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an individual(istic) admonition. Rather it is an invitation: as the tempo-
rality of reading and writing is forever askew (see Spivak, 1976), it is an
invitation to work backwards and outwards to the texts most relevant and
pressing.
4. One final time (for those reading from front-to-back), the mantra of
beginning some-where and some-time is not only a persistent reminder
that we are always already within the question of Indigeneity within
science education, but also an invitation to address it as such. To “begin”
as if nothing has been done is a form of know-nothing-ism which serves to
mask power with innocence, and obscures: (a) the multiple and ongoing
responses articulated and practiced within science education for the last
few decades; (b) that Indigenous peoples are the most researched peoples
in the world; and, (c) that science’s Othering of (and, in turn, co-
constitution by) Indigeneity irreducibly places the two in relation of
obligation. This is to state that science education has a responsibility:
one that is to the Other rather than for the Other. The distinction here
is not semantic: a responsibility to is to be accountable and answerable to
the ways in which Othering has occurred, rather than enacting a form of
responsibility-as-usual which leaves (neo-)colonial forms of power strati-
fied and sedimented (see McKinley, 2001). Hence the question: science
education has a response-ability, but is it able to respond?
For readers beginning at the end, Kuokkanen (2007) suggests that
there is homework to be done:
The academic responsibility for doing homework on [I]ndigenous
epistemes must begin at an even more elemental level than exam-
ining one’s beliefs, biases, and assumptions. It must start with the
acknowledgement that the “[I]ndigenous” exists, be it in terms of
peoples, their epistemes, or how they have been configured in the
geopolitical past and present. (p. 115)
(Re)opening responsiveness requires doing a creative excavation of the
multiple ways in which the home of science education (e.g., cultural,
disciplinary, geographic, historical) differs and defers the possibility of
hospitably receiving Indigenous science. However, as Kuokkanen (2007)
emphasizes, this critical and creative work can only begin once we
have accepted the existence of Indigenous science or ways-of-living-with
Nature.
5. It can be, and has been stated that the possibility for Indigenous science
to (wholly) arrive on its own terms and in ethical relation is an impossible
possibility in this contemporary moment (see Carter, 2004; McKinley &
Aikenhead, 2005).
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6. After Cajete (1994), we are encouraged to (re)consider science education
as a journeying of pathways. This is subtle deconstructive prompt that
is significant in three major ways. First, it addresses the (neo-)colonial
desire for representation: what might appear as a sedimented and stratified
path is inseparable from its enactment, its journeying, its way. Secondly,
journeying the path denaturalizes it as it is and can never be the same
times: a pathway of science education comes to reveal itself as but a path,
(re)opening up a multiplicity of ethical possibilities. Lastly, such tactical
insights provide direction for strategically straying off the beaten path or
taking the pathway in unintended ways to lose sight of the prescriptive
and often problematic ways in which the path is regularly travelled.
7. This partial account is not only a textual strategy to present future orien-
tations and possibilities offered by the work within this book, but also
whose incompleteness is meant as gift: presenting an account rather than
the account invites orientations to continue wandering the pathways of
science education rather than destinations which one accepts or rejects
(i.e., science is or is not this).
8. The significance of deconstruction in science education cannot be under-
stated. It is a form of methodological engagement that allows for the
possibility of (re)opening science education towards Indigenous science
to-come by identifying and tinkering with/in the structure of education,
between what it is, is not, and could be(come); as well as (mis)reading
science education for its subtle and lingering (neo-)colonial referents and
enactments. Despite its significance, deconstruction is rarely seen at this
intersection, despite calls for its use in science education (e.g., Carter,
2004; McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005), science studies (e.g., Barad, 2010;
Latour, 1993), as well as in spaces of Indigenous education that overlap
with decolonizing and post-colonial science education (e.g., Battiste,
2013; Cajete, 1994; Donald, 2012).
9. Significantly, as there has been much learned from approaches that dili-
gently study and critically interrogate the culture of science and school
science, moving towards ontological plurality does not require the doing
away of culture, nor its politics.
10. Notably, this framing significantly extends de/colonizing’s introduction
elsewhere for science education (i.e., Higgins, 2014), and situates it
within a larger conversation which was already ongoing (e.g., Rhee &
Subreenduth, 2006) and provides a richer theoretical context between
the decolonizing and post-colonial theories that inform it.
11. For example, the taken-for-granted Western notion of responsibility
doubly individualizes responsibility by making responsibility an individual
affair and rendering the individual the adjudicator of whether responsible
336 M. HIGGINS
action has occurred or not. Such becomes problematic when epistemic
ignorance renders the possibility of accounting for and being accountable
to one’s own actions murky and diffuse (i.e., individuals who perceive
their actions as not being oppressive are often also the final arbiter of
such within conventional notions of responsibility; see Kuokkanen, 2007).
In turn, unsettling response-ability entails decentering the individualistic
subject of responsibility to engage with the larger questions of how this
“I” is shaped (i.e., the homework of response-ability). Moving beyond the
“I” as the ethical subject means considering the ability to respond as being
more than an individual affair (without excusing the “I” from responsi-
bility): responsibility must be more than a self-accounting for individually
doing or having done the right thing.
12. Furthermore, such metaphors invite a critical suspension (see Bohm,
1996; Foucault, 1997). As some of the issues facing the place of Indige-
nous science within school-based science education has been differentially
(re)produced for decades now (McKinley & Stewart, 2012), it may be
worth considering momentary suspension towards displacing (rather than
attempting the impossible and never achieved destruction) of dominant
logics (despite seeming counter-intuitive to pause amidst this critical
contemporary moment in which Indigenous science is yet-to-come) (see
also Patel, 2016; Stengers, 2018).
13. As this conclusion, like all conclusions, is always already an introduction,
a supplement that escapes the structure which may be unintelligible as
such and yet-to-come, I subtly offer an invitation here, in the margins.
As Derrida (1976) suggests, “thought is … the blank part of the text”
(Derrida, 1976, p. 93, emphasis in original); this “closing” is also an
opening. You are invited to critically create conditions for students and for
yourself to pedagogically be wounded by thought (i.e., penser): to think
Nature beyond the metaphysics of modernity through which the wound
of knowing nature is bandaged closed (i.e., panser). However, it bears
repeating one last time that one cannot be wounded by thought (penser)
if the wound is already (ad)dressed (panser): responding to world beyond
oneself requires that the world not be (fore)closed prior its encounter (see
also Spivak, 1999). To engage in the homework of response-ability is to
engage in the necessary (re)opening the possibility of being wounded by
thought by addressing the ways in which the multiplicity of “home” in
homework is (fore)closed to its (co-)constitutive otherness. All of this, to
engage with and tell stories that Nature (i.e., space, time, matter) might
tell (with) us as a community of learners, were we able to listen anew
through different attunement (see Barad, 2007; Cajete, 2015).
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